{"@context":"http://iiif.io/api/presentation/3/context.json","id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/iiif/k06ww77972/manifest","type":"Manifest","label":{"en":["Singapore Lecture, October 30, 1981 and television studio discussion, November 1, 1981, 1981"]},"logo":"https://d9jk7wjtjpu5g.cloudfront.net/organizations/logo_images/000/000/013/original/yale-blue.png?1678220072","metadata":[{"label":{"en":["Identifier"]},"value":{"en":["mssa.ms.1981 (EAD ID)","MS 1981  (Call Number)","ms_1981_s07_b0904.u.mov (Digital Object ID)"]}},{"label":{"en":["Format"]},"value":{"en":["videocassettes_(vhs)"]}},{"label":{"en":["Date"]},"value":{"en":["1981 (Creation)"]}},{"label":{"en":["Description"]},"value":{"en":["https://preservica.library.yale.edu/explorer/explorer.html#prop:4\u0026amp;baaec020-690e-476d-9332-32a2dc83127e (Other Finding Aid Note)"]}},{"label":{"en":["Language"]},"value":{"en":[]}},{"label":{"en":["Rights Statement"]},"value":{"en":["The materials are open for research.","Researchers must register and agree to the Yale University Library User Agreement for Special Collections before accessing audiovisual material in this collection."]}},{"label":{"en":["Publisher"]},"value":{"en":["Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library."]}},{"label":{"en":["Source Metadata URI"]},"value":{"en":["https://archives.yale.edu/repositories/12/archival_objects/2076689"]}},{"label":{"en":["Preferred Citation"]},"value":{"en":["Singapore Lecture, October 30, 1981 and television studio discussion, November 1, 1981, 1981. Henry A. Kissinger Papers, Part II (MS 1981). Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library. https://archives.yale.edu/repositories/12/resources/5211."]}}],"summary":{"en":["https://preservica.library.yale.edu/explorer/explorer.html#prop:4\u0026baaec020-690e-476d-9332-32a2dc83127e"]},"requiredStatement":{"label":{"en":["Attribution"]},"value":{"en":["The materials are open for research.","Researchers must register and agree to the Yale University Library User Agreement for Special Collections before accessing audiovisual material in this collection."]}},"provider":[{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/aboutus","type":"Agent","label":{"en":["Manuscripts and Archives Yale University Library"]},"homepage":[{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/","type":"Text","label":{"en":["Manuscripts and Archives Yale University Library"]},"format":"text/html"}],"logo":[{"id":"https://d9jk7wjtjpu5g.cloudfront.net/organizations/logo_images/000/000/013/original/yale-blue.png?1678220072","type":"Image"}]}],"thumbnail":[{"id":"https://d9jk7wjtjpu5g.cloudfront.net/collection_resource_files/thumbnails/000/072/919/small/open-uri20200228-764-1bsa6lz_1582903145.jpg?1582885146","type":"Image","format":"image/jpeg"}],"items":[{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919","type":"Canvas","label":{"en":["Media File 1 of 1 - open-uri20200228-764-1bsa6lz.mov"]},"duration":9059.52,"width":640,"height":360,"thumbnail":[{"id":"https://d9jk7wjtjpu5g.cloudfront.net/collection_resource_files/thumbnails/000/072/919/small/open-uri20200228-764-1bsa6lz_1582903145.jpg?1582885146","type":"Image","format":"image/jpeg"}],"items":[{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/content/1","type":"AnnotationPage","items":[{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/content/1/annotation/1","type":"Annotation","motivation":"painting","body":{"id":"https://aviary-p-yalemssa.s3.wasabisys.com/collection_resource_files/resource_files/000/072/919/original/open-uri20200228-764-1bsa6lz.mov?1582885145","type":"Video","format":"video/mp4","duration":9059.52,"width":640,"height":360},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919","metadata":[]}]}],"annotations":[{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752","type":"AnnotationPage","label":{"en":["ms_1981_s07_b0904_transcript.txt [Transcript]"]},"items":[{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/1","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\u003e\u003e [SOUND]\n\u003e\u003e [APPLAUSE]\n\u003e\u003e Dr Kissinger Ladies and gentlemen, welcome to the 1981 Singapore lecture. The first Singapore lecture inaugurated last year by professor Friedman. Doubt with finding solutions to economic problems which even the mythological invisible hand appears unable to guide in the desired direction. Our speaker tonight Doctor Henry Kissinger will deal with error of facet of the world crisis, the disarray, and the conduct of international relations.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=0.0,89.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/2","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nSince international economics and politics are interrelated problems what Dr Kissinger has to say tonight will, I'm sure, bring illumination to the more fundamental source of the crisis which permeates almost all aspects of modern life. The title of Dr. Kissinger's talk suggest a presentation of American foreign policy not from a national but from a global point of view.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=89.0,134.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/3","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nHis title confirms my belief, that a global power, like the United States, cannot limit itself to a foreign policy founded only on national interest. Though many American politicians talk as though that were the case. However, Dr Kissinger is an exception. As Secretary of State, he more than his predecessors, consciously and deliberately directed his countries foreign policy more in the European tradition than the American tradition.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=134.0,191.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/4","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd this more than his personal style of diplomacy is what made him so controversial a figure in his own country. It is my impression, that as Secretary of State he better understood precisely for this reason that he owe us better, he owe us better understood precisely for this reason by his ideological adversaries in the Soviet Union, in China, and even in The Middle East.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=191.0,234.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/5","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThey may not have appreciated his precise and disconsulting moves he made in the power game from time to time. But they knew that he was playing chess and not checkers. And in the dangerous game of power politics where calculated risks have to be taken in diplomacy, it is very important for adversaries to know whether chess or checkers is being played.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=234.0,278.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/6","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nDr. Kissinger's topic is a crucial interest to non communist countries like Singapore because our future. Regardless of whether we find the Americans lovable or not, will depend on whether the United States, or the Soviet Union wins the ongoing contest for leadership, in world economy and world politics. The outcome of this contest between the two will be decided not in some remote future, but in the lifetime of the vast majority present in this hall tonight.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=278.0,331.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/7","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nSince one or the other of the only two contestants for world leadership must win. Then, in so far as this contest is concerned, neutrality will not preclude the rest of us from becoming either beneficiaries or victims. But what possibly bothers some of us is whether an affluent, democratic United States is better equipped for the rigorous and discipline of contests for world leadership, than a lean and austere Soviet dictatorship.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=331.0,387.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/8","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThis is what says, and I can think of no speaker better qualified to clear up this very human doubts and anxieties on our part than Dr. Kissinger. You can decide after hearing him whether to hedge your bets or not. I have now great pleasure in inviting Dr. Kissinger to deliver the 1981 Singapore lecture.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=387.0,423.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/9","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e [APPLAUSE]\n\u003e\u003e Mr Deputy Prime Minister, excellencies, [COUGH] ladies and gentlemen. I accepted the invitation to speak here with great eagerness. Because though Singapore is a relatively small country in terms of population. In terms of its influence when I was in office. Under the Distinguished leadership that you have, it has always played a very significant role.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=423.0,494.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/10","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nI believe that the deputy prime minister has posed exactly that I'd question for our period. And exactly, the question that the United States must answer if free societies are to survive. And also I wanna take this opportunity to tell you, How important for my own intellectual development in understanding this area has been disconcentrated, and the occasional scolding we have received from your prime minister.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=494.0,555.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/11","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n[COUGH] Who, the first time I met him, was telling my colleagues at Harvard that they didn't know what they were talking about, and who appeared from time to time when I was in office in Washington to recall us to our duty. So I'm here as an admirer, of what has been accomplished here, and as a friend of your leaders.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=555.0,599.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/12","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd I will now try to address some of the questions your deputy prime minister, chairman here, has addressed to me. As I said, it is the key question of our period. Whether the United States can master sufficient understanding and resolutions. To maintain and to prevail in the contest that is now taking place.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=599.0,645.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/13","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nFor the emotional balance of those members of the American embassy who may be here, I would like to stress that I speak in my private capacity.\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e And that you must receive the official formulations from our ambassador and his outstanding staff. At the same time, I want to stress that I strongly support the main lines of the foreign policy of the Reagan administration.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=645.0,694.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/14","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd that I make this qualification only so that I can talk to you as a philosopher and as an observer. But you should remember that I am at ease about the main directions of our foreign policy, and that I support it. The question that has been put to me.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=694.0,724.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/15","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIt's important because there is no doubt that the United States has found itself in the post-war period, in a world for which very little In our historical experienced has prepare us. It has not occurred, it had not occurred to Americans before the end of World War II. That ours was irresponsibility for a continuing foreign policy.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=724.0,769.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/16","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nUntil 1945, the United States felt itself secure behind two great oceans. And it was inconceivable to Americans that upheavals in distant continents could affect American security. It was considered a basic principle in the United States, that nothing that occurred in Europe could possible affect the United States directly and in both World Wars.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=769.0,808.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/17","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIt took the United States three years in the World War I, and two years in the World War 2, and an attack on our territory before we committed ourselves to maintaining the global balance of power. A slight laid as 1947, an American chief of staff could present the military budget to the congress with a statement, this budget has been prepared without any political considerations whatsoever, strictly on its military merits, as if the relevance to the global balance of power was not of concern to him.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=808.0,866.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/18","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nSo you have to understand that the post-war period has been a rather painful process for Americans. And when I read foreign commentary about the complicated dark designs of American strategy, I sometimes wish it would have been true. The truth was much less complicated. The truth has been that for much of the post-war period, the United States has had reluctantly, to understand that conflicts in distant parts had a direct impact on America's future.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=866.0,927.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/19","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThe hardest lesson for us has been implied in the question that your chairman put at the beginning. We have had to learn that the American national interest has to be sought in the global interest. And that for the United States to believe, that it can protect itself while sacrificing others.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=927.0,960.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/20","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nWas only to put off the evil day and to mortgage our onw future. I speak to you this frankly because you are all familiar with debates that have had very unfortunate outcomes, such as the one characteristic of the period of the Vietnam War. There have been, in the United States, until fairly recently, two dominant schools of reflection about international politics.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=960.0,1009.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/21","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThere has been a school that has treated foreign policy as if it were a subdivision of psychiatry.\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e According to it, relations among nations are like relations among people. And that you achieve peace through the strenuous exercise of personal good will. That you may put people at ease by making unilateral concessions.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=1009.0,1054.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/22","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd you found that very much during the Vietnam negotiations, a great part of which I conducted. In which, many of our media described the negotiations as if they were a detective story in which the Vietnamese would throw out vague clues. And we had to guess at the answer.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=1054.0,1083.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/23","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd if somehow, we didn't quite get the point, that these gentle, sensitive, put upon people they're trying to make, they would be so offended. That is was always our fault that the negotiations failed. And the other school of thought has tended to see foreign policy as a subdivision of theology.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=1083.0,1117.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/24","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e As an example of the eternal struggle between good and evil in which you conduct foreign policy by this strenuous condemnation. Of your opponent and by never having anything to do with him. And by isolating yourself as much as possible from the impurities of a world that can not be expected to reach our own moral exaltation.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=1117.0,1168.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/25","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nSo you have had periods in America of isolationism because we considered ourselves too good for this world. And other periods of isolationism because we didn't consider ourselves good enough for this world. And the impact on international politics has not been fortunate in either case. But, I am tracing this historical process, so that you can understand that for the United States, the post war period has also been a process of self-education.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=1168.0,1224.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/26","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nWe have had to learn that foreign policy is a process and not a series of disconnected events. Contrary to our historical experience. We have had to accept the proposition that there are no final answers in foreign policy. That every apparent solution is an admissions price, an admission ticket to a new set of problems.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=1224.0,1264.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/27","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nWe would like to think as a nation, that we can work for a day, at which it can be said that the world is now at peace. And everybody can live with a consciousness of harmony. But history teaches us that almost every war that has occurred has broken out between people who have been at peace.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=1264.0,1300.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/28","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIt is only in the Middle East that wars occur between countries that are already at war.\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e And therefore the process or the problem of maintaining the conditions in which peace can be preserved is unending. And there'll never be a period at which Americans can withdraw from the world.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=1300.0,1341.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/29","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd there can never be a period any longer in which we can say that our own selfish interest permits us to withdraw to the continental United States. And let other nations fend for themselves, because to the extent that we ever attempted to do this we would simply produce a crisis of enormous magnitude for ourselves later on.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=1341.0,1382.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/30","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nA properly understood American self-interest must take into account the interest of those who depend on us. And of our friends and even must understand, to some extent, the interests of our adversaries. I believe that after a period of enormous national anguish produced, in part, by the rebellion against the world which does not let us escape from it.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=1382.0,1431.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/31","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThe American people is now behind an administration Which agrees with some of it almost all the principles that I have put forward here. Though they might express them not having been born in Germany in somewhat simpler language than is my habit. [COUGH] Fundamentally, American foreign policy now realizes that there can be no peace in the world without a balance of power.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=1431.0,1491.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/32","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThat there can be no progress in the world without a significant American role. The balance of power is not something that we can do once and for all. But that has to be tended with great care by constant assessments and careful analysis. In fact the biggest problem in the conduct of foreign politic is that when you sculpt for action is greatest the knowledge on which to base such action, it's at a minimum and when your knowledge is greatest the sculpt for created action has often disappeared.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=1491.0,1548.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/33","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nSo we have to adjust, all of us, our policies to new conditions whenever they arise. This, quite frankly, is one of the sources of the debate that is now going on within the United States and some of our European allies about the nature of military strategy. There is no escaping American responsibilities.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=1548.0,1588.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/34","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nTo assert the technology and that the military capabilities have radically changed. Since the days that the Atlantic alliance was first formed. It is a fact that nuclear stockpiles on both sides have grown immeasurably. But where I differ without allies or some of our allies is, That they seem to think America seeks to escape the common defense when it calls attention to the new realities.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=1588.0,1648.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/35","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIn fact, There is no escaping the common defense. As I've said earlier, if the United States is perceived to sacrifice the interests of friendly countries, much less the existence of friendly countries. All global structure and order will disappear. By the same token, if the United States is serious about the survival of our friends.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=1648.0,1688.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/36","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIt has a duty to put before them periodically its strategic assessment. And it has an obligation to invite them to a participation in their defense. It is simply not logical in out relations with European countries to assume that a continent that has a population larger than the Soviet Union, and a gross national product larger that the Soviet Union cannot make a greater effort in the common defense.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=1688.0,1734.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/37","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd especially, when there's so many other areas of the world that cry for our attention. Now, [COUGH] With this same reasoning one has to look at this part of the world. Almost miraculously Southeast Asia has developed economically more rapidly, the many expected despite the set backs in Vietnam.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=1734.0,1782.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/38","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nFor which quiet frankly a domestic debates very heavy responsibility. Despite this there has developed here in this region a political self confidence and an attempt a successful attempt for the elaboration of their own estimates. It is in the American national interest that this processes continues, and it is in our interest to prevent outside powers, from imposing on this area a destiny which this area has not chosen.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=1782.0,1845.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/39","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nEither directly or by the use of proxy forces. And let me, therefore now, turn to some discussion of our principal adversary The Soviet Union. [COUGH] The Soviet Union, Is the heir of the old Russian Empire and it has added to it an ideology that claims to be of universal significance.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=1845.0,1902.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/40","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nWhen your chairman said, however lovable the United States maybe we are crucial to the future of this area. I must tell him that it is the American illusion That we're infinitely lovable, and that we can prevail because people like us. It is, I fear, the Russian knowledge, that they are not particularly lovable.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=1902.0,1939.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/41","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd that if they're going to prevail anywhere, it has to be by military force. We have, after all, the astonishing phenomenon that nowhere has a communist government ever come to power by peaceful message. Wherever a communist government has been established, it has required the Red Army, or at any rate, a communist military effort.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=1939.0,1986.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/42","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd then, in those areas controlled by the Soviet Union. They have been the only developed countries in which revolutions have taken place, contrary to any communist theory. We face, in the communist system, an opponent who, as your Chairman said, is austere and determined, maybe even implacable. An adversary that has spent several decades elaborating his military capabilities.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=1986.0,2042.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/43","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBut at the same time, we have to realize that it is a system that is top-heavy and stagnating. On the one hand, it places great stress on what it calls objective factors, which means the balance of power and material conditions. Nothing is more futile than to attempt to persuade Soviet negotiators through personal charm and good personal relations.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=2042.0,2090.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/44","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThe basic attitude of Soviet negotiators to their Western counterparts, or to their non-communist counterparts, is like that of Western psychiatrists to their patients.\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e No matter what we say, they think they understand us better than we understand ourselves.\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e They believe very strongly,. In so-called scientific materialism and in what they call the correlation of forces.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=2090.0,2136.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/45","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThe only trouble is that if you look at the correlation of forces, and at this scientific materialism, you'll find a society of great military power, but not one, that in any sense can represent a meaningful wave of the future. The Soviet system now has been in existence for 75 years.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=2136.0,2176.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/46","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIn that whole period, they have had exactly three changes of top leadership. The first two died in office. The third went on vacation without his colleagues. And the fate of the fourth one is [INAUDIBLE].\nNobody has ever retired honorably from a top leadership position. There is no system of regularized succession.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=2176.0,2218.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/47","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nA few months ago, the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on a departed congress met and looked over their top leadership. Found that their average age was 74 and concluded that, that is exactly what they needed for the next five years. I find it difficult to believe that a system that does not governance itself by any set of regular procedures can possibly continue in its present shape indefinitely.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=2218.0,2276.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/48","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIf one looks at the history of Soviet successions. The new leaders have always emerged from procedures that were essentially unpredictable when the process started. In a funny way, the Soviet system is not run by organized, legalized procedures, but more like a feudal system on the basis of the personal loyalties to individual members of the public bureau.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=2276.0,2322.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/49","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThe second major problem that exists is that clearly, that a system of total planning cannot possibly work. In fact, the more elaborated the socialist economist become, the less they seem to work. Wherever in the world, market economies have competed with planned economies. There is no example that a system of Soviet planning has ever done anywhere near as well as the market systems.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=2322.0,2372.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/50","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nWhether you look in this area, where even today, South Vietnam is still better off than North Vietnam. Or if you look at South Korea and North Korea, or West Germany and East Germany, or Austria, and any of its neighbors. The fact seems to be that it is impossible to run an economy.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=2372.0,2398.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/51","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIn which managers know neither their suppliers nor their customers, and not totally dependent on bureaucrats. And the curious feature is, that a system of bureaucratic planning leads to essential arbitrariness. And corruption and can be sustained only by a system of black, which is to say free, markets. And that gets us to the fundamental problem of all communist societies.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=2398.0,2440.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/52","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd especially all Soviet communist societies which is to be expressed in this paradox, what do you do with a communist party in a communist state? The communist party is needed to seize power. It may be needed to establish a government, but once it is in power, it produces a group of supernumeraries that are not needed for government and are not needed for the economy.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=2440.0,2477.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/53","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThey are not needed for any function except to solve the crises they themselves create.\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e And therefore it is no accident. First, I mentioned before that in industrialized countries, the only revolutions that occur are in communist countries, and secondly, that they all concern the role of the communist party.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=2477.0,2516.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/54","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThat is the fundamental problem in Poland. 35 years, after having establish a monopoly of power, after controlling all the media of communications, the secret police, the army, the open police, and then the other form of pressure the human mind can imagine. And after all of this, there is not one communist country in Eastern Europe where the communist party will have a chance of winning a free election.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=2516.0,2554.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/55","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nTherefore, while it is possible to mention many mistakes that the United States has made, and while it would be idle to deny that the United States has not had very great difficulties of its own. Our problems are problems of self-education, of policy, of gaining understanding. The soviet problems are problems of structure.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=2554.0,2596.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/56","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThey're insoluble without a fundamental change in the Soviet system and this being the case. We face this policy challenge. A temptation for the Soviet Union must be very great to try to extend its domination over the external environment so that whenever they have to turn to the problem of domestic reform, there is no conceivable center of power in the outside world.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=2596.0,2646.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/57","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBut it is also true that if they should fail to achieve this domination of the outside world, either directly or through practice that then the problem of domestic reform will become absolutely unavoidable. Conversely, the problem of American foreign policy is to deprive the Soviet Union of any hope that they can escape their domestic dilemmas by foreign adventures.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=2646.0,2686.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/58","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nEither by foreign adventures that they generate directly, or by foreign adventures that are conducted by proxy by Cuba in Africa, or by Vietnam in Southeast Asia. And therefore, all those who are concerned with the future of peace in this world must work together To prevent this. They must not believe That either the Soviet Union or its proxies can be appeased by conciliatory statements.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=2686.0,2749.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/59","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nMy lifespan was significantly shortened by having to negotiate with the North Vietnamese.\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e For a period of all the four years. And as an experience I wish on all my mortal enemies.\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e It is my conviction based on experience, not that negotiations are impossible, but that negotiations must reflect a balance of forces.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=2749.0,2797.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/60","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd without that balance of forces, there is no magic formula. There is no gimmick that can rescue us. It is an illusion to believe that a political solution is an alternative to a balance of power. A political solution is the result of a balance of power. Those are not alternatives.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=2797.0,2829.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/61","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThose are causal relationships. Negotiations are not a substitute of strength, but a result of strength. Now as long as I have been in public life, I have advocated a policy of linkage, by which I mean that we should not limit our adversaries. To pick among all the problems that exist in the world, those which most relieve their difficulties, and negotiate those while continuing Acts of pressure, intimidation, and aggression elsewhere.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=2829.0,2885.