{"@context":"http://iiif.io/api/presentation/3/context.json","id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/iiif/251fj29g6c/manifest","type":"Manifest","label":{"en":["Conference on World Affairs plenary address, 1961 April 11"]},"logo":"https://d9jk7wjtjpu5g.cloudfront.net/organizations/logo_images/000/000/013/original/yale-blue.png?1678220072","metadata":[{"label":{"en":["Identifier"]},"value":{"en":["mssa.ms.1981 (EAD ID)","MS 1981  (Call Number)","ms_1981_s07_b0911_0001.mp3 (Digital Object ID)"]}},{"label":{"en":["Format"]},"value":{"en":["audiocassettes"]}},{"label":{"en":["Date"]},"value":{"en":["1961 April 11 (Creation)"]}},{"label":{"en":["Description"]},"value":{"en":["https://preservica.library.yale.edu/explorer/explorer.html#prop:4\u0026amp;8f5cdd53-7f9d-4bf1-b6ff-6baa28414546 (Other Finding Aid Note)"]}},{"label":{"en":["Language"]},"value":{"en":[]}},{"label":{"en":["Rights Statement"]},"value":{"en":["The materials are open for research.","Researchers must register and agree to the Yale University Library User Agreement for Special Collections before accessing audiovisual material in this collection."]}},{"label":{"en":["Publisher"]},"value":{"en":["Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library."]}},{"label":{"en":["Source Metadata URI"]},"value":{"en":["https://archives.yale.edu/repositories/12/archival_objects/2076697"]}},{"label":{"en":["Preferred Citation"]},"value":{"en":["Conference on World Affairs plenary address, 1961 April 11. Henry A. Kissinger Papers, Part II (MS 1981). Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library. https://archives.yale.edu/repositories/12/resources/5211."]}}],"summary":{"en":["https://preservica.library.yale.edu/explorer/explorer.html#prop:4\u00268f5cdd53-7f9d-4bf1-b6ff-6baa28414546"]},"requiredStatement":{"label":{"en":["Attribution"]},"value":{"en":["The materials are open for research.","Researchers must register and agree to the Yale University Library User Agreement for Special Collections before accessing audiovisual material in this collection."]}},"provider":[{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/aboutus","type":"Agent","label":{"en":["Manuscripts and Archives Yale University Library"]},"homepage":[{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/","type":"Text","label":{"en":["Manuscripts and Archives Yale University Library"]},"format":"text/html"}],"logo":[{"id":"https://d9jk7wjtjpu5g.cloudfront.net/organizations/logo_images/000/000/013/original/yale-blue.png?1678220072","type":"Image"}]}],"thumbnail":[{"id":"https://d9jk7wjtjpu5g.cloudfront.net/public/images/audio-default.png","type":"Image","format":"image/png"}],"items":[{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959","type":"Canvas","label":{"en":["Media File 1 of 1 - open-uri20200302-3371-1u0q20z.mpga"]},"duration":3023.59509,"width":640,"height":40,"thumbnail":[{"id":"https://d9jk7wjtjpu5g.cloudfront.net/public/images/audio-default.png","type":"Image","format":"image/png"}],"items":[{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/content/1","type":"AnnotationPage","items":[{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/content/1/annotation/1","type":"Annotation","motivation":"painting","body":{"id":"https://aviary-p-yalemssa.s3.wasabisys.com/collection_resource_files/resource_files/000/072/959/original/open-uri20200302-3371-1u0q20z.mpga?1583143840","type":"Audio","format":"audio/mpeg","duration":3023.59509,"width":640,"height":40},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959","metadata":[]}]}],"annotations":[{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797","type":"AnnotationPage","label":{"en":["ms_1981_s07_b0911_0001_transcript.txt [Transcript]"]},"items":[{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/1","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\u003e\u003e Morning. [INAUDIBLE]\nWelcome all of you to this morning's session, here to enjoy together the treat we have this morning. With one of our nation's leading and thoughtful analysts. Some of the critical problems which face the world today. Our speaker this morning was born in Germany, has had a career which is essentially educational, and yet he has had an unusual contribution to public affairs and world affairs.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=2.0,41.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/2","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nHe has been a man to whom people have turned for ideas, he is a person in turn who has challenged persons to review their own thoughts and to review their own values in the field of world affairs today, in the light of impossible impending international disaster It is typical, I suppose, for a person in academic settings to emphasize the academic backgrounds of speakers.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=41.0,76.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/3","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBut I shall refrain from that, except to say that our speaker has been associated and is associated with the Harvard International seminar in the Harvard Center for International Affairs. He is a highly respected political scientist. He is, in addition, a person who has written incisive analyses of current problems which has won him a citation from the Overseas Press Club and the Woodrow Wilson prize for the best book in the fields of government politics and international affairs in 1958.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=76.0,113.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/4","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIt is with great pleasure that I introduce to all of you Professor Henry A Kissinger.\n\u003e\u003e [APPLAUSE]\n\u003e\u003e Mr Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, now, the subject about which I have been asked to speak, Is perhaps one of the most serious that the nation faces, at the moment. There's no doubt that any American desires peace, no one who has even the slightest familiarity with modern weapons can be interested in another war.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=113.0,182.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/5","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThere should be, in America, no debate, even though some attempt to create one, between those who are allegedly dedicated to a policy of war and others who are allegedly dedicated to a policy of peace. The problem arises because peace is not enough. We can always have peace by surrender.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=182.0,220.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/6","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThat opportunity is always open to us. If we want peace with freedom and if we want peace and preserve the values of our society, however imperfectly we may sometimes practice them, then we confront the issue about which I'm speaking today. Also, I want to make clear now that neither I nor any other responsible student of the problem of military security and foreign policy, has ever maintained for a minute that military security answers all our problems.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=220.0,278.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/7","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nMilitary security is the condition of our policy. It isn't the end of our policy, it cannot protect us against economic, the economic council. It cannot excuse us from making a contribution, from helping to try to solve some of the moral dilemmas of our time. At the same time, those who are charged with the final responsibility, have to keep in mind that the survival of their society must be one of their primary concern.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=278.0,335.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/8","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThey do not have the option of staking the survival of the United States, simply on a conjecture of what might happen if we did not prepare ourselves. For if it turns out that these conjectures are wrong, they cannot like re-academics, go back to a laboratory and try again.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=335.0,372.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/9","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n[COUGH] Also I would like to stress. That the question of military policies is not simply a concern of the professional officers. But that it lies at the basis of many other things we have to do in the field of foreign affairs. There's a great deal of talk about the future of NATO.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=372.0,407.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/10","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nYet, unless we clarify, throughout the West, the significance or a lack of significance, of nuclear weapons, unless we know what we are trying to achieve with the armaments that are being created. A sense of insecurity, of lack of purpose, of confusion, of division, is going to continue. Again, the future of the western community of nations is not entirely, perhaps not even primarily, a military problem.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=407.0,461.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/11","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAll I'm maintaining is that it cannot be solved without clarity in the military field. Another area in which there is going to be a major effort by the new administration And in which many serious and dedicated people and to which many serious and dedicated people are now giving attention is the field of disarmament, arms control, Mitigating the effects of arms race or whatever you wish to call it.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=461.0,501.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/12","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nYet, anyone who has ever studied this after Has come to the conclusion that responsible proposals in the field of disarmament presuppose an understanding of the field or armament. It is impossible to develop controlled plans unless one knows what one is going to control. [COUGH] It's therefore, no accident that in my judgement.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=501.0,537.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/13","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThe real contribution in the field of disarmament has not been made by those who think that moral intensity is a substitute for thought but it has been made by the less spectacular, More careful analysts who have been willing to go step-by-step. It's no accident also that, as I said on some of the disarmament groups that now study the problem, I have a sense that I'm coming in where I have left off.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=537.0,580.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/14","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nFour years ago, we were sitting on panels with slightly different composition which were discussing presumably questions of strategy. Now, in the field of disarmament, it appears that almost every issue that arises finally returns to very similar problems. What is the purpose of our military establishment, what is the role of nuclear weapons, what is the significance of conventional forces?\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=580.0,614.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/15","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd until those questions are answered it has in practice proved very hard to design reasonable [COUGH] proposals. Now, One of the reasons Why we have been floundering so much in our military policy, in our foreign policy and in our disarmament policy is the difficulty of developing A view of strategy which can find common assent and which is also responsive to our political needs.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=614.0,665.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/16","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThis is not due to the short sidedness or stupidity of the leading people. Although we haven't been lacking in those qualities either sometimes. It has been do for one thing because technology has been changing at such a fantastic rate. In the past, the political leadership had to learn the basic characteristics of one weapon system and that would be stable for nearly a generation.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=665.0,706.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/17","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nToday, we have undergone three or four technological revolution in the span of 15 years. Greater in extent that any previous generation has had 30 years to assimilate. We have had to do this while our all in foreign affairs has been transformed while a revolution has been sweeping the Earth.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=706.0,734.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/18","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd it's not surprising that our response should sometimes have been hesitant. Secondly, as a result of this, [COUGH] There has been the fact That the so called experts in many areas have become sometimes irrelevant, sometimes an obstacle to understand. There are many [COUGH] professionals here, as part of this conference, who will be delighted to enlighten you about the limits of my understanding.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=734.0,789.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/19","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBut, as long as I have the floor, [COUGH] I might perhaps be permitted to say, peculiarly I see no one to stop me that [COUGH] one of the problems the professional military have had is that the scale of experience on which their expertise has been formed is almost completely irrelevant to our contemporary problems.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=789.0,828.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/20","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThat experience which formed a senior officer up to 1945 is no guarantee whatever that he understands contemporary problems. Indeed, it may be a positive obstacle for him to understand contemporary problems. [COUGH] The notion which I take to be fairly axiomatic. That there are no longer any purely military answers, that even if war starts, one cannot insist on a purely military solution.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=828.0,877.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/21","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIt's very hard to accept for people who have been brought up to believe that once war starts, their primary purpose has to be to destroy the enemy completely. And if the military professionals have had difficulties, the political leadership has had equal difficulties. Last year, when there was a debate in which one side was maintaining that we have become more vulnerable than ever.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=877.0,917.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/22","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd the other side was answering that we are stronger Than we have been in our history. Some people were maintaining that the balance of power was shifting. Others were saying, that this couldn't be true because our power was greater that it ever had been before. It was hard to accept the fact that everybody was right.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=917.0,952.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/23","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIt is hard to accept the fact that we are both stronger and more vulnerable. That if balance of power can shift Even while absolute power increases. [COUGH]\nIn the past, no nation had the problem that it might have too much power for political ends. Our generation has to solve the problem that there's no limit to the physical strength that it can bring to bear.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=952.0,987.