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/62","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIt is surely not asking too much to ask Soviet forces and Soviet proxy forces to stay within their own national borders If they want expanded economic relations with the free societies. That has to be the major thrust of the negotiations, that anybody can favor, and that so many people urge upon us.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=2885.0,2932.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/63","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd I believe that if there were assurances. That Soviet forces would stop blackmailing their neighbors. And if Soviet proxy forces in Vietnam, and Cuba, and elsewhere, withdrew into their national territories, that then new conditions would exist. But until these conditions have arisen, one should not believe that there is some abstract diplomatic formula that can substitute for a solution on the part of the free societies and of unity.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=2932.0,2986.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/64","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd I'm sure that what I have said here is the current view of the American government and is strongly supported by the American public. I would like to make a few additional remarks about relations between the United States and the developing world. Because I do not want to leave the impression that the United States believes that all problems in the world can be ascribe or can be subsumed, and the category of east west problems.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=2986.0,3044.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/65","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nNow, there's no doubt that what we witness in the developing world will in retrospect be seen as one of the great revolutionary movements in history. Not in the Marxist sense but in the sense of the expansion of human consciousness. After all, when the United Nations was formed, there was something like 50 sovereign states in the world.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=3044.0,3083.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/66","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nToday, there are some 150 states. And each of them, in its own way, has to develop its own identity. In a time period, much shorter than anything that the European nations, which were the original nation states, Experienced. In fact, There is often a very important difference between the original nation states and many of the states that have come into existence.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=3083.0,3134.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/67","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThe original nation states were nations before they were states. Many of the developing countries are states before they are nations, and they therefore have a much more complicated problem of defining who they are and what political process they can follow. It also means that some of the advocates in America who believed that we could spread our institutions at random, throughout the world, with the best intentions in the world, often have had a deserving impact on the political structure of new countries.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=3134.0,3201.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/68","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nWhere the problem of Democratic forums takes by a different character than it does in this society where they developed over 150 years of evolution. It is also remarkable. There is one looks, and this, I guess, speak for myself. At the developing world, many of the nations that make most noise have been least successful.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=3201.0,3244.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/69","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd many of those who have been most successful do not make all that much noise. They have developed extraordinary concepts in the post-war period. Before World War II, it would never have occurred to any nation in the world that it had arrived to economic assistance as the principal means of its own development.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=3244.0,3284.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/70","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nUntil the end of World War II, it would have been taken for granted that a nation that wanted to develop had to do it largely by its own effort and had to relate itself, in some means, to its own capacities. And indeed, the successful developing nation, such as this country, which has no natural resources to speak of, have done exactly that.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=3284.0,3322.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/71","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThe notion of aid without strings that trips so lightly off the lips of individuals is really another extraordinary concept. Why is it that nations should give aid without any conditions? Recipients have a right to complain about the conditions, but they haven't any right to demand. That one gives resources, without a purpose.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=3322.0,3371.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/72","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd I must say, there is the phenomenon of non-alignment. Of course, every nation has a right to be unaligned. But, what it cannot do is to insist. That we do not make a difference between friends and non-aligned. Of course we treat friends better than we treat non-aligned. [COUGH] And if we didn't, what would be the sense in friendship.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=3371.0,3421.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/73","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nWith the United States and I must tell you, without wanting to be offensive or more offensive than I've already been.\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e When I was in office, shocking as this may be to you, Chairman\n\u003e\u003e I never read the full text of the biannual declaration of the non-aligned nations.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=3421.0,3453.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/74","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nMy staff gave me a summary which did not wet my appetite. But when I left office I decided to read the full text of what I had missed.\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e And I made an astonishing discovery. I found, that in reading these documents, That it was impossible to find in these declarations even one word of approbation for the United States, or one word of criticism for the Soviet Union.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=3453.0,3505.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/75","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThen I said to myself, it is after all statically improbable that the United States is always wrong.\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e Sometimes by accident.\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e We've gotta do something that's right.\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e And yet, The so-called non-aligned have never found the statistical probability. Now, how long do you think it is possible to ask the American Congress and the American public to make Economic contributions, in a world in which our economic system is reviled by the recipients.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=3505.0,3572.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/76","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIn which it is claimed that any purpose we have in giving the aide is improper. And in which on top of it, the recipients identify nonalignment, with constant opposition to every purpose we have. I'm not asking that they support us all the time. I believe that the as such because they do not feel involved in all of the conflicts of the world.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=3572.0,3616.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/77","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAlthough it is another paradox that the largest plug of nations to know exists is the alignment of the non.\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e Now, I have said all of these because when reading\n\u003e\u003e Some of the newspaper articles and the commentaries on the recent conference in Cancun I find repeated some of the dialogue, the controversies of recent years.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=3616.0,3659.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/78","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nWhen I was in office, the slogan was A New Economic Order. Now the slogan is, A Global Dialogue. When I was in office, nobody could tell me what they meant by new economic order.\n\u003e\u003e But it was considered the test of American sincerity to embrace it. Now, I don't know exactly what is meant by a global dialogue.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=3659.0,3693.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/79","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nDoes it mean everybody talks to everybody simultaneously? [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e Or does it mean anybody is entitle to raise any subject at one point in time? I don't think it makes any sense for nations to tie us to slogans. I favour negotiations between the United States and developing countries that have common purposes and I believe it is important that they deal with concrete issues of economic progress in which all the world shares.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=3693.0,3747.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/80","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIn this sense in fact that the current administration is not playing the game of slogans should be a reason for reassurance to our friends, and not a cause for debate. Now, I have tried to answer the points that your Chairman raised in general terms. I want to repeat.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=3747.0,3790.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/81","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nEven the wisest American leaders are bound to make mistakes, now and then. Even with the best of intentions, there are bound to be disagreements between us and friendly nations. But fundamental I think it is the duty of the Unites States to look after the global balance of power and the global balance of power is composed of a series of regional balances For that we need the assistance of other countries.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=3790.0,3843.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/82","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBut it is not a duty we can delegate to surrogates, however friendly they may be to us, and how ever important they are in their reach. We cannot turn over Southeast Asia, Or the defense of Southeast Asia to neighboring friendly countries. We must play an important role in it ourselves, with the assistance of the countries that are importantly concerned.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=3843.0,3886.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/83","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nWe face a difficult and austere adversary. But if a man came to this Earth from a distant planet and were given the balance sheet of the strengths and weaknesses of the United States and its principal adversary, he would be mad if he chose the Soviet side. Our problems are soluble by our decisions.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=3886.0,3928.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/84","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nTheir problems require structural change. So, I would say to you ladies and gentlemen not that history will do our work for us. I'm saying something perhaps more fundamental. It is that if we do what we are capable of doing, we, all together and with our strong support, can do our job for ourselves.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=3928.0,3971.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/85","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThank you very much.\n\u003e\u003e [APPLAUSE]\n[SOUND]\n\u003e\u003e Thank you, Dr. Kissinger. I think you have answered some of my questions, but I'm quite sure there are other questions which the audience would like to put to you.\n\u003e\u003e My name is Co Can Chee. Mister Chairman I have two interrelated questions on what is perhaps the missing link in Dr. Kissinger's masterly analysis because he has not mentioned China at all.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=3971.0,4031.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/86","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nFirst question is, the US policy in the Asia-Pacific region rests on the need to strengthen China as a counterweight to the Soviet Union. At the same time, the US wants to have close links with ASEAN. How would America reconcile the arming of China with ASEAN's fear of a militarily strong China?\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=4031.0,4059.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/87","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThe second question is, Washington's relationship with Beijing is dictated by global strategic considerations. But there are some who argue that by putting too much emphasis on the China card, the US may in fact be provoking the Soviets to adopt a more adventurous policy. Do you subscribe to this view Dr. Kissinger?\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=4059.0,4089.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/88","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e Let me take the second question first because it involves the general principle of relationships between the United States and China and then I will discuss the impact on the ASEAN countries. [COUGH] I have never believed in the so-called China card. If it means that we tighten our relations with China in order to punish the Soviet Union and by implication that we loosen our relations if the Soviet Union behaves in a more acceptable manner to us.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=4089.0,4137.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/89","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAfter all, China has the longest continuous record of self government in history and they did not get to this point by being anybody's card. And I therefore believe that we need to base our relationship with China not on the fluctuating tactics with the Soviet Union. But on the specific weight we assign to the various factors in foreign policy.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=4137.0,4172.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/90","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nNow in, Analyzing the balance of power, one has to keep in mind, one has try to understand who is the weaker and who is the stronger. Who is the threatened country and which is the one that is engaging in making the threats. What brought China and the United States together was the fact that the Soviet Union built up about a million forces on the Chinese border.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=4172.0,4214.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/91","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd that the Chinese decided that they needed outside friends. It was not that we in Washington suddenly said, wouldn't it be nice if we had the Chinese on our side against the Soviet Union? And let's see whether that we can get them involved against the Soviet Union. Now from this it follows that given the importance, historically, culturally and physically of China.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=4214.0,4248.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/92","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThe United States has an interest in the independence and territorial integrity of China, even when we do not agree with its ideology. And the American interest in that is not in order to annoy the Soviet Union. But in order to prevent that the world balance of power is overturned by some colossal event like the dismemberment of China which would have the profoundest consequences.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=4248.0,4289.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/93","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nNot only in Southeast Asia, but in many other parts of the world. Now, of course, we have to conduct our policy with due prudence. And I don't deny that it is conceivable that we might do things which transcend the purposes that I stated and could have a provocative aspect.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=4289.0,4317.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/94","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBut a wise American foreign policy will not do this, anymore than a wise Chinese policy will do that. It is not in either of our countries interest to provoke a Soviet, Chinese war. But it is in our interest to maintain the territorial integrity of China against the attack of against Soviet military pressures.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=4317.0,4349.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/95","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nNow there's no doubt that there is in some countries a fear of a rearmed China. Of course, at this moment, the United States is not supplying, to the best of knowledge, any military equipment to China. And my estimate would be that in the foreseeable future whatever military equipment may be sold to China will not be of quantities that will rapidly make a decisive difference in the situation.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=4349.0,4392.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/96","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBut in any analysis of foreign policy, one has to look at the time scale involved. It would seem to me that China is almost certain to be preoccupied with its domestic necessities for the best part of the next generation. And that during that period, if the ASEAN countries continue to make the progress they have made in the last five to ten years.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=4392.0,4423.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/97","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThey will be able to create a bastion in this area, that it would not be all that easy to attack. Especially since once can also expect that under those circumstances the relations with the United States will become much stronger. So I would say yes, I understand the fears that may exist but they have to be put into some historical perspective and what will happen in 25, 30 years?\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=4423.0,4461.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/98","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nWhat assessment one would then make of the situation? That it would be difficult to say. Because there will be other nations that will grow in power, if my analysis of the Soviet Union is correct, the Soviet Union will be more preoccupied with its domestic affairs. This area will have developed much greater strengths of its own.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=4461.0,4486.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/99","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nSo that there'll be many factors that would be quite different 30 years from now when China will have a greater military capacity than they are today but it is certainly a factor one would take into consideration.\n\u003e\u003e Yes, my name is Winter. After the withdrawal of American military support to South Vietnam which was interpreted by some people as being tantamount to desertion of an ally in the face of the enemy.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=4486.0,4520.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/100","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThere has been, as you are undoubtedly aware, a considerable erosion of confidence in this area. And I presume in other areas, in the actual will and ability of American governments to carry out promises of support which they have given to people who are in very precarious positions. Now we're told that the new administration, we're told by the new administration, that they will indeed support their commitments and their support to these countries, but we've been told that before.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=4520.0,4553.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/101","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd is it your opinion that the position of the American government and of American society in general is now such that they really can give firm and lasting inconsistent support to such commitments.\n\u003e\u003e The Vietnam War was a great national tragedy for the United States. The Nixon administration inherited it from its predecessors, who then turned against the war they had themselves committed our country to.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=4553.0,4599.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/102","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd left us to fight it as best we could against the opposition of those who had originally committed us to it which was an extremely difficult situation. Even then I think we had achieved an honorable outcome, had not the Watergate crisis deprived our executive of the authority to enforce the agreement.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=4599.0,4636.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/103","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd we found ourselves, then, suddenly in the position where an agreement which we had, had every intention of enforcing when we made it. As a result of totally unpredictable American domestic circumstances, it can never be repeated. We lost the capacity to enforce it no agreement in history has ever been self implementing.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=4636.0,4666.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/104","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nI believe that the American people have now seen the consequences of this application. During the Vietnam War a lot of fun was made of the so called domino theory by the opponents of the world. Every American has now seen that there has been a terrible domino theory, not just in Southeast Asia, but in every other part of the world in which people have depended on American promises.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=4666.0,4695.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/105","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd I think one has to interpret the recent American election as an affirmation by the American people that they are tired of retreat. And that they will not accept the proposition that the most ruthless are going to inherit the earth. Of course, no one can ever make an absolutely certain prediction about the future.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=4695.0,4725.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/106","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBut I would think that, the recent election and the present mood in America gives a force to the of the current administration. That in the more innocent period of the 60s, and in the domestic strife of the early 70s, was not there. You have identified our key problem, and it is to convince people that we have now a settled policy, that will be carried out over an indefinite period of time by whoever is in office in the United States.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=4725.0,4765.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/107","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIt's our biggest national problem. I believe we are on the way to solving it. But you have raised an important question and I can only tell you my best judgement.\n\u003e\u003e Mr Chairman, Dr Kissinger played a prominent role in settling the Vietnam war. Since then we've had a takeover of the whole of by the Vietnamese and the Russians.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=4765.0,4795.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/108","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e The whole of Indochina. And a near takeover of Afghanistan by the Soviet forces. Now, if Dr. Kissinger were to be the secretary general of the US today, what measures would he adopt to rectify the situation in these two countries? [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e Look, it is almost impossible. In fact, it is impossible when you're not in office to make a responsible statement about the detailed tactics one would pursue in given circumstances.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=4795.0,4849.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/109","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nWith respect to the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, I believe that the policy pursued by the Asian countries as supported by the United States is essentially correct. I think it is one cannot accept the principle. I think that Pol Pot is a genocidal murderer. And I have absolutely no use for what he represents.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=4849.0,4890.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/110","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBut nevertheless, one cannot accept the principle that the Vietnamese simply have the right to march into a neighboring country. All the more so as the last reason that they did it was because of human delicacy about the conduct of their neighbor. It was rather that his crime was not how many Cambodians he was killing.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=4890.0,4918.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/111","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nHis crime was that he wanted to be independent from Hanoi. So I think we have to maintain the principle that this was an illegal act. And I think we have to make it as difficult as possible for Hanoi to maintain itself in that territory. Again, we, certainly the United States and I, would be amazed that no Asian country has any particular interest in having Cambodia as any kind of military or political outpost against Vietnam.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=4918.0,4957.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/112","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIf Vietnam wants security, that, in my judgment, is relatively easy to arrange. What is not easy is to accept the proposition that they can have security only by occupying all their neighbors. [COUGH] With respect to Afghanistan, I would apply the same principle. I would make it as difficult and as costly as possible for the Soviet Union.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=4957.0,4986.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/113","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIn this respect, I must say that I am not happy with the fact that 18 months after the occupation of Afghanistan, every punitive action that's been taken, including those taken by my own country, have been withdrawn. This is hardly designed to discourage Soviet adventures. And the Soviets have to know in the future that military aggression against their neighbor has certain irremediable consequences.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=4986.0,5030.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/114","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd not simply a 12 to 18-months interruption of certain economic deliveries.\n\u003e\u003e Under what circumstances would the Soviet Union invade Poland? And if such an invasion should take place, what kind of response could one expect from the United States and other Western countries?\n\u003e\u003e Well, so that you can judge the answer which I will give you.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=5030.0,5065.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/115","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nI must tell you that I have been consistently wrong in predicting what the Soviet Union-\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e In predicting what the Soviet Union would do about Poland. Because I, quite frankly, thought they would invade during the last year. My reasoning was that for the Soviet, the situation in Poland, whatever happens, whether they go in or not go in, is a disaster for the Soviet Union.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=5065.0,5101.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/116","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIt's a disaster because here you have a worker state. A so-called worker state in which they create a trade union to negotiate with the workers' government.\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e Which is a fundamental offense to any theory of the communist state. So the mere existence of Solidarity is an assault on communist theory.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=5101.0,5127.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/117","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nNow you have the phenomenon of a general who is minister of defense, prime minister, and secretary general of the Communist Party. Now, does that make the party a subdivision of the army? The army a subdivision of the party? Both of them a subdivision of the government? Is it Bonapartism, communism, what is it?\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=5127.0,5163.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/118","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThird, the Soviets have a very serious problem in Poland. In the sense that when they invaded Czechoslovakia and Hungary, they could foresee the consequences. In the sense that they were, In the sense that once they had established a civil authority, It was likely to be obeyed. And the countries were small enough so that authority could be enforced.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=5163.0,5205.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/119","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nI suppose if the Soviet Union puts enough military power into Poland, they can also enforce authority. But, A normal military operation will have consequences that are not that easy to foretell. So I think that the present Soviet strategy is to let the chaos deepen. And perhaps hope that the Polish people will turn against Solidarity as the cause of the chaos rather than against the Communist Party.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=5205.0,5248.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/120","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nOr to use force, if they have to, by backing up a state of emergency, which the Polish government may call, by sending in selective forces rather than a blanket invasion. What should be the Western reaction? I have always believed that When the Soviets use military force, the first reaction is always panic.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=5248.0,5283.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/121","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd people think that they're gonna go on. The real danger is that there is, it is almost always followed by a Soviet peace offensive. And if the Soviets destroy the free institutions in Poland, one way or the other by the use of military force, then I think there have to be exacted penalties that are substantial and long term in nature.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=5283.0,5316.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/122","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nI would think it is very difficult to imagine that we would continue arms control negotiations that are now going on. Secondly, I would think that serious economic penalties would have to be exacted. And that we should be honest with ourselves in defining what we mean by economic penalties.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=5316.0,5342.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/123","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThere are at least three kinds of questions. First, if there is some kind of economic restriction put on, does it apply only to new orders or does it also apply to existing orders? If it applies only to new orders it will have no effect for two to three years and by then it will be abandoned.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=5342.0,5368.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/124","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nSecondly does it apply only to the Soviet Union or does it apply also to the East European regimes? Third, if it applies to the East European regimes, does it also apply to East Germany or does it exclude East Germany? Those are questions that we must answer to ourselves.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=5368.0,5391.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/125","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nWe don't have to announce it. But we should not, but they will determine whether we are serious and whether the penalty will have an effect. I think I have made clear by in the way I pose the question what answers I would recommend.\n\u003e\u003e My name is Jonah Boy.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=5391.0,5417.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/126","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nI'm not asking a question, but I'd like to know what Dr Kissinger thinks about the opposition that's going on in friendly Europe towards American policy with regard to the arms that America proposes to put in Western Europe.\n\u003e\u003e I tried to express but I think delicately at the beginning of my remarks but I'll be glad to do it indelicately too.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=5417.0,5449.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/127","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e It think we are in an absolutely absurd circumstance. There is absolutely no doubt that the United States can defend itself in a nuclear war without basing nuclear weapons in Europe. There are thousands of Soviet nuclear weapons in Europe. The United States has now offered to put 572 nuclear delivery vehicles in Europe.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=5449.0,5477.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/128","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAny freshman in college should be able to figure out that this cannot possibly be for our own selfish purposes, we could put them at sea, we can put them anywhere, we don't have to have them in Europe. We're putting them in Europe in order to prevent selective blackmail.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=5477.0,5498.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/129","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIn order to keep the Soviet Union from threatening Europe with nuclear war and in order to create the automaticity of response which the Europeans claim they want. Now the Europeans, or not the Europeans, but tens of thousands are marching around the streets acting as if they are doing us a favor.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=5498.0,5520.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/130","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e And all kinds of complicated negotiations have to be undertaken so that we have to prove that we have no aggressive intentions, that we're really quite willing to give up all these weapons. We haven't even got one of them there yet. While the Soviet's are building them, by the dozens.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=5520.0,5549.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/131","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd yet are the ones, we have to say there was a reason NATO meeting in which we were prepared to go down to zero. We are at zero. It's the Soviets who are not yet at zero.\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e So I have very little use for it, I once said to an unaligned friend who in my judgement whose security of whose country seemed to depend extraordinarily on the United States which did not stem his passionate criticism of our actions.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=5549.0,5597.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/132","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nI said to him, be careful what you recommend. Because someday we're going to accept your recommendation and then where will you be?\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e And I would say that to some of our European critics, they shouldn't tempt us too much.\n\u003e\u003e My name's Lawrence Mah. Living in Singapore, I find it a little bit difficult to understand the American system of government.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=5597.0,5625.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/133","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nWitnessing the news reports on the lobbying that President Reagan has had to do in order to effect the sales of claims to Saudi Arabia. Don't you think, sir, that that is in an inherent weakness in the American system of government that will prevent your effective execution of the global role of protecting the democracy against the expansion of the Soviet Union?\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=5625.0,5653.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/134","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e There's no question [COUGH] that our system of government, it's extremely complex. And there's also no doubt that our system of checks and balances occasionally produces decisions that are against our local interests. When I was in office, the Congress imposed an embargo on Turkey, which is after all, one of the pillars of the NATO defense in the Mediterranean.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=5653.0,5691.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/135","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nOn the other hand you have to say that the decision that is implied by the AVACS\\g vote would have been absolutely unthinkable three or four years ago. And the fact that President Reagan succeeded, I had a marginal role in it. Therefore, I was informed somewhat about the discussions.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=5691.0,5720.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/136","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nWhen the White House started lining up votes, the count was about 64 to 26 against it. The fact that President Reagan succeeded in achieving a majority shows that a determined president who knows what he wants can with effort achieve actions that are in the national interest. And I think that you could Equally will argue, in fact, even [INAUDIBLE] that it shows that some of the difficulties that I've described are being overcome.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=5720.0,5765.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/137","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBut there's no question, we should not pretend to our friends that the internal management of the American government is getting very complicated, that there are, certainly, countervailing forces to the trends that I described. I believe they're being overcome and managed. And if we have a successful administration by President Reagan, I think the authority of the executive will continue to grow.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=5765.0,5798.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/138","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBut you've certainly identified an important problem, yes?\n\u003e\u003e The Soviet Union has not been very successful in their invasion of Afghanistan for the past two years, and they are still there. They've got their feet wet, and should they decide to gain any further ground, they would have to commit quite substantial resources.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=5798.0,5823.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/139","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nUnder such circumstances, what are the options open to them? In view of the very expensive political and economic price they have to pay, should they decide to move further? And how would these options affect their strategy in Vietnam?\n\u003e\u003e I think that the Soviets, in many ways, are in a morass of their own making.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=5823.0,5863.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/140","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nFor them to maintain military operation in Afghanistan, military operation in Vietnam, and a de facto military operation in Poland, in the sense that they're keeping 40 divisions around Poland, is an enormous strain. If they increase the forces in Afghanistan, it reduces, further, their capacity for intervention in other parts of the world.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=5863.0,5894.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/141","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd if I were the Vietnamese, I would begin to ask myself at what point something has to give. And if you add Cuba to this list, the Soviet economic resources are not are not infinite, to put it mildly. So I think that the Soviets are facing enormous difficulties.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=5894.0,5923.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/142","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd therefore, it would be a pity if we eased these difficulties before we have negotiated a political self-restraint, and before we have got the Soviets back to their own territories. And I think the same is true in Vietnam. I think if present trends continue, with the crisis in Poland, the crisis in Afghanistan, and the crisis in Indochina, and if the West does not supply the resources to manage these crises, the Soviet Union, sooner or later, will have to make some serious decisions, which of these crises it considers more important, and which it will have to abandon, or whether it should make some accommodation with the West.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=5923.0,5974.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/143","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd after all, I can only repeat, we're not asking anything untoward to ask the Red Army to stay within its own territory. It still leaves them the largest land area in the world.\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e But I think they have a problem. In fact, there's a Russian saying about a fellow, somebody that's running into the village.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=5974.0,6008.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/144","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd Mikailovich, or whatever the fellow is called, is stuck in the mud, up to his ankles. And the other fellow says, well, up to his ankles, that doesn't sound so bad. And the other says, yes, but he dived into it head first.\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e Last question?\n\u003e\u003e Is this mic on?\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=6008.0,6034.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/145","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nMy name is Pamela Evans, and my question is a followup to the previous one on the AWACS. Were you in the favor of the Senate approval to the AWACS to Saudi Arabia? And what do you foresee as its impact on the peace process in the Middle East?\n\u003e\u003e The question was I in favor of it?\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=6034.0,6054.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/146","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nYes, I strongly supported the administration's sale of AWACS, or rather, I strongly supported the Senate approval of the sale of AWACS. Whether the AWACS, in the abstract, where the ideal issue on which to produce such a domestic debate is not relevant. I think that the refusal by the Senate of the AWACS would have damaged our relations with the Arab countries, undermine the authority of the president, and would have been of no benefit to Israel.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=6054.0,6101.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/147","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nSo it would of had only disadvantages, without any compensating advantages. And for that reason, I actively supported it. I called many senators, and I wrote an article in The Washington Post in its support. The impact on the peace process? I think the sale of AWACS, by itself, is not a major factor in the peace process.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=6101.0,6136.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/148","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThe refusal by the Senate to approve it might have had a negative effect. I think the peace process will depend on the balance between moderate and radical Arabs, and the degree to which we can support moderate Arabs. And secondly, on the degree to which the talks that are now going on can be given impetus, and other Arab nations, especially Jordan, can be brought into them.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=6136.0,6169.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/149","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nUnder those conditions, I think progress is possible. And in fact, I believe that recent events, including the assassination of the president of Egypt, the AWACS debate, will have brought home to all of the parties that they must take another serious look at the options before things slide out of control.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=6169.0,6205.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/150","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e [APPLAUSE]\n[SOUND]\n[SOUND]\nDoctor Kissinger, one of the many achievements your achievements in public life is the conclusion of a treaty which brought the United States an honorable peace in Vietnam. And for you, a Nobel Prize. I just can't help wondering whether at any moment at that time.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=6205.0,6318.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/151","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIt had occurred to you, or you could have envisaged or foreseen that you were signing peace with the Vietnam that could turn out to be the Vietnam that we, in Southeast Asia, have to live with and deal with today.\n\u003e\u003e When we made Peace in Vietnam, you have to look at the overall circumstances.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=6318.0,6345.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/152","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nFirst of all, the Nixon administration inherited the war in Vietnam from his predecessors and at a time when American public opinion had already begun to turn against the war because of its inconclusive nature. So we had a very complicated situation of withdrawing with honor. Maintaining enough public support to withdraw with honor, which was not always easy because many of the people who gotten us into the war turned against the very war that they had started.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=6345.0,6384.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/153","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThat was the fundamental problem. Now, in 1972 when we signed this agreement, you cannot negotiate with the North Vietnamese without getting the sense that you're dealing with an implacable country that is dedicated to achieving its objectives. And frankly, probably we would have preferred to win outright. But we faced a situation where it was practically certain that the Congress would vote us out of the war but our judgment of the peace terms was this.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=6384.0,6419.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/154","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nWe thought, first of all, we had not turned over a country to communists. Second, that with adequate support, the south Vietnamese would be able to defend themselves against normal attacks. And if the North Vietnamese launched an all out attack we were prepared to support them. So within a year Watergate destroyed all these assumptions, the congress would not give us the resources to support South Vietnam.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=6419.0,6456.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/155","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThen the congress prohibited military assistance to North to South Vietnam so that not only did the North Vietnamese see our aid declining they saw that they were and against our coming to their assistance. And I must say that after the end of 73, I pretty well feared that our domestic situation had doomed South Vietnam.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=6456.0,6481.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/156","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nI was ashamed of it then. I'm ashamed of it now. I knew North Vietnam was dangerous. I thought North Vietnam would be what you now face. I thought we could handle it and without Watergate I think we could have. I know we could have.\n\u003e\u003e Doctor Kissinger, you were intimately involved in these long and arduous negotiations with the Vietnamese in an effort to bring about a peaceful conclusion to the war in Vietnam.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=6481.0,6515.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/157","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nWhat do you think will make the Vietnamese negotiate a comprehensive political settlement within the UN framework on Campuchia?\n\u003e\u003e Based on my experience?\n\u003e\u003e Based on your experience.\n\u003e\u003e Based on my experience, nothing will make them negotiate except a balance of forces. When I started negotiating with the North Vietnamese, I have believed what all of my intellectual friends and all my journalist friends were saying.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=6515.0,6544.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/158","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThat they were distrustful of us, that we had to reassure them. That we had to show our good will, that we had to give them a sense of security. I believed many of those things. And then several years of negotiations, we made a whole series of concessions to them, in order to prove to make these points.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=6544.0,6563.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/159","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nMy experience has been that any concession you make, that you make unilaterally, they simply pocket. And they will not think that it is a sign of your good will. They will think it is a sign of weakness, whether my intellectual friends like it or not, the most successful negotiations occurred when we were militarily strongest.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=6563.0,6588.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/160","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd I believe that negotiations with be possible in Campuchia and on Southeast Asia when there is a balance of forces. Which makes them to believe that their present efforts are too costly. Then we can negotiate security guarantees for them. We have no, I don't think any country in this region and northern United States has any military designs on Vietnam.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=6588.0,6612.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/161","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBut my experience is that until you create objective conditions in which according to their calculations, the balance of forces favors negotiations. It is useless. You cannot substitute negotiation for reality, as far as the Vietnamese are concerned.\n\u003e\u003e Does it mean, from what you say, that you consider the Chinese strategy of a military solution, and a strategy of bleeding Vietnam dry, will stand a better chance of success?\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=6612.0,6640.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/162","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThen the strategy of a political solution.\n\u003e\u003e I think they both depend on each other. I think the Chinese strategy of bleeding Vietnam dry is not necessarily, we have no interest on bleeding Vietnam dry. We have an interest in Vietnam staying within its own borders. So if Vietnam stays within its own borders, we have no interest, neither the United States nor the ASEAN countries, in destroying Vietnam.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=6640.0,6673.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/163","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n[COUGH] On the other hand, if political solution means it can substitute for a balance of strength, I think that is not possible either. So what we need is a combination of the Chinese military strategy and of the ASEAN political strategy. And at some point along that road when the Vietnamese are ready to negotiate, then I think we can make constructive proposals.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=6673.0,6703.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/164","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e Since the fall of Indochina in 1975, Dr Kissinger. The strategic balance has shifted in favor of the Soviets and the Vietnamese. And Vietnam has emerged as a regional power. The Chinese believe that the aims of the Soviet Union and Vietnam are beyond Indochina, and to make Vietnam the overlord in the region.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=6703.0,6728.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/165","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nDo you subscribe to this view?\n\u003e\u003e Well, I think the aims of the Soviet Union are beyond Vietnam. And to them, Vietnam is one pawn in an overall strategy. The Soviet Union would like to contain and isolate China, there's no question about that and they will certainly support Vietnam and strengthen Vietnam in order to achieve this objective.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=6728.0,6757.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/166","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIn the long run, I don't think they want Vietnam to be the dominant country either, they want themselves to be the dominant country. And I understand, for example, that they are beginning to train Laotians and Cambodians in Moscow, which, if I am any judge of Hanoi, it's not something that Hanoi welcomes, to put it mildly.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=6757.0,6780.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/167","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBut they can't do anything about it. So the Soviet ambitions certainly go beyond Indochina and the practical consequences to make Vietnam potentially the strongest nation in the area. On the other hand, when you say the balance of forces has changed, we ought to remember almost all the problems America has had, it has done to itself.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=6780.0,6803.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/168","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThey haven't been done to us by somebody else. So, we can remedy them. And if you look at the Soviet situation, they have a war to support in Kamupchea. Plus economic support for a bankrupt economy in Vietnam. They have Afghanistan. They have Poland. Even when they don't invade it, they have to keep 30 to 40 divisions sitting there.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=6803.0,6827.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/169","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThen they have Cuba in the Caribbean and Cuba in Africa, so they are in a morass all over the world. And the idea that the Soviet Union can do everything simultaneously with that economy that is not growing, I think is unrealistic. So the immediate balance of forces may look as if it favors them.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=6827.0,6847.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/170","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThe longterm balance of forces, I think favors us.\n\u003e\u003e Do you think with the past experience that the United States will find it easier now to contain Vietnam than it did last [CROSSTALK]?\n\u003e\u003e Well, I think, well first of all, one should not completely underrate what was achieved in the Vietnam situation.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=6847.0,6872.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/171","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nOne of the most hopeful areas in the world today, is the ASEAN region. Having just visited Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. One really, and having had talks here with leaders from other countries, from Thailand and Philippines. It's really amazing, one looks at the growth rates, one looks at what has been achieved, essentially with market economies.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=6872.0,6900.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/172","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd I don't know whether that would have been possible without the time that was bought by the American commitment in Vietnam. In the middle 1960's, Indonesia was wavering towards a Communist solution. Partly because Sukarno had been convinced that that was the wave of the future in this region.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=6900.0,6921.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/173","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nSo I think that something was achieved in the Vietnam war, though at an exorbitant cost for the United States. One of the problems was that we attempted to do it all by ourselves and as an American enterprise. I think whatever is done now will emerge as an ASEAN enterprise.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=6921.0,6947.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/174","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nWith the United States backing it up, I hope adequately but not with the United States being the principal country that organizes the whole thing. And if one looks at the evolution, if the ASEAN countries continue to grow at a rate of between 7 and 9% a year, and Vietnam continues to stagnate, it is going to become economically a back border.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=6947.0,6977.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/175","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nOf course, they could always start military actions, but there's a limit even to what the Vietnamese can endure and when one reads about the growing corruption in South Vietnam, the insurgents in Cambodia, I think it is gonna be a serious question for the Vietnamese to start attacking neighbors with China sitting on it's northern border.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=6977.0,7001.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/176","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nSo i think that the containment of Vietnam in the 80s is a different problem from what it was in the 60s. And if it is handled with wisdom and with understanding of local conditions, I think it is possible.\n\u003e\u003e This is one thing that puzzles me about Reagan administration policy on Kampuchea.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7001.0,7019.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/177","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nASEAN from last June onwards tried to elaborate a policy for settlement in Kampuchea, which would take account of Vietnam's legitimate security interests. At the July conference in New York, the International Conference on Kampuchea proposed that there be a transitional administration, an impartial traditional administration set up in Kampuchea.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7019.0,7047.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/178","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd firm safeguards that there would be free and fair elections, including the disarming of the Khmer Rouge and all other groups. Now, when it came to the crunch in New York, China strongly opposed this. The United States, the Reagan administration, had said publicly and Holdridge repeated it in the Senate two weeks ago.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7047.0,7067.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/179","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThat the US will support and continue to support ASEAN initiatives on Kampuchea, yet on this critical point the US went to water. The US did not attempt to use its influence to make China agree to these terms that ASEAN wanted.\n\u003e\u003e But China has two objectives in Kampuchea.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7067.0,7095.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/180","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nOne is to bleed the Vietnamese, as you pointed out. And there's no question that looking at it as a practical proposition the Khmer Rouge are the most effective mechanism for bleeding the Vietnamese. And even I, with all my revulsion to it, the Khmer Rouge and Berlin to see the Khmer Rouge used for that purpose.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7095.0,7118.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/181","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nWhere perhaps we might part company with the Chinese is with that the Chinese probably would be reasonably comfortable with the Khmer Rouge as the dominant political group in Kampuchea after the war, and that the Chinese would probably also reason that they should not demoralize the Khmer Rouge, that even if the Khmer Rouge do not emerge as the dominant political force.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7118.0,7146.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/182","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThat is an issue to be faced after the war and not now. And they do not want to do anything to demoralize the Khmer Rouge during the fighting. So as experts in guerilla war, which the Chinese undoubtedly are, I have to take those arguments seriously. As a long-term solution in so far as the Chinese want the Khmer Rogue the dominant group in Kampuchea.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7146.0,7175.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/183","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nI would think that our American approach would have to differ. I wanna make clear to your viewers that I'm here as a private citizen, that I strongly support the main lines of the Reagan Have foreign policy but that doesn't mean that every last tactical move of the Reagan administration has my equal support.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7175.0,7199.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/184","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBut the main line of our policy I strongly support and the main lines of the Reagan administration. But I could not reconcile myself personally to an outcome in which the Khmer Rouge became the dominant political force in\n\u003e\u003e Perhaps Dr. Kissinger is that the Chinese are needed in this achievement of balance between Vietnam and the Soviet Union and the non-Communist states in the region.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7199.0,7227.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/185","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd as such, I think it could have been that the U.S. saw that China needed to be accommodated on this particular point. I do not know.\n\u003e\u003e I think that you are absolutely right. I think the judgment of the administration, I am fairly confident that the administration feels as I do, that we do not want the Khmer Rouge to emerge as the dominant force in Cambodia.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7227.0,7251.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/186","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBut the administration would also believe that China's support is essential and that we have other relations with China and therefore, they must have made this as a tactical judgment.\n\u003e\u003e On a slightly different topic, I think it's your view once, I believe, that while in dealing with the Communists and with the Soviet Union in particular, that there are times when one needs to project a sense or a mood of irrationality.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7251.0,7283.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/187","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nNow do you think that to be effective, do you think that the Western world today and the Reagan administration in particular are, with an inverted comma, irrational enough to be effective enough against the Soviet Union?\n\u003e\u003e Well let me-\n\u003e\u003e Do you think the Chinese are better in this game?\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7283.0,7303.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/188","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e Well first to answer, let me take the last question first. I think the Chinese are extremely impressive in their conduct of their strategic relations. I think the courage it took to punish Vietnam, given the balance of forces existing between China and the Soviet Union was really quite remarkable.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7303.0,7327.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/189","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd I think the Chinese have, who are militarily not have their weaknesses, have consciously adopted the policy that if they won't submit a weakness, there will be no end to the demands that are made on them. So their strategy is to indicate that if you make an unreasonable demand or a demand against their honor or you conduct yourself in a threatening way on their borders, that then they will act regardless of seeming calculation.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7327.0,7357.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/190","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThey did it with us in Korea, they did it with the Vietnamese and they have done it with the Soviets. I think this is an impressive performance, which is difficult for a democracy to emulate. Now I don't say the United States should look irrational. That's always said that I said this.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7357.0,7376.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/191","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nWhat I say is little more complicated. I say it is dangerous to tell your opponent ahead of time exactly how you will react to all certain conditions. You must not be so calculable that he can draw up a balance sheet and calculate the profits and losses ahead of time with absolute assurance.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7376.0,7398.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/192","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nYou must leave a factor of uncertainty. One of the reasons why President Nixon was an outstanding president in foreign policy was that in the final analysis, if you pushed him against the world, he might do something you absolutely did not expect. You take 1972. Here he had an election.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7398.0,7418.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/193","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nHe had a trip to Moscow. I'm sure the Vietnamese figured that it was impossible for him in the middle of an election year, two weeks away from a trip to Moscow to react to the invasion in South Vietnam, but he did, and that turned the psychological situation around.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7418.0,7437.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/194","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nI don't think you should behave like a mad man. But I don't think you should tell your adversary, if you do A, I will do exactly B, and reassure him with that degree of precision. Now, can we do it? Our system is not very comfortable with it because if, anytime the United States uses force or threatens force, we have to brief our congress.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7437.0,7464.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/195","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThe first question they ask is what is the limit of this committment? Now this is very reassuring to our public, but it may also be too reassuring to our adversaries. And for that reason, this is what I have in mind by incalculability. But is the Reagan administration capable of doing it?\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7464.0,7483.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/196","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nI think so because if you look at the performance of the Reagan administration, take Ethan in a domestic situation, like the air controller strike. And leaving us out now who, I won't go into the merits of the dispute, but the fact of the matter is Reagan said, I will not permit a strike by public servants who have signed a pledge that they wouldn't strike.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7483.0,7506.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/197","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd if they strike, I'll fire them. Nobody believed it, but he did it. Never been done before. And, you have to say that when he's had a decision to make, he's made a strong decision and he stuck with it. So, I think if he's challenged in foreign policy, he will make a strong decision and stick with it.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7506.0,7527.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/198","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e By logic of what you said about China and in the face of growing reluctance that we can see here of western Europe and Japan to take on a greater military responsibility, the sort that the United States want its people to take, does it make sense to say that China would make a more effective ally of the United States, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7527.0,7557.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/199","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd if so, would it-\n\u003e\u003e More effective than Japan?\n\u003e\u003e Yes, because of what you say. I think it is a great mistake to believe for the United States that we can play with China as an American card. The Chinese have conducted their own independent affairs for 3,000 years.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7557.0,7582.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/200","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThe worst mistake we can make with the Chinese is to give them the impression that they are our tool that we play, or even that they are our ally. The Chinese are cooperating with us in a very realistic and positive manner, because they believe that their security interests and our security interests are parallel.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7582.0,7605.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/201","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd to the extent that we are both concerned with what is called head Germany. Soviet domination of the world, I think this is true. So I think we have an interest in the independence and integrity of China. And I have always believed at the time that this was very unfashionable, that if there should be a Soviet attack on China.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7605.0,7626.