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/24","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBut there is a limit to the political purposes that can be realized with that strength. There has been, therefore, because of the difficulty of understanding on the part of the military. And of the corollary and perhaps even greater difficulty of understanding on the part of the political leadership.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=987.0,1013.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/25","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThere have been all kinds of hurdles that have to be met. In much of the contemporary strategic debate for example. It seems to me not enough to be able to settle the question among the so called military experts. What has to be asked at every point is, can the military experts convince the political leadership.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=1013.0,1044.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/26","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThat we, in fact, possess the capability that the military think they have. One of the big debates, to which I will return in a few minutes, in our military establishment at the moment. Is the debate between what is technically called counterforce strategy and another view which is called finite deterrence.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=1044.0,1069.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/27","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd this is a crude definition of a more complicated problem. This debate affects the view we take towards NATO, towards disarmament, in fact towards the defence of freedom everywhere. Counteforce means in effect, that if this Soviet Union attacks anywhere, We would respond by trying to destroy the Soviet retaliatory force.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=1069.0,1103.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/28","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd having destroyed the Soviet retaliatory force. We could then threaten damage to the fabric of Soviet life, until they desist from the course of action we are trying to prevent. Finite deterrence means that it is impossible. The advocates for finite deterrence would maintain that it is impossible to destroy the Soviet retaliatory force.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=1103.0,1133.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/29","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd that our targeting must have other purposes. And Soviet aggression must be stopped by other means than an attack on the Soviet homeland. Now, I will come to this problem in a few minutes, but I would like to say now. That it seems to me extraordinarily unlikely that the military establishment will ever be able to convince the president.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=1133.0,1169.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/30","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThat it in fact possesses a counterforce capability even if in fact it does. What is required to win a modern strategic war? It's so complicated, so subtle, and so untested. That I do not see how a conclusive demonstration could be made within our governmental machine, that we possess such a capability.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=1169.0,1202.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/31","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd then we face the curious fact that we may in fact have a certain capability. But since our political leadership doesn't believe it, we cannot use it politically. And we will act politically as if we didn't have the capability. This is one problem. The second problem is, since the purpose of our military establishment is to prevent war There are two other psychological hurdles.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=1202.0,1243.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/32","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nOne of these psychological hurdles is again our own state of mind. The effectiveness of our military establishment is tested negatively. It is tested by things which do not happen. Now any of you who have studied logic will know that it is impossible to prove the reason why something does not happen.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=1243.0,1266.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/33","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n[COUGH]\nAlso, you never can prove that another policy might not have been even more successful. Even less can you prove that there is a need for change. The very fact that something has been successful for 15 years is going to be taken as a proof that it must continue to be successful.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=1266.0,1294.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/34","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nEven though technology is changing. The success of the existing policy can therefore be a menace to the future security. And then there is the psychological hurdle of the state of mind of the potential aggressor. A military policy that doesn't evoke in the potential aggressor the responses we are trying to evoke.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=1294.0,1326.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/35","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nMay have disastrous consequences, or it may simply fail. If we cannot succeed in conveying either our determination or the consequences of our determination. Either deterrence will fail or we may lose a war. Indeed from the point of view of deterrence, An action which is intended as a bluff but which is taken seriously.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=1326.0,1372.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/36","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIs more useful than an action which is intended seriously but interpreted as a bluff. Now all of these are psychological problems which one has to keep in mind. Reasonably independent of the nature of our forces they would exist in any case. And I mention them only to indicate the complexity of the problem that our policymakers face.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=1372.0,1404.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/37","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nNow I would like to say one very brief word here about why all of this is necessary and then I will turn to the strategic question as such. When I hear my friends from various pacifist groups or unilateral disarmament groups speak about the notion of deterrence. I can hardly understand how people can be As stupid as they described the people who have studied the problem of deterrence.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=1404.0,1447.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/38","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIndeed I would believe, if the problem were quite that simple, even we who have studied the problem, might understand it. No one has ever advocated that we start a war of any kind. The problem of war and of defense arises only, if there is communist pressure, communist blackmail, or communist aggression.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=1447.0,1483.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/39","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd I would say that the history of the last 15 years makes it at least plausible that those things can happen. I don't maintain, that the communists have a theory, or a master plan according to which they want to take over the world by military means. Communist psychology and theory work in a more complicated fashion.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=1483.0,1515.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/40","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nCommunists believe that they understand objective factors better than we do ourselves. And they believe also that any change in objective conditions, what they call objective conditions, must bring about a political benefit. As a result, even though very shortly after the inauguration we made clear that we were prepared to settle for a neutral hours.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=1515.0,1549.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/41","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThe communists brought in more and more troops, incidentally, quite different from the American approach, say during the Korean peace negotiations, or during the nuclear test ban. Our tendency is that when negotiation start to take off the pressure, because we want to show that we are regular fellows, and we don't want to disturb goodwill.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=1549.0,1573.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/42","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThe communists when negotiation are eminent, increase the pressure. Because they are convinced that a settlement will reflect whatever balance of forces has been established. And the communist build-up in Laos increased, rather than decreased, after we made our conciliatory gestures. The pressure on Berlin has been justified essentially with one argument, or basically with one argument as follows.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=1573.0,1607.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/43","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIn 1945, the Berlin situation was all right, because the balance of forces was a certain way. In 1961 and in 60, the balance of power in the world has changed, and therefore we communists must get some political benefit from it. And if the balance of power continues to change, this is how the communists would use it.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=1607.0,1637.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/44","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nNot necessarily to land troops in the United States, but to get a change of the political environment for their purposes. Indeed it maybe, I believe that the communists do this for reasons they consider defensive Except that these, we can draw a small consolation from that fact. The key is not that the communists feel defensive, but that they cannot be reassured, short of the neutralization of any non-communist power.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=1637.0,1687.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/45","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd again, all one has to do is to look at how communist leaders treat each other. In what communist country has anytime, not so much opposition, but even divergent opinion been tolerated. Where have the communist leaders learned anything except that opposition, indeed even potential opposition, must be smashed.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=1687.0,1719.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/46","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThis is what forces us into a consideration of the problem of security. Now here we face the fact that matters have changed at least four times since World War II. There was first of all a period when we had the atomic monopoly. There was a second period when we no longer had a atomic monopoly, but a decisive strategic superiority.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=1719.0,1759.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/47","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThere was a third period, that second period ended as late as 1956, 57 perhaps. There was a third period through which we may be coming to an end, in which the side which struck first had a great advantage, and there was a great premium on surprise attack. Perhaps both sides, certainly we could win if we struck first, but this might not be the situation if we didn't strike first.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=1759.0,1798.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/48","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd finally, there was the period, which in my judgement is approaching, in which in the equation of strategic war, neither side will be able to calculate with sufficient certainty, that it can win, by striking first and obviously not by striking second. Now, the difficulty we have had in our military policy, is that we have essentially pursued the same strategy through all the strategic changes.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=1798.0,1838.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/49","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nEssentially our policy has been an adaptation of the policy of World War II. That is if the aggression was clear and unambiguous, we would destroy the opponent by devastating his homeland. We forgot that in World War II we were in essence in an invulnerable position, we could do so without fear of retaliation.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=1838.0,1873.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/50","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nWe forgot that up to 1956, this policy worked reasonably well. Not so much because of the destructiveness of our weapons, but because of our ability to destroy the opposing retaliatory force, if we struck first. Under these conditions, the communists had to be very careful, even in local adventures lest they, in retaliation, they be destroyed.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=1873.0,1911.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/51","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAs to nuclear age develops, this condition is going to be increasingly difficult. Indeed, I would say impossible to maintain. We are moving into a period, First of all, we are moving into a period of the Missile Age. For some time, the Soviet Union is likely to possess somewhat more missiles than we are.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=1911.0,1942.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/52","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nUnder those conditions, it is going to be technically almost impossible to win by striking first. Let me explain what I mean by striking first here. I don't mean that we start a war. I mean that if the Communists, say, attack Europe, we attack the communist retaliatory force. Under those conditions, an American first strike is technically impossible, or at least impossible in the sense that a political leader cannot rely on it.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=1942.0,1977.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/53","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBecause it will take several hours for American airplanes to go from the Soviet early warning lines to Soviet missile sites, or plenty of time for the Soviets to fire their missiles. After the period of the missile gap ends, and both sides have large numbers of missiles, it will be technically very hard to calculate with sufficient precision.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=1977.0,2013.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/54","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nDespite the theoretical calculations, which I know many people make, the sufficient precision, a successfully retaliatory strike for us to continue to rely on this policy. Now, this has been recognized by the president, and it has been embodied in his defense budget. It was repeated again yesterday. It is, in effect, a statement that we would not, under most circumstances, rely on a massive first strike as a response to communist aggression.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=2013.0,2063.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/55","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nOne of the difficulty in this connection is political. Namely, how we can convey, even if we wanted to, our desire or our willingness to run this risk to the other side. Now, what we would be forced to do in any crisis, such as Berlin, is to convince the communists that we are prepared to resort to mutual annihilation.