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/202","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThe United States, in some way or another, will have to come to the assistance of China. But if one says alliance on a global basis, and in which we give up traditional friendships in order to have a particular special friendship with China. And if it's carried even further, then we say China should be sort of the policeman of Southeast Asia for us.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7626.0,7655.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/203","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThat I don't think is necessary. I think China, by existing, by being an independent state in its own essence, contributes a way to the international balance. Beyond that, to Ask to give them assignments outside that region. First of all, they won't do it. The Chinese will not carry out our policies, they never have carried out anybody else's policy.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7655.0,7682.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/204","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nSecondly, even if they were willing to do it, this would go beyond the parallelism of interest. And in fairness I have to say, they've never asked for this. I think we can have our best relationship with China if we both conduct our own policies in parallel. Openly, frankly, understanding that their independence and integrity is in our interest, and that prevention of Soviet-led Germany is in our common interest.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7682.0,7710.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/205","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e I think you were talking yesterday in your speech about punishment and penalties when we got to Poland. And which is one of the themes that you've been touching of even when you were in public office. But what sort of penalties, effective penalties and punishments can the United States meet out today that will work against the Soviet Union?\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7710.0,7732.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/206","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e First we have to understand what is going on in Poland here. Here's a country of 35 million that has been under Soviet rule for 35 years or so, not under Soviet rule, under communist rule, but communist rule imposed by the Soviet Union. They have had a monopoly of power, a monopoly of the press, a monopoly of the Secret Police, of the actual police, of the army, of the education system.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7732.0,7760.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/207","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThey've had a totalitarian state, and still the people don't want it. Now why should it be permissible for the Soviet Union to interfere with constant threats as they're doing, with constant pressure to impose a system that, obviously, the Polish people do not want? Again, I say, I would say something very similar here as I said about Vietnam.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7760.0,7786.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/208","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThat is to say, I think the Soviet Union has every right to be concerned that countries on its borders, not be used as military or intelligence or other bases against it. That's a legitimate Soviet concern, and that we should make every effort to meet. Now if they continue to intervene and if the end result of this process is that the Solidarity movement gets destroyed, and that a totalitarian communist regime is reimposed by whatever method, what can we do?\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7786.0,7819.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/209","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nWe can do nothing militarily. I don't know whether we could, but there would be no support for it, and we shouldn't pretend that we will do something that we will not carry through. So we should not give any impression that we will give military support to Polish uprisings or anything like this, because we won't.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7819.0,7838.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/210","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd if we did, it wouldn't be enough. But that would have to be in the field of economics, if we do something in the field of, it would be in two fields, in the field of diplomacy and the field of economics. I would believe if the Soviet Union makes an overt intervention in Poland, that the existing arms control negotiations would have to be ended.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7838.0,7858.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/211","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBoth the theater and nuclear force negotiations in Europe solve negotiations. And each side would have to look to its unilateral position. Second, there would have to be some specific economic reprisal. But if they're taken, I think they should be taken with an agreement within industrial democracy, that they're going to stick with them.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7858.0,7881.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/212","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nI think the sort of thing that happened after Afghanistan is more likely to encourage the Soviet Union than to discourage them. Because you take a few measures that have no immediate practical effect if you cut off new orders. What you are in effect fulfilling the old ones, which is all you would be doing anyway, and then you make larger new orders when the new orders are permitted again, and if the embargo lasts only a year or so.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7881.0,7911.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/213","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBy the time the embargo ends, you have not heard the Soviet Union at all, so we would have to take together a series of measures, some of which would be painful in my judgment, including also existing contracts. Now, some of this would be painful. But if we're not willing to do that, then we are really telling the Soviet Union that we're not willing to make any sacrifices for our convictions and for our national interest.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7911.0,7943.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/214","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e With regard to Cuban involvement in Africa, I'm not asking for a flat statement, but Cuba is very close to you. And do you think it's a credible policy to insist that making life difficult for Cuba may be a price that the Soviet Union may have to pay if they went beyond a certain point in Africa?\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7943.0,7967.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/215","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e I think it is in the long term intolerable for the United States to have a little Caribbean Island.\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e 70 Miles off our shore act as a recruitment place for Soviet proxy forces in continents thousands of miles away with which that island has had no organic relationship except perhaps that some of its citizens originally came from there.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=7967.0,8000.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/216","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd that they are supported there by Soviet logistics military leadership. So I have always believed that the geographic location of Cuba and its weakness, and the distance of Africa from both Cuba and the Soviet Union should not make it beyond the will of man to exact a price that they cannot pay over an indefinite period of time, and that will force them to withdraw.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8000.0,8028.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/217","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e Dr. Kissinger, do you agree with the following observation? And that is that the young new breed of Americans today will never allow the United States to go to war except when the US is being attacked? Or when its survival is being threatened in the case of oil supply and that you will not be prepared to go to war over West Germany or Japan, or even Israel?\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8028.0,8061.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/218","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd I'm here saying actually going to war, not just providing military help or military aid or expressions of moral indignation.\n\u003e\u003e No, our problem isn't the young American, our problem is the American intellectual, and that kind of people. I think the American public and that is one fo the results of the last election, is sick and tired of retreat.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8061.0,8091.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/219","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd in fact it would be politically extremely dangerous for any American administration to be perceived by the American public, to be constantly in retreat. I think the single most important factor in the defeat of President Carter was the image he created. That he was more conscious of what America could not do than what it could do, and the symbolism of this was the hostage crisis.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8091.0,8119.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/220","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nWe can argue forever what could, should, or might have been done. As far as the American public was concerned, 50 Americans sitting in Tehran was too much, so I think there would be public support provided that we are understood. Not so much that the immediate survival of America is at stake, but that we are facing a profound challenge, which if not met there, will become worse and worse, similar to what we faced In understanding the Nazi danger in World War II.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8119.0,8153.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/221","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIt is absolutely unthinkable to me that the United States would permit a military adventure against Western Europe, or against Japan, or for that matter against South East Asia. Even though we have no legal obligation. Indeed, I have always believed as I've said earlier in this program, that if China with which we have no treaty relationship whatever we're attacked, in one way or another.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8153.0,8183.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/222","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nWe would have to come to its support simply because, an attack on a nation of this magnitude that succeeded would have such an effect on the international balance of power. That it would undermine our position, of course a great deal depends on American leadership. Great deal depends what our president will tell the public and what his cabinet will tell the public.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8183.0,8205.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/223","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBut I believe that this president understands this, so I do not think that what you said is true. I think they'll be some opposition from some editorial writers and some professors who grew up during the Vietnam period. That you expect in a democracy, but America is a strong country, you couldn't get a million people marching around the way you do in Europe right now.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8205.0,8234.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/224","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e Earlier on you said though, that the problems faced by the United States is in fact self-generated.\n\u003e\u003e Many of them are.\n\u003e\u003e Many of them are, are they anything to do with the Constitution, or is it really up here?\n\u003e\u003e Our Constitution is extremely complicated. And it lends itself to acts of obstruction more easily than to acts of leadership, and this is because it is an 18th century instrument, which was designed to curb the power of the executive authority.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8234.0,8276.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/225","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nOn the other hand, history has shown that strong American presidents can nevertheless gained tremendous impetus. And that in fact the complexity of our institutions is a good way of building a public consensus because it forces our executive into, where other executives would give an order. Our executive at the end of the day has to explain to so many different groups that this is really a very democratic way of making decisions.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8276.0,8313.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/226","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nNow we have had in the last 20 years a whole series of tragedies which have created a problem which is largely psychological. We've had one President assassinated, then we've had a President who was driven out of office because of the Vietnam War. Then we've had a President who was driven out of office because of some personal peculiarities, and actions that are really really hard to explain, and whose consequences will out of proportion to the original offense.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8313.0,8358.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/227","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThen we've had an interim President, then we've had a President who one has to say was not largely successful, and all those in a period when the international environment was changing. So we haven't had a normal President between Eisenhower and Reagan, that's 20 years. There's a whole generation of Americans that have grown up that have never seen a two term president.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8358.0,8382.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/228","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd we found ourselves in the shocking circumstance that where we at the same time that we had this crisis of leadership, the international environment was changing from a condition in which we were very dominant. Economically we had 52% of the world's gross national product on 1950, we have 22% today.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8382.0,8407.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/229","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThat is an important change in the world in our situation, so this has been a serious problem for Americans. Not easy to meet and yet I think again like many educational processes like the process of maturing itself it was painful, but I think it is the condition for a new period of American creativity.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8407.0,8434.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/230","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e You once quipped about being emperor of the United States, now, I'd like to base my next question on this joke. And that is if you are in fact the emperor of the United States today with very limited royal powers if you could change one portion of the Constitution, which portion would you change?\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8434.0,8452.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/231","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nTo make the United States small-\n\u003e\u003e First, my quip was, people were asking me whether I could become president and the American Constitution prohibits somebody who was born outside the United States, so I said Constitution doesn't prohibit you from being emperor. I would not change the Constitution, I think it's really a rather a good, really it's a great Constitution.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8452.0,8474.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/232","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIt's a written Constitution that lasts and it's essential characteristics for over 200 years it's a considerable achievement. What I would change is the relative balance by which the various organs of governments within that constitutional structure are asserting themselves. I think, for example, that in the Watergate period the congress passed a series of laws.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8474.0,8505.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/233","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThat unduly limited the executive authority and unduly exalted the role of congress. For example, it used to be that our intelligence activities could just be briefed to just two committees of Congress. One in the Senate and one in the House, of a very restricted group. Now they have to briefed to eight different committees of Congress that are very large, so the result is that the danger of leaks is so great that we are necessarily constricted.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8505.0,8541.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/234","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nSecondly, I think there's such things as the Freedom of Information Act, which in theory It's supposed to give the public access to the deliberations of government in practice. It has two drawbacks, it leads to, it creates a temptation for each new administration to go after its predecessors, by leaking out information that might be embarrassing.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8541.0,8567.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/235","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nTo its predecessors with the result that while you're in office you don't keep accurate records anymore. And the end result of the Freedom of Information Act will be both excessive disclosure, but more importantly, inaccurate record keeping. And I think that these are all legal things. Third, I think the War Powers Act in which the President has to tell the Congress every time he moves military forces.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8567.0,8593.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/236","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nWhat he's going to do with them and how he will employ them sounds very democratic. The fact though is that In my experience, in a crisis, your most effective weapon is that your opponent does not what you're going to do. If you tell him I'm moving this aircraft carrier, but I tell you now I'm only gonna use ten airplanes from it, you are practically inviting him to test you.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8593.0,8618.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/237","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nSo, I think that a number of restrictions have been put on American actions that could be adjusted. But the fundamental constitutional system that we have is a sign of great strength that we should maintain. And even of those things that I have criticized, I wouldn't want them all abolished.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8618.0,8638.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/238","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nI would just like to, I think it's useful to have a Freedom of Information Act, but it should be given a less sweeping application.\n\u003e\u003e May I move you back, Dr. Kissinger, to grow in the Asia Pacific region? China has now embarked on a tremendous modernization drive. What are the implications of this drive to the communist system of government in China?\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8638.0,8665.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/239","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e Of course, I happen to believe that the Stalinist, Leninist, Soviet system of communism is incompatible with the modern economy and that it is bound to reach a point of stagnation. That leads to tremendous domestic tensions. I believe that the Chinese have understood this. And one can not deal with Chinese people, wherever one meets them, without being struck by their enormous, unsentimental practicality on matters that affect their society and their survival.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8665.0,8707.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/240","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nSo I have the impression, that the Chinese leadership has understood that you have to create incentives. That they're intending to decentralize decision makings. That they know that you run an economy in which the managers do not know their customers or their suppliers, you have absolutely no check. On the decisions.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8707.0,8728.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/241","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd that you are creating an absolutely arbitrary system. And not a planned system. And you are creating more corruption, rather than less corruption because there's no normal check. So this, but of course there's a communist party. And how to reconcile the communist party with the needs of incentive, this is the drama of the Chinese domestic effort right now.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8728.0,8753.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/242","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nOn which I think they are making progress. The second problem is, if one looks at Chinese history. And to say this in a city populated so largely by Chinese is ridiculous. But to be, as a Westerner, studying Chinese history. One is struck by the fact. That there seems to be a reason between modernization and remaining Chinese and that, in the 19th Century, the Chinese have always felt.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8753.0,8784.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/243","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBefore too that being Chinese is so precious and so unique that you must hesitate that by trying to become like everybody else. And yet when you modernize, to some extent, you become like everybody else. So, I would not be surprised that in a society in which after all in the Confucian tradition and a Taoist tradition.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8784.0,8813.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/244","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nEach of which were based on the concept of uniqueness that there is a psychological revolution by some against continued modernization. I think that's a serious psychological problem. On the other hand if you look at typical, you can see what can be done once this particular obstacle is overcome.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8813.0,8840.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/245","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd I think that the Chinese, if there is any nation that will be able to overcome this die feeling effect of a communist structure and develop, I think it's the, it's the Chinese. Because, there is just a limit I think when looks with again I'm speaking as an outsider.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8840.0,8864.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/246","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThere's a barbarian looking at the Chinese, to me they look like the most individualistic people. And there's just a limit beyond which you cannot impose doctrine and forms on them that are country to reality. And one way or another, they're gonna make something work. And so, I'm really quite optimistic that the Chinese, that communist China will adopt the forms that will enable it to modernize.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8864.0,8895.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/247","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBut it will be painful and it will take a long time.\n\u003e\u003e Just about enough time for a last question, and I'd like to direct it on a personal plane, if you don't mind. It's a very subjective question, but one of the impressions we got here is that you were a lot more outspoken when you were in office than you were out.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8895.0,8914.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/248","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd my question is whether, first of all, whether that's true. And if true, whether that's a better protocol. And you have many friends in Washington. Or whether, as some cynics have pointed out, that you still have affection of a mind still directed on a possible return to high public office?\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8914.0,8935.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/249","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e Well, to take your last first, I do not have my mind directed towards return to high public office. I It can in fact get used to the proposition that I can give a speech in Singapore, that they won't even notice in Washington, no matter what I say.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8935.0,8960.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/250","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nSo, that is not my problem. I do believe, and I support this present administration even though there have been periods previously. But I was not in agreement with President Reagan because as I look at the American history over the last 20 years, I think it is important that America have a strong President.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8960.0,8985.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/251","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd because I do not see that any purpose is served by picking around on minor issues. And of course it's less exciting if you are in substantial agreement but I have no, I think my most useful role now is to say what I think. And if what I think happens to think is in agreement with existing policy that it is the price I have to pay for something less outspoken.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=8985.0,9013.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7752/annotation/252","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e Well, and on that note I like to, in behalf of my two colleagues here. I like to thank you for the opportunity of this interview. Thank you very much Dr. Kissinger.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=9013.0,9059.52"}]},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7753","type":"AnnotationPage","label":{"en":["ms_1981_s07_b0904_caption.vtt [Transcript]"]},"items":[{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7753/annotation/253","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"00:00:00.000 --\u003e 00:00:09.766\n\u003e\u003e [SOUND]\n\n00:00:09.766 --\u003e 00:00:19.766\n\u003e\u003e [APPLAUSE]\n\n00:00:32.710 --\u003e 00:00:38.004\n\u003e\u003e Dr Kissinger Ladies and gentlemen,\n\n00:00:38.004 --\u003e 00:00:44.501\nwelcome to the 1981 Singapore lecture.\n\n00:00:46.300 --\u003e 00:00:52.070\nThe first Singapore lecture inaugurated\nlast year by professor Friedman.\n\n00:00:53.580 --\u003e 00:00:58.960\nDoubt with finding solutions\nto economic problems\n\n00:01:00.040 --\u003e 00:01:04.792\nwhich even the mythological invisible hand\n\n00:01:04.792 --\u003e 00:01:10.370\nappears unable to guide\nin the desired direction.\n\n00:01:12.500 --\u003e 00:01:18.810\nOur speaker tonight Doctor Henry Kissinger\nwill deal with error of facet\n\n00:01:19.890 --\u003e 00:01:26.450\nof the world crisis, the disarray, and\nthe conduct of international relations.\n\n00:01:29.390 --\u003e 00:01:35.509\nSince international economics and\npolitics are interrelated\n\n00:01:35.509 --\u003e 00:01:41.744\nproblems what Dr Kissinger has\nto say tonight will, I'm sure,\n\n00:01:41.744 --\u003e 00:01:47.979\nbring illumination to the more\nfundamental source of the crisis\n\n00:01:47.979 --\u003e 00:01:53.072\nwhich permeates almost all\naspects of modern life.\n\n00:01:55.516 --\u003e 00:02:00.540\nThe title of Dr. Kissinger's talk\n\n00:02:00.540 --\u003e 00:02:05.564\nsuggest a presentation of American\n\n00:02:05.564 --\u003e 00:02:10.922\nforeign policy not from a national but\n\n00:02:10.922 --\u003e 00:02:14.951\nfrom a global point of view.\n\n00:02:14.951 --\u003e 00:02:18.767\nHis title confirms my belief,\n\n00:02:18.767 --\u003e 00:02:24.490\nthat a global power,\nlike the United States,\n\n00:02:24.490 --\u003e 00:02:29.334\ncannot limit itself to a foreign policy\n\n00:02:29.334 --\u003e 00:02:33.909\nfounded only on national interest.\n\n00:02:35.620 --\u003e 00:02:42.360\nThough many American politicians\ntalk as though that were the case.\n\n00:02:44.780 --\u003e 00:02:49.560\nHowever, Dr Kissinger is an exception.\n\n00:02:49.560 --\u003e 00:02:56.124\nAs Secretary of State,\nhe more than his predecessors,\n\n00:02:56.124 --\u003e 00:03:01.294\nconsciously and deliberately directed his\n\n00:03:01.294 --\u003e 00:03:06.742\ncountries foreign policy\nmore in the European\n\n00:03:06.742 --\u003e 00:03:11.641\ntradition than the American tradition.\n\n00:03:11.641 --\u003e 00:03:19.377\nAnd this more than his personal style\nof diplomacy is what made him so\n\n00:03:19.377 --\u003e 00:03:24.410\ncontroversial a figure in his own country.\n\n00:03:27.020 --\u003e 00:03:32.252\nIt is my impression,\nthat as Secretary of State he\n\n00:03:32.252 --\u003e 00:03:39.355\nbetter understood precisely for\nthis reason that he owe us better,\n\n00:03:39.355 --\u003e 00:03:43.717\nhe owe us better understood precisely for\n\n00:03:43.717 --\u003e 00:03:50.571\nthis reason by his ideological\nadversaries in the Soviet Union,\n\n00:03:50.571 --\u003e 00:03:54.700\nin China, and even in The Middle East.\n\n00:03:54.700 --\u003e 00:04:00.217\nThey may not have\nappreciated his precise and\n\n00:04:00.217 --\u003e 00:04:08.070\ndisconsulting moves he made in\nthe power game from time to time.\n\n00:04:09.440 --\u003e 00:04:16.020\nBut they knew that he was\nplaying chess and not checkers.\n\n00:04:17.890 --\u003e 00:04:23.361\nAnd in the dangerous game\nof power politics where\n\n00:04:23.361 --\u003e 00:04:28.833\ncalculated risks have to\nbe taken in diplomacy,\n\n00:04:28.833 --\u003e 00:04:33.771\nit is very important for\nadversaries to know\n\n00:04:33.771 --\u003e 00:04:38.722\nwhether chess or checkers is being played.\n\n00:04:38.722 --\u003e 00:04:43.567\nDr. Kissinger's topic is\na crucial interest to non\n\n00:04:43.567 --\u003e 00:04:48.971\ncommunist countries like\nSingapore because our future.\n\n00:04:48.971 --\u003e 00:04:54.737\nRegardless of whether we find\nthe Americans lovable or\n\n00:04:54.737 --\u003e 00:04:59.874\nnot, will depend on\nwhether the United States,\n\n00:04:59.874 --\u003e 00:05:04.888\nor the Soviet Union wins\nthe ongoing contest for\n\n00:05:04.888 --\u003e 00:05:10.430\nleadership, in world economy and\nworld politics.\n\n00:05:12.450 --\u003e 00:05:17.270\nThe outcome of this contest\nbetween the two will be decided\n\n00:05:18.860 --\u003e 00:05:24.580\nnot in some remote future,\nbut in the lifetime\n\n00:05:24.580 --\u003e 00:05:28.640\nof the vast majority present\nin this hall tonight.\n\n00:05:31.300 --\u003e 00:05:37.790\nSince one or\nthe other of the only two contestants for\n\n00:05:37.790 --\u003e 00:05:41.523\nworld leadership must win.\n\n00:05:41.523 --\u003e 00:05:49.034\nThen, in so\nfar as this contest is concerned,\n\n00:05:49.034 --\u003e 00:05:53.850\nneutrality will not preclude\n\n00:05:53.850 --\u003e 00:05:59.435\nthe rest of us from becoming either\n\n00:05:59.435 --\u003e 00:06:04.080\nbeneficiaries or victims.\n\n00:06:04.080 --\u003e 00:06:10.320\nBut what possibly bothers some\nof us is whether an affluent,\n\n00:06:10.320 --\u003e 00:06:15.360\ndemocratic United States\nis better equipped for\n\n00:06:15.360 --\u003e 00:06:20.200\nthe rigorous and discipline of\ncontests for world leadership,\n\n00:06:21.680 --\u003e 00:06:27.710\nthan a lean and\naustere Soviet dictatorship.\n\n00:06:27.710 --\u003e 00:06:33.141\nThis is what says, and\nI can think of no speaker\n\n00:06:33.141 --\u003e 00:06:38.574\nbetter qualified to clear up\nthis very human doubts and\n\n00:06:38.574 --\u003e 00:06:42.958\nanxieties on our part than Dr. Kissinger.\n\n00:06:45.534 --\u003e 00:06:53.908\nYou can decide after hearing him\nwhether to hedge your bets or not.\n\n00:06:53.908 --\u003e 00:06:58.150\nI have now great pleasure in inviting Dr.\n\n00:06:58.150 --\u003e 00:07:03.853\nKissinger to deliver\nthe 1981 Singapore lecture.\n\n00:07:03.853 --\u003e 00:07:13.853\n\u003e\u003e [APPLAUSE]\n\n00:07:19.476 --\u003e 00:07:23.047\n\u003e\u003e Mr Deputy Prime Minister, excellencies,\n\n00:07:23.047 --\u003e 00:07:25.465\n[COUGH] ladies and gentlemen.\n\n00:07:29.617 --\u003e 00:07:37.530\nI accepted the invitation to\nspeak here with great eagerness.\n\n00:07:39.852 --\u003e 00:07:45.026\nBecause though Singapore is a relatively\n\n00:07:45.026 --\u003e 00:07:49.910\nsmall country in terms of population.\n\n00:07:52.000 --\u003e 00:07:57.350\nIn terms of its influence\nwhen I was in office.\n\n00:07:59.670 --\u003e 00:08:06.020\nUnder the Distinguished\nleadership that you have,\n\n00:08:08.060 --\u003e 00:08:11.970\nit has always played\na very significant role.\n\n00:08:14.040 --\u003e 00:08:19.585\nI believe that the deputy\nprime minister has\n\n00:08:19.585 --\u003e 00:08:25.740\nposed exactly that I'd question for\nour period.\n\n00:08:27.470 --\u003e 00:08:32.972\nAnd exactly,\nthe question that the United States\n\n00:08:32.972 --\u003e 00:08:38.089\nmust answer if free\nsocieties are to survive.\n\n00:08:41.254 --\u003e 00:08:45.737\nAnd also I wanna take this\nopportunity to tell you,\n\n00:08:48.780 --\u003e 00:08:54.424\nHow important for my own intellectual\n\n00:08:54.424 --\u003e 00:08:59.716\ndevelopment in understanding this\n\n00:08:59.716 --\u003e 00:09:04.654\narea has been disconcentrated,\n\n00:09:04.654 --\u003e 00:09:09.944\nand the occasional scolding we have\n\n00:09:09.944 --\u003e 00:09:15.428\nreceived from your prime minister.\n\n00:09:15.428 --\u003e 00:09:20.705\n[COUGH] Who, the first time I met him,\n\n00:09:20.705 --\u003e 00:09:26.664\nwas telling my colleagues at Harvard that\n\n00:09:26.664 --\u003e 00:09:33.644\nthey didn't know what\nthey were talking about,\n\n00:09:33.644 --\u003e 00:09:39.092\nand who appeared from time to time when\n\n00:09:39.092 --\u003e 00:09:46.773\nI was in office in Washington\nto recall us to our duty.\n\n00:09:46.773 --\u003e 00:09:53.560\nSo I'm here as an admirer,\nof what has been accomplished here,\n\n00:09:53.560 --\u003e 00:09:56.960\nand as a friend of your leaders.\n\n00:09:59.683 --\u003e 00:10:04.700\nAnd I will now try to address some of\n\n00:10:04.700 --\u003e 00:10:11.101\nthe questions your deputy prime minister,\n\n00:10:11.101 --\u003e 00:10:16.640\nchairman here, has addressed to me.\n\n00:10:19.760 --\u003e 00:10:23.980\nAs I said,\nit is the key question of our period.\n\n00:10:25.620 --\u003e 00:10:33.630\nWhether the United States can master\nsufficient understanding and resolutions.\n\n00:10:35.742 --\u003e 00:10:40.122\nTo maintain and to prevail in\n\n00:10:40.122 --\u003e 00:10:45.971\nthe contest that is now taking place.\n\n00:10:45.971 --\u003e 00:10:50.668\nFor the emotional\n\n00:10:50.668 --\u003e 00:10:55.890\nbalance of those members of\nthe American embassy who may be here,\n\n00:10:57.640 --\u003e 00:11:03.675\nI would like to stress that I\nspeak in my private capacity.\n\n00:11:03.675 --\u003e 00:11:08.849\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e And\n\n00:11:08.849 --\u003e 00:11:15.286\nthat you must receive\nthe official formulations from\n\n00:11:15.286 --\u003e 00:11:20.586\nour ambassador and his outstanding staff.\n\n00:11:20.586 --\u003e 00:11:25.875\nAt the same time,\nI want to stress that I strongly\n\n00:11:25.875 --\u003e 00:11:34.165\nsupport the main lines of the foreign\npolicy of the Reagan administration.\n\n00:11:34.165 --\u003e 00:11:39.030\nAnd that I make this qualification only so\n\n00:11:39.030 --\u003e 00:11:45.708\nthat I can talk to you as\na philosopher and as an observer.\n\n00:11:45.708 --\u003e 00:11:51.160\nBut you should remember that\nI am at ease about the main\n\n00:11:51.160 --\u003e 00:11:57.115\ndirections of our foreign policy,\nand that I support it.\n\n00:11:57.115 --\u003e 00:12:01.450\nThe question that has been put to me.\n\n00:12:04.079 --\u003e 00:12:09.407\nIt's important because\nthere is no doubt that\n\n00:12:09.407 --\u003e 00:12:16.376\nthe United States has found\nitself in the post-war period,\n\n00:12:16.376 --\u003e 00:12:20.610\nin a world for which very little In our\n\n00:12:20.610 --\u003e 00:12:25.410\nhistorical experienced has prepare us.\n\n00:12:28.400 --\u003e 00:12:33.760\nIt has not occurred,\nit had not occurred to Americans\n\n00:12:35.360 --\u003e 00:12:38.709\nbefore the end of World War II.\n\n00:12:40.630 --\u003e 00:12:45.298\nThat ours was irresponsibility for\n\n00:12:45.298 --\u003e 00:12:49.348\na continuing foreign policy.\n\n00:12:49.348 --\u003e 00:12:57.709\nUntil 1945, the United States felt\nitself secure behind two great oceans.\n\n00:13:00.156 --\u003e 00:13:05.615\nAnd it was inconceivable\nto Americans that upheavals\n\n00:13:05.615 --\u003e 00:13:11.450\nin distant continents could\naffect American security.\n\n00:13:13.030 --\u003e 00:13:18.280\nIt was considered a basic\nprinciple in the United States,\n\n00:13:18.280 --\u003e 00:13:22.100\nthat nothing that occurred\nin Europe could possible\n\n00:13:22.100 --\u003e 00:13:26.890\naffect the United States directly and\nin both World Wars.\n\n00:13:28.750 --\u003e 00:13:34.565\nIt took the United States three\nyears in the World War I,\n\n00:13:34.565 --\u003e 00:13:38.399\nand two years in the World War 2, and\n\n00:13:38.399 --\u003e 00:13:43.227\nan attack on our territory\nbefore we committed\n\n00:13:43.227 --\u003e 00:13:49.070\nourselves to maintaining\nthe global balance of power.\n\n00:13:51.100 --\u003e 00:13:56.480\nA slight laid as 1947,\nan American chief of\n\n00:13:56.480 --\u003e 00:14:01.490\nstaff could present the military budget\nto the congress with a statement,\n\n00:14:02.870 --\u003e 00:14:09.240\nthis budget has been prepared without\nany political considerations whatsoever,\n\n00:14:12.080 --\u003e 00:14:18.650\nstrictly on its military merits,\nas if the relevance\n\n00:14:18.650 --\u003e 00:14:23.280\nto the global balance of power\nwas not of concern to him.\n\n00:14:26.140 --\u003e 00:14:31.149\nSo you have to understand\nthat the post-war period\n\n00:14:31.149 --\u003e 00:14:36.050\nhas been a rather painful process for\nAmericans.\n\n00:14:37.790 --\u003e 00:14:40.990\nAnd when I read foreign commentary\n\n00:14:42.470 --\u003e 00:14:47.860\nabout the complicated\ndark designs of American\n\n00:14:47.860 --\u003e 00:14:53.304\nstrategy, I sometimes wish\nit would have been true.\n\n00:14:53.304 --\u003e 00:14:58.005\nThe truth was much\n\n00:14:58.005 --\u003e 00:15:02.700\nless complicated.\n\n00:15:02.700 --\u003e 00:15:09.254\nThe truth has been that for\nmuch of the post-war period,\n\n00:15:09.254 --\u003e 00:15:15.179\nthe United States has had reluctantly,\nto understand\n\n00:15:15.179 --\u003e 00:15:19.510\nthat conflicts in distant parts\n\n00:15:20.690 --\u003e 00:15:25.210\nhad a direct impact on America's future.\n\n00:15:27.100 --\u003e 00:15:31.700\nThe hardest lesson for us has been implied\n\n00:15:32.740 --\u003e 00:15:36.220\nin the question that your\nchairman put at the beginning.\n\n00:15:37.970 --\u003e 00:15:43.240\nWe have had to learn that the American\n\n00:15:43.240 --\u003e 00:15:48.630\nnational interest has to be\nsought in the global interest.\n\n00:15:50.710 --\u003e 00:15:52.949\nAnd that for the United States to believe,\n\n00:15:54.620 --\u003e 00:15:58.980\nthat it can protect itself\nwhile sacrificing others.\n\n00:16:00.880 --\u003e 00:16:05.668\nWas only to put off the evil day and\n\n00:16:05.668 --\u003e 00:16:09.775\nto mortgage our onw future.\n\n00:16:09.775 --\u003e 00:16:14.591\nI speak to you this frankly because you\n\n00:16:14.591 --\u003e 00:16:19.558\nare all familiar with debates that have\n\n00:16:19.558 --\u003e 00:16:23.774\nhad very unfortunate outcomes,\n\n00:16:23.774 --\u003e 00:16:31.921\nsuch as the one characteristic of\nthe period of the Vietnam War.\n\n00:16:34.403 --\u003e 00:16:40.618\nThere have been, in the United States,\nuntil fairly recently,\n\n00:16:40.618 --\u003e 00:16:47.180\ntwo dominant schools of reflection\nabout international politics.\n\n00:16:49.220 --\u003e 00:16:53.931\nThere has been a school\nthat has treated foreign\n\n00:16:53.931 --\u003e 00:16:58.887\npolicy as if it were\na subdivision of psychiatry.\n\n00:16:58.887 --\u003e 00:17:04.094\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e According to it,\n\n00:17:04.094 --\u003e 00:17:12.026\nrelations among nations are like\nrelations among people.\n\n00:17:12.026 --\u003e 00:17:15.979\nAnd that you achieve peace through\n\n00:17:15.979 --\u003e 00:17:21.439\nthe strenuous exercise\nof personal good will.\n\n00:17:23.510 --\u003e 00:17:32.181\nThat you may put people at ease\nby making unilateral concessions.\n\n00:17:34.898 --\u003e 00:17:40.361\nAnd you found that very much\nduring the Vietnam negotiations,\n\n00:17:40.361 --\u003e 00:17:43.360\na great part of which I conducted.\n\n00:17:44.600 --\u003e 00:17:51.740\nIn which, many of our media described\nthe negotiations as if they\n\n00:17:51.740 --\u003e 00:17:57.579\nwere a detective story in which the\nVietnamese would throw out vague clues.\n\n00:17:59.360 --\u003e 00:18:01.140\nAnd we had to guess at the answer.\n\n00:18:03.360 --\u003e 00:18:10.800\nAnd if somehow, we didn't quite\nget the point, that these gentle,\n\n00:18:10.800 --\u003e 00:18:16.729\nsensitive, put upon people they're trying\nto make, they would be so offended.\n\n00:18:18.230 --\u003e 00:18:22.410\nThat is was always our fault\nthat the negotiations failed.\n\n00:18:24.700 --\u003e 00:18:30.253\nAnd the other school of thought has tended\n\n00:18:30.253 --\u003e 00:18:37.242\nto see foreign policy as\na subdivision of theology.\n\n00:18:37.242 --\u003e 00:18:42.547\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e As an example of\n\n00:18:42.547 --\u003e 00:18:47.555\nthe eternal struggle between good and\n\n00:18:47.555 --\u003e 00:18:52.877\nevil in which you conduct foreign policy\n\n00:18:52.877 --\u003e 00:18:57.425\nby this strenuous condemnation.\n\n00:18:58.891 --\u003e 00:19:03.970\nOf your opponent and\nby never having anything to do with him.\n\n00:19:06.885 --\u003e 00:19:12.261\nAnd by isolating yourself as much\n\n00:19:12.261 --\u003e 00:19:17.445\nas possible from the impurities\n\n00:19:17.445 --\u003e 00:19:23.205\nof a world that can not be expected to\n\n00:19:23.205 --\u003e 00:19:28.590\nreach our own moral exaltation.\n\n00:19:28.590 --\u003e 00:19:31.770\nSo you have had periods in America\n\n00:19:33.410 --\u003e 00:19:39.040\nof isolationism because we considered\nourselves too good for this world.\n\n00:19:41.080 --\u003e 00:19:45.310\nAnd other periods of isolationism\nbecause we didn't consider\n\n00:19:45.310 --\u003e 00:19:49.180\nourselves good enough for this world.\n\n00:19:52.080 --\u003e 00:19:56.917\nAnd the impact on international politics\n\n00:19:56.917 --\u003e 00:20:01.486\nhas not been fortunate in either case.\n\n00:20:01.486 --\u003e 00:20:09.161\nBut, I am tracing this historical process,\n\n00:20:09.161 --\u003e 00:20:13.454\nso that you can understand that for\n\n00:20:13.454 --\u003e 00:20:18.782\nthe United States, the post war period has\n\n00:20:18.782 --\u003e 00:20:24.000\nalso been a process of self-education.\n\n00:20:24.000 --\u003e 00:20:30.746\nWe have had to learn that\nforeign policy is a process and\n\n00:20:30.746 --\u003e 00:20:35.450\nnot a series of disconnected events.\n\n00:20:37.827 --\u003e 00:20:40.190\nContrary to our historical experience.\n\n00:20:42.020 --\u003e 00:20:44.630\nWe have had to accept the proposition\n\n00:20:46.380 --\u003e 00:20:50.430\nthat there are no final\nanswers in foreign policy.\n\n00:20:52.100 --\u003e 00:20:57.418\nThat every apparent solution\nis an admissions price,\n\n00:20:57.418 --\u003e 00:21:01.820\nan admission ticket to\na new set of problems.\n\n00:21:04.781 --\u003e 00:21:09.060\nWe would like to think as a nation,\n\n00:21:09.060 --\u003e 00:21:14.077\nthat we can work for\na day, at which it can\n\n00:21:14.077 --\u003e 00:21:18.810\nbe said that the world is now at peace.\n\n00:21:20.790 --\u003e 00:21:26.410\nAnd everybody can live with\na consciousness of harmony.\n\n00:21:28.440 --\u003e 00:21:33.570\nBut history teaches us that\nalmost every war that has\n\n00:21:33.570 --\u003e 00:21:38.260\noccurred has broken out between\npeople who have been at peace.\n\n00:21:40.010 --\u003e 00:21:43.485\nIt is only in the Middle East that\nwars occur between countries that\n\n00:21:43.485 --\u003e 00:21:44.549\nare already at war.\n\n00:21:44.549 --\u003e 00:21:52.650\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\n00:21:52.650 --\u003e 00:21:56.253\n\u003e\u003e And therefore the process or\n\n00:21:56.253 --\u003e 00:22:01.658\nthe problem of maintaining the conditions\n\n00:22:01.658 --\u003e 00:22:07.373\nin which peace can be\npreserved is unending.\n\n00:22:10.044 --\u003e 00:22:15.720\nAnd there'll never be a period at which\n\n00:22:15.720 --\u003e 00:22:21.574\nAmericans can withdraw from the world.\n\n00:22:21.574 --\u003e 00:22:26.753\nAnd there can never be\na period any longer in which\n\n00:22:26.753 --\u003e 00:22:32.059\nwe can say that our own\nselfish interest permits us\n\n00:22:32.059 --\u003e 00:22:37.131\nto withdraw to the continental\nUnited States.\n\n00:22:37.131 --\u003e 00:22:41.416\nAnd let other nations fend for\n\n00:22:41.416 --\u003e 00:22:46.560\nthemselves, because to the extent\n\n00:22:46.560 --\u003e 00:22:52.390\nthat we ever attempted to do this we would\n\n00:22:52.390 --\u003e 00:22:57.534\nsimply produce a crisis of enormous\n\n00:22:57.534 --\u003e 00:23:02.700\nmagnitude for ourselves later on.\n\n00:23:02.700 --\u003e 00:23:09.670\nA properly understood American\nself-interest must take into account\n\n00:23:11.340 --\u003e 00:23:16.139\nthe interest of those who depend on us.\n\n00:23:17.890 --\u003e 00:23:22.315\nAnd of our friends and\neven must understand,\n\n00:23:22.315 --\u003e 00:23:27.444\nto some extent,\nthe interests of our adversaries.\n\n00:23:31.746 --\u003e 00:23:36.614\nI believe that after a period of enormous\n\n00:23:36.614 --\u003e 00:23:41.339\nnational anguish produced, in part,\n\n00:23:41.339 --\u003e 00:23:49.940\nby the rebellion against the world\nwhich does not let us escape from it.\n\n00:23:51.920 --\u003e 00:23:56.810\nThe American people is now behind\n\n00:23:56.810 --\u003e 00:24:01.993\nan administration Which agrees with\n\n00:24:01.993 --\u003e 00:24:06.903\nsome of it almost all\n\n00:24:06.903 --\u003e 00:24:12.962\nthe principles that I have put\n\n00:24:12.962 --\u003e 00:24:17.950\nforward here.\n\n00:24:17.950 --\u003e 00:24:23.389\nThough they might express\nthem not having been born\n\n00:24:23.389 --\u003e 00:24:29.596\nin Germany in somewhat simpler\nlanguage than is my habit.\n\n00:24:32.499 --\u003e 00:24:39.493\n[COUGH] Fundamentally, American\n\n00:24:39.493 --\u003e 00:24:44.693\nforeign policy now realizes\nthat there can be no\n\n00:24:44.693 --\u003e 00:24:49.767\npeace in the world without\na balance of power.\n\n00:24:51.619 --\u003e 00:24:59.490\nThat there can be no progress in the world\nwithout a significant American role.\n\n00:25:01.600 --\u003e 00:25:06.740\nThe balance of power is not something\nthat we can do once and for all.\n\n00:25:08.210 --\u003e 00:25:13.580\nBut that has to be tended with great care\n\n00:25:13.580 --\u003e 00:25:20.261\nby constant assessments and\ncareful analysis.\n\n00:25:20.261 --\u003e 00:25:24.745\nIn fact the biggest\nproblem in the conduct of\n\n00:25:24.745 --\u003e 00:25:29.108\nforeign politic is that\nwhen you sculpt for\n\n00:25:29.108 --\u003e 00:25:35.530\naction is greatest the knowledge\non which to base such action,\n\n00:25:35.530 --\u003e 00:25:42.437\nit's at a minimum and when your\nknowledge is greatest the sculpt for\n\n00:25:42.437 --\u003e 00:25:46.590\ncreated action has often disappeared.\n\n00:25:48.220 --\u003e 00:25:51.980\nSo we have to adjust, all of us,\n\n00:25:53.150 --\u003e 00:25:58.440\nour policies to new conditions\nwhenever they arise.\n\n00:26:00.620 --\u003e 00:26:05.808\nThis, quite frankly, is one of the sources\n\n00:26:05.808 --\u003e 00:26:12.962\nof the debate that is now going\non within the United States and\n\n00:26:12.962 --\u003e 00:26:20.970\nsome of our European allies about\nthe nature of military strategy.\n\n00:26:25.062 --\u003e 00:26:28.946\nThere is no escaping\nAmerican responsibilities.\n\n00:26:28.946 --\u003e 00:26:33.860\nTo assert the technology and\n\n00:26:33.860 --\u003e 00:26:38.920\nthat the military capabilities\nhave radically changed.\n\n00:26:40.270 --\u003e 00:26:46.220\nSince the days that the Atlantic\nalliance was first formed.\n\n00:26:48.480 --\u003e 00:26:53.368\nIt is a fact that nuclear stockpiles on\n\n00:26:53.368 --\u003e 00:26:58.266\nboth sides have grown immeasurably.\n\n00:27:02.990 --\u003e 00:27:08.610\nBut where I differ without allies or\n\n00:27:08.610 --\u003e 00:27:12.175\nsome of our allies is,\n\n00:27:14.159 --\u003e 00:27:19.025\nThat they seem to think America seeks to\n\n00:27:19.025 --\u003e 00:27:23.154\nescape the common defense when it\n\n00:27:23.154 --\u003e 00:27:28.024\ncalls attention to the new realities.\n\n00:27:28.024 --\u003e 00:27:34.700\nIn fact,\nThere is no escaping the common defense.\n\n00:27:36.490 --\u003e 00:27:42.262\nAs I've said earlier,\nif the United States is perceived\n\n00:27:42.262 --\u003e 00:27:47.554\nto sacrifice the interests\nof friendly countries,\n\n00:27:47.554 --\u003e 00:27:52.495\nmuch less the existence\nof friendly countries.\n\n00:27:52.495 --\u003e 00:27:56.990\nAll global structure and\norder will disappear.\n\n00:27:58.890 --\u003e 00:28:03.140\nBy the same token,\nif the United States is serious\n\n00:28:04.720 --\u003e 00:28:08.690\nabout the survival of our friends.\n\n00:28:08.690 --\u003e 00:28:16.590\nIt has a duty to put before them\nperiodically its strategic assessment.\n\n00:28:18.270 --\u003e 00:28:23.699\nAnd it has an obligation to invite\n\n00:28:23.699 --\u003e 00:28:30.570\nthem to a participation in their defense.\n\n00:28:30.570 --\u003e 00:28:34.800\nIt is simply not logical\nin out relations with\n\n00:28:34.800 --\u003e 00:28:39.588\nEuropean countries to assume\nthat a continent that\n\n00:28:39.588 --\u003e 00:28:44.375\nhas a population larger\nthan the Soviet Union, and\n\n00:28:44.375 --\u003e 00:28:49.386\na gross national product\nlarger that the Soviet Union\n\n00:28:49.386 --\u003e 00:28:54.313\ncannot make a greater effort\nin the common defense.\n\n00:28:54.313 --\u003e 00:28:57.227\nAnd especially, when there's so\n\n00:28:57.227 --\u003e 00:29:02.059\nmany other areas of the world that cry for\nour attention.\n\n00:29:05.004 --\u003e 00:29:11.068\nNow, [COUGH] With this same reasoning\n\n00:29:11.068 --\u003e 00:29:17.299\none has to look at this part of the world.\n\n00:29:21.662 --\u003e 00:29:27.290\nAlmost miraculously Southeast Asia has\n\n00:29:27.290 --\u003e 00:29:32.919\ndeveloped economically more rapidly,\n\n00:29:32.919 --\u003e 00:29:40.210\nthe many expected despite\nthe set backs in Vietnam.\n\n00:29:42.890 --\u003e 00:29:48.000\nFor which quiet frankly a domestic\n\n00:29:48.000 --\u003e 00:29:52.848\ndebates very heavy responsibility.\n\n00:29:52.848 --\u003e 00:29:56.350\nDespite this there has developed here\n\n00:29:58.220 --\u003e 00:30:03.510\nin this region a political\nself confidence and\n\n00:30:03.510 --\u003e 00:30:08.739\nan attempt a successful attempt for\n\n00:30:08.739 --\u003e 00:30:15.870\nthe elaboration of their own estimates.\n\n00:30:18.330 --\u003e 00:30:23.910\nIt is in the American national interest\n\n00:30:23.910 --\u003e 00:30:29.151\nthat this processes continues, and\n\n00:30:29.151 --\u003e 00:30:36.083\nit is in our interest to\nprevent outside powers,\n\n00:30:36.083 --\u003e 00:30:41.155\nfrom imposing on this area a destiny\n\n00:30:41.155 --\u003e 00:30:45.733\nwhich this area has not chosen.\n\n00:30:45.733 --\u003e 00:30:49.959\nEither directly or\n\n00:30:49.959 --\u003e 00:30:56.037\nby the use of proxy forces.\n\n00:30:58.938 --\u003e 00:31:02.554\nAnd let me, therefore now,\n\n00:31:02.554 --\u003e 00:31:07.678\nturn to some discussion of our principal\n\n00:31:07.678 --\u003e 00:31:12.020\nadversary The Soviet Union.\n\n00:31:19.359 --\u003e 00:31:23.964\n[COUGH] The Soviet Union, Is\n\n00:31:23.964 --\u003e 00:31:29.346\nthe heir of the old Russian Empire and\n\n00:31:29.346 --\u003e 00:31:35.248\nit has added to it an ideology that claims\n\n00:31:35.248 --\u003e 00:31:40.290\nto be of universal significance.\n\n00:31:42.880 --\u003e 00:31:49.256\nWhen your chairman said,\nhowever lovable the United States\n\n00:31:49.256 --\u003e 00:31:54.267\nmaybe we are crucial to\nthe future of this area.\n\n00:31:54.267 --\u003e 00:31:58.060\nI must tell him that it\nis the American illusion\n\n00:31:59.720 --\u003e 00:32:04.080\nThat we're infinitely lovable, and\n\n00:32:04.080 --\u003e 00:32:07.770\nthat we can prevail\nbecause people like us.\n\n00:32:10.130 --\u003e 00:32:14.863\nIt is, I fear, the Russian knowledge,\n\n00:32:14.863 --\u003e 00:32:19.745\nthat they are not particularly lovable.\n\n00:32:19.745 --\u003e 00:32:24.977\nAnd that if they're going\nto prevail anywhere,\n\n00:32:24.977 --\u003e 00:32:28.302\nit has to be by military force.\n\n00:32:30.489 --\u003e 00:32:33.687\nWe have, after all,\n\n00:32:33.687 --\u003e 00:32:38.667\nthe astonishing phenomenon that\n\n00:32:38.667 --\u003e 00:32:44.002\nnowhere has a communist government\n\n00:32:44.002 --\u003e 00:32:50.070\never come to power by peaceful message.\n\n00:32:50.070 --\u003e 00:32:56.970\nWherever a communist government\nhas been established,\n\n00:32:56.970 --\u003e 00:33:00.849\nit has required the Red Army, or\n\n00:33:00.849 --\u003e 00:33:06.178\nat any rate, a communist military effort.\n\n00:33:06.178 --\u003e 00:33:09.871\nAnd then, in those areas\ncontrolled by the Soviet Union.\n\n00:33:11.549 --\u003e 00:33:18.368\nThey have been the only\ndeveloped countries\n\n00:33:18.368 --\u003e 00:33:24.631\nin which revolutions have taken place,\n\n00:33:24.631 --\u003e 00:33:30.168\ncontrary to any communist theory.\n\n00:33:30.168 --\u003e 00:33:35.436\nWe face, in the communist system,\n\n00:33:35.436 --\u003e 00:33:41.581\nan opponent who, as your Chairman said,\n\n00:33:41.581 --\u003e 00:33:45.795\nis austere and determined,\n\n00:33:45.795 --\u003e 00:33:49.494\nmaybe even implacable.\n\n00:33:49.494 --\u003e 00:33:54.849\nAn adversary that has spent several\n\n00:33:54.849 --\u003e 00:34:02.540\ndecades elaborating his\nmilitary capabilities.\n\n00:34:02.540 --\u003e 00:34:07.662\nBut at the same time, we have to\n\n00:34:07.662 --\u003e 00:34:12.784\nrealize that it is a system that\n\n00:34:12.784 --\u003e 00:34:18.106\nis top-heavy and stagnating.\n\n00:34:20.509 --\u003e 00:34:28.848\nOn the one hand, it places great stress\non what it calls objective factors,\n\n00:34:28.848 --\u003e 00:34:35.380\nwhich means the balance of power and\nmaterial conditions.\n\n00:34:37.150 --\u003e 00:34:43.610\nNothing is more futile than to\nattempt to persuade Soviet negotiators\n\n00:34:43.610 --\u003e 00:34:50.800\nthrough personal charm and\ngood personal relations.\n\n00:34:50.800 --\u003e 00:34:55.700\nThe basic attitude of Soviet negotiators\nto their Western counterparts, or\n\n00:34:55.700 --\u003e 00:34:57.379\nto their non-communist counterparts,\n\n00:34:58.470 --\u003e 00:35:03.680\nis like that of Western\npsychiatrists to their patients.\n\n00:35:03.680 --\u003e 00:35:06.220\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e No matter what we say,\n\n00:35:07.610 --\u003e 00:35:12.888\nthey think they understand us better\nthan we understand ourselves.\n\n00:35:12.888 --\u003e 00:35:20.144\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e They believe very strongly,.\n\n00:35:22.910 --\u003e 00:35:28.493\nIn so-called scientific materialism and\n\n00:35:28.493 --\u003e 00:35:34.390\nin what they call\nthe correlation of forces.\n\n00:35:36.860 --\u003e 00:35:44.140\nThe only trouble is that if you\nlook at the correlation of forces,\n\n00:35:45.950 --\u003e 00:35:51.540\nand at this scientific materialism,\nyou'll find a society\n\n00:35:51.540 --\u003e 00:35:57.560\nof great military power, but not one,\n\n00:35:57.560 --\u003e 00:36:03.990\nthat in any sense can represent\na meaningful wave of the future.\n\n00:36:06.910 --\u003e 00:36:13.840\nThe Soviet system now has been\nin existence for 75 years.\n\n00:36:16.110 --\u003e 00:36:21.448\nIn that whole period,\nthey have had exactly three changes\n\n00:36:21.448 --\u003e 00:36:26.600\nof top leadership.\n\n00:36:26.600 --\u003e 00:36:28.760\nThe first two died in office.\n\n00:36:30.670 --\u003e 00:36:34.440\nThe third went on vacation\nwithout his colleagues.\n\n00:36:37.640 --\u003e 00:36:42.020\nAnd the fate of the fourth\none is [INAUDIBLE].\n\n00:36:42.020 --\u003e 00:36:44.800\nNobody has ever retired honorably\n\n00:36:46.460 --\u003e 00:36:50.746\nfrom a top leadership position.\n\n00:36:50.746 --\u003e 00:36:58.170\nThere is no system of\nregularized succession.\n\n00:36:58.170 --\u003e 00:37:04.500\nA few months ago, the central committee\n\n00:37:04.500 --\u003e 00:37:09.420\nof the Communist Party of the Soviet Union\non a departed congress met\n\n00:37:11.330 --\u003e 00:37:13.790\nand looked over their top leadership.\n\n00:37:15.370 --\u003e 00:37:20.130\nFound that their average age was 74 and\nconcluded that,\n\n00:37:20.130 --\u003e 00:37:25.270\nthat is exactly what they needed for\nthe next five years.\n\n00:37:29.160 --\u003e 00:37:35.968\nI find it difficult to\nbelieve that a system that\n\n00:37:35.968 --\u003e 00:37:41.242\ndoes not governance itself by any set\n\n00:37:41.242 --\u003e 00:37:46.348\nof regular procedures can possibly\n\n00:37:46.348 --\u003e 00:37:53.000\ncontinue in its present\nshape indefinitely.\n\n00:37:56.821 --\u003e 00:38:01.172\nIf one looks at the history\nof Soviet successions.\n\n00:38:04.204 --\u003e 00:38:09.550\nThe new leaders have always\nemerged from procedures\n\n00:38:09.550 --\u003e 00:38:16.242\nthat were essentially unpredictable\nwhen the process started.\n\n00:38:19.314 --\u003e 00:38:24.320\nIn a funny way,\nthe Soviet system is not run\n\n00:38:24.320 --\u003e 00:38:29.466\nby organized, legalized procedures, but\n\n00:38:29.466 --\u003e 00:38:35.585\nmore like a feudal system on\nthe basis of the personal\n\n00:38:35.585 --\u003e 00:38:42.139\nloyalties to individual\nmembers of the public bureau.\n\n00:38:42.139 --\u003e 00:38:46.447\nThe second major problem\n\n00:38:46.447 --\u003e 00:38:51.576\nthat exists is that clearly,\n\n00:38:51.576 --\u003e 00:38:56.911\nthat a system of total planning\n\n00:38:56.911 --\u003e 00:39:01.025\ncannot possibly work.\n\n00:39:01.025 --\u003e 00:39:06.148\nIn fact, the more elaborated the socialist\n\n00:39:06.148 --\u003e 00:39:11.690\neconomist become,\nthe less they seem to work.\n\n00:39:13.400 --\u003e 00:39:19.520\nWherever in the world, market economies\nhave competed with planned economies.\n\n00:39:21.340 --\u003e 00:39:25.560\nThere is no example that\na system of Soviet planning\n\n00:39:26.570 --\u003e 00:39:31.280\nhas ever done anywhere near as\nwell as the market systems.\n\n00:39:32.430 --\u003e 00:39:37.080\nWhether you look in this area,\nwhere even today,\n\n00:39:37.080 --\u003e 00:39:41.940\nSouth Vietnam is still better\noff than North Vietnam.\n\n00:39:43.030 --\u003e 00:39:46.760\nOr if you look at South Korea and\nNorth Korea, or\n\n00:39:46.760 --\u003e 00:39:50.900\nWest Germany and East Germany, or\nAustria, and any of its neighbors.\n\n00:39:52.290 --\u003e 00:39:57.030\nThe fact seems to be that it is\nimpossible to run an economy.\n\n00:39:58.050 --\u003e 00:40:02.790\nIn which managers know neither their\nsuppliers nor their customers, and\n\n00:40:02.790 --\u003e 00:40:05.900\nnot totally dependent on bureaucrats.\n\n00:40:08.090 --\u003e 00:40:12.900\nAnd the curious feature is, that a system\n\n00:40:12.900 --\u003e 00:40:17.359\nof bureaucratic planning leads\nto essential arbitrariness.\n\n00:40:18.550 --\u003e 00:40:24.140\nAnd corruption and\ncan be sustained only by a system\n\n00:40:24.140 --\u003e 00:40:28.940\nof black, which is to say free, markets.\n\n00:40:31.040 --\u003e 00:40:38.870\nAnd that gets us to the fundamental\nproblem of all communist societies.\n\n00:40:40.550 --\u003e 00:40:45.800\nAnd especially all Soviet\ncommunist societies which is\n\n00:40:45.800 --\u003e 00:40:47.630\nto be expressed in this paradox,\n\n00:40:49.040 --\u003e 00:40:54.270\nwhat do you do with a communist\nparty in a communist state?\n\n00:40:56.140 --\u003e 00:40:59.940\nThe communist party is\nneeded to seize power.\n\n00:41:01.490 --\u003e 00:41:06.950\nIt may be needed to establish\na government, but once it is in power,\n\n00:41:08.200 --\u003e 00:41:13.170\nit produces a group of supernumeraries\nthat are not needed for\n\n00:41:13.170 --\u003e 00:41:15.860\ngovernment and\nare not needed for the economy.\n\n00:41:17.320 --\u003e 00:41:18.968\nThey are not needed for\n\n00:41:18.968 --\u003e 00:41:23.751\nany function except to solve\nthe crises they themselves create.\n\n00:41:23.751 --\u003e 00:41:32.160\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e And therefore it is no accident.\n\n00:41:33.860 --\u003e 00:41:39.239\nFirst, I mentioned before that\nin industrialized countries,\n\n00:41:40.760 --\u003e 00:41:45.760\nthe only revolutions that occur\nare in communist countries,\n\n00:41:47.360 --\u003e 00:41:54.700\nand secondly, that they all concern\nthe role of the communist party.\n\n00:41:56.940 --\u003e 00:42:01.270\nThat is the fundamental problem in Poland.\n\n00:42:01.270 --\u003e 00:42:06.181\n35 years, after having\nestablish a monopoly of power,\n\n00:42:06.181 --\u003e 00:42:10.694\nafter controlling all\nthe media of communications,\n\n00:42:10.694 --\u003e 00:42:15.106\nthe secret police, the army,\nthe open police, and\n\n00:42:15.106 --\u003e 00:42:20.139\nthen the other form of pressure\nthe human mind can imagine.\n\n00:42:21.750 --\u003e 00:42:27.720\nAnd after all of this, there is not one\ncommunist country in Eastern Europe\n\n00:42:27.720 --\u003e 00:42:32.390\nwhere the communist party will have\na chance of winning a free election.\n\n00:42:34.810 --\u003e 00:42:39.259\nTherefore, while it is possible\n\n00:42:41.230 --\u003e 00:42:46.890\nto mention many mistakes that\nthe United States has made, and\n\n00:42:46.890 --\u003e 00:42:52.230\nwhile it would be idle to\ndeny that the United States\n\n00:42:52.230 --\u003e 00:42:57.240\nhas not had very great\ndifficulties of its own.\n\n00:42:59.580 --\u003e 00:43:04.602\nOur problems are problems\nof self-education,\n\n00:43:04.602 --\u003e 00:43:08.770\nof policy, of gaining understanding.\n\n00:43:10.750 --\u003e 00:43:15.130\nThe soviet problems\nare problems of structure.\n\n00:43:16.410 --\u003e 00:43:22.038\nThey're insoluble without\na fundamental change\n\n00:43:22.038 --\u003e 00:43:27.135\nin the Soviet system and\nthis being the case.\n\n00:43:27.135 --\u003e 00:43:32.887\nWe face this policy\n\n00:43:32.887 --\u003e 00:43:36.850\nchallenge.\n\n00:43:36.850 --\u003e 00:43:42.545\nA temptation for\nthe Soviet Union must be very great to try\n\n00:43:42.545 --\u003e 00:43:48.420\nto extend its domination\n\n00:43:48.420 --\u003e 00:43:53.169\nover the external environment so\n\n00:43:53.169 --\u003e 00:43:57.920\nthat whenever they have to turn to\nthe problem of domestic reform,\n\n00:43:59.210 --\u003e 00:44:03.880\nthere is no conceivable center\nof power in the outside world.\n\n00:44:06.410 --\u003e 00:44:13.360\nBut it is also true that if\nthey should fail to achieve\n\n00:44:13.360 --\u003e 00:44:18.180\nthis domination of the outside world,\neither directly\n\n00:44:20.180 --\u003e 00:44:24.510\nor through practice that then the problem\n\n00:44:24.510 --\u003e 00:44:29.190\nof domestic reform will become\nabsolutely unavoidable.\n\n00:44:31.490 --\u003e 00:44:35.980\nConversely, the problem of\nAmerican foreign policy\n\n00:44:37.660 --\u003e 00:44:41.780\nis to deprive the Soviet Union of any hope\n\n00:44:42.830 --\u003e 00:44:46.529\nthat they can escape their domestic\ndilemmas by foreign adventures.\n\n00:44:46.529 --\u003e 00:44:52.280\nEither by foreign adventures\nthat they generate directly,\n\n00:44:53.950 --\u003e 00:44:57.930\nor by foreign adventures\nthat are conducted by proxy\n\n00:44:59.410 --\u003e 00:45:06.420\nby Cuba in Africa, or\nby Vietnam in Southeast Asia.\n\n00:45:11.020 --\u003e 00:45:16.486\nAnd therefore, all those who are concerned\n\n00:45:16.486 --\u003e 00:45:21.656\nwith the future of peace\nin this world must\n\n00:45:21.656 --\u003e 00:45:27.420\nwork together To prevent this.\n\n00:45:29.210 --\u003e 00:45:34.316\nThey must not believe That\n\n00:45:34.316 --\u003e 00:45:39.041\neither the Soviet Union or\n\n00:45:39.041 --\u003e 00:45:44.410\nits proxies can be appeased by\n\n00:45:44.410 --\u003e 00:45:49.575\nconciliatory statements.\n\n00:45:49.575 --\u003e 00:45:54.210\nMy lifespan was significantly\nshortened by having to\n\n00:45:54.210 --\u003e 00:45:57.616\nnegotiate with the North Vietnamese.\n\n00:45:57.616 --\u003e 00:46:04.700\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e For a period of all the four years.\n\n00:46:05.710 --\u003e 00:46:10.265\nAnd as an experience I wish\non all my mortal enemies.\n\n00:46:10.265 --\u003e 00:46:12.935\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\n00:46:17.610 --\u003e 00:46:21.176\n\u003e\u003e It is my conviction based on\n\n00:46:21.176 --\u003e 00:46:28.309\nexperience, not that\nnegotiations are impossible,\n\n00:46:28.309 --\u003e 00:46:35.760\nbut that negotiations must\nreflect a balance of forces.\n\n00:46:37.310 --\u003e 00:46:40.150\nAnd without that balance of forces,\nthere is no magic formula.\n\n00:46:40.150 --\u003e 00:46:47.863\nThere is no gimmick that can rescue us.\n\n00:46:47.863 --\u003e 00:46:52.525\nIt is an illusion to\nbelieve that a political\n\n00:46:52.525 --\u003e 00:46:57.820\nsolution is an alternative\nto a balance of power.\n\n00:46:59.380 --\u003e 00:47:04.530\nA political solution is\nthe result of a balance of power.\n\n00:47:05.960 --\u003e 00:47:07.770\nThose are not alternatives.\n\n00:47:09.050 --\u003e 00:47:11.503\nThose are causal relationships.\n\n00:47:11.503 --\u003e 00:47:20.135\nNegotiations are not\na substitute of strength,\n\n00:47:20.135 --\u003e 00:47:24.773\nbut a result of strength.\n\n00:47:24.773 --\u003e 00:47:30.628\nNow as long as I have been in public life,\n\n00:47:30.628 --\u003e 00:47:36.141\nI have advocated a policy of linkage,\n\n00:47:36.141 --\u003e 00:47:44.430\nby which I mean that we should\nnot limit our adversaries.\n\n00:47:45.510 --\u003e 00:47:48.370\nTo pick among all the problems\nthat exist in the world,\n\n00:47:49.730 --\u003e 00:47:54.110\nthose which most relieve\ntheir difficulties, and\n\n00:47:54.110 --\u003e 00:47:59.800\nnegotiate those while\ncontinuing Acts of pressure,\n\n00:47:59.800 --\u003e 00:48:05.045\nintimidation, and aggression elsewhere.\n\n00:48:05.045 --\u003e 00:48:12.004\nIt is surely not asking too\nmuch to ask Soviet forces and\n\n00:48:12.004 --\u003e 00:48:17.149\nSoviet proxy forces to stay within their\n\n00:48:17.149 --\u003e 00:48:22.597\nown national borders If they want expanded\n\n00:48:22.597 --\u003e 00:48:28.523\neconomic relations with\nthe free societies.\n\n00:48:32.736 --\u003e 00:48:38.004\nThat has to be the major thrust\n\n00:48:38.004 --\u003e 00:48:42.008\nof the negotiations,\n\n00:48:42.008 --\u003e 00:48:47.066\nthat anybody can favor, and\n\n00:48:47.066 --\u003e 00:48:52.990\nthat so many people urge upon us.\n\n00:48:52.990 --\u003e 00:48:58.363\nAnd I believe that if\nthere were assurances.\n\n00:49:01.061 --\u003e 00:49:05.360\nThat Soviet forces would stop\nblackmailing their neighbors.\n\n00:49:07.700 --\u003e 00:49:12.460\nAnd if Soviet proxy forces in Vietnam, and\n\n00:49:12.460 --\u003e 00:49:17.119\nCuba, and elsewhere,\nwithdrew into their national territories,\n\n00:49:18.560 --\u003e 00:49:21.990\nthat then new conditions would exist.\n\n00:49:23.610 --\u003e 00:49:29.580\nBut until these conditions have arisen,\none should not believe\n\n00:49:30.760 --\u003e 00:49:36.860\nthat there is some abstract diplomatic\nformula that can substitute\n\n00:49:38.260 --\u003e 00:49:45.010\nfor a solution on the part of\nthe free societies and of unity.\n\n00:49:46.830 --\u003e 00:49:51.862\nAnd I'm sure that what I have said here is\n\n00:49:51.862 --\u003e 00:49:57.784\nthe current view of\nthe American government and\n\n00:49:57.784 --\u003e 00:50:03.718\nis strongly supported\nby the American public.\n\n00:50:06.662 --\u003e 00:50:11.769\nI would like to make a few\nadditional remarks about\n\n00:50:11.769 --\u003e 00:50:18.349\nrelations between the United States and\nthe developing world.\n\n00:50:20.090 --\u003e 00:50:25.203\nBecause I do not want\nto leave the impression\n\n00:50:25.203 --\u003e 00:50:31.007\nthat the United States\nbelieves that all problems\n\n00:50:31.007 --\u003e 00:50:36.394\nin the world can be ascribe or\ncan be subsumed,\n\n00:50:36.394 --\u003e 00:50:41.115\nand the category of east west problems.\n\n00:50:44.667 --\u003e 00:50:49.683\nNow, there's no doubt that what we witness\n\n00:50:49.683 --\u003e 00:50:55.379\nin the developing world\nwill in retrospect be seen\n\n00:50:55.379 --\u003e 00:51:01.902\nas one of the great revolutionary\nmovements in history.\n\n00:51:03.180 --\u003e 00:51:10.610\nNot in the Marxist sense but in the sense\nof the expansion of human consciousness.\n\n00:51:13.500 --\u003e 00:51:17.220\nAfter all,\nwhen the United Nations was formed,\n\n00:51:18.640 --\u003e 00:51:21.909\nthere was something like 50\nsovereign states in the world.\n\n00:51:23.730 --\u003e 00:51:27.640\nToday, there are some 150 states.\n\n00:51:30.770 --\u003e 00:51:33.520\nAnd each of them, in its own way,\n\n00:51:35.920 --\u003e 00:51:40.750\nhas to develop its own identity.\n\n00:51:42.010 --\u003e 00:51:47.011\nIn a time period,\nmuch shorter than anything that\n\n00:51:47.011 --\u003e 00:51:52.490\nthe European nations,\nwhich were the original nation\n\n00:51:52.490 --\u003e 00:51:57.859\nstates, Experienced.\n\n00:51:57.859 --\u003e 00:52:02.954\nIn fact, There is often a very\n\n00:52:02.954 --\u003e 00:52:08.589\nimportant difference between\nthe original nation states and\n\n00:52:08.589 --\u003e 00:52:13.150\nmany of the states that\nhave come into existence.\n\n00:52:14.780 --\u003e 00:52:21.489\nThe original nation states were\nnations before they were states.\n\n00:52:23.847 --\u003e 00:52:27.818\nMany of the developing countries\n\n00:52:27.818 --\u003e 00:52:32.638\nare states before they are nations, and\n\n00:52:32.638 --\u003e 00:52:37.885\nthey therefore have\na much more complicated\n\n00:52:37.885 --\u003e 00:52:42.138\nproblem of defining who they are and\n\n00:52:42.138 --\u003e 00:52:47.132\nwhat political process they can follow.\n\n00:52:51.217 --\u003e 00:52:56.073\nIt also means that some\nof the advocates in\n\n00:52:56.073 --\u003e 00:53:01.347\nAmerica who believed\nthat we could spread our\n\n00:53:01.347 --\u003e 00:53:07.177\ninstitutions at random,\nthroughout the world,\n\n00:53:07.177 --\u003e 00:53:11.756\nwith the best intentions in the world,\n\n00:53:11.756 --\u003e 00:53:15.919\noften have had a deserving impact on\n\n00:53:15.919 --\u003e 00:53:21.092\nthe political structure of new countries.\n\n00:53:21.092 --\u003e 00:53:26.243\nWhere the problem of\nDemocratic forums takes\n\n00:53:26.243 --\u003e 00:53:32.206\nby a different character\nthan it does in this society\n\n00:53:32.206 --\u003e 00:53:38.450\nwhere they developed over\n150 years of evolution.\n\n00:53:41.390 --\u003e 00:53:43.500\nIt is also remarkable.\n\n00:53:45.530 --\u003e 00:53:50.520\nThere is one looks, and this,\nI guess, speak for myself.\n\n00:53:52.720 --\u003e 00:53:57.790\nAt the developing world,\nmany of the nations\n\n00:53:58.830 --\u003e 00:54:02.710\nthat make most noise have\nbeen least successful.\n\n00:54:04.570 --\u003e 00:54:09.549\nAnd many of those who have been\nmost successful do not make\n\n00:54:09.549 --\u003e 00:54:11.423\nall that much noise.\n\n00:54:16.741 --\u003e 00:54:24.930\nThey have developed extraordinary\nconcepts in the post-war period.