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=2063.0,2098.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/56","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nRather than aqueous in their game, but that we are not going to attack irrationally. These may be two inconsistent measures. We would have to convince them that to defend Berlin, for example, or Saigon, we are willing to suffer tens of millions of casualties. The only way we could convince them of this is to prove to them that we have a high capacity for irrationality.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=2098.0,2133.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/57","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIn other words, we would have to behave in such a fashion, at the beginning of a crisis, so nervously that the communist leaders would draw the conclusion that, sensible or not, on this issue, the Americans are likely to go crazy.\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e I'm quite serious, this is what would have to be done.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=2133.0,2157.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/58","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThe other hand, this is exactly the kind of policy which we cannot pursue vis-a-vis our own people, or vis-a-vis our own ally. Indeed, at the beginning of any crisis, it is the normal reaction of most American presidents to say we are going to be calm, we are gonna be collected.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=2157.0,2181.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/59","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIn President Kennedy's words or laws, we're not gonna be trapped. We are gonna be under good control. In other words, to behave in precisely the fashion, which must convince the communists that we are not likely to resort to the threat of a counter-force or a massive first strike policy.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=2181.0,2207.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/60","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd this gets, however, to the second problem. As the danger, to the communist, of a massive strike is reduced, the risks to them of local pressures are also reduced. And we can therefore expect, over the next few years, an increase in local communist pressures. Many of the actions that are now being taken, which I strongly support, such as bringing the retaliatory forces under closer political control.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=2207.0,2249.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/61","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThose measures are essential, but they have the penalty that the rest of the Soviets are being reduced, the risk of local actions. And that we therefore must be prepared to build up local forces and also to build up non-nuclear forces. And again, many of my pacifist friends are having a marvelous time proving that people who talk about arms control, and at the same time say, we must build up conventional forces, are either fools or knaves.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=2249.0,2289.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/62","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIt isn't so ridiculous. If we are serious in reducing reliance on our retaliatory strategy, if we really mean it that we do not want to stake an exchange of cities on every crisis. If we are serious about that, then we have to be also serious about building up our local forces.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=2289.0,2318.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/63","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nOtherwise, we will have a continuation of losses all over the world. We'll have a repetition of the Berlin-type crisis. We cannot have something for nothing. In NATO, for example, about which, I understand there's a panel this afternoon. One difficulty is that our allies are torn by two contradictory concerns.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=2318.0,2352.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/64","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nOne is that the United States would use nuclear weapons in their defense. And the second is that the United States would not use nuclear weapons in their defense. One is that we are too trigger happy, the other is that we are not trigger happy enough. Our allies, even more than weak, would like to have the advantage of low military budgets, minimum risk, maximum security.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=2352.0,2387.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/65","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nWe cannot have that. We cannot combine the advantage of every course of action. Many of our allies Have had as a primary purpose, a commitment of American forces in Europe. Not because they felt these forces would do any good but because they wanted to be very sure that if the communists attack, the United States would be in the war.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=2387.0,2415.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/66","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThey have about the same significance as when the Chief of Staff of the French army was asked in 1914 by the British, how many British soldiers do you want? He said, we want one soldier and we'll make sure he gets killed in the first day of the war.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=2415.0,2431.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/67","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e Now, this kind of evasion. Of this kind of evasion of responsibility. This kind of unwillingness to tell the truth to their own people of all members of the alliance, including ourselves. Has had the result, that when we put nuclear weapons into Europe, there is an outcry.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=2431.0,2457.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/68","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd when we control the nuclear weapons we put into Europe, there is another cry. When we ask them to build up conventional forces, it is interpreted as an attempt by the United States to shirk its responsibilities. We ask them to build up their own forces, it is taken as a proof.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=2457.0,2481.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/69","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nNow, NATO can not possibly survive unless we straighten out these confusions. And unless we admit to ourselves that security cannot no longer be had on the cheap. And that all our people's will have to choose between whether they want present comfort or ultimate freedom. Now let me say a few words here about the reverse side of this.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=2481.0,2525.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/70","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nMany people, after they hear a strategic discussion of strategy, leave with somewhat of a feeling of despair. They ask themselves, how can this ever end? Is there going to be an endless multiplication of arms. Can we do something about it? Now, it is of course I think, one of the most attractive to American traits.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=2525.0,2556.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/71","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nTo believe that you can do something about every problem. And that the right answer hasn't been given yet because somebody has forgotten to ask the right question. Now it may well be, indeed it is certain. That no matter what we will do, we will live through our lifetimes in the midst of crisis.