\n\n00:54:27.320 --\u003e 00:54:32.253\nBefore World War II,\nit would never have occurred to\n\n00:54:32.253 --\u003e 00:54:37.297\nany nation in the world that\nit had arrived to economic\n\n00:54:37.297 --\u003e 00:54:42.922\nassistance as the principal\nmeans of its own development.\n\n00:54:44.959 --\u003e 00:54:50.031\nUntil the end of World War II,\nit would have been taken for granted\n\n00:54:50.031 --\u003e 00:54:55.843\nthat a nation that wanted to develop had\nto do it largely by its own effort and\n\n00:54:55.843 --\u003e 00:55:00.659\nhad to relate itself, in some means,\nto its own capacities.\n\n00:55:02.070 --\u003e 00:55:08.034\nAnd indeed,\nthe successful developing nation,\n\n00:55:08.034 --\u003e 00:55:13.146\nsuch as this country, which has no natural\n\n00:55:13.146 --\u003e 00:55:18.974\nresources to speak of,\nhave done exactly that.\n\n00:55:22.281 --\u003e 00:55:28.307\nThe notion of aid without\nstrings that trips so\n\n00:55:28.307 --\u003e 00:55:33.251\nlightly off the lips of individuals is\n\n00:55:33.251 --\u003e 00:55:38.670\nreally another extraordinary concept.\n\n00:55:40.010 --\u003e 00:55:44.870\nWhy is it that nations should give\n\n00:55:44.870 --\u003e 00:55:49.370\naid without any conditions?\n\n00:55:49.370 --\u003e 00:55:52.950\nRecipients have a right to\ncomplain about the conditions,\n\n00:55:55.510 --\u003e 00:55:58.670\nbut they haven't any right to demand.\n\n00:56:01.310 --\u003e 00:56:07.694\nThat one gives resources,\nwithout a purpose.\n\n00:56:11.793 --\u003e 00:56:15.642\nAnd I must say,\n\n00:56:15.642 --\u003e 00:56:21.562\nthere is the phenomenon\n\n00:56:21.562 --\u003e 00:56:26.904\nof non-alignment.\n\n00:56:26.904 --\u003e 00:56:33.630\nOf course,\nevery nation has a right to be unaligned.\n\n00:56:35.530 --\u003e 00:56:39.920\nBut, what it cannot do is to insist.\n\n00:56:39.920 --\u003e 00:56:46.750\nThat we do not make a difference\nbetween friends and non-aligned.\n\n00:56:46.750 --\u003e 00:56:52.704\nOf course we treat friends better\nthan we treat non-aligned.\n\n00:56:52.704 --\u003e 00:56:59.479\n[COUGH] And if we didn't,\nwhat would be the sense in friendship.\n\n00:57:01.000 --\u003e 00:57:05.160\nWith the United States and\nI must tell you,\n\n00:57:06.540 --\u003e 00:57:11.335\nwithout wanting to be offensive or\nmore offensive than I've already been.\n\n00:57:11.335 --\u003e 00:57:14.260\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e When I was in office,\n\n00:57:17.080 --\u003e 00:57:21.110\nshocking as this may be to you, Chairman\n\u003e\u003e I never read\n\n00:57:22.640 --\u003e 00:57:31.378\nthe full text of the biannual\ndeclaration of the non-aligned nations.\n\n00:57:33.879 --\u003e 00:57:40.059\nMy staff gave me a summary\nwhich did not wet my appetite.\n\n00:57:41.180 --\u003e 00:57:46.675\nBut when I left office I decided to\nread the full text of what I had missed.\n\n00:57:46.675 --\u003e 00:57:51.470\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\n00:57:51.470 --\u003e 00:57:55.150\n\u003e\u003e And I made an astonishing discovery.\n\n00:57:57.488 --\u003e 00:58:01.891\nI found, that in reading these documents,\n\n00:58:04.192 --\u003e 00:58:11.515\nThat it was impossible to find\nin these declarations even one\n\n00:58:11.515 --\u003e 00:58:17.116\nword of approbation for\nthe United States, or\n\n00:58:17.116 --\u003e 00:58:22.440\none word of criticism for\nthe Soviet Union.\n\n00:58:25.340 --\u003e 00:58:31.030\nThen I said to myself,\nit is after all statically\n\n00:58:31.030 --\u003e 00:58:35.725\nimprobable that the United States\nis always wrong.\n\n00:58:35.725 --\u003e 00:58:43.375\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e Sometimes by accident.\n\n00:58:43.375 --\u003e 00:58:49.213\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e We've gotta do something that's right.\n\n00:58:49.213 --\u003e 00:58:51.760\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e And yet,\n\n00:58:54.522 --\u003e 00:58:59.823\nThe so-called non-aligned\n\n00:58:59.823 --\u003e 00:59:08.530\nhave never found\nthe statistical probability.\n\n00:59:08.530 --\u003e 00:59:14.310\nNow, how long do you think it is possible\nto ask the American Congress and\n\n00:59:14.310 --\u003e 00:59:19.510\nthe American public to make Economic\n\n00:59:20.700 --\u003e 00:59:25.950\ncontributions, in a world in which\n\n00:59:25.950 --\u003e 00:59:30.960\nour economic system is\nreviled by the recipients.\n\n00:59:32.910 --\u003e 00:59:39.004\nIn which it is claimed that any purpose\nwe have in giving the aide is improper.\n\n00:59:41.254 --\u003e 00:59:48.425\nAnd in which on top of it,\nthe recipients identify nonalignment,\n\n00:59:48.425 --\u003e 00:59:54.070\nwith constant opposition\nto every purpose we have.\n\n00:59:55.970 --\u003e 01:00:00.013\nI'm not asking that they\nsupport us all the time.\n\n01:00:00.013 --\u003e 01:00:03.394\nI believe that\n\n01:00:03.394 --\u003e 01:00:09.027\nthe as such\n\n01:00:09.027 --\u003e 01:00:14.570\nbecause they do not feel involved in\nall of the conflicts of the world.\n\n01:00:16.610 --\u003e 01:00:22.330\nAlthough it is another paradox that\nthe largest plug of nations to know exists\n\n01:00:23.450 --\u003e 01:00:28.073\nis the alignment of the non.\n\n01:00:28.073 --\u003e 01:00:31.042\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e Now,\n\n01:00:31.042 --\u003e 01:00:37.100\nI have said all of these\nbecause when reading\n\n01:00:38.290 --\u003e 01:00:42.390\n\u003e\u003e Some of the newspaper articles and\n\n01:00:42.390 --\u003e 01:00:50.830\nthe commentaries on the recent\nconference in Cancun I find repeated\n\n01:00:52.730 --\u003e 01:00:57.239\nsome of the dialogue,\nthe controversies of recent years.\n\n01:00:59.070 --\u003e 01:01:04.630\nWhen I was in office,\nthe slogan was A New Economic Order.\n\n01:01:06.470 --\u003e 01:01:09.560\nNow the slogan is, A Global Dialogue.\n\n01:01:11.440 --\u003e 01:01:17.390\nWhen I was in office, nobody could tell\nme what they meant by new economic order.\n\n01:01:18.530 --\u003e 01:01:23.730\n\u003e\u003e But it was considered the test of\nAmerican sincerity to embrace it.\n\n01:01:25.620 --\u003e 01:01:31.840\nNow, I don't know exactly what\nis meant by a global dialogue.\n\n01:01:33.450 --\u003e 01:01:37.260\nDoes it mean everybody talks\nto everybody simultaneously?\n\n01:01:38.805 --\u003e 01:01:42.700\n[LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e Or does it mean anybody is entitle to\n\n01:01:42.700 --\u003e 01:01:48.630\nraise any subject at one point in time?\n\n01:01:51.040 --\u003e 01:01:57.289\nI don't think it makes any sense for\nnations to tie us to slogans.\n\n01:01:59.370 --\u003e 01:02:05.330\nI favour negotiations\nbetween the United States\n\n01:02:06.800 --\u003e 01:02:12.020\nand developing countries\nthat have common purposes\n\n01:02:13.610 --\u003e 01:02:17.889\nand I believe it is important that\nthey deal with concrete issues\n\n01:02:19.720 --\u003e 01:02:26.260\nof economic progress in\nwhich all the world shares.\n\n01:02:27.580 --\u003e 01:02:34.060\nIn this sense in fact that\nthe current administration\n\n01:02:34.060 --\u003e 01:02:40.260\nis not playing the game of\nslogans should be a reason for\n\n01:02:40.260 --\u003e 01:02:45.070\nreassurance to our friends, and\n\n01:02:45.070 --\u003e 01:02:48.864\nnot a cause for debate.\n\n01:02:48.864 --\u003e 01:02:54.307\nNow, I have tried to answer\n\n01:02:54.307 --\u003e 01:03:00.225\nthe points that your Chairman\n\n01:03:00.225 --\u003e 01:03:05.450\nraised in general terms.\n\n01:03:05.450 --\u003e 01:03:06.320\nI want to repeat.\n\n01:03:10.740 --\u003e 01:03:15.895\nEven the wisest American leaders are bound\n\n01:03:15.895 --\u003e 01:03:19.911\nto make mistakes, now and then.\n\n01:03:21.225 --\u003e 01:03:25.344\nEven with the best of intentions,\n\n01:03:25.344 --\u003e 01:03:33.733\nthere are bound to be disagreements\nbetween us and friendly nations.\n\n01:03:36.143 --\u003e 01:03:43.070\nBut fundamental I think it is\nthe duty of the Unites States\n\n01:03:43.070 --\u003e 01:03:48.410\nto look after the global\nbalance of power and\n\n01:03:48.410 --\u003e 01:03:53.461\nthe global balance of power is composed of\n\n01:03:53.461 --\u003e 01:03:58.970\na series of regional balances For\n\n01:03:58.970 --\u003e 01:04:01.840\nthat we need the assistance\nof other countries.\n\n01:04:03.340 --\u003e 01:04:08.842\nBut it is not a duty we can\ndelegate to surrogates,\n\n01:04:08.842 --\u003e 01:04:13.165\nhowever friendly they may be to us, and\n\n01:04:13.165 --\u003e 01:04:18.021\nhow ever important they\nare in their reach.\n\n01:04:19.678 --\u003e 01:04:24.275\nWe cannot turn over Southeast Asia, Or\n\n01:04:24.275 --\u003e 01:04:29.864\nthe defense of Southeast Asia to\nneighboring friendly countries.\n\n01:04:31.604 --\u003e 01:04:37.413\nWe must play an important\nrole in it ourselves,\n\n01:04:37.413 --\u003e 01:04:46.140\nwith the assistance of the countries\nthat are importantly concerned.\n\n01:04:46.140 --\u003e 01:04:52.363\nWe face a difficult and austere adversary.\n\n01:04:54.442 --\u003e 01:05:00.340\nBut if a man came to this Earth\nfrom a distant planet and\n\n01:05:00.340 --\u003e 01:05:05.716\nwere given the balance\nsheet of the strengths and\n\n01:05:05.716 --\u003e 01:05:12.667\nweaknesses of the United States and\nits principal adversary,\n\n01:05:12.667 --\u003e 01:05:17.407\nhe would be mad if he\nchose the Soviet side.\n\n01:05:21.000 --\u003e 01:05:28.506\nOur problems are soluble by our decisions.\n\n01:05:28.506 --\u003e 01:05:34.611\nTheir problems require structural change.\n\n01:05:36.289 --\u003e 01:05:41.275\nSo, I would say to you ladies and\n\n01:05:41.275 --\u003e 01:05:49.231\ngentlemen not that history\nwill do our work for us.\n\n01:05:49.231 --\u003e 01:05:54.789\nI'm saying something\nperhaps more fundamental.\n\n01:05:54.789 --\u003e 01:06:01.650\nIt is that if we do what we\nare capable of doing, we,\n\n01:06:01.650 --\u003e 01:06:07.397\nall together and with our strong support,\n\n01:06:07.397 --\u003e 01:06:11.401\ncan do our job for ourselves.\n\n01:06:11.401 --\u003e 01:06:12.880\nThank you very much.\n\n01:06:12.880 --\u003e 01:06:22.514\n\u003e\u003e [APPLAUSE]\n\n01:06:22.514 --\u003e 01:06:28.536\n[SOUND]\n\n01:06:36.337 --\u003e 01:06:38.108\n\u003e\u003e Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.\n\n01:06:39.365 --\u003e 01:06:44.172\nI think you have answered\nsome of my questions,\n\n01:06:44.172 --\u003e 01:06:48.739\nbut I'm quite sure there\nare other questions\n\n01:06:48.739 --\u003e 01:06:53.198\nwhich the audience would\nlike to put to you.\n\n01:06:55.332 --\u003e 01:06:56.945\n\u003e\u003e My name is Co Can Chee.\n\n01:06:56.945 --\u003e 01:07:03.133\nMister Chairman I have two interrelated\nquestions on what is perhaps the missing\n\n01:07:03.133 --\u003e 01:07:09.870\nlink in Dr. Kissinger's masterly analysis\nbecause he has not mentioned China at all.\n\n01:07:11.550 --\u003e 01:07:16.510\nFirst question is, the US policy\nin the Asia-Pacific region rests\n\n01:07:16.510 --\u003e 01:07:21.340\non the need to strengthen China as\na counterweight to the Soviet Union.\n\n01:07:24.020 --\u003e 01:07:28.470\nAt the same time, the US wants\nto have close links with ASEAN.\n\n01:07:29.940 --\u003e 01:07:34.543\nHow would America reconcile\nthe arming of China\n\n01:07:34.543 --\u003e 01:07:39.384\nwith ASEAN's fear of\na militarily strong China?\n\n01:07:39.384 --\u003e 01:07:44.354\nThe second question is,\nWashington's relationship with Beijing\n\n01:07:44.354 --\u003e 01:07:48.110\nis dictated by global\nstrategic considerations.\n\n01:07:49.690 --\u003e 01:07:54.500\nBut there are some who argue that\nby putting too much emphasis\n\n01:07:54.500 --\u003e 01:07:58.330\non the China card, the US may in fact\n\n01:07:58.330 --\u003e 01:08:02.590\nbe provoking the Soviets to\nadopt a more adventurous policy.\n\n01:08:03.730 --\u003e 01:08:05.889\nDo you subscribe to this view Dr.\nKissinger?\n\n01:08:09.222 --\u003e 01:08:15.236\n\u003e\u003e Let me take the second question\nfirst because it involves the general\n\n01:08:15.236 --\u003e 01:08:20.316\nprinciple of relationships\nbetween the United States and\n\n01:08:20.316 --\u003e 01:08:25.928\nChina and then I will discuss\nthe impact on the ASEAN countries.\n\n01:08:30.470 --\u003e 01:08:38.686\n[COUGH] I have never believed\nin the so-called China card.\n\n01:08:38.686 --\u003e 01:08:44.063\nIf it means that we tighten our\nrelations with China in order\n\n01:08:44.063 --\u003e 01:08:49.761\nto punish the Soviet Union and\nby implication that we loosen our\n\n01:08:49.761 --\u003e 01:08:56.340\nrelations if the Soviet Union behaves\nin a more acceptable manner to us.\n\n01:08:57.810 --\u003e 01:09:03.173\nAfter all,\nChina has the longest continuous\n\n01:09:03.173 --\u003e 01:09:07.971\nrecord of self government in history and\n\n01:09:07.971 --\u003e 01:09:14.615\nthey did not get to this point\nby being anybody's card.\n\n01:09:14.615 --\u003e 01:09:19.604\nAnd I therefore believe that we need\nto base our relationship with China not\n\n01:09:19.604 --\u003e 01:09:23.950\non the fluctuating tactics\nwith the Soviet Union.\n\n01:09:23.950 --\u003e 01:09:32.599\nBut on the specific weight we assign to\nthe various factors in foreign policy.\n\n01:09:32.599 --\u003e 01:09:38.275\nNow in, Analyzing\n\n01:09:38.275 --\u003e 01:09:43.949\nthe balance of power,\none has to keep in mind,\n\n01:09:43.949 --\u003e 01:09:49.476\none has try to understand\nwho is the weaker and\n\n01:09:49.476 --\u003e 01:09:52.108\nwho is the stronger.\n\n01:09:52.108 --\u003e 01:09:54.944\nWho is the threatened country and\n\n01:09:54.944 --\u003e 01:09:59.712\nwhich is the one that is\nengaging in making the threats.\n\n01:10:01.472 --\u003e 01:10:07.312\nWhat brought China and\nthe United States together was the fact\n\n01:10:07.312 --\u003e 01:10:14.510\nthat the Soviet Union built up about\na million forces on the Chinese border.\n\n01:10:14.510 --\u003e 01:10:21.660\nAnd that the Chinese decided that\nthey needed outside friends.\n\n01:10:22.730 --\u003e 01:10:26.140\nIt was not that we in\nWashington suddenly said,\n\n01:10:26.140 --\u003e 01:10:30.960\nwouldn't it be nice if we had the Chinese\non our side against the Soviet Union?\n\n01:10:30.960 --\u003e 01:10:35.790\nAnd let's see whether that we can get\nthem involved against the Soviet Union.\n\n01:10:37.790 --\u003e 01:10:42.955\nNow from this it follows\nthat given the importance,\n\n01:10:42.955 --\u003e 01:10:47.320\nhistorically, culturally and\nphysically of China.\n\n01:10:48.980 --\u003e 01:10:53.880\nThe United States has an interest\nin the independence and\n\n01:10:53.880 --\u003e 01:11:01.350\nterritorial integrity of China, even\nwhen we do not agree with its ideology.\n\n01:11:03.840 --\u003e 01:11:11.830\nAnd the American interest in that is\nnot in order to annoy the Soviet Union.\n\n01:11:13.150 --\u003e 01:11:18.090\nBut in order to prevent\nthat the world balance\n\n01:11:18.090 --\u003e 01:11:22.943\nof power is overturned by\nsome colossal event like\n\n01:11:22.943 --\u003e 01:11:29.980\nthe dismemberment of China which would\nhave the profoundest consequences.\n\n01:11:29.980 --\u003e 01:11:34.423\nNot only in Southeast Asia, but\nin many other parts of the world.\n\n01:11:36.825 --\u003e 01:11:44.840\nNow, of course, we have to conduct\nour policy with due prudence.\n\n01:11:44.840 --\u003e 01:11:48.330\nAnd I don't deny that it is\nconceivable that we might do things\n\n01:11:50.350 --\u003e 01:11:56.260\nwhich transcend the purposes that I stated\nand could have a provocative aspect.\n\n01:11:57.790 --\u003e 01:12:01.880\nBut a wise American foreign\npolicy will not do this,\n\n01:12:01.880 --\u003e 01:12:05.830\nanymore than a wise Chinese\npolicy will do that.\n\n01:12:05.830 --\u003e 01:12:12.620\nIt is not in either of our countries\ninterest to provoke a Soviet, Chinese war.\n\n01:12:13.630 --\u003e 01:12:19.926\nBut it is in our interest\nto maintain the territorial\n\n01:12:19.926 --\u003e 01:12:24.793\nintegrity of China against the attack of\n\n01:12:24.793 --\u003e 01:12:29.386\nagainst Soviet military pressures.\n\n01:12:29.386 --\u003e 01:12:36.144\nNow there's no doubt that there is in some\n\n01:12:37.496 --\u003e 01:12:43.492\ncountries a fear of a rearmed China.\n\n01:12:46.270 --\u003e 01:12:50.147\nOf course, at this moment,\nthe United States is not supplying,\n\n01:12:50.147 --\u003e 01:12:53.750\nto the best of knowledge,\nany military equipment to China.\n\n01:12:55.360 --\u003e 01:13:00.060\nAnd my estimate would be that in\nthe foreseeable future whatever military\n\n01:13:00.060 --\u003e 01:13:05.800\nequipment may be sold to China\nwill not be of quantities\n\n01:13:05.800 --\u003e 01:13:10.350\nthat will rapidly make a decisive\ndifference in the situation.\n\n01:13:12.230 --\u003e 01:13:16.659\nBut in any analysis of foreign policy, one\nhas to look at the time scale involved.\n\n01:13:19.150 --\u003e 01:13:24.400\nIt would seem to me that China is almost\ncertain to be preoccupied with its\n\n01:13:24.400 --\u003e 01:13:31.840\ndomestic necessities for\nthe best part of the next generation.\n\n01:13:33.915 --\u003e 01:13:38.260\nAnd that during that period,\nif the ASEAN countries\n\n01:13:38.260 --\u003e 01:13:42.440\ncontinue to make the progress they have\nmade in the last five to ten years.\n\n01:13:43.600 --\u003e 01:13:50.080\nThey will be able to create\na bastion in this area,\n\n01:13:51.080 --\u003e 01:13:54.900\nthat it would not be all\nthat easy to attack.\n\n01:13:54.900 --\u003e 01:13:59.660\nEspecially since once can\nalso expect that under those\n\n01:13:59.660 --\u003e 01:14:04.120\ncircumstances the relations with the\nUnited States will become much stronger.\n\n01:14:05.350 --\u003e 01:14:11.400\nSo I would say yes,\nI understand the fears that may exist but\n\n01:14:11.400 --\u003e 01:14:17.087\nthey have to be put into some\nhistorical perspective and\n\n01:14:17.087 --\u003e 01:14:21.080\nwhat will happen in 25, 30 years?\n\n01:14:21.080 --\u003e 01:14:24.480\nWhat assessment one would\nthen make of the situation?\n\n01:14:25.860 --\u003e 01:14:28.995\nThat it would be difficult to say.\n\n01:14:28.995 --\u003e 01:14:32.836\nBecause there will be other\nnations that will grow in power,\n\n01:14:32.836 --\u003e 01:14:35.772\nif my analysis of\nthe Soviet Union is correct,\n\n01:14:35.772 --\u003e 01:14:41.090\nthe Soviet Union will be more\npreoccupied with its domestic affairs.\n\n01:14:41.090 --\u003e 01:14:46.983\nThis area will have developed much\ngreater strengths of its own.\n\n01:14:46.983 --\u003e 01:14:51.820\nSo that there'll be many factors that\nwould be quite different 30 years from\n\n01:14:51.820 --\u003e 01:14:56.439\nnow when China will have a greater\nmilitary capacity than they are today but\n\n01:14:56.439 --\u003e 01:15:00.195\nit is certainly a factor one\nwould take into consideration.\n\n01:15:02.782 --\u003e 01:15:04.906\n\u003e\u003e Yes, my name is Winter.\n\n01:15:07.061 --\u003e 01:15:11.172\nAfter the withdrawal of\nAmerican military support to\n\n01:15:11.172 --\u003e 01:15:15.740\nSouth Vietnam which was interpreted\nby some people as being\n\n01:15:15.740 --\u003e 01:15:20.325\ntantamount to desertion of\nan ally in the face of the enemy.\n\n01:15:20.325 --\u003e 01:15:23.342\nThere has been,\nas you are undoubtedly aware,\n\n01:15:23.342 --\u003e 01:15:26.667\na considerable erosion of\nconfidence in this area.\n\n01:15:26.667 --\u003e 01:15:30.095\nAnd I presume in other areas,\nin the actual will and\n\n01:15:30.095 --\u003e 01:15:34.485\nability of American governments\nto carry out promises of support\n\n01:15:34.485 --\u003e 01:15:39.940\nwhich they have given to people who\nare in very precarious positions.\n\n01:15:39.940 --\u003e 01:15:42.460\nNow we're told that the new\nadministration, we're told by the new\n\n01:15:42.460 --\u003e 01:15:49.070\nadministration, that they will\nindeed support their commitments and\n\n01:15:49.070 --\u003e 01:15:53.240\ntheir support to these countries,\nbut we've been told that before.\n\n01:15:53.240 --\u003e 01:15:57.529\nAnd is it your opinion that the position\nof the American government and\n\n01:15:57.529 --\u003e 01:16:02.109\nof American society in general is now\nsuch that they really can give firm and\n\n01:16:02.109 --\u003e 01:16:05.392\nlasting inconsistent support\nto such commitments.\n\n01:16:11.272 --\u003e 01:16:16.260\n\u003e\u003e The Vietnam War was a great\n\n01:16:16.260 --\u003e 01:16:20.343\nnational tragedy for\n\n01:16:20.343 --\u003e 01:16:25.100\nthe United States.\n\n01:16:25.100 --\u003e 01:16:31.077\nThe Nixon administration inherited\nit from its predecessors,\n\n01:16:31.077 --\u003e 01:16:37.940\nwho then turned against the war they had\nthemselves committed our country to.\n\n01:16:39.030 --\u003e 01:16:45.662\nAnd left us to fight it as best\nwe could against the opposition\n\n01:16:45.662 --\u003e 01:16:50.604\nof those who had originally\ncommitted us to it\n\n01:16:50.604 --\u003e 01:16:55.691\nwhich was an extremely\ndifficult situation.\n\n01:16:55.691 --\u003e 01:17:02.698\nEven then I think we had\nachieved an honorable outcome,\n\n01:17:02.698 --\u003e 01:17:07.916\nhad not the Watergate crisis deprived our\n\n01:17:07.916 --\u003e 01:17:14.790\nexecutive of the authority\nto enforce the agreement.\n\n01:17:16.070 --\u003e 01:17:19.068\nAnd we found ourselves, then,\n\n01:17:19.068 --\u003e 01:17:24.510\nsuddenly in the position where\nan agreement which we had,\n\n01:17:24.510 --\u003e 01:17:29.187\nhad every intention of\nenforcing when we made it.\n\n01:17:29.187 --\u003e 01:17:33.641\nAs a result of totally unpredictable\nAmerican domestic circumstances,\n\n01:17:33.641 --\u003e 01:17:35.230\nit can never be repeated.\n\n01:17:38.060 --\u003e 01:17:43.380\nWe lost the capacity to enforce\nit no agreement in history\n\n01:17:43.380 --\u003e 01:17:45.190\nhas ever been self implementing.\n\n01:17:46.760 --\u003e 01:17:51.030\nI believe that the American people\nhave now seen the consequences\n\n01:17:51.030 --\u003e 01:17:52.080\nof this application.\n\n01:17:53.360 --\u003e 01:17:56.950\nDuring the Vietnam War a lot\nof fun was made of the so\n\n01:17:56.950 --\u003e 01:18:01.550\ncalled domino theory by\nthe opponents of the world.\n\n01:18:01.550 --\u003e 01:18:06.060\nEvery American has now seen that there\nhas been a terrible domino theory,\n\n01:18:06.060 --\u003e 01:18:08.710\nnot just in Southeast Asia, but\n\n01:18:08.710 --\u003e 01:18:13.910\nin every other part of the world in which\npeople have depended on American promises.\n\n01:18:15.230 --\u003e 01:18:20.636\nAnd I think one has to interpret\nthe recent American election as\n\n01:18:20.636 --\u003e 01:18:26.665\nan affirmation by the American people\nthat they are tired of retreat.\n\n01:18:26.665 --\u003e 01:18:31.124\nAnd that they will not accept\nthe proposition that the most\n\n01:18:31.124 --\u003e 01:18:34.309\nruthless are going to inherit the earth.\n\n01:18:34.309 --\u003e 01:18:39.175\nOf course,\nno one can ever make an absolutely\n\n01:18:39.175 --\u003e 01:18:43.410\ncertain prediction about the future.\n\n01:18:45.310 --\u003e 01:18:51.180\nBut I would think that,\nthe recent election and\n\n01:18:51.180 --\u003e 01:18:58.839\nthe present mood in America gives a force\nto the of the current administration.\n\n01:18:59.920 --\u003e 01:19:05.130\nThat in the more innocent period\nof the 60s, and in the domestic\n\n01:19:05.130 --\u003e 01:19:10.060\nstrife of the early 70s, was not there.\n\n01:19:10.060 --\u003e 01:19:14.050\nYou have identified our key problem,\nand it is\n\n01:19:15.070 --\u003e 01:19:20.630\nto convince people that we have now\na settled policy, that will be carried\n\n01:19:20.630 --\u003e 01:19:25.870\nout over an indefinite period of time by\nwhoever is in office in the United States.\n\n01:19:25.870 --\u003e 01:19:28.470\nIt's our biggest national problem.\n\n01:19:28.470 --\u003e 01:19:33.320\nI believe we are on the way to solving it.\n\n01:19:33.320 --\u003e 01:19:37.492\nBut you have raised\nan important question and\n\n01:19:37.492 --\u003e 01:19:41.013\nI can only tell you my best judgement.\n\n01:19:41.013 --\u003e 01:19:42.129\n\u003e\u003e Mr Chairman,\n\n01:19:42.129 --\u003e 01:19:47.340\nDr Kissinger played a prominent\nrole in settling the Vietnam war.\n\n01:19:48.570 --\u003e 01:19:54.340\nSince then we've had a takeover of\nthe whole of by the Vietnamese and\n\n01:19:54.340 --\u003e 01:19:55.522\nthe Russians.\n\n01:19:55.522 --\u003e 01:19:56.340\n\u003e\u003e The whole of Indochina.\n\n01:19:58.210 --\u003e 01:20:02.544\nAnd a near takeover of\nAfghanistan by the Soviet forces.\n\n01:20:02.544 --\u003e 01:20:08.793\nNow, if Dr. Kissinger were to be\nthe secretary general of the US today,\n\n01:20:08.793 --\u003e 01:20:15.564\nwhat measures would he adopt to rectify\nthe situation in these two countries?\n\n01:20:15.564 --\u003e 01:20:18.557\n[LAUGH]\n\n01:20:26.134 --\u003e 01:20:30.880\n\u003e\u003e Look, it is almost impossible.\n\n01:20:30.880 --\u003e 01:20:37.580\nIn fact, it is impossible when you're not\nin office to make a responsible statement\n\n01:20:38.710 --\u003e 01:20:45.180\nabout the detailed tactics one would\npursue in given circumstances.\n\n01:20:49.266 --\u003e 01:20:57.033\nWith respect to the Vietnamese\noccupation of Cambodia,\n\n01:20:57.033 --\u003e 01:21:01.886\nI believe that the policy pursued by\n\n01:21:01.886 --\u003e 01:21:06.740\nthe Asian countries as supported by\n\n01:21:06.740 --\u003e 01:21:12.749\nthe United States is essentially correct.\n\n01:21:14.150 --\u003e 01:21:17.850\nI think it is one cannot\naccept the principle.\n\n01:21:17.850 --\u003e 01:21:21.470\nI think that Pol Pot is\na genocidal murderer.\n\n01:21:23.560 --\u003e 01:21:30.123\nAnd I have absolutely no use for\nwhat he represents.\n\n01:21:30.123 --\u003e 01:21:35.225\nBut nevertheless, one cannot accept\nthe principle that the Vietnamese\n\n01:21:35.225 --\u003e 01:21:39.410\nsimply have the right to march\ninto a neighboring country.\n\n01:21:40.530 --\u003e 01:21:46.550\nAll the more so as the last reason\nthat they did it was because of\n\n01:21:46.550 --\u003e 01:21:52.200\nhuman delicacy about\nthe conduct of their neighbor.\n\n01:21:52.200 --\u003e 01:21:58.860\nIt was rather that his crime was not\nhow many Cambodians he was killing.\n\n01:21:58.860 --\u003e 01:22:03.160\nHis crime was that he wanted\nto be independent from Hanoi.\n\n01:22:04.410 --\u003e 01:22:08.820\nSo I think we have to maintain the\nprinciple that this was an illegal act.\n\n01:22:10.620 --\u003e 01:22:14.200\nAnd I think we have to make it\nas difficult as possible for\n\n01:22:14.200 --\u003e 01:22:17.810\nHanoi to maintain itself\nin that territory.\n\n01:22:20.010 --\u003e 01:22:25.170\nAgain, we,\ncertainly the United States and I,\n\n01:22:25.170 --\u003e 01:22:31.850\nwould be amazed that no Asian country has\nany particular interest in having Cambodia\n\n01:22:31.850 --\u003e 01:22:37.640\nas any kind of military or\npolitical outpost against Vietnam.\n\n01:22:37.640 --\u003e 01:22:44.140\nIf Vietnam wants security, that, in my\njudgment, is relatively easy to arrange.\n\n01:22:44.140 --\u003e 01:22:48.170\nWhat is not easy is to\naccept the proposition that\n\n01:22:48.170 --\u003e 01:22:52.920\nthey can have security only by\noccupying all their neighbors.\n\n01:22:55.194 --\u003e 01:23:00.660\n[COUGH] With respect to Afghanistan,\nI would apply the same principle.\n\n01:23:00.660 --\u003e 01:23:05.010\nI would make it as difficult and as\ncostly as possible for the Soviet Union.\n\n01:23:06.560 --\u003e 01:23:12.290\nIn this respect, I must say that\nI am not happy with the fact\n\n01:23:14.480 --\u003e 01:23:20.640\nthat 18 months after the occupation of\nAfghanistan, every punitive action that's\n\n01:23:20.640 --\u003e 01:23:27.960\nbeen taken, including those taken by\nmy own country, have been withdrawn.\n\n01:23:27.960 --\u003e 01:23:35.210\nThis is hardly designed to\ndiscourage Soviet adventures.\n\n01:23:36.430 --\u003e 01:23:41.340\nAnd the Soviets have to\nknow in the future that\n\n01:23:41.340 --\u003e 01:23:46.088\nmilitary aggression against\ntheir neighbor has certain\n\n01:23:46.088 --\u003e 01:23:50.901\nirremediable consequences.\n\n01:23:50.901 --\u003e 01:23:55.364\nAnd not simply a 12 to\n18-months interruption of\n\n01:23:55.364 --\u003e 01:23:58.049\ncertain economic deliveries.\n\n01:24:01.822 --\u003e 01:24:07.290\n\u003e\u003e Under what circumstances would\nthe Soviet Union invade Poland?\n\n01:24:07.290 --\u003e 01:24:11.630\nAnd if such an invasion should take place,\nwhat kind of response\n\n01:24:11.630 --\u003e 01:24:15.340\ncould one expect from the United States\nand other Western countries?\n\n01:24:20.415 --\u003e 01:24:23.050\n\u003e\u003e Well, so that you can judge\nthe answer which I will give you.\n\n01:24:25.649 --\u003e 01:24:30.495\nI must tell you that I have been\nconsistently wrong in predicting\n\n01:24:30.495 --\u003e 01:24:34.430\nwhat the Soviet Union-\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\n01:24:34.430 --\u003e 01:24:35.670\n\u003e\u003e In predicting\n\n01:24:35.670 --\u003e 01:24:37.910\nwhat the Soviet Union\nwould do about Poland.\n\n01:24:37.910 --\u003e 01:24:44.540\nBecause I, quite frankly, thought they\nwould invade during the last year.\n\n01:24:46.770 --\u003e 01:24:51.280\nMy reasoning was that for the Soviet,\n\n01:24:51.280 --\u003e 01:24:55.100\nthe situation in Poland,\nwhatever happens, whether they go in or\n\n01:24:55.100 --\u003e 01:25:01.450\nnot go in, is a disaster for\nthe Soviet Union.\n\n01:25:01.450 --\u003e 01:25:04.916\nIt's a disaster because here\nyou have a worker state.\n\n01:25:04.916 --\u003e 01:25:09.726\nA so-called worker state in which they\ncreate a trade union to negotiate with\n\n01:25:09.726 --\u003e 01:25:11.535\nthe workers' government.\n\n01:25:11.535 --\u003e 01:25:14.870\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e Which\n\n01:25:14.870 --\u003e 01:25:19.590\nis a fundamental offense to any\ntheory of the communist state.\n\n01:25:19.590 --\u003e 01:25:25.990\nSo the mere existence of Solidarity\nis an assault on communist theory.\n\n01:25:27.670 --\u003e 01:25:32.040\nNow you have the phenomenon of a general\n\n01:25:33.640 --\u003e 01:25:38.460\nwho is minister of defense,\nprime minister, and\n\n01:25:38.460 --\u003e 01:25:42.230\nsecretary general of the Communist Party.\n\n01:25:44.310 --\u003e 01:25:47.400\nNow, does that make the party\na subdivision of the army?\n\n01:25:48.600 --\u003e 01:25:51.100\nThe army a subdivision of the party?\n\n01:25:52.180 --\u003e 01:25:54.348\nBoth of them a subdivision\nof the government?\n\n01:25:54.348 --\u003e 01:25:58.814\nIs it Bonapartism, communism, what is it?\n\n01:26:03.716 --\u003e 01:26:11.270\nThird, the Soviets have a very\nserious problem in Poland.\n\n01:26:11.270 --\u003e 01:26:16.291\nIn the sense that when they\ninvaded Czechoslovakia and\n\n01:26:16.291 --\u003e 01:26:21.790\nHungary, they could\nforesee the consequences.\n\n01:26:21.790 --\u003e 01:26:27.655\nIn the sense that they were, In the sense\n\n01:26:27.655 --\u003e 01:26:34.120\nthat once they had established a civil\nauthority, It was likely to be obeyed.\n\n01:26:36.470 --\u003e 01:26:43.167\nAnd the countries were small enough so\nthat authority could be enforced.\n\n01:26:45.894 --\u003e 01:26:49.965\nI suppose if the Soviet Union puts\nenough military power into Poland,\n\n01:26:49.965 --\u003e 01:26:51.970\nthey can also enforce authority.\n\n01:26:54.100 --\u003e 01:26:59.129\nBut, A normal military operation\n\n01:26:59.129 --\u003e 01:27:03.920\nwill have consequences that\nare not that easy to foretell.\n\n01:27:08.411 --\u003e 01:27:15.250\nSo I think that the present Soviet\nstrategy is to let the chaos deepen.\n\n01:27:16.450 --\u003e 01:27:21.270\nAnd perhaps hope that the Polish\npeople will turn against Solidarity\n\n01:27:21.270 --\u003e 01:27:25.530\nas the cause of the chaos rather\nthan against the Communist Party.\n\n01:27:28.311 --\u003e 01:27:33.246\nOr to use force, if they have to,\nby backing up a state\n\n01:27:33.246 --\u003e 01:27:38.296\nof emergency,\nwhich the Polish government may call,\n\n01:27:38.296 --\u003e 01:27:44.250\nby sending in selective forces\nrather than a blanket invasion.\n\n01:27:48.108 --\u003e 01:27:52.082\nWhat should be the Western reaction?\n\n01:27:52.082 --\u003e 01:27:57.860\nI have always believed that\n\n01:27:57.860 --\u003e 01:28:02.760\nWhen the Soviets use military force,\nthe first reaction is always panic.\n\n01:28:03.760 --\u003e 01:28:06.230\nAnd people think that they're gonna go on.\n\n01:28:07.940 --\u003e 01:28:09.780\nThe real danger is that there is,\n\n01:28:09.780 --\u003e 01:28:13.010\nit is almost always followed\nby a Soviet peace offensive.\n\n01:28:14.920 --\u003e 01:28:21.480\nAnd if the Soviets destroy\nthe free institutions in Poland,\n\n01:28:21.480 --\u003e 01:28:25.620\none way or\nthe other by the use of military force,\n\n01:28:27.010 --\u003e 01:28:30.890\nthen I think there have\nto be exacted penalties\n\n01:28:30.890 --\u003e 01:28:35.189\nthat are substantial and\nlong term in nature.\n\n01:28:36.410 --\u003e 01:28:39.870\nI would think it is very\ndifficult to imagine\n\n01:28:39.870 --\u003e 01:28:44.790\nthat we would continue arms control\nnegotiations that are now going on.\n\n01:28:44.790 --\u003e 01:28:49.580\nSecondly, I would think\nthat serious economic\n\n01:28:49.580 --\u003e 01:28:52.379\npenalties would have to be exacted.\n\n01:28:54.600 --\u003e 01:28:57.490\nAnd that we should be\nhonest with ourselves\n\n01:28:57.490 --\u003e 01:28:59.980\nin defining what we mean\nby economic penalties.\n\n01:29:02.350 --\u003e 01:29:04.320\nThere are at least three\nkinds of questions.\n\n01:29:05.500 --\u003e 01:29:11.990\nFirst, if there is some kind of\neconomic restriction put on,\n\n01:29:13.270 --\u003e 01:29:18.140\ndoes it apply only to new orders or\ndoes it also apply to existing orders?\n\n01:29:19.680 --\u003e 01:29:23.920\nIf it applies only to new orders\nit will have no effect for\n\n01:29:23.920 --\u003e 01:29:28.550\ntwo to three years and\nby then it will be abandoned.\n\n01:29:28.550 --\u003e 01:29:33.220\nSecondly does it apply only\nto the Soviet Union or\n\n01:29:33.220 --\u003e 01:29:36.880\ndoes it apply also to\nthe East European regimes?\n\n01:29:38.220 --\u003e 01:29:41.200\nThird, if it applies to\nthe East European regimes,\n\n01:29:41.200 --\u003e 01:29:46.660\ndoes it also apply to East Germany or\ndoes it exclude East Germany?\n\n01:29:47.890 --\u003e 01:29:51.510\nThose are questions that we\nmust answer to ourselves.\n\n01:29:51.510 --\u003e 01:29:52.609\nWe don't have to announce it.\n\n01:29:53.910 --\u003e 01:30:01.490\nBut we should not, but they will\ndetermine whether we are serious and\n\n01:30:01.490 --\u003e 01:30:06.670\nwhether the penalty will have an effect.\n\n01:30:06.670 --\u003e 01:30:11.410\nI think I have made clear by in the way\nI pose the question what answers I would\n\n01:30:11.410 --\u003e 01:30:11.930\nrecommend.\n\n01:30:15.120 --\u003e 01:30:17.040\n\u003e\u003e My name is Jonah Boy.\n\n01:30:17.040 --\u003e 01:30:22.775\nI'm not asking a question, but\nI'd like to know what Dr Kissinger thinks\n\n01:30:22.775 --\u003e 01:30:29.162\nabout the opposition that's going on in\nfriendly Europe towards American policy\n\n01:30:29.162 --\u003e 01:30:34.733\nwith regard to the arms that America\nproposes to put in Western Europe.\n\n01:30:42.548 --\u003e 01:30:47.032\n\u003e\u003e I tried to express but I think\ndelicately at the beginning of my remarks\n\n01:30:47.032 --\u003e 01:30:49.844\nbut I'll be glad to do\nit indelicately too.\n\n01:30:49.844 --\u003e 01:30:54.800\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e It think we are in an absolutely absurd\n\n01:30:54.800 --\u003e 01:30:55.400\ncircumstance.\n\n01:30:56.590 --\u003e 01:31:00.270\nThere is absolutely no doubt that\nthe United States can defend\n\n01:31:00.270 --\u003e 01:31:05.710\nitself in a nuclear war without\nbasing nuclear weapons in Europe.\n\n01:31:05.710 --\u003e 01:31:09.100\nThere are thousands of Soviet\nnuclear weapons in Europe.\n\n01:31:10.620 --\u003e 01:31:16.050\nThe United States has now offered to put\n572 nuclear delivery vehicles in Europe.\n\n01:31:17.430 --\u003e 01:31:23.530\nAny freshman in college\nshould be able to figure out\n\n01:31:23.530 --\u003e 01:31:28.710\nthat this cannot possibly be for our\nown selfish purposes, we could put them\n\n01:31:28.710 --\u003e 01:31:33.830\nat sea, we can put them anywhere,\nwe don't have to have them in Europe.\n\n01:31:34.840 --\u003e 01:31:38.755\nWe're putting them in Europe in order\nto prevent selective blackmail.\n\n01:31:38.755 --\u003e 01:31:43.956\nIn order to keep the Soviet Union from\nthreatening Europe with nuclear war and\n\n01:31:43.956 --\u003e 01:31:48.917\nin order to create the automaticity\nof response which the Europeans claim\n\n01:31:48.917 --\u003e 01:31:49.730\nthey want.\n\n01:31:51.000 --\u003e 01:31:55.338\nNow the Europeans, or not the Europeans,\nbut tens of thousands\n\n01:31:55.338 --\u003e 01:32:00.092\nare marching around the streets acting\nas if they are doing us a favor.\n\n01:32:00.092 --\u003e 01:32:04.610\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\n01:32:04.610 --\u003e 01:32:09.400\n\u003e\u003e And all kinds of complicated\n\n01:32:10.610 --\u003e 01:32:14.940\nnegotiations have to be undertaken so\n\n01:32:14.940 --\u003e 01:32:17.880\nthat we have to prove that we\nhave no aggressive intentions,\n\n01:32:17.880 --\u003e 01:32:21.810\nthat we're really quite willing\nto give up all these weapons.\n\n01:32:21.810 --\u003e 01:32:23.810\nWe haven't even got one of them there yet.\n\n01:32:23.810 --\u003e 01:32:27.680\nWhile the Soviet's are building them,\nby the dozens.\n\n01:32:29.390 --\u003e 01:32:33.610\nAnd yet are the ones,\nwe have to say there was a reason\n\n01:32:35.710 --\u003e 01:32:40.470\nNATO meeting in which we were\nprepared to go down to zero.\n\n01:32:40.470 --\u003e 01:32:42.030\nWe are at zero.\n\n01:32:42.030 --\u003e 01:32:44.189\nIt's the Soviets who are not yet at zero.\n\n01:32:44.189 --\u003e 01:32:49.728\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e So I have very little use for\n\n01:32:49.728 --\u003e 01:32:55.057\nit, I once said to an unaligned friend who\n\n01:32:55.057 --\u003e 01:33:00.084\nin my judgement whose security of whose\n\n01:33:00.084 --\u003e 01:33:05.874\ncountry seemed to depend\nextraordinarily on\n\n01:33:05.874 --\u003e 01:33:10.901\nthe United States which did not stem his\n\n01:33:10.901 --\u003e 01:33:15.960\npassionate criticism of our actions.\n\n01:33:17.400 --\u003e 01:33:19.439\nI said to him,\nbe careful what you recommend.\n\n01:33:20.500 --\u003e 01:33:25.785\nBecause someday we're going to accept your\nrecommendation and then where will you be?\n\n01:33:25.785 --\u003e 01:33:28.030\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e And I would say that\n\n01:33:29.980 --\u003e 01:33:33.230\nto some of our European critics,\nthey shouldn't tempt us too much.\n\n01:33:38.060 --\u003e 01:33:39.953\n\u003e\u003e My name's Lawrence Mah.\n\n01:33:39.953 --\u003e 01:33:43.737\nLiving in Singapore, I find it a little\nbit difficult to understand the American\n\n01:33:43.737 --\u003e 01:33:45.820\nsystem of government.\n\n01:33:45.820 --\u003e 01:33:50.283\nWitnessing the news reports on\nthe lobbying that President Reagan has\n\n01:33:50.283 --\u003e 01:33:54.833\nhad to do in order to effect\nthe sales of claims to Saudi Arabia.\n\n01:33:54.833 --\u003e 01:34:00.551\nDon't you think, sir, that that is in an\ninherent weakness in the American system\n\n01:34:00.551 --\u003e 01:34:05.782\nof government that will prevent your\neffective execution of the global role\n\n01:34:05.782 --\u003e 01:34:10.786\nof protecting the democracy against\nthe expansion of the Soviet Union?\n\n01:34:13.660 --\u003e 01:34:18.995\n\u003e\u003e There's no question\n[COUGH] that our system\n\n01:34:18.995 --\u003e 01:34:24.487\nof government, it's extremely complex.\n\n01:34:24.487 --\u003e 01:34:30.014\nAnd there's also no doubt\nthat our system of checks and\n\n01:34:30.014 --\u003e 01:34:38.439\nbalances occasionally produces decisions\nthat are against our local interests.\n\n01:34:40.160 --\u003e 01:34:46.580\nWhen I was in office, the Congress imposed\nan embargo on Turkey, which is after all,\n\n01:34:46.580 --\u003e 01:34:51.090\none of the pillars of the NATO\ndefense in the Mediterranean.\n\n01:34:51.090 --\u003e 01:34:55.650\nOn the other hand you have\nto say that the decision\n\n01:34:56.950 --\u003e 01:35:01.790\nthat is implied by the AVACS\\g vote\n\n01:35:01.790 --\u003e 01:35:04.490\nwould have been absolutely\nunthinkable three or four years ago.\n\n01:35:05.880 --\u003e 01:35:14.330\nAnd the fact that President Reagan\nsucceeded, I had a marginal role in it.\n\n01:35:14.330 --\u003e 01:35:20.830\nTherefore, I was informed\nsomewhat about the discussions.\n\n01:35:20.830 --\u003e 01:35:26.100\nWhen the White House\nstarted lining up votes,\n\n01:35:26.100 --\u003e 01:35:30.700\nthe count was about 64 to 26 against it.\n\n01:35:32.380 --\u003e 01:35:36.919\nThe fact that\nPresident Reagan succeeded in\n\n01:35:36.919 --\u003e 01:35:41.580\nachieving a majority\nshows that a determined\n\n01:35:41.580 --\u003e 01:35:46.609\npresident who knows what\nhe wants can with effort\n\n01:35:46.609 --\u003e 01:35:52.024\nachieve actions that are in\nthe national interest.\n\n01:35:52.024 --\u003e 01:35:57.710\nAnd I think that you\ncould Equally will argue,\n\n01:35:57.710 --\u003e 01:36:01.120\nin fact,\neven [INAUDIBLE] that it shows that\n\n01:36:02.480 --\u003e 01:36:05.570\nsome of the difficulties that I've\ndescribed are being overcome.\n\n01:36:05.570 --\u003e 01:36:10.210\nBut there's no question,\nwe should not pretend to our friends that\n\n01:36:10.210 --\u003e 01:36:15.990\nthe internal management of the American\ngovernment is getting very complicated,\n\n01:36:17.230 --\u003e 01:36:21.720\nthat there are, certainly, countervailing\nforces to the trends that I described.\n\n01:36:22.760 --\u003e 01:36:27.240\nI believe they're being overcome and\nmanaged.\n\n01:36:27.240 --\u003e 01:36:33.272\nAnd if we have a successful\nadministration by President Reagan,\n\n01:36:33.272 --\u003e 01:36:38.987\nI think the authority of\nthe executive will continue to grow.\n\n01:36:38.987 --\u003e 01:36:43.920\nBut you've certainly identified\nan important problem, yes?\n\n01:36:43.920 --\u003e 01:36:47.758\n\u003e\u003e The Soviet Union has not been\nvery successful in their invasion of\n\n01:36:47.758 --\u003e 01:36:51.474\nAfghanistan for the past two years,\nand they are still there.\n\n01:36:51.474 --\u003e 01:36:57.703\nThey've got their feet wet, and should\nthey decide to gain any further ground,\n\n01:36:57.703 --\u003e 01:37:02.110\nthey would have to commit\nquite substantial resources.\n\n01:37:03.210 --\u003e 01:37:06.810\nUnder such circumstances,\nwhat are the options open to them?\n\n01:37:08.910 --\u003e 01:37:13.884\nIn view of the very expensive political\nand economic price they have to pay,\n\n01:37:13.884 --\u003e 01:37:16.303\nshould they decide to move further?\n\n01:37:16.303 --\u003e 01:37:23.760\nAnd how would these options\naffect their strategy in Vietnam?\n\n01:37:23.760 --\u003e 01:37:28.886\n\u003e\u003e I think that the Soviets, in many ways,\n\n01:37:28.886 --\u003e 01:37:36.660\nare in a morass of their own making.\n\n01:37:43.495 --\u003e 01:37:48.302\nFor them to maintain military\noperation in Afghanistan,\n\n01:37:48.302 --\u003e 01:37:54.776\nmilitary operation in Vietnam, and\na de facto military operation in Poland,\n\n01:37:54.776 --\u003e 01:38:00.269\nin the sense that they're keeping\n40 divisions around Poland,\n\n01:38:00.269 --\u003e 01:38:02.250\nis an enormous strain.\n\n01:38:03.860 --\u003e 01:38:07.670\nIf they increase\nthe forces in Afghanistan,\n\n01:38:08.710 --\u003e 01:38:13.200\nit reduces, further, their capacity for\nintervention in other parts of the world.\n\n01:38:14.270 --\u003e 01:38:17.990\nAnd if I were the Vietnamese, I would\n\n01:38:19.310 --\u003e 01:38:24.700\nbegin to ask myself at what\npoint something has to give.\n\n01:38:26.210 --\u003e 01:38:31.750\nAnd if you add Cuba to this list,\nthe Soviet economic\n\n01:38:31.750 --\u003e 01:38:37.180\nresources are not are not infinite,\nto put it mildly.\n\n01:38:39.120 --\u003e 01:38:43.788\nSo I think that the Soviets\nare facing enormous difficulties.\n\n01:38:43.788 --\u003e 01:38:49.362\nAnd therefore, it would be a pity\nif we eased these difficulties\n\n01:38:49.362 --\u003e 01:38:54.423\nbefore we have negotiated\na political self-restraint,\n\n01:38:54.423 --\u003e 01:39:00.115\nand before we have got the Soviets\nback to their own territories.\n\n01:39:00.115 --\u003e 01:39:03.050\nAnd I think the same is true in Vietnam.\n\n01:39:03.050 --\u003e 01:39:08.650\nI think if present trends continue,\nwith the crisis in Poland,\n\n01:39:08.650 --\u003e 01:39:13.240\nthe crisis in Afghanistan, and\nthe crisis in Indochina, and\n\n01:39:13.240 --\u003e 01:39:18.290\nif the West does not supply\nthe resources to manage these crises,\n\n01:39:18.290 --\u003e 01:39:22.140\nthe Soviet Union, sooner or later,\nwill have to make some serious decisions,\n\n01:39:22.140 --\u003e 01:39:28.960\nwhich of these crises it considers\nmore important, and which it\n\n01:39:28.960 --\u003e 01:39:34.540\nwill have to abandon, or whether it should\nmake some accommodation with the West.\n\n01:39:34.540 --\u003e 01:39:39.380\nAnd after all, I can only repeat,\nwe're not asking anything\n\n01:39:39.380 --\u003e 01:39:44.165\nuntoward to ask the Red Army to\nstay within its own territory.\n\n01:39:44.165 --\u003e 01:39:51.439\nIt still leaves them the largest\nland area in the world.\n\n01:39:51.439 --\u003e 01:39:54.550\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\n01:39:54.550 --\u003e 01:39:59.110\n\u003e\u003e But I think they have a problem.\n\n01:39:59.110 --\u003e 01:40:04.190\nIn fact,\nthere's a Russian saying about a fellow,\n\n01:40:04.190 --\u003e 01:40:08.584\nsomebody that's running into the village.\n\n01:40:08.584 --\u003e 01:40:12.408\nAnd Mikailovich, or whatever the fellow\nis called, is stuck in the mud,\n\n01:40:12.408 --\u003e 01:40:13.344\nup to his ankles.\n\n01:40:13.344 --\u003e 01:40:18.545\nAnd the other fellow says, well, up to\nhis ankles, that doesn't sound so bad.\n\n01:40:18.545 --\u003e 01:40:21.138\nAnd the other says, yes, but\nhe dived into it head first.\n\n01:40:21.138 --\u003e 01:40:30.855\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\n01:40:30.855 --\u003e 01:40:32.133\n\u003e\u003e Last question?\n\n01:40:32.133 --\u003e 01:40:34.543\n\u003e\u003e Is this mic on?\n\n01:40:34.543 --\u003e 01:40:36.162\nMy name is Pamela Evans, and\n\n01:40:36.162 --\u003e 01:40:39.890\nmy question is a followup to\nthe previous one on the AWACS.\n\n01:40:39.890 --\u003e 01:40:44.200\nWere you in the favor of the Senate\napproval to the AWACS to Saudi Arabia?\n\n01:40:44.200 --\u003e 01:40:48.110\nAnd what do you foresee as its impact on\nthe peace process in the Middle East?\n\n01:40:50.590 --\u003e 01:40:52.109\n\u003e\u003e The question was I in favor of it?\n\n01:40:54.230 --\u003e 01:40:58.990\nYes, I strongly supported\nthe administration's sale of AWACS, or\n\n01:40:58.990 --\u003e 01:41:04.008\nrather, I strongly supported the Senate\napproval of the sale of AWACS.\n\n01:41:08.651 --\u003e 01:41:13.698\nWhether the AWACS,\nin the abstract, where the ideal\n\n01:41:13.698 --\u003e 01:41:19.883\nissue on which to produce such\na domestic debate is not relevant.\n\n01:41:19.883 --\u003e 01:41:25.308\nI think that the refusal\nby the Senate of the AWACS\n\n01:41:25.308 --\u003e 01:41:31.924\nwould have damaged our relations\nwith the Arab countries,\n\n01:41:31.924 --\u003e 01:41:36.819\nundermine the authority of the president,\n\n01:41:36.819 --\u003e 01:41:41.741\nand would have been of\nno benefit to Israel.\n\n01:41:41.741 --\u003e 01:41:49.300\nSo it would of had only disadvantages,\nwithout any compensating advantages.\n\n01:41:49.300 --\u003e 01:41:52.748\nAnd for that reason,\nI actively supported it.\n\n01:41:52.748 --\u003e 01:41:54.884\nI called many senators, and\n\n01:41:54.884 --\u003e 01:41:59.160\nI wrote an article in\nThe Washington Post in its support.\n\n01:42:03.353 --\u003e 01:42:09.559\nThe impact on the peace process?\n\n01:42:09.559 --\u003e 01:42:16.470\nI think the sale of AWACS, by itself, is\nnot a major factor in the peace process.\n\n01:42:16.470 --\u003e 01:42:21.210\nThe refusal by the Senate to approve\nit might have had a negative effect.\n\n01:42:21.210 --\u003e 01:42:26.010\nI think the peace process will depend\non the balance between moderate and\n\n01:42:26.010 --\u003e 01:42:32.650\nradical Arabs, and the degree to\nwhich we can support moderate Arabs.\n\n01:42:32.650 --\u003e 01:42:34.740\nAnd secondly, on the degree to which\n\n01:42:36.120 --\u003e 01:42:41.070\nthe talks that are now going\non can be given impetus, and\n\n01:42:41.070 --\u003e 01:42:45.270\nother Arab nations, especially Jordan,\ncan be brought into them.\n\n01:42:49.224 --\u003e 01:42:55.845\nUnder those conditions,\nI think progress is possible.\n\n01:42:55.845 --\u003e 01:43:00.142\nAnd in fact, I believe that recent events,\n\n01:43:00.142 --\u003e 01:43:05.718\nincluding the assassination\nof the president of Egypt,\n\n01:43:05.718 --\u003e 01:43:10.596\nthe AWACS debate,\nwill have brought home to all of\n\n01:43:10.596 --\u003e 01:43:15.708\nthe parties that they must\ntake another serious look\n\n01:43:15.708 --\u003e 01:43:20.730\nat the options before things\nslide out of control.\n\n01:43:25.682 --\u003e 01:43:35.682\n\u003e\u003e [APPLAUSE]\n\n01:44:03.491 --\u003e 01:44:13.114\n[SOUND]\n\n01:44:13.114 --\u003e 01:44:22.738\n[SOUND]\n\n01:44:53.402 --\u003e 01:44:55.974\nDoctor Kissinger, one of the many\n\n01:44:55.974 --\u003e 01:45:01.031\nachievements your achievements in\npublic life is the conclusion of\n\n01:45:01.031 --\u003e 01:45:06.860\na treaty which brought the United States\nan honorable peace in Vietnam.\n\n01:45:06.860 --\u003e 01:45:09.250\nAnd for you, a Nobel Prize.\n\n01:45:09.250 --\u003e 01:45:16.196\nI just can't help wondering whether\nat any moment at that time.\n\n01:45:18.604 --\u003e 01:45:23.378\nIt had occurred to you, or you could\nhave envisaged or foreseen that you were\n\n01:45:23.378 --\u003e 01:45:28.150\nsigning peace with the Vietnam that could\nturn out to be the Vietnam that we,\n\n01:45:28.150 --\u003e 01:45:31.820\nin Southeast Asia,\nhave to live with and deal with today.\n\n01:45:34.945 --\u003e 01:45:38.221\n\u003e\u003e When we made Peace in Vietnam,\n\n01:45:38.221 --\u003e 01:45:43.270\nyou have to look at\nthe overall circumstances.\n\n01:45:45.990 --\u003e 01:45:50.350\nFirst of all, the Nixon administration\ninherited the war in Vietnam from his\n\n01:45:50.350 --\u003e 01:45:56.530\npredecessors and\nat a time when American public opinion\n\n01:45:56.530 --\u003e 01:46:02.340\nhad already begun to turn against the war\nbecause of its inconclusive nature.\n\n01:46:04.290 --\u003e 01:46:11.409\nSo we had a very complicated\nsituation of withdrawing with honor.\n\n01:46:11.409 --\u003e 01:46:15.258\nMaintaining enough public\nsupport to withdraw with honor,\n\n01:46:15.258 --\u003e 01:46:20.086\nwhich was not always easy because many\nof the people who gotten us into the war\n\n01:46:20.086 --\u003e 01:46:23.340\nturned against the very\nwar that they had started.\n\n01:46:24.890 --\u003e 01:46:26.160\nThat was the fundamental problem.\n\n01:46:27.290 --\u003e 01:46:32.340\nNow, in 1972 when we signed\nthis agreement, you cannot\n\n01:46:32.340 --\u003e 01:46:36.020\nnegotiate with the North Vietnamese\nwithout getting the sense that you're\n\n01:46:36.020 --\u003e 01:46:41.920\ndealing with an implacable country that\nis dedicated to achieving its objectives.\n\n01:46:44.220 --\u003e 01:46:48.880\nAnd frankly, probably we would\nhave preferred to win outright.\n\n01:46:50.440 --\u003e 01:46:53.880\nBut we faced a situation where it was\npractically certain that the Congress\n\n01:46:53.880 --\u003e 01:46:59.970\nwould vote us out of the war but\nour judgment of the peace terms was this.\n\n01:46:59.970 --\u003e 01:47:05.140\nWe thought, first of all, we had not\nturned over a country to communists.\n\n01:47:05.140 --\u003e 01:47:10.330\nSecond, that with adequate support,\nthe south Vietnamese would be able to\n\n01:47:10.330 --\u003e 01:47:15.189\ndefend themselves against normal attacks.\n\n01:47:16.370 --\u003e 01:47:20.960\nAnd if the North Vietnamese\nlaunched an all out attack we were\n\n01:47:20.960 --\u003e 01:47:23.034\nprepared to support them.\n\n01:47:23.034 --\u003e 01:47:28.622\nSo within a year Watergate\ndestroyed all these assumptions,\n\n01:47:28.622 --\u003e 01:47:35.080\nthe congress would not give us\nthe resources to support South Vietnam.\n\n01:47:36.090 --\u003e 01:47:40.470\nThen the congress prohibited military\nassistance to North to South Vietnam so\n\n01:47:40.470 --\u003e 01:47:46.820\nthat not only did the North Vietnamese\nsee our aid declining they\n\n01:47:46.820 --\u003e 01:47:51.710\nsaw that they were and\nagainst our coming to their assistance.\n\n01:47:51.710 --\u003e 01:47:55.280\nAnd I must say that after the end of 73,\n\n01:47:55.280 --\u003e 01:48:01.840\nI pretty well feared that our domestic\nsituation had doomed South Vietnam.\n\n01:48:01.840 --\u003e 01:48:03.840\nI was ashamed of it then.\n\n01:48:03.840 --\u003e 01:48:04.790\nI'm ashamed of it now.\n\n01:48:07.790 --\u003e 01:48:11.630\nI knew North Vietnam was dangerous.\n\n01:48:12.910 --\u003e 01:48:16.640\nI thought North Vietnam\nwould be what you now face.\n\n01:48:16.640 --\u003e 01:48:21.430\nI thought we could handle it and\nwithout Watergate I think we could have.\n\n01:48:21.430 --\u003e 01:48:22.779\nI know we could have.\n\n01:48:22.779 --\u003e 01:48:26.966\n\u003e\u003e Doctor Kissinger, you were\nintimately involved in these long and\n\n01:48:26.966 --\u003e 01:48:31.303\narduous negotiations with the Vietnamese\nin an effort to bring about\n\n01:48:31.303 --\u003e 01:48:34.160\na peaceful conclusion\nto the war in Vietnam.\n\n01:48:35.270 --\u003e 01:48:40.312\nWhat do you think will make\nthe Vietnamese negotiate\n\n01:48:40.312 --\u003e 01:48:47.884\na comprehensive political settlement\nwithin the UN framework on Campuchia?\n\n01:48:47.884 --\u003e 01:48:48.958\n\u003e\u003e Based on my experience?\n\n01:48:48.958 --\u003e 01:48:50.449\n\u003e\u003e Based on your experience.\n\n01:48:50.449 --\u003e 01:48:51.862\n\u003e\u003e Based on my experience,\n\n01:48:51.862 --\u003e 01:48:55.370\nnothing will make them negotiate\nexcept a balance of forces.\n\n01:48:56.510 --\u003e 01:49:01.130\nWhen I started negotiating with the North\nVietnamese, I have believed what all of my\n\n01:49:01.130 --\u003e 01:49:04.510\nintellectual friends and\nall my journalist friends were saying.\n\n01:49:04.510 --\u003e 01:49:07.545\nThat they were distrustful of us,\nthat we had to reassure them.\n\n01:49:07.545 --\u003e 01:49:11.850\nThat we had to show our good will, that\nwe had to give them a sense of security.\n\n01:49:11.850 --\u003e 01:49:13.280\nI believed many of those things.\n\n01:49:13.280 --\u003e 01:49:18.237\nAnd then several years of negotiations,\nwe made a whole series\n\n01:49:18.237 --\u003e 01:49:23.920\nof concessions to them,\nin order to prove to make these points.\n\n01:49:23.920 --\u003e 01:49:26.620\nMy experience has been that\nany concession you make,\n\n01:49:28.750 --\u003e 01:49:31.900\nthat you make unilaterally,\nthey simply pocket.\n\n01:49:31.900 --\u003e 01:49:34.289\nAnd they will not think that it\nis a sign of your good will.\n\n01:49:34.289 --\u003e 01:49:37.349\nThey will think it is a sign of weakness,\n\n01:49:37.349 --\u003e 01:49:41.039\nwhether my intellectual friends like it or\nnot,\n\n01:49:41.039 --\u003e 01:49:48.040\nthe most successful negotiations occurred\nwhen we were militarily strongest.\n\n01:49:48.040 --\u003e 01:49:52.890\nAnd I believe that negotiations\nwith be possible in Campuchia and\n\n01:49:52.890 --\u003e 01:49:56.470\non Southeast Asia when there\nis a balance of forces.\n\n01:49:56.470 --\u003e 01:49:59.610\nWhich makes them to believe that\ntheir present efforts are too costly.\n\n01:50:00.680 --\u003e 01:50:04.110\nThen we can negotiate\nsecurity guarantees for them.\n\n01:50:04.110 --\u003e 01:50:07.200\nWe have no, I don't think any\ncountry in this region and\n\n01:50:07.200 --\u003e 01:50:11.160\nnorthern United States has any\nmilitary designs on Vietnam.\n\n01:50:12.310 --\u003e 01:50:16.800\nBut my experience is that until you\ncreate objective conditions in which\n\n01:50:16.800 --\u003e 01:50:22.180\naccording to their calculations,\nthe balance of forces favors negotiations.\n\n01:50:22.180 --\u003e 01:50:22.820\nIt is useless.\n\n01:50:22.820 --\u003e 01:50:26.940\nYou cannot substitute negotiation for\nreality,\n\n01:50:26.940 --\u003e 01:50:29.400\nas far as the Vietnamese are concerned.\n\n01:50:29.400 --\u003e 01:50:30.660\n\u003e\u003e Does it mean, from what you say,\n\n01:50:30.660 --\u003e 01:50:35.790\nthat you consider the Chinese\nstrategy of a military solution,\n\n01:50:35.790 --\u003e 01:50:40.428\nand a strategy of bleeding Vietnam dry,\nwill stand a better chance of success?\n\n01:50:40.428 --\u003e 01:50:45.082\nThen the strategy of a political solution.\n\n01:50:45.082 --\u003e 01:50:49.390\n\u003e\u003e I think they both depend on each other.\n\n01:50:50.440 --\u003e 01:50:53.600\nI think the Chinese strategy\nof bleeding Vietnam dry\n\n01:50:55.100 --\u003e 01:51:00.000\nis not necessarily, we have no\ninterest on bleeding Vietnam dry.\n\n01:51:00.000 --\u003e 01:51:03.490\nWe have an interest in Vietnam\nstaying within its own borders.\n\n01:51:03.490 --\u003e 01:51:08.041\nSo if Vietnam stays within its\nown borders, we have no interest,\n\n01:51:08.041 --\u003e 01:51:13.443\nneither the United States nor the ASEAN\ncountries, in destroying Vietnam.\n\n01:51:13.443 --\u003e 01:51:19.537\n[COUGH] On the other hand, if political\nsolution means it can substitute for\n\n01:51:19.537 --\u003e 01:51:24.480\na balance of strength,\nI think that is not possible either.\n\n01:51:24.480 --\u003e 01:51:29.240\nSo what we need is a combination of\nthe Chinese military strategy and\n\n01:51:29.240 --\u003e 01:51:31.740\nof the ASEAN political strategy.\n\n01:51:31.740 --\u003e 01:51:38.846\nAnd at some point along that road when\nthe Vietnamese are ready to negotiate,\n\n01:51:38.846 --\u003e 01:51:43.455\nthen I think we can make\nconstructive proposals.\n\n01:51:43.455 --\u003e 01:51:46.370\n\u003e\u003e Since the fall of Indochina in 1975,\nDr Kissinger.\n\n01:51:48.140 --\u003e 01:51:52.300\nThe strategic balance has shifted in\nfavor of the Soviets and the Vietnamese.\n\n01:51:52.300 --\u003e 01:51:55.990\nAnd Vietnam has emerged\nas a regional power.\n\n01:51:55.990 --\u003e 01:52:00.050\nThe Chinese believe that\nthe aims of the Soviet Union and\n\n01:52:00.050 --\u003e 01:52:04.030\nVietnam are beyond Indochina, and\n\n01:52:04.030 --\u003e 01:52:08.380\nto make Vietnam\nthe overlord in the region.\n\n01:52:08.380 --\u003e 01:52:09.630\nDo you subscribe to this view?\n\n01:52:11.420 --\u003e 01:52:14.760\n\u003e\u003e Well, I think the aims of\nthe Soviet Union are beyond Vietnam.\n\n01:52:17.130 --\u003e 01:52:23.423\nAnd to them, Vietnam is one\npawn in an overall strategy.\n\n01:52:23.423 --\u003e 01:52:27.752\nThe Soviet Union would like to contain and\nisolate China,\n\n01:52:27.752 --\u003e 01:52:33.406\nthere's no question about that and\nthey will certainly support Vietnam and\n\n01:52:33.406 --\u003e 01:52:37.710\nstrengthen Vietnam in order\nto achieve this objective.\n\n01:52:37.710 --\u003e 01:52:43.740\nIn the long run, I don't think they want\nVietnam to be the dominant country either,\n\n01:52:43.740 --\u003e 01:52:46.480\nthey want themselves to\nbe the dominant country.\n\n01:52:46.480 --\u003e 01:52:50.790\nAnd I understand, for example, that\nthey are beginning to train Laotians and\n\n01:52:50.790 --\u003e 01:52:56.540\nCambodians in Moscow, which,\nif I am any judge of Hanoi,\n\n01:52:56.540 --\u003e 01:52:59.580\nit's not something that Hanoi welcomes,\nto put it mildly.\n\n01:53:00.670 --\u003e 01:53:03.690\nBut they can't do anything about it.\n\n01:53:03.690 --\u003e 01:53:07.630\nSo the Soviet ambitions certainly go\nbeyond Indochina and the practical\n\n01:53:07.630 --\u003e 01:53:14.170\nconsequences to make Vietnam potentially\nthe strongest nation in the area.\n\n01:53:14.170 --\u003e 01:53:18.300\nOn the other hand, when you say the\nbalance of forces has changed, we ought to\n\n01:53:18.300 --\u003e 01:53:23.110\nremember almost all the problems\nAmerica has had, it has done to itself.\n\n01:53:23.110 --\u003e 01:53:25.840\nThey haven't been done\nto us by somebody else.\n\n01:53:25.840 --\u003e 01:53:27.760\nSo, we can remedy them.\n\n01:53:27.760 --\u003e 01:53:34.660\nAnd if you look at the Soviet situation,\nthey have a war to support in Kamupchea.\n\n01:53:34.660 --\u003e 01:53:39.600\nPlus economic support for\na bankrupt economy in Vietnam.\n\n01:53:39.600 --\u003e 01:53:41.380\nThey have Afghanistan.\n\n01:53:41.380 --\u003e 01:53:42.920\nThey have Poland.\n\n01:53:42.920 --\u003e 01:53:47.570\nEven when they don't invade it, they have\nto keep 30 to 40 divisions sitting there.\n\n01:53:47.570 --\u003e 01:53:49.580\nThen they have Cuba in the Caribbean and\n\n01:53:49.580 --\u003e 01:53:55.250\nCuba in Africa, so\nthey are in a morass all over the world.\n\n01:53:55.250 --\u003e 01:53:58.950\nAnd the idea that the Soviet Union\ncan do everything simultaneously\n\n01:53:58.950 --\u003e 01:54:03.440\nwith that economy that is not growing,\nI think is unrealistic.\n\n01:54:03.440 --\u003e 01:54:07.740\nSo the immediate balance of forces\nmay look as if it favors them.\n\n01:54:07.740 --\u003e 01:54:10.920\nThe longterm balance of forces,\nI think favors us.\n\n01:54:10.920 --\u003e 01:54:15.884\n\u003e\u003e Do you think with the past experience\nthat the United States will find\n\n01:54:15.884 --\u003e 01:54:20.259\nit easier now to contain Vietnam\nthan it did last [CROSSTALK]?\n\n01:54:20.259 --\u003e 01:54:26.314\n\u003e\u003e Well, I think, well first of all,\none should not completely\n\n01:54:26.314 --\u003e 01:54:32.560\nunderrate what was achieved\nin the Vietnam situation.\n\n01:54:32.560 --\u003e 01:54:38.780\nOne of the most hopeful areas in\nthe world today, is the ASEAN region.\n\n01:54:38.780 --\u003e 01:54:44.910\nHaving just visited Indonesia,\nMalaysia and Singapore.\n\n01:54:45.980 --\u003e 01:54:50.570\nOne really, and having had talks here\nwith leaders from other countries,\n\n01:54:50.570 --\u003e 01:54:51.850\nfrom Thailand and Philippines.\n\n01:54:51.850 --\u003e 01:54:55.130\nIt's really amazing,\none looks at the growth rates,\n\n01:54:55.130 --\u003e 01:55:00.300\none looks at what has been achieved,\nessentially with market economies.\n\n01:55:00.300 --\u003e 01:55:03.790\nAnd I don't know whether that would have\nbeen possible without the time that was\n\n01:55:03.790 --\u003e 01:55:07.020\nbought by the American\ncommitment in Vietnam.\n\n01:55:07.020 --\u003e 01:55:14.710\nIn the middle 1960's, Indonesia was\nwavering towards a Communist solution.\n\n01:55:14.710 --\u003e 01:55:17.990\nPartly because Sukarno had been convinced\n\n01:55:17.990 --\u003e 01:55:20.450\nthat that was the wave of\nthe future in this region.\n\n01:55:21.530 --\u003e 01:55:26.840\nSo I think that something was achieved in\n\n01:55:26.840 --\u003e 01:55:31.210\nthe Vietnam war, though at an exorbitant\ncost for the United States.\n\n01:55:34.640 --\u003e 01:55:38.650\nOne of the problems was that we\nattempted to do it all by ourselves and\n\n01:55:38.650 --\u003e 01:55:41.020\nas an American enterprise.\n\n01:55:41.020 --\u003e 01:55:45.559\nI think whatever is done now will\nemerge as an ASEAN enterprise.\n\n01:55:47.470 --\u003e 01:55:53.720\nWith the United States backing it up,\nI hope adequately but\n\n01:55:53.720 --\u003e 01:55:57.990\nnot with the United States\nbeing the principal\n\n01:55:59.720 --\u003e 01:56:02.500\ncountry that organizes the whole thing.\n\n01:56:03.530 --\u003e 01:56:05.921\nAnd if one looks at the evolution,\n\n01:56:05.921 --\u003e 01:56:11.529\nif the ASEAN countries continue to grow\nat a rate of between 7 and 9% a year, and\n\n01:56:11.529 --\u003e 01:56:17.321\nVietnam continues to stagnate, it is going\nto become economically a back border.\n\n01:56:17.321 --\u003e 01:56:21.354\nOf course, they could always\nstart military actions, but\n\n01:56:21.354 --\u003e 01:56:26.275\nthere's a limit even to what the\nVietnamese can endure and when one reads\n\n01:56:26.275 --\u003e 01:56:31.599\nabout the growing corruption in\nSouth Vietnam, the insurgents in Cambodia,\n\n01:56:31.599 --\u003e 01:56:36.114\nI think it is gonna be a serious\nquestion for the Vietnamese to start\n\n01:56:36.114 --\u003e 01:56:41.600\nattacking neighbors with China\nsitting on it's northern border.\n\n01:56:41.600 --\u003e 01:56:45.930\nSo i think that the containment\nof Vietnam in the 80s is\n\n01:56:45.930 --\u003e 01:56:48.780\na different problem from\nwhat it was in the 60s.\n\n01:56:48.780 --\u003e 01:56:50.520\nAnd if it is handled with wisdom and\n\n01:56:50.520 --\u003e 01:56:53.940\nwith understanding of local conditions,\nI think it is possible.\n\n01:56:54.980 --\u003e 01:56:59.496\n\u003e\u003e This is one thing that puzzles me about\nReagan administration policy on Kampuchea.\n\n01:56:59.496 --\u003e 01:57:04.440\nASEAN from last June onwards tried\n\n01:57:04.440 --\u003e 01:57:09.840\nto elaborate a policy for\nsettlement in Kampuchea,\n\n01:57:09.840 --\u003e 01:57:14.240\nwhich would take account of Vietnam's\nlegitimate security interests.\n\n01:57:14.240 --\u003e 01:57:18.881\nAt the July conference in New York,\nthe International Conference on\n\n01:57:18.881 --\u003e 01:57:23.442\nKampuchea proposed that there be\na transitional administration,\n\n01:57:23.442 --\u003e 01:57:27.774\nan impartial traditional\nadministration set up in Kampuchea.\n\n01:57:27.774 --\u003e 01:57:31.294\nAnd firm safeguards that there\nwould be free and fair elections,\n\n01:57:31.294 --\u003e 01:57:34.850\nincluding the disarming of\nthe Khmer Rouge and all other groups.\n\n01:57:34.850 --\u003e 01:57:39.840\nNow, when it came to the crunch in\nNew York, China strongly opposed this.\n\n01:57:39.840 --\u003e 01:57:44.050\nThe United States, the Reagan\nadministration, had said publicly and\n\n01:57:44.050 --\u003e 01:57:47.656\nHoldridge repeated it in\nthe Senate two weeks ago.\n\n01:57:47.656 --\u003e 01:57:53.770\nThat the US will support and continue to\nsupport ASEAN initiatives on Kampuchea,\n\n01:57:53.770 --\u003e 01:57:58.810\nyet on this critical point\nthe US went to water.\n\n01:57:58.810 --\u003e 01:58:03.579\nThe US did not attempt to\nuse its influence to make\n\n01:58:03.579 --\u003e 01:58:08.127\nChina agree to these\nterms that ASEAN wanted.\n\n01:58:08.127 --\u003e 01:58:15.810\n\u003e\u003e But\nChina has two objectives in Kampuchea.\n\n01:58:15.810 --\u003e 01:58:19.570\nOne is to bleed the Vietnamese,\nas you pointed out.\n\n01:58:19.570 --\u003e 01:58:23.680\nAnd there's no question that looking at it\nas a practical proposition the Khmer Rouge\n\n01:58:23.680 --\u003e 01:58:27.410\nare the most effective mechanism for\nbleeding the Vietnamese.\n\n01:58:27.410 --\u003e 01:58:32.650\nAnd even I, with all my revulsion to it,\nthe Khmer Rouge and\n\n01:58:32.650 --\u003e 01:58:38.880\nBerlin to see the Khmer Rouge used for\nthat purpose.\n\n01:58:38.880 --\u003e 01:58:44.594\nWhere perhaps we might part company with\nthe Chinese is with that the Chinese\n\n01:58:44.594 --\u003e 01:58:50.491\nprobably would be reasonably comfortable\nwith the Khmer Rouge as the dominant\n\n01:58:50.491 --\u003e 01:58:55.850\npolitical group in Kampuchea after\nthe war, and that the Chinese would\n\n01:58:55.850 --\u003e 01:59:01.210\nprobably also reason that they should\nnot demoralize the Khmer Rouge,\n\n01:59:01.210 --\u003e 01:59:06.863\nthat even if the Khmer Rouge do not\nemerge as the dominant political force.\n\n01:59:06.863 --\u003e 01:59:10.040\nThat is an issue to be faced\nafter the war and not now.\n\n01:59:10.040 --\u003e 01:59:13.880\nAnd they do not want to do anything\nto demoralize the Khmer Rouge\n\n01:59:13.880 --\u003e 01:59:15.170\nduring the fighting.\n\n01:59:15.170 --\u003e 01:59:20.420\nSo as experts in guerilla war,\nwhich the Chinese undoubtedly are,\n\n01:59:21.550 --\u003e 01:59:26.088\nI have to take those arguments seriously.\n\n01:59:26.088 --\u003e 01:59:28.518\nAs a long-term solution in so\n\n01:59:28.518 --\u003e 01:59:35.400\nfar as the Chinese want the Khmer Rogue\nthe dominant group in Kampuchea.\n\n01:59:35.400 --\u003e 01:59:40.110\nI would think that our American\napproach would have to differ.\n\n01:59:41.870 --\u003e 01:59:46.416\nI wanna make clear to your viewers\nthat I'm here as a private citizen,\n\n01:59:46.416 --\u003e 01:59:51.180\nthat I strongly support the main lines\nof the Reagan Have foreign policy but\n\n01:59:51.180 --\u003e 01:59:54.580\nthat doesn't mean that\nevery last tactical move\n\n01:59:54.580 --\u003e 01:59:58.860\nof the Reagan administration\nhas my equal support.\n\n01:59:59.980 --\u003e 02:00:02.780\nBut the main line of our\npolicy I strongly support and\n\n02:00:03.970 --\u003e 02:00:06.740\nthe main lines of\nthe Reagan administration.\n\n02:00:06.740 --\u003e 02:00:10.880\nBut I could not reconcile\nmyself personally to an outcome\n\n02:00:10.880 --\u003e 02:00:14.744\nin which the Khmer Rouge became\nthe dominant political force in\n\n02:00:14.744 --\u003e 02:00:17.980\n\u003e\u003e Perhaps Dr. Kissinger is that\n\n02:00:17.980 --\u003e 02:00:23.710\nthe Chinese are needed in this achievement\nof balance between Vietnam and\n\n02:00:23.710 --\u003e 02:00:27.570\nthe Soviet Union and\nthe non-Communist states in the region.\n\n02:00:27.570 --\u003e 02:00:31.783\nAnd as such,\nI think it could have been that the U.S.\n\n02:00:31.783 --\u003e 02:00:37.080\nsaw that China needed to be\naccommodated on this particular point.\n\n02:00:37.080 --\u003e 02:00:38.910\nI do not know.\n\u003e\u003e I think that you are absolutely right.\n\n02:00:38.910 --\u003e 02:00:41.120\nI think the judgment\nof the administration,\n\n02:00:42.120 --\u003e 02:00:45.850\nI am fairly confident that\nthe administration feels as I do,\n\n02:00:45.850 --\u003e 02:00:49.850\nthat we do not want the Khmer Rouge to\nemerge as the dominant force in Cambodia.\n\n02:00:51.320 --\u003e 02:00:55.930\nBut the administration would also believe\nthat China's support is essential and\n\n02:00:55.930 --\u003e 02:00:57.790\nthat we have other\nrelations with China and\n\n02:00:57.790 --\u003e 02:01:02.650\ntherefore, they must have made\nthis as a tactical judgment.\n\n02:01:02.650 --\u003e 02:01:07.510\n\u003e\u003e On a slightly different topic,\nI think it's your view once, I believe,\n\n02:01:07.510 --\u003e 02:01:12.690\nthat while in dealing\nwith the Communists and\n\n02:01:12.690 --\u003e 02:01:17.710\nwith the Soviet Union in particular,\nthat there are times when one needs to\n\n02:01:19.040 --\u003e 02:01:23.690\nproject a sense or\na mood of irrationality.\n\n02:01:23.690 --\u003e 02:01:29.610\nNow do you think that to be effective, do\nyou think that the Western world today and\n\n02:01:29.610 --\u003e 02:01:34.750\nthe Reagan administration in\nparticular are, with an inverted comma,\n\n02:01:34.750 --\u003e 02:01:37.800\nirrational enough to be effective\nenough against the Soviet Union?\n\n02:01:37.800 --\u003e 02:01:42.267\n\u003e\u003e Well let me-\n\u003e\u003e Do you think the Chinese are better in\n\n02:01:42.267 --\u003e 02:01:43.446\nthis game?\n\n02:01:43.446 --\u003e 02:01:48.130\n\u003e\u003e Well first to answer,\nlet me take the last question first.\n\n02:01:48.130 --\u003e 02:01:51.730\nI think the Chinese\nare extremely impressive\n\n02:01:51.730 --\u003e 02:01:55.520\nin their conduct of their\nstrategic relations.\n\n02:01:55.520 --\u003e 02:02:02.180\nI think the courage it took to\npunish Vietnam, given the balance\n\n02:02:02.180 --\u003e 02:02:06.090\nof forces existing between China and the\nSoviet Union was really quite remarkable.\n\n02:02:07.330 --\u003e 02:02:13.425\nAnd I think the Chinese have, who\nare militarily not have their weaknesses,\n\n02:02:13.425 --\u003e 02:02:19.428\nhave consciously adopted the policy\nthat if they won't submit a weakness,\n\n02:02:19.428 --\u003e 02:02:23.861\nthere will be no end to\nthe demands that are made on them.\n\n02:02:23.861 --\u003e 02:02:28.405\nSo their strategy is to indicate that\nif you make an unreasonable demand or\n\n02:02:28.405 --\u003e 02:02:33.026\na demand against their honor or you\nconduct yourself in a threatening way on\n\n02:02:33.026 --\u003e 02:02:37.890\ntheir borders, that then they will act\nregardless of seeming calculation.\n\n02:02:37.890 --\u003e 02:02:43.140\nThey did it with us in Korea,\nthey did it with the Vietnamese and\n\n02:02:43.140 --\u003e 02:02:44.940\nthey have done it with the Soviets.\n\n02:02:44.940 --\u003e 02:02:49.160\nI think this is an impressive performance,\nwhich is difficult for\n\n02:02:49.160 --\u003e 02:02:50.480\na democracy to emulate.\n\n02:02:50.480 --\u003e 02:02:54.422\nNow I don't say the United States\nshould look irrational.\n\n02:02:54.422 --\u003e 02:02:56.780\nThat's always said that I said this.\n\n02:02:56.780 --\u003e 02:02:59.200\nWhat I say is little more complicated.