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=2556.0,2584.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/72","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nNo one should pretend and anyone who pretends cannot be understanding. That we are working towards some kind of a terminal date called peace in which only for effort disappears. And in which all tension has evaporated. No one should promise this to the American people because it isn't true.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=2584.0,2619.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/73","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nWhat we can do, what we should try to do, Is to affect the environment in which we live in such a way that the incentives produced by the weapons to go to war, is reduced. Perhaps eliminated. It isn't any good to say, as many people do, We simply have to trust the Russians.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=2619.0,2654.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/74","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd if we trusted the Russians we could have all kinds of disarmament agreements. If we trusted the Russians we wouldn't need disarmament agreements.\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e No one has ever proposed that we make a disarmament agreement with Great Britain. No one has ever proposed that we inspect the British nuclear force.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=2654.0,2677.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/75","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nEven though they could also kill millions of Americans. The problem of these disarmament negotiations is precisely the fact that we do not trust the Russians. And we cannot simply explain that problem away or that the Russians trust us. Nor can disarmament remove all causes of tension. What we can ask of these negotiations is that they address themselves to those tensions that are produced by weapons themselves.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=2677.0,2721.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/76","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd of those tensions, there is the great advantage that is inherent in surprise. There is the great problem of the spread of nuclear weapons to ever more nations. There's the problem, which was discussed in one of the panels this morning, of the control of outer space. There is the problem of accidental war.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=2721.0,2756.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/77","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd again I would stress, that in these negotiations every thing depends on the ability to be concrete and on the ability to make precise proposals. I sometimes have the impression that there are some groups who believe, that unless you tell horror stories to the American people, you will never get them to do anything.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=2756.0,2790.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/78","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThere is a problem of accidental war. But it doesn't happen to be the problem described in On the Beach. There is a problem about the spread of nuclear weapons but I rarely see it described in analytical terms. [COUGH]\nWe have to get used to the fact, and I won't pretend to give the answers in this field of disarmament, or arms control, or whatever you want to call it.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=2790.0,2827.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/79","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThat the answers are gonna be very complex if they are serious. We have even to be kept used to the fact that it may be that our most responsible proposals will not be understood by the rest of the world. Everyone says we have to take into world opinion into account.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=2827.0,2850.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/80","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nOf course we do. But we also have to remember that one of the criticisms that is made of the United States, is that we've had too few people studying the problem of disarmament. We've had about close to 100 studying it now. There's no country in the world, none of the new countries, that has even one full time person studying the problem of disarmament.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=2850.0,2883.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/81","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n[COUGH] If we are going to engage in a propaganda slogan, the battle of propaganda slogans. If we want to get [COUGH]\na public relations appeal. Then we should hire a firm from Madison Avenue. And a lot of people are now wasting their time in watching. [COUGH] All I can say, is That we may have to engage in many seemingly contradictory actions.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=2883.0,2918.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/82","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nWe may have to build up conventional forces even as we are trying to control nuclear forces. We also have to keep in mind that there are many things that we can do unilaterally. Regardless of whether we get agreement. We can make sure that our military forces are always responsive to political control.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=2918.0,2944.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/83","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nWe can make sure that they are as invulnerable as we can make them, in order to remove an incentive for attack. We can take certain other unilateral steps. But we may have to engaged in seemingly contradictory actions simultaneously. All of them are going to be complex. All of them have to keep in mind not only the military but the psychological and political environment.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=2944.0,2978.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7797/annotation/84","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nI would therefore suggest that many of the answers we give here will test not only our technical ability to survive but above all, our worthiness to survive.\n\u003e\u003e [APPLAUSE]\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=2978.0,3023.59509"}]},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7798","type":"AnnotationPage","label":{"en":["ms_1981_s07_b0911_0001_caption.vtt [Transcript]"]},"items":[{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7798/annotation/85","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"WEBVTT\nLanguage: en\n\n00:00:02.549 --\u003e 00:00:03.760\nMorning.\n\n00:00:03.760 --\u003e 00:00:08.380\n[INAUDIBLE]\nWelcome all of you to this morning's\n\n00:00:08.380 --\u003e 00:00:12.980\nsession, here to enjoy together\nthe treat we have this morning.\n\n00:00:15.430 --\u003e 00:00:19.950\nWith one of our nation's leading and\nthoughtful analysts.\n\n00:00:19.950 --\u003e 00:00:22.800\nSome of the critical problems\nwhich face the world today.\n\n00:00:24.320 --\u003e 00:00:29.298\nOur speaker this morning was\nborn in Germany, has had\n\n00:00:29.298 --\u003e 00:00:34.580\na career which is essentially educational,\n\n00:00:35.620 --\u003e 00:00:40.300\nand yet he has had an unusual contribution\nto public affairs and world affairs.\n\n00:00:41.472 --\u003e 00:00:48.130\nHe has been a man to whom people have\nturned for ideas, he is a person in turn\n\n00:00:48.130 --\u003e 00:00:52.490\nwho has challenged persons to\nreview their own thoughts and\n\n00:00:52.490 --\u003e 00:00:57.200\nto review their own values in\nthe field of world affairs today,\n\n00:00:57.200 --\u003e 00:01:02.829\nin the light of impossible\nimpending international disaster\n\n00:01:06.523 --\u003e 00:01:08.777\nIt is typical, I suppose, for\n\n00:01:08.777 --\u003e 00:01:14.870\na person in academic settings to emphasize\nthe academic backgrounds of speakers.\n\n00:01:16.100 --\u003e 00:01:17.850\nBut I shall refrain from that,\n\n00:01:17.850 --\u003e 00:01:22.790\nexcept to say that our speaker has\nbeen associated and is associated with\n\n00:01:22.790 --\u003e 00:01:28.520\nthe Harvard International seminar in the\nHarvard Center for International Affairs.\n\n00:01:28.520 --\u003e 00:01:32.210\nHe is a highly respected\npolitical scientist.\n\n00:01:32.210 --\u003e 00:01:37.448\nHe is, in addition,\na person who has written incisive analyses\n\n00:01:37.448 --\u003e 00:01:43.947\nof current problems which has won him a\ncitation from the Overseas Press Club and\n\n00:01:43.947 --\u003e 00:01:48.603\nthe Woodrow Wilson prize for\nthe best book in the fields of\n\n00:01:48.603 --\u003e 00:01:53.754\ngovernment politics and\ninternational affairs in 1958.\n\n00:01:53.754 --\u003e 00:02:00.578\nIt is with great pleasure that I introduce\nto all of you Professor Henry A Kissinger.\n\n00:02:00.578 --\u003e 00:02:11.246\n\u003e\u003e [APPLAUSE]\n\n00:02:11.246 --\u003e 00:02:15.018\n\u003e\u003e Mr Chairman, ladies and\n\n00:02:15.018 --\u003e 00:02:20.586\ngentlemen, now, the subject about\n\n00:02:20.586 --\u003e 00:02:25.621\nwhich I have been asked to speak,\n\n00:02:27.031 --\u003e 00:02:31.727\nIs perhaps one of the most serious that\n\n00:02:31.727 --\u003e 00:02:35.991\nthe nation faces, at the moment.\n\n00:02:39.683 --\u003e 00:02:46.404\nThere's no doubt that any\nAmerican desires peace,\n\n00:02:46.404 --\u003e 00:02:53.736\nno one who has even the slightest\nfamiliarity with modern\n\n00:02:53.736 --\u003e 00:02:59.250\nweapons can be interested in another war.\n\n00:03:02.730 --\u003e 00:03:10.470\nThere should be, in America, no debate,\neven though some attempt to create one,\n\n00:03:10.470 --\u003e 00:03:16.496\nbetween those who are allegedly\ndedicated to a policy of war and\n\n00:03:16.496 --\u003e 00:03:21.850\nothers who are allegedly\ndedicated to a policy of peace.\n\n00:03:26.089 --\u003e 00:03:33.170\nThe problem arises because\npeace is not enough.\n\n00:03:34.830 --\u003e 00:03:37.890\nWe can always have peace by surrender.\n\n00:03:40.001 --\u003e 00:03:44.194\nThat opportunity is always open to us.\n\n00:03:46.878 --\u003e 00:03:52.576\nIf we want peace with freedom and\nif we want peace and\n\n00:03:52.576 --\u003e 00:03:56.684\npreserve the values of our society,\n\n00:03:56.684 --\u003e 00:04:02.782\nhowever imperfectly we may\nsometimes practice them,\n\n00:04:02.782 --\u003e 00:04:09.560\nthen we confront the issue\nabout which I'm speaking today.\n\n00:04:12.175 --\u003e 00:04:17.185\nAlso, I want to make clear\nnow that neither I nor\n\n00:04:17.185 --\u003e 00:04:24.579\nany other responsible student of\nthe problem of military security and\n\n00:04:24.579 --\u003e 00:04:28.965\nforeign policy, has ever maintained for\n\n00:04:28.965 --\u003e 00:04:35.250\na minute that military security\nanswers all our problems.\n\n00:04:38.024 --\u003e 00:04:44.252\nMilitary security is\nthe condition of our policy.\n\n00:04:44.252 --\u003e 00:04:47.897\nIt isn't the end of our policy,\n\n00:04:47.897 --\u003e 00:04:53.492\nit cannot protect us against economic,\n\n00:04:53.492 --\u003e 00:04:57.572\nthe economic council.\n\n00:04:57.572 --\u003e 00:05:05.680\nIt cannot excuse us from\nmaking a contribution,\n\n00:05:05.680 --\u003e 00:05:10.590\nfrom helping to try to solve some\nof the moral dilemmas of our time.\n\n00:05:13.990 --\u003e 00:05:21.010\nAt the same time, those who are charged\nwith the final responsibility,\n\n00:05:22.820 --\u003e 00:05:27.760\nhave to keep in mind that\nthe survival of their society\n\n00:05:28.900 --\u003e 00:05:33.490\nmust be one of their primary concern.\n\n00:05:35.170 --\u003e 00:05:41.770\nThey do not have the option\nof staking the survival of\n\n00:05:43.530 --\u003e 00:05:49.920\nthe United States, simply on a conjecture\n\n00:05:49.920 --\u003e 00:05:54.320\nof what might happen if we\ndid not prepare ourselves.\n\n00:05:55.550 --\u003e 00:06:01.337\nFor if it turns out that\nthese conjectures are wrong,\n\n00:06:01.337 --\u003e 00:06:05.067\nthey cannot like re-academics,\n\n00:06:05.067 --\u003e 00:06:09.193\ngo back to a laboratory and try again.\n\n00:06:12.646 --\u003e 00:06:18.620\n[COUGH] Also I would like to stress.\n\n00:06:20.010 --\u003e 00:06:24.680\nThat the question of military\npolicies is not simply\n\n00:06:26.250 --\u003e 00:06:30.070\na concern of the professional officers.\n\n00:06:31.760 --\u003e 00:06:37.123\nBut that it lies at the basis\nof many other things\n\n00:06:37.123 --\u003e 00:06:42.228\nwe have to do in the field\nof foreign affairs.\n\n00:06:42.228 --\u003e 00:06:47.532\nThere's a great deal of talk\nabout the future of NATO.\n\n00:06:47.532 --\u003e 00:06:51.261\nYet, unless we clarify,\n\n00:06:51.261 --\u003e 00:06:57.362\nthroughout the West, the significance or\n\n00:06:57.362 --\u003e 00:07:03.973\na lack of significance,\nof nuclear weapons,\n\n00:07:03.973 --\u003e 00:07:10.075\nunless we know what we\nare trying to achieve\n\n00:07:10.075 --\u003e 00:07:16.360\nwith the armaments that are being created.\n\n00:07:18.150 --\u003e 00:07:22.459\nA sense of insecurity, of lack of purpose,\n\n00:07:22.459 --\u003e 00:07:27.590\nof confusion, of division,\nis going to continue.\n\n00:07:29.270 --\u003e 00:07:34.190\nAgain, the future of the western\ncommunity of nations\n\n00:07:34.190 --\u003e 00:07:39.509\nis not entirely, perhaps not even\nprimarily, a military problem.\n\n00:07:41.910 --\u003e 00:07:46.700\nAll I'm maintaining is that\nit cannot be solved without\n\n00:07:47.910 --\u003e 00:07:49.410\nclarity in the military field.\n\n00:07:51.935 --\u003e 00:07:58.420\nAnother area in which there is going to be\na major effort by the new administration\n\n00:08:00.030 --\u003e 00:08:06.289\nAnd in which many serious and dedicated\npeople and to which many serious and\n\n00:08:06.289 --\u003e 00:08:12.349\ndedicated people are now giving\nattention is the field of disarmament,\n\n00:08:12.349 --\u003e 00:08:19.241\narms control, Mitigating the effects of\narms race or whatever you wish to call it.\n\n00:08:21.438 --\u003e 00:08:25.786\nYet, anyone who has\never studied this after\n\n00:08:28.059 --\u003e 00:08:33.890\nHas come to the conclusion that\nresponsible proposals in the field\n\n00:08:33.890 --\u003e 00:08:40.150\nof disarmament presuppose an understanding\nof the field or armament.\n\n00:08:41.800 --\u003e 00:08:46.603\nIt is impossible to develop\ncontrolled plans unless\n\n00:08:46.603 --\u003e 00:08:50.210\none knows what one is going to control.\n\n00:08:52.067 --\u003e 00:08:57.090\n[COUGH] It's therefore,\nno accident that in my judgement.\n\n00:08:57.090 --\u003e 00:09:03.252\nThe real contribution in the field\nof disarmament has not been made\n\n00:09:03.252 --\u003e 00:09:08.642\nby those who think that moral\nintensity is a substitute for\n\n00:09:08.642 --\u003e 00:09:13.604\nthought but\nit has been made by the less spectacular,\n\n00:09:15.654 --\u003e 00:09:21.814\nMore careful analysts who have\nbeen willing to go step-by-step.\n\n00:09:23.520 --\u003e 00:09:28.307\nIt's no accident also that,\nas I said on some of\n\n00:09:28.307 --\u003e 00:09:33.576\nthe disarmament groups that\nnow study the problem,\n\n00:09:33.576 --\u003e 00:09:39.100\nI have a sense that I'm coming\nin where I have left off.\n\n00:09:40.230 --\u003e 00:09:45.300\nFour years ago, we were sitting\non panels with slightly different\n\n00:09:45.300 --\u003e 00:09:49.970\ncomposition which were discussing\npresumably questions of strategy.\n\n00:09:51.830 --\u003e 00:09:57.420\nNow, in the field of disarmament,\nit appears that almost\n\n00:09:57.420 --\u003e 00:10:03.763\nevery issue that arises finally\nreturns to very similar problems.\n\n00:10:03.763 --\u003e 00:10:08.950\nWhat is the purpose of our military\nestablishment, what is the role\n\n00:10:08.950 --\u003e 00:10:14.504\nof nuclear weapons, what is\nthe significance of conventional forces?\n\n00:10:14.504 --\u003e 00:10:19.512\nAnd until those questions\nare answered it has in practice\n\n00:10:19.512 --\u003e 00:10:24.530\nproved very hard to design\nreasonable [COUGH] proposals.\n\n00:10:27.036 --\u003e 00:10:31.542\nNow, One of the reasons\n\n00:10:33.169 --\u003e 00:10:38.078\nWhy we have been floundering so\nmuch in our\n\n00:10:38.078 --\u003e 00:10:43.269\nmilitary policy, in our foreign policy and\n\n00:10:43.269 --\u003e 00:10:50.158\nin our disarmament policy is\nthe difficulty of developing\n\n00:10:54.015 --\u003e 00:10:58.638\nA view of strategy which\ncan find common assent and\n\n00:10:58.638 --\u003e 00:11:03.270\nwhich is also responsive\nto our political needs.\n\n00:11:05.370 --\u003e 00:11:12.470\nThis is not due to the short sidedness or\nstupidity of the leading people.\n\n00:11:13.660 --\u003e 00:11:17.365\nAlthough we haven't been lacking in\nthose qualities either sometimes.\n\n00:11:19.490 --\u003e 00:11:25.077\nIt has been do for\none thing because technology\n\n00:11:25.077 --\u003e 00:11:30.388\nhas been changing at\nsuch a fantastic rate.\n\n00:11:31.609 --\u003e 00:11:36.644\nIn the past,\nthe political leadership had to learn\n\n00:11:36.644 --\u003e 00:11:41.681\nthe basic characteristics\nof one weapon system and\n\n00:11:41.681 --\u003e 00:11:46.261\nthat would be stable for\nnearly a generation.\n\n00:11:46.261 --\u003e 00:11:49.280\nToday, we have undergone three or\n\n00:11:49.280 --\u003e 00:11:54.390\nfour technological revolution\nin the span of 15 years.\n\n00:11:54.390 --\u003e 00:12:02.660\nGreater in extent that any previous\ngeneration has had 30 years to assimilate.\n\n00:12:04.680 --\u003e 00:12:09.730\nWe have had to do this while our all\nin foreign affairs has been transformed\n\n00:12:10.860 --\u003e 00:12:13.270\nwhile a revolution has\nbeen sweeping the Earth.\n\n00:12:14.860 --\u003e 00:12:20.524\nAnd it's not surprising that our response\nshould sometimes have been hesitant.\n\n00:12:23.630 --\u003e 00:12:28.379\nSecondly, as a result of this,\n\n00:12:31.355 --\u003e 00:12:38.002\n[COUGH] There has been\nthe fact That the so\n\n00:12:38.002 --\u003e 00:12:42.715\ncalled experts in many areas have\n\n00:12:42.715 --\u003e 00:12:47.260\nbecome sometimes irrelevant,\n\n00:12:47.260 --\u003e 00:12:52.826\nsometimes an obstacle to understand.\n\n00:12:55.159 --\u003e 00:13:01.203\nThere are many [COUGH] professionals here,\nas part of this conference,\n\n00:13:01.203 --\u003e 00:13:07.760\nwho will be delighted to enlighten you\nabout the limits of my understanding.\n\n00:13:09.470 --\u003e 00:13:13.324\nBut, as long as I have the floor,\n\n00:13:13.324 --\u003e 00:13:18.283\n[COUGH] I might perhaps\nbe permitted to say,\n\n00:13:18.283 --\u003e 00:13:23.929\npeculiarly I see no one to\nstop me that [COUGH] one of\n\n00:13:23.929 --\u003e 00:13:29.166\nthe problems the professional\nmilitary have\n\n00:13:29.166 --\u003e 00:13:34.814\nhad is that the scale of\nexperience on which their\n\n00:13:34.814 --\u003e 00:13:40.327\nexpertise has been formed\nis almost completely\n\n00:13:40.327 --\u003e 00:13:45.466\nirrelevant to our contemporary problems.\n\n00:13:48.456 --\u003e 00:13:54.232\nThat experience which formed\na senior officer up to 1945\n\n00:13:54.232 --\u003e 00:14:01.040\nis no guarantee whatever that he\nunderstands contemporary problems.\n\n00:14:02.480 --\u003e 00:14:07.460\nIndeed, it may be a positive obstacle for\n\n00:14:07.460 --\u003e 00:14:12.734\nhim to understand contemporary problems.\n\n00:14:15.868 --\u003e 00:14:22.080\n[COUGH] The notion which I\ntake to be fairly axiomatic.\n\n00:14:23.685 --\u003e 00:14:28.470\nThat there are no longer any\npurely military answers,\n\n00:14:29.490 --\u003e 00:14:35.320\nthat even if war starts, one cannot\ninsist on a purely military solution.\n\n00:14:37.260 --\u003e 00:14:39.916\nIt's very hard to accept for\n\n00:14:39.916 --\u003e 00:14:45.893\npeople who have been brought up\nto believe that once war starts,\n\n00:14:45.893 --\u003e 00:14:51.994\ntheir primary purpose has to be\nto destroy the enemy completely.\n\n00:14:54.628 --\u003e 00:14:59.428\nAnd if the military professionals\nhave had difficulties,\n\n00:14:59.428 --\u003e 00:15:03.945\nthe political leadership\nhas had equal difficulties.\n\n00:15:03.945 --\u003e 00:15:08.361\nLast year, when there was a debate in\n\n00:15:08.361 --\u003e 00:15:12.920\nwhich one side was maintaining that we\n\n00:15:12.920 --\u003e 00:15:17.780\nhave become more vulnerable than ever.\n\n00:15:17.780 --\u003e 00:15:22.873\nAnd the other side was\nanswering that we are stronger\n\n00:15:24.388 --\u003e 00:15:27.020\nThan we have been in our history.\n\n00:15:29.020 --\u003e 00:15:34.510\nSome people were maintaining that\nthe balance of power was shifting.\n\n00:15:35.940 --\u003e 00:15:39.860\nOthers were saying,\nthat this couldn't be true\n\n00:15:39.860 --\u003e 00:15:43.720\nbecause our power was greater\nthat it ever had been before.\n\n00:15:45.790 --\u003e 00:15:50.191\nIt was hard to accept the fact\nthat everybody was right.\n\n00:15:52.027 --\u003e 00:15:57.910\nIt is hard to accept the fact that we\nare both stronger and more vulnerable.\n\n00:15:57.910 --\u003e 00:16:02.840\nThat if balance of power can shift\nEven while absolute power increases.\n\n00:16:02.840 --\u003e 00:16:08.100\n[COUGH]\nIn the past,\n\n00:16:09.540 --\u003e 00:16:15.865\nno nation had the problem that it might\nhave too much power for political ends.\n\n00:16:17.580 --\u003e 00:16:21.690\nOur generation has to solve the problem\n\n00:16:21.690 --\u003e 00:16:25.860\nthat there's no limit to the physical\nstrength that it can bring to bear.\n\n00:16:27.080 --\u003e 00:16:31.973\nBut there is a limit to\nthe political purposes\n\n00:16:31.973 --\u003e 00:16:36.493\nthat can be realized with that strength.\n\n00:16:36.493 --\u003e 00:16:38.695\nThere has been, therefore,\n\n00:16:38.695 --\u003e 00:16:44.079\nbecause of the difficulty of understanding\non the part of the military.\n\n00:16:44.079 --\u003e 00:16:49.043\nAnd of the corollary and\nperhaps even greater difficulty of\n\n00:16:49.043 --\u003e 00:16:53.819\nunderstanding on the part of\nthe political leadership.\n\n00:16:53.819 --\u003e 00:16:58.140\nThere have been all kinds of\nhurdles that have to be met.\n\n00:16:59.400 --\u003e 00:17:04.202\nIn much of the contemporary\nstrategic debate for example.\n\n00:17:04.202 --\u003e 00:17:08.918\nIt seems to me not enough\nto be able to settle\n\n00:17:08.918 --\u003e 00:17:14.691\nthe question among the so\ncalled military experts.\n\n00:17:14.691 --\u003e 00:17:18.251\nWhat has to be asked at every point is,\n\n00:17:18.251 --\u003e 00:17:24.166\ncan the military experts convince\nthe political leadership.\n\n00:17:24.166 --\u003e 00:17:30.618\nThat we, in fact, possess the capability\nthat the military think they have.\n\n00:17:30.618 --\u003e 00:17:35.297\nOne of the big debates,\nto which I will return in a few minutes,\n\n00:17:35.297 --\u003e 00:17:38.759\nin our military\nestablishment at the moment.\n\n00:17:38.759 --\u003e 00:17:45.532\nIs the debate between what is technically\ncalled counterforce strategy and\n\n00:17:45.532 --\u003e 00:17:49.994\nanother view which is\ncalled finite deterrence.\n\n00:17:49.994 --\u003e 00:17:56.115\nAnd this is a crude definition\nof a more complicated problem.\n\n00:17:56.115 --\u003e 00:18:01.617\nThis debate affects the view we take\ntowards NATO, towards disarmament,\n\n00:18:01.617 --\u003e 00:18:05.512\nin fact towards the defence\nof freedom everywhere.\n\n00:18:05.512 --\u003e 00:18:08.982\nCounteforce means in effect,\n\n00:18:08.982 --\u003e 00:18:14.058\nthat if this Soviet Union\nattacks anywhere,\n\n00:18:16.372 --\u003e 00:18:23.189\nWe would respond by trying to destroy\nthe Soviet retaliatory force.\n\n00:18:23.189 --\u003e 00:18:26.545\nAnd having destroyed\nthe Soviet retaliatory force.\n\n00:18:26.545 --\u003e 00:18:31.145\nWe could then threaten damage\nto the fabric of Soviet life,\n\n00:18:31.145 --\u003e 00:18:36.486\nuntil they desist from the course\nof action we are trying to prevent.\n\n00:18:40.257 --\u003e 00:18:46.436\nFinite deterrence means\nthat it is impossible.\n\n00:18:46.436 --\u003e 00:18:51.425\nThe advocates for finite deterrence would\nmaintain that it is impossible