\n\n02:02:59.200 --\u003e 02:03:03.650\nI say it is dangerous to tell\nyour opponent ahead of time\n\n02:03:03.650 --\u003e 02:03:07.290\nexactly how you will react\nto all certain conditions.\n\n02:03:07.290 --\u003e 02:03:11.990\nYou must not be so calculable that\nhe can draw up a balance sheet and\n\n02:03:13.620 --\u003e 02:03:18.280\ncalculate the profits and losses ahead\nof time with absolute assurance.\n\n02:03:18.280 --\u003e 02:03:20.740\nYou must leave a factor of uncertainty.\n\n02:03:20.740 --\u003e 02:03:26.260\nOne of the reasons why President Nixon was\nan outstanding president in foreign policy\n\n02:03:26.260 --\u003e 02:03:30.980\nwas that in the final analysis,\nif you pushed him against the world,\n\n02:03:30.980 --\u003e 02:03:35.090\nhe might do something you\nabsolutely did not expect.\n\n02:03:35.090 --\u003e 02:03:36.030\nYou take 1972.\n\n02:03:36.030 --\u003e 02:03:38.300\nHere he had an election.\n\n02:03:38.300 --\u003e 02:03:39.530\nHe had a trip to Moscow.\n\n02:03:41.590 --\u003e 02:03:44.870\nI'm sure the Vietnamese figured\nthat it was impossible for\n\n02:03:44.870 --\u003e 02:03:46.470\nhim in the middle of an election year,\n\n02:03:46.470 --\u003e 02:03:51.570\ntwo weeks away from a trip to Moscow to\nreact to the invasion in South Vietnam,\n\n02:03:51.570 --\u003e 02:03:57.560\nbut he did, and that turned\nthe psychological situation around.\n\n02:03:57.560 --\u003e 02:04:00.800\nI don't think you should\nbehave like a mad man.\n\n02:04:01.930 --\u003e 02:04:05.440\nBut I don't think you should tell your\nadversary, if you do A, I will do exactly\n\n02:04:05.440 --\u003e 02:04:12.670\nB, and reassure him with\nthat degree of precision.\n\n02:04:12.670 --\u003e 02:04:13.520\nNow, can we do it?\n\n02:04:14.640 --\u003e 02:04:19.220\nOur system is not very comfortable\nwith it because if, anytime\n\n02:04:19.220 --\u003e 02:04:24.820\nthe United States uses force or threatens\nforce, we have to brief our congress.\n\n02:04:24.820 --\u003e 02:04:28.600\nThe first question they ask is what\nis the limit of this committment?\n\n02:04:28.600 --\u003e 02:04:31.850\nNow this is very reassuring to our public,\nbut\n\n02:04:31.850 --\u003e 02:04:35.240\nit may also be too reassuring\nto our adversaries.\n\n02:04:35.240 --\u003e 02:04:39.030\nAnd for that reason, this is what\nI have in mind by incalculability.\n\n02:04:39.030 --\u003e 02:04:41.860\nBut is the Reagan administration\ncapable of doing it?\n\n02:04:43.110 --\u003e 02:04:46.500\nI think so because if you look at the\nperformance of the Reagan administration,\n\n02:04:48.500 --\u003e 02:04:52.280\ntake Ethan in a domestic situation,\nlike the air controller strike.\n\n02:04:52.280 --\u003e 02:04:56.070\nAnd leaving us out now who, I won't go\ninto the merits of the dispute, but\n\n02:04:56.070 --\u003e 02:05:01.466\nthe fact of the matter is Reagan said,\nI will not permit a strike by public\n\n02:05:01.466 --\u003e 02:05:06.770\nservants who have signed a pledge\nthat they wouldn't strike.\n\n02:05:06.770 --\u003e 02:05:08.870\nAnd if they strike, I'll fire them.\n\n02:05:08.870 --\u003e 02:05:11.050\nNobody believed it, but he did it.\n\n02:05:12.450 --\u003e 02:05:13.560\nNever been done before.\n\n02:05:15.520 --\u003e 02:05:18.890\nAnd, you have to say that when\nhe's had a decision to make,\n\n02:05:18.890 --\u003e 02:05:22.170\nhe's made a strong decision and\nhe stuck with it.\n\n02:05:22.170 --\u003e 02:05:26.920\nSo, I think if he's challenged in foreign\npolicy, he will make a strong decision and\n\n02:05:26.920 --\u003e 02:05:27.830\nstick with it.\n\n02:05:27.830 --\u003e 02:05:30.620\n\u003e\u003e By logic of what you\nsaid about China and\n\n02:05:30.620 --\u003e 02:05:36.170\nin the face of growing reluctance that\nwe can see here of western Europe and\n\n02:05:36.170 --\u003e 02:05:40.990\nJapan to take on a greater\nmilitary responsibility,\n\n02:05:40.990 --\u003e 02:05:46.220\nthe sort that the United States want\nits people to take, does it make sense\n\n02:05:46.220 --\u003e 02:05:51.110\nto say that China would make a more\n\n02:05:52.170 --\u003e 02:05:56.020\neffective ally of the United States,\nvis-a-vis the Soviet Union.\n\n02:05:57.560 --\u003e 02:06:02.660\nAnd if so, would it-\n\u003e\u003e More effective than Japan?\n\n02:06:02.660 --\u003e 02:06:05.120\n\u003e\u003e Yes, because of what you say.\n\n02:06:09.467 --\u003e 02:06:12.318\nI think it is a great\nmistake to believe for\n\n02:06:12.318 --\u003e 02:06:17.730\nthe United States that we can play\nwith China as an American card.\n\n02:06:17.730 --\u003e 02:06:22.940\nThe Chinese have conducted their own\nindependent affairs for 3,000 years.\n\n02:06:22.940 --\u003e 02:06:27.220\nThe worst mistake we can make with\nthe Chinese is to give them the impression\n\n02:06:27.220 --\u003e 02:06:34.430\nthat they are our tool that we play,\nor even that they are our ally.\n\n02:06:34.430 --\u003e 02:06:39.100\nThe Chinese are cooperating\nwith us in a very realistic and\n\n02:06:39.100 --\u003e 02:06:42.810\npositive manner, because they believe\nthat their security interests and\n\n02:06:42.810 --\u003e 02:06:45.490\nour security interests are parallel.\n\n02:06:45.490 --\u003e 02:06:48.914\nAnd to the extent that we\nare both concerned with\n\n02:06:48.914 --\u003e 02:06:51.880\nwhat is called head Germany.\n\n02:06:51.880 --\u003e 02:06:54.130\nSoviet domination of the world,\nI think this is true.\n\n02:06:55.510 --\u003e 02:07:00.040\nSo I think we have an interest in\nthe independence and integrity of China.\n\n02:07:00.040 --\u003e 02:07:03.660\nAnd I have always believed at the time\nthat this was very unfashionable,\n\n02:07:03.660 --\u003e 02:07:05.850\nthat if there should be\na Soviet attack on China.\n\n02:07:06.910 --\u003e 02:07:09.440\nThe United States, in some way or another,\n\n02:07:09.440 --\u003e 02:07:12.464\nwill have to come to\nthe assistance of China.\n\n02:07:15.107 --\u003e 02:07:19.213\nBut if one says alliance\non a global basis, and\n\n02:07:19.213 --\u003e 02:07:23.848\nin which we give up traditional\nfriendships in order\n\n02:07:23.848 --\u003e 02:07:28.850\nto have a particular special\nfriendship with China.\n\n02:07:28.850 --\u003e 02:07:30.515\nAnd if it's carried even further,\n\n02:07:30.515 --\u003e 02:07:35.660\nthen we say China should be sort of\nthe policeman of Southeast Asia for us.\n\n02:07:35.660 --\u003e 02:07:37.314\nThat I don't think is necessary.\n\n02:07:37.314 --\u003e 02:07:43.091\nI think China, by existing, by being\nan independent state in its own essence,\n\n02:07:43.091 --\u003e 02:07:46.980\ncontributes a way to\nthe international balance.\n\n02:07:46.980 --\u003e 02:07:53.626\nBeyond that, to Ask to give them\nassignments outside that region.\n\n02:07:53.626 --\u003e 02:07:55.372\nFirst of all, they won't do it.\n\n02:07:55.372 --\u003e 02:07:58.032\nThe Chinese will not\ncarry out our policies,\n\n02:07:58.032 --\u003e 02:08:02.180\nthey never have carried\nout anybody else's policy.\n\n02:08:02.180 --\u003e 02:08:05.088\nSecondly, even if they\nwere willing to do it,\n\n02:08:05.088 --\u003e 02:08:08.307\nthis would go beyond\nthe parallelism of interest.\n\n02:08:08.307 --\u003e 02:08:11.770\nAnd in fairness I have to say,\nthey've never asked for this.\n\n02:08:11.770 --\u003e 02:08:15.510\nI think we can have our best relationship\nwith China if we both conduct\n\n02:08:15.510 --\u003e 02:08:17.196\nour own policies in parallel.\n\n02:08:17.196 --\u003e 02:08:21.797\nOpenly, frankly,\nunderstanding that their independence and\n\n02:08:21.797 --\u003e 02:08:24.266\nintegrity is in our interest, and\n\n02:08:24.266 --\u003e 02:08:29.139\nthat prevention of Soviet-led Germany\nis in our common interest.\n\n02:08:30.260 --\u003e 02:08:34.490\n\u003e\u003e I think you were talking yesterday\nin your speech about punishment and\n\n02:08:34.490 --\u003e 02:08:37.380\npenalties when we got to Poland.\n\n02:08:37.380 --\u003e 02:08:41.653\nAnd which is one of the themes that you've\nbeen touching of even when you were in\n\n02:08:41.653 --\u003e 02:08:42.580\npublic office.\n\n02:08:42.580 --\u003e 02:08:46.810\nBut what sort of penalties,\neffective penalties and punishments\n\n02:08:46.810 --\u003e 02:08:51.710\ncan the United States meet out today\nthat will work against the Soviet Union?\n\n02:08:52.770 --\u003e 02:08:55.250\n\u003e\u003e First we have to understand\nwhat is going on in Poland here.\n\n02:08:55.250 --\u003e 02:09:00.580\nHere's a country of 35 million that\nhas been under Soviet rule for\n\n02:09:00.580 --\u003e 02:09:05.290\n35 years or so, not under Soviet rule,\n\n02:09:05.290 --\u003e 02:09:08.540\nunder communist rule, but communist\nrule imposed by the Soviet Union.\n\n02:09:10.320 --\u003e 02:09:13.900\nThey have had a monopoly of power,\na monopoly of the press, a monopoly of\n\n02:09:13.900 --\u003e 02:09:20.150\nthe Secret Police, of the actual police,\nof the army, of the education system.\n\n02:09:20.150 --\u003e 02:09:24.160\nThey've had a totalitarian state,\nand still the people don't want it.\n\n02:09:25.240 --\u003e 02:09:30.660\nNow why should it be permissible for\nthe Soviet Union to\n\n02:09:30.660 --\u003e 02:09:36.530\ninterfere with constant threats as\nthey're doing, with constant pressure\n\n02:09:36.530 --\u003e 02:09:41.770\nto impose a system that, obviously,\nthe Polish people do not want?\n\n02:09:41.770 --\u003e 02:09:46.540\nAgain, I say, I would say something very\nsimilar here as I said about Vietnam.\n\n02:09:46.540 --\u003e 02:09:51.360\nThat is to say,\nI think the Soviet Union has every right\n\n02:09:51.360 --\u003e 02:09:55.900\nto be concerned that countries on its\nborders, not be used as military or\n\n02:09:55.900 --\u003e 02:09:59.060\nintelligence or other bases against it.\n\n02:09:59.060 --\u003e 02:10:03.970\nThat's a legitimate Soviet concern, and\nthat we should make every effort to meet.\n\n02:10:03.970 --\u003e 02:10:09.240\nNow if they continue to intervene and\nif the end result of this process is that\n\n02:10:09.240 --\u003e 02:10:14.500\nthe Solidarity movement gets destroyed,\nand that a totalitarian\n\n02:10:14.500 --\u003e 02:10:19.570\ncommunist regime is reimposed by\nwhatever method, what can we do?\n\n02:10:19.570 --\u003e 02:10:21.283\nWe can do nothing militarily.\n\n02:10:21.283 --\u003e 02:10:25.780\nI don't know whether we could, but\nthere would be no support for it, and\n\n02:10:25.780 --\u003e 02:10:30.880\nwe shouldn't pretend that we will do\nsomething that we will not carry through.\n\n02:10:30.880 --\u003e 02:10:34.020\nSo we should not give any\nimpression that we will give\n\n02:10:34.020 --\u003e 02:10:38.320\nmilitary support to Polish uprisings or\nanything like this, because we won't.\n\n02:10:38.320 --\u003e 02:10:39.640\nAnd if we did, it wouldn't be enough.\n\n02:10:40.860 --\u003e 02:10:42.640\nBut that would have to be\nin the field of economics,\n\n02:10:43.700 --\u003e 02:10:47.290\nif we do something in the field of,\nit would be in two fields,\n\n02:10:47.290 --\u003e 02:10:50.620\nin the field of diplomacy and\nthe field of economics.\n\n02:10:50.620 --\u003e 02:10:54.980\nI would believe if the Soviet Union\nmakes an overt intervention in Poland,\n\n02:10:54.980 --\u003e 02:10:58.210\nthat the existing arms control\nnegotiations would have to be ended.\n\n02:10:58.210 --\u003e 02:11:02.010\nBoth the theater and nuclear force\nnegotiations in Europe solve negotiations.\n\n02:11:02.010 --\u003e 02:11:07.193\nAnd each side would have to look\nto its unilateral position.\n\n02:11:07.193 --\u003e 02:11:13.000\nSecond, there would have to be\nsome specific economic reprisal.\n\n02:11:13.000 --\u003e 02:11:17.760\nBut if they're taken, I think they\nshould be taken with an agreement\n\n02:11:17.760 --\u003e 02:11:21.170\nwithin industrial democracy,\nthat they're going to stick with them.\n\n02:11:21.170 --\u003e 02:11:24.380\nI think the sort of thing that\nhappened after Afghanistan\n\n02:11:24.380 --\u003e 02:11:27.630\nis more likely to encourage\nthe Soviet Union than to discourage them.\n\n02:11:27.630 --\u003e 02:11:31.650\nBecause you take a few measures that\nhave no immediate practical effect\n\n02:11:31.650 --\u003e 02:11:33.080\nif you cut off new orders.\n\n02:11:34.910 --\u003e 02:11:40.020\nWhat you are in effect fulfilling the old\nones, which is all you would be doing\n\n02:11:40.020 --\u003e 02:11:45.170\nanyway, and then you make\nlarger new orders when the new\n\n02:11:45.170 --\u003e 02:11:50.080\norders are permitted again, and\nif the embargo lasts only a year or so.\n\n02:11:51.980 --\u003e 02:11:57.600\nBy the time the embargo ends, you have\nnot heard the Soviet Union at all, so\n\n02:11:57.600 --\u003e 02:12:02.950\nwe would have to take together\na series of measures,\n\n02:12:02.950 --\u003e 02:12:07.630\nsome of which would be\npainful in my judgment,\n\n02:12:07.630 --\u003e 02:12:10.120\nincluding also existing contracts.\n\n02:12:10.120 --\u003e 02:12:11.590\nNow, some of this would be painful.\n\n02:12:12.770 --\u003e 02:12:17.470\nBut if we're not willing to do that, then\nwe are really telling the Soviet Union\n\n02:12:17.470 --\u003e 02:12:21.680\nthat we're not willing to make any\nsacrifices for our convictions and for\n\n02:12:21.680 --\u003e 02:12:23.460\nour national interest.\n\n02:12:23.460 --\u003e 02:12:27.510\n\u003e\u003e With regard to Cuban involvement\nin Africa, I'm not asking for\n\n02:12:27.510 --\u003e 02:12:31.750\na flat statement, but\nCuba is very close to you.\n\n02:12:31.750 --\u003e 02:12:36.555\nAnd do you think it's a credible policy to\n\n02:12:36.555 --\u003e 02:12:42.120\ninsist that making life difficult for\nCuba may be a price that\n\n02:12:42.120 --\u003e 02:12:46.730\nthe Soviet Union may have to pay if they\nwent beyond a certain point in Africa?\n\n02:12:47.900 --\u003e 02:12:52.460\n\u003e\u003e I think it is in the long\nterm intolerable for\n\n02:12:52.460 --\u003e 02:12:55.331\nthe United States to have\na little Caribbean Island.\n\n02:12:55.331 --\u003e 02:12:59.324\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e 70 Miles off our shore act as\n\n02:12:59.324 --\u003e 02:13:05.025\na recruitment place for\nSoviet proxy forces in continents\n\n02:13:05.025 --\u003e 02:13:09.911\nthousands of miles away\nwith which that island has\n\n02:13:09.911 --\u003e 02:13:14.682\nhad no organic relationship\nexcept perhaps that\n\n02:13:14.682 --\u003e 02:13:20.490\nsome of its citizens\noriginally came from there.\n\n02:13:20.490 --\u003e 02:13:25.324\nAnd that they are supported there by\nSoviet logistics military leadership.\n\n02:13:25.324 --\u003e 02:13:30.552\nSo I have always believed that\nthe geographic location of Cuba and\n\n02:13:30.552 --\u003e 02:13:35.304\nits weakness, and\nthe distance of Africa from both Cuba and\n\n02:13:35.304 --\u003e 02:13:40.434\nthe Soviet Union should not make\nit beyond the will of man to exact\n\n02:13:40.434 --\u003e 02:13:45.470\na price that they cannot pay over\nan indefinite period of time,\n\n02:13:45.470 --\u003e 02:13:48.539\nand that will force them to withdraw.\n\n02:13:48.539 --\u003e 02:13:52.580\n\u003e\u003e Dr. Kissinger, do you agree\nwith the following observation?\n\n02:13:54.610 --\u003e 02:14:00.049\nAnd that is that the young new\nbreed of Americans today will\n\n02:14:00.049 --\u003e 02:14:07.382\nnever allow the United States to go to\nwar except when the US is being attacked?\n\n02:14:07.382 --\u003e 02:14:13.711\nOr when its survival is being threatened\nin the case of oil supply and\n\n02:14:13.711 --\u003e 02:14:19.263\nthat you will not be prepared to\ngo to war over West Germany or\n\n02:14:19.263 --\u003e 02:14:21.610\nJapan, or even Israel?\n\n02:14:21.610 --\u003e 02:14:26.990\nAnd I'm here saying actually going to war,\nnot just providing military help or\n\n02:14:26.990 --\u003e 02:14:30.560\nmilitary aid or\nexpressions of moral indignation.\n\n02:14:30.560 --\u003e 02:14:35.626\n\u003e\u003e No,\nour problem isn't the young American,\n\n02:14:35.626 --\u003e 02:14:40.560\nour problem is the American intellectual,\n\n02:14:40.560 --\u003e 02:14:43.460\nand that kind of people.\n\n02:14:43.460 --\u003e 02:14:45.733\nI think the American public and\n\n02:14:45.733 --\u003e 02:14:51.424\nthat is one fo the results of the last\nelection, is sick and tired of retreat.\n\n02:14:51.424 --\u003e 02:14:55.311\nAnd in fact it would be politically\nextremely dangerous for\n\n02:14:55.311 --\u003e 02:14:59.900\nany American administration to be\nperceived by the American public,\n\n02:14:59.900 --\u003e 02:15:02.010\nto be constantly in retreat.\n\n02:15:02.010 --\u003e 02:15:07.640\nI think the single most important factor\nin the defeat of President Carter\n\n02:15:07.640 --\u003e 02:15:10.090\nwas the image he created.\n\n02:15:10.090 --\u003e 02:15:15.560\nThat he was more conscious of what America\ncould not do than what it could do,\n\n02:15:15.560 --\u003e 02:15:19.410\nand the symbolism of this\nwas the hostage crisis.\n\n02:15:19.410 --\u003e 02:15:23.320\nWe can argue forever what could,\nshould, or might have been done.\n\n02:15:23.320 --\u003e 02:15:25.100\nAs far as the American\npublic was concerned,\n\n02:15:25.100 --\u003e 02:15:30.800\n50 Americans sitting in\nTehran was too much, so\n\n02:15:30.800 --\u003e 02:15:37.660\nI think there would be public support\nprovided that we are understood.\n\n02:15:37.660 --\u003e 02:15:41.490\nNot so much that the immediate\nsurvival of America is at stake, but\n\n02:15:41.490 --\u003e 02:15:43.590\nthat we are facing a profound challenge,\n\n02:15:43.590 --\u003e 02:15:48.290\nwhich if not met there, will become worse\nand worse, similar to what we faced\n\n02:15:49.470 --\u003e 02:15:53.748\nIn understanding the Nazi\ndanger in World War II.\n\n02:15:53.748 --\u003e 02:15:58.454\nIt is absolutely unthinkable to me\nthat the United States would permit\n\n02:15:58.454 --\u003e 02:16:03.320\na military adventure against\nWestern Europe, or against Japan, or for\n\n02:16:03.320 --\u003e 02:16:05.890\nthat matter against South East Asia.\n\n02:16:06.990 --\u003e 02:16:09.080\nEven though we have no legal obligation.\n\n02:16:09.080 --\u003e 02:16:14.754\nIndeed, I have always believed as\nI've said earlier in this program,\n\n02:16:14.754 --\u003e 02:16:19.105\nthat if China with which we\nhave no treaty relationship\n\n02:16:19.105 --\u003e 02:16:23.191\nwhatever we're attacked,\nin one way or another.\n\n02:16:23.191 --\u003e 02:16:26.409\nWe would have to come to\nits support simply because,\n\n02:16:26.409 --\u003e 02:16:29.702\nan attack on a nation of this\nmagnitude that succeeded\n\n02:16:29.702 --\u003e 02:16:34.560\nwould have such an effect on\nthe international balance of power.\n\n02:16:34.560 --\u003e 02:16:36.639\nThat it would undermine our position,\n\n02:16:36.639 --\u003e 02:16:39.602\nof course a great deal depends\non American leadership.\n\n02:16:39.602 --\u003e 02:16:43.273\nGreat deal depends what our\npresident will tell the public and\n\n02:16:43.273 --\u003e 02:16:45.609\nwhat his cabinet will tell the public.\n\n02:16:45.609 --\u003e 02:16:50.064\nBut I believe that this\npresident understands this,\n\n02:16:50.064 --\u003e 02:16:54.310\nso I do not think that\nwhat you said is true.\n\n02:16:54.310 --\u003e 02:16:59.100\nI think they'll be some opposition\nfrom some editorial writers and\n\n02:16:59.100 --\u003e 02:17:03.079\nsome professors who grew up\nduring the Vietnam period.\n\n02:17:04.920 --\u003e 02:17:08.210\nThat you expect in a democracy,\nbut America is a strong country,\n\n02:17:08.210 --\u003e 02:17:14.760\nyou couldn't get a million people marching\naround the way you do in Europe right now.\n\n02:17:14.760 --\u003e 02:17:16.140\n\u003e\u003e Earlier on you said though,\n\n02:17:16.140 --\u003e 02:17:21.130\nthat the problems faced by the United\nStates is in fact self-generated.\n\n02:17:21.130 --\u003e 02:17:21.940\n\u003e\u003e Many of them are.\n\n02:17:21.940 --\u003e 02:17:26.190\n\u003e\u003e Many of them are, are they anything\nto do with the Constitution, or\n\n02:17:26.190 --\u003e 02:17:26.990\nis it really up here?\n\n02:17:28.640 --\u003e 02:17:30.720\n\u003e\u003e Our Constitution is\nextremely complicated.\n\n02:17:31.990 --\u003e 02:17:36.924\nAnd it lends itself to\nacts of obstruction more\n\n02:17:36.924 --\u003e 02:17:41.099\neasily than to acts of leadership, and\n\n02:17:41.099 --\u003e 02:17:46.667\nthis is because it is\nan 18th century instrument,\n\n02:17:46.667 --\u003e 02:17:53.640\nwhich was designed to curb the power\nof the executive authority.\n\n02:17:56.530 --\u003e 02:18:01.370\nOn the other hand,\nhistory has shown that strong American\n\n02:18:01.370 --\u003e 02:18:06.326\npresidents can nevertheless\ngained tremendous impetus.\n\n02:18:06.326 --\u003e 02:18:11.734\nAnd that in fact the complexity\nof our institutions is a good\n\n02:18:11.734 --\u003e 02:18:18.441\nway of building a public consensus\nbecause it forces our executive into,\n\n02:18:18.441 --\u003e 02:18:23.140\nwhere other executives\nwould give an order.\n\n02:18:23.140 --\u003e 02:18:27.290\nOur executive at the end of\nthe day has to explain to so\n\n02:18:27.290 --\u003e 02:18:33.520\nmany different groups that this is really\na very democratic way of making decisions.\n\n02:18:33.520 --\u003e 02:18:38.510\nNow we have had in the last 20 years\na whole series of tragedies which have\n\n02:18:39.700 --\u003e 02:18:44.040\ncreated a problem which\nis largely psychological.\n\n02:18:44.040 --\u003e 02:18:46.120\nWe've had one President assassinated,\n\n02:18:53.360 --\u003e 02:18:57.800\nthen we've had a President who was driven\nout of office because of the Vietnam War.\n\n02:18:57.800 --\u003e 02:19:02.400\nThen we've had a President\nwho was driven out of office\n\n02:19:02.400 --\u003e 02:19:06.300\nbecause of some personal peculiarities,\nand\n\n02:19:06.300 --\u003e 02:19:10.700\nactions that are really\nreally hard to explain, and\n\n02:19:10.700 --\u003e 02:19:16.510\nwhose consequences will out of\nproportion to the original offense.\n\n02:19:18.210 --\u003e 02:19:19.670\nThen we've had an interim President,\n\n02:19:19.670 --\u003e 02:19:23.580\nthen we've had a President who one has\nto say was not largely successful,\n\n02:19:23.580 --\u003e 02:19:28.320\nand all those in a period when the\ninternational environment was changing.\n\n02:19:28.320 --\u003e 02:19:31.480\nSo we haven't had a normal\nPresident between Eisenhower and\n\n02:19:31.480 --\u003e 02:19:32.760\nReagan, that's 20 years.\n\n02:19:36.350 --\u003e 02:19:39.550\nThere's a whole generation of\nAmericans that have grown up\n\n02:19:39.550 --\u003e 02:19:41.460\nthat have never seen a two term president.\n\n02:19:42.560 --\u003e 02:19:47.794\nAnd we found ourselves in\nthe shocking circumstance that where\n\n02:19:47.794 --\u003e 02:19:54.113\nwe at the same time that we had this\ncrisis of leadership, the international\n\n02:19:54.113 --\u003e 02:20:00.354\nenvironment was changing from a condition\nin which we were very dominant.\n\n02:20:00.354 --\u003e 02:20:05.409\nEconomically we had 52% of the world's\ngross national product on 1950,\n\n02:20:05.409 --\u003e 02:20:07.360\nwe have 22% today.\n\n02:20:07.360 --\u003e 02:20:12.510\nThat is an important change in\nthe world in our situation, so\n\n02:20:12.510 --\u003e 02:20:15.710\nthis has been a serious problem for\nAmericans.\n\n02:20:17.070 --\u003e 02:20:22.415\nNot easy to meet and yet\nI think again like many educational\n\n02:20:22.415 --\u003e 02:20:28.197\nprocesses like the process of\nmaturing itself it was painful,\n\n02:20:28.197 --\u003e 02:20:34.761\nbut I think it is the condition for\na new period of American creativity.\n\n02:20:34.761 --\u003e 02:20:37.837\n\u003e\u003e You once quipped about being\nemperor of the United States,\n\n02:20:37.837 --\u003e 02:20:40.619\nnow, I'd like to base my\nnext question on this joke.\n\n02:20:41.750 --\u003e 02:20:46.550\nAnd that is if you are in fact the emperor\nof the United States today with\n\n02:20:46.550 --\u003e 02:20:50.700\nvery limited royal powers if you could\nchange one portion of the Constitution,\n\n02:20:50.700 --\u003e 02:20:52.290\nwhich portion would you change?\n\n02:20:52.290 --\u003e 02:20:54.472\nTo make the United States small-\n\u003e\u003e First, my quip was,\n\n02:20:54.472 --\u003e 02:20:57.584\npeople were asking me whether\nI could become president and\n\n02:20:57.584 --\u003e 02:21:01.204\nthe American Constitution prohibits\nsomebody who was born outside\n\n02:21:01.204 --\u003e 02:21:05.860\nthe United States, so I said Constitution\ndoesn't prohibit you from being emperor.\n\n02:21:07.970 --\u003e 02:21:11.900\nI would not change the Constitution,\nI think it's really a rather a good,\n\n02:21:11.900 --\u003e 02:21:14.260\nreally it's a great Constitution.\n\n02:21:14.260 --\u003e 02:21:20.160\nIt's a written Constitution that lasts and\nit's essential characteristics\n\n02:21:20.160 --\u003e 02:21:24.110\nfor over 200 years it's\na considerable achievement.\n\n02:21:25.930 --\u003e 02:21:33.530\nWhat I would change is the relative\nbalance by which the various organs\n\n02:21:33.530 --\u003e 02:21:37.890\nof governments within that constitutional\nstructure are asserting themselves.\n\n02:21:37.890 --\u003e 02:21:39.794\nI think, for example,\n\n02:21:39.794 --\u003e 02:21:45.140\nthat in the Watergate period\nthe congress passed a series of laws.\n\n02:21:45.140 --\u003e 02:21:49.553\nThat unduly limited\nthe executive authority and\n\n02:21:49.553 --\u003e 02:21:53.170\nunduly exalted the role of congress.\n\n02:21:53.170 --\u003e 02:21:58.110\nFor example,\nit used to be that our intelligence\n\n02:21:58.110 --\u003e 02:22:02.370\nactivities could just be briefed to\njust two committees of Congress.\n\n02:22:02.370 --\u003e 02:22:06.700\nOne in the Senate and one in the House,\nof a very restricted group.\n\n02:22:06.700 --\u003e 02:22:12.051\nNow they have to briefed to eight\ndifferent committees of Congress\n\n02:22:12.051 --\u003e 02:22:17.303\nthat are very large, so the result\nis that the danger of leaks is so\n\n02:22:17.303 --\u003e 02:22:21.270\ngreat that we are necessarily constricted.\n\n02:22:21.270 --\u003e 02:22:25.290\nSecondly, I think there's such things\nas the Freedom of Information Act,\n\n02:22:25.290 --\u003e 02:22:28.570\nwhich in theory It's\nsupposed to give the public\n\n02:22:28.570 --\u003e 02:22:32.460\naccess to the deliberations\nof government in practice.\n\n02:22:32.460 --\u003e 02:22:37.590\nIt has two drawbacks, it leads to,\nit creates a temptation for\n\n02:22:37.590 --\u003e 02:22:41.400\neach new administration to\ngo after its predecessors,\n\n02:22:41.400 --\u003e 02:22:45.960\nby leaking out information\nthat might be embarrassing.\n\n02:22:47.000 --\u003e 02:22:50.130\nTo its predecessors with the result that\nwhile you're in office you don't keep\n\n02:22:50.130 --\u003e 02:22:52.230\naccurate records anymore.\n\n02:22:52.230 --\u003e 02:22:56.410\nAnd the end result of the Freedom\nof Information Act will be\n\n02:22:56.410 --\u003e 02:23:00.980\nboth excessive disclosure, but more\nimportantly, inaccurate record keeping.\n\n02:23:02.060 --\u003e 02:23:05.380\nAnd I think that these\nare all legal things.\n\n02:23:05.380 --\u003e 02:23:09.446\nThird, I think the War Powers Act\nin which the President has\n\n02:23:09.446 --\u003e 02:23:13.440\nto tell the Congress every\ntime he moves military forces.\n\n02:23:13.440 --\u003e 02:23:18.720\nWhat he's going to do with them and how he\nwill employ them sounds very democratic.\n\n02:23:18.720 --\u003e 02:23:23.230\nThe fact though is that In my experience,\nin a crisis,\n\n02:23:23.230 --\u003e 02:23:28.470\nyour most effective weapon is that your\nopponent does not what you're going to do.\n\n02:23:28.470 --\u003e 02:23:32.500\nIf you tell him I'm moving this aircraft\ncarrier, but I tell you now I'm only gonna\n\n02:23:32.500 --\u003e 02:23:38.290\nuse ten airplanes from it, you\nare practically inviting him to test you.\n\n02:23:38.290 --\u003e 02:23:43.146\nSo, I think that a number of\nrestrictions have been put on\n\n02:23:43.146 --\u003e 02:23:46.798\nAmerican actions that could be adjusted.\n\n02:23:46.798 --\u003e 02:23:50.356\nBut the fundamental constitutional\nsystem that we have is a sign of great\n\n02:23:50.356 --\u003e 02:23:52.850\nstrength that we should maintain.\n\n02:23:52.850 --\u003e 02:23:56.020\nAnd even of those things\nthat I have criticized,\n\n02:23:56.020 --\u003e 02:23:58.520\nI wouldn't want them all abolished.\n\n02:23:58.520 --\u003e 02:24:03.590\nI would just like to, I think it's useful\nto have a Freedom of Information Act, but\n\n02:24:03.590 --\u003e 02:24:05.910\nit should be given a less\nsweeping application.\n\n02:24:06.930 --\u003e 02:24:11.990\n\u003e\u003e May I move you back, Dr. Kissinger,\nto grow in the Asia Pacific region?\n\n02:24:11.990 --\u003e 02:24:16.180\nChina has now embarked on\na tremendous modernization drive.\n\n02:24:17.690 --\u003e 02:24:21.450\nWhat are the implications of this\ndrive to the communist system of\n\n02:24:21.450 --\u003e 02:24:22.220\ngovernment in China?\n\n02:24:25.430 --\u003e 02:24:31.756\n\u003e\u003e Of course,\nI happen to believe that the Stalinist,\n\n02:24:31.756 --\u003e 02:24:37.680\nLeninist, Soviet system of communism is\nincompatible with the modern economy and\n\n02:24:37.680 --\u003e 02:24:40.110\nthat it is bound to reach\na point of stagnation.\n\n02:24:41.190 --\u003e 02:24:45.170\nThat leads to tremendous\ndomestic tensions.\n\n02:24:47.520 --\u003e 02:24:50.020\nI believe that the Chinese\nhave understood this.\n\n02:24:51.350 --\u003e 02:24:57.430\nAnd one can not deal with Chinese people,\nwherever one meets them,\n\n02:24:57.430 --\u003e 02:25:02.056\nwithout being struck by their enormous,\nunsentimental\n\n02:25:02.056 --\u003e 02:25:07.710\npracticality on matters that affect\ntheir society and their survival.\n\n02:25:07.710 --\u003e 02:25:08.689\nSo I have the impression,\n\n02:25:09.980 --\u003e 02:25:14.000\nthat the Chinese leadership has understood\nthat you have to create incentives.\n\n02:25:15.140 --\u003e 02:25:17.840\nThat they're intending to\ndecentralize decision makings.\n\n02:25:17.840 --\u003e 02:25:21.720\nThat they know that you run\nan economy in which the managers do\n\n02:25:21.720 --\u003e 02:25:27.310\nnot know their customers or their\nsuppliers, you have absolutely no check.\n\n02:25:27.310 --\u003e 02:25:28.140\nOn the decisions.\n\n02:25:28.140 --\u003e 02:25:31.170\nAnd that you are creating\nan absolutely arbitrary system.\n\n02:25:31.170 --\u003e 02:25:33.260\nAnd not a planned system.\n\n02:25:33.260 --\u003e 02:25:34.890\nAnd you are creating more corruption,\n\n02:25:34.890 --\u003e 02:25:38.176\nrather than less corruption\nbecause there's no normal check.\n\n02:25:38.176 --\u003e 02:25:43.710\nSo this, but\nof course there's a communist party.\n\n02:25:43.710 --\u003e 02:25:47.890\nAnd how to reconcile the communist\nparty with the needs of incentive,\n\n02:25:47.890 --\u003e 02:25:52.920\nthis is the drama of the Chinese\ndomestic effort right now.\n\n02:25:53.950 --\u003e 02:25:55.760\nOn which I think they are making progress.\n\n02:25:55.760 --\u003e 02:25:58.510\nThe second problem is,\nif one looks at Chinese history.\n\n02:25:58.510 --\u003e 02:26:04.130\nAnd to say this in a city populated so\nlargely by Chinese is ridiculous.\n\n02:26:04.130 --\u003e 02:26:08.350\nBut to be, as a Westerner,\nstudying Chinese history.\n\n02:26:08.350 --\u003e 02:26:10.340\nOne is struck by the fact.\n\n02:26:10.340 --\u003e 02:26:16.740\nThat there seems to be a reason\nbetween modernization and\n\n02:26:16.740 --\u003e 02:26:24.350\nremaining Chinese and that, in the 19th\nCentury, the Chinese have always felt.\n\n02:26:24.350 --\u003e 02:26:27.882\nBefore too that being Chinese is so\nprecious and so\n\n02:26:27.882 --\u003e 02:26:33.280\nunique that you must hesitate that by\ntrying to become like everybody else.\n\n02:26:35.130 --\u003e 02:26:38.880\nAnd yet when you modernize, to some\nextent, you become like everybody else.\n\n02:26:41.180 --\u003e 02:26:47.103\nSo, I would not be surprised\nthat in a society in which\n\n02:26:47.103 --\u003e 02:26:53.070\nafter all in the Confucian tradition and\na Taoist tradition.\n\n02:26:53.070 --\u003e 02:26:58.230\nEach of which were based on\nthe concept of uniqueness that there\n\n02:26:58.230 --\u003e 02:27:04.070\nis a psychological revolution by some\nagainst continued modernization.\n\n02:27:06.330 --\u003e 02:27:08.340\nI think that's a serious\npsychological problem.\n\n02:27:08.340 --\u003e 02:27:14.330\nOn the other hand if you look at typical,\nyou can see what can be done once\n\n02:27:14.330 --\u003e 02:27:19.310\nthis particular obstacle is overcome.\n\n02:27:20.360 --\u003e 02:27:26.870\nAnd I think that the Chinese,\nif there is any nation that will be\n\n02:27:26.870 --\u003e 02:27:32.270\nable to overcome this die feeling\neffect of a communist structure and\n\n02:27:32.270 --\u003e 02:27:35.650\ndevelop, I think it's the,\nit's the Chinese.\n\n02:27:35.650 --\u003e 02:27:38.960\nBecause, there is just a limit\n\n02:27:40.580 --\u003e 02:27:44.100\nI think when looks with again\nI'm speaking as an outsider.\n\n02:27:44.100 --\u003e 02:27:47.786\nThere's a barbarian\nlooking at the Chinese,\n\n02:27:47.786 --\u003e 02:27:52.141\nto me they look like the most\nindividualistic people.\n\n02:27:52.141 --\u003e 02:27:58.101\nAnd there's just a limit beyond\nwhich you cannot impose doctrine and\n\n02:27:58.101 --\u003e 02:28:01.820\nforms on them that are country to reality.\n\n02:28:01.820 --\u003e 02:28:05.470\nAnd one way or another,\nthey're gonna make something work.\n\n02:28:05.470 --\u003e 02:28:09.909\nAnd so, I'm really quite\noptimistic that the Chinese,\n\n02:28:09.909 --\u003e 02:28:15.840\nthat communist China will adopt the forms\nthat will enable it to modernize.\n\n02:28:15.840 --\u003e 02:28:19.020\nBut it will be painful and\nit will take a long time.\n\n02:28:19.020 --\u003e 02:28:21.330\n\u003e\u003e Just about enough time for\na last question, and\n\n02:28:21.330 --\u003e 02:28:24.520\nI'd like to direct it on a personal plane,\nif you don't mind.\n\n02:28:24.520 --\u003e 02:28:29.541\nIt's a very subjective question, but\none of the impressions we got here\n\n02:28:29.541 --\u003e 02:28:34.904\nis that you were a lot more outspoken when\nyou were in office than you were out.\n\n02:28:34.904 --\u003e 02:28:39.820\nAnd my question is whether,\nfirst of all, whether that's true.\n\n02:28:39.820 --\u003e 02:28:43.450\nAnd if true,\nwhether that's a better protocol.\n\n02:28:43.450 --\u003e 02:28:45.790\nAnd you have many friends in Washington.\n\n02:28:45.790 --\u003e 02:28:50.680\nOr whether, as some cynics have pointed\nout, that you still have affection of\n\n02:28:50.680 --\u003e 02:28:54.580\na mind still directed on a possible\nreturn to high public office?\n\n02:28:55.750 --\u003e 02:29:02.160\n\u003e\u003e Well, to take your last first,\nI do not have my mind directed towards\n\n02:29:03.970 --\u003e 02:29:09.027\nreturn to high public office.\n\n02:29:09.027 --\u003e 02:29:13.810\nI It can in fact get used to the\nproposition that I can give a speech in\n\n02:29:13.810 --\u003e 02:29:20.320\nSingapore, that they won't even notice\nin Washington, no matter what I say.\n\n02:29:20.320 --\u003e 02:29:22.860\nSo, that is not my problem.\n\n02:29:24.010 --\u003e 02:29:28.879\nI do believe, and\nI support this present administration\n\n02:29:28.879 --\u003e 02:29:33.146\neven though there have\nbeen periods previously.\n\n02:29:33.146 --\u003e 02:29:37.440\nBut I was not in agreement with\nPresident Reagan because as I look at\n\n02:29:37.440 --\u003e 02:29:40.508\nthe American history\nover the last 20 years,\n\n02:29:40.508 --\u003e 02:29:45.360\nI think it is important that\nAmerica have a strong President.\n\n02:29:45.360 --\u003e 02:29:49.310\nAnd because I do not see that\nany purpose is served by\n\n02:29:49.310 --\u003e 02:29:53.840\npicking around on minor issues.\n\n02:29:53.840 --\u003e 02:29:58.540\nAnd of course it's less exciting if\nyou are in substantial agreement but\n\n02:29:58.540 --\u003e 02:30:04.850\nI have no, I think my most useful\nrole now is to say what I think.\n\n02:30:04.850 --\u003e 02:30:08.400\nAnd if what I think happens to think is\nin agreement with existing policy that\n\n02:30:09.850 --\u003e 02:30:12.600\nit is the price I have to pay for\nsomething less outspoken.\n\n02:30:13.810 --\u003e 02:30:17.590\n\u003e\u003e Well, and on that note I like to,\nin behalf of my two colleagues here.\n\n02:30:17.590 --\u003e 02:30:20.420\nI like to thank you for\nthe opportunity of this interview.\n\n02:30:20.420 --\u003e 02:30:21.721\nThank you very much Dr. Kissinger.","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919#t=0.0,9059.52"}]},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17466/file/72919/transcript/7753","type":"AnnotationPage","label":{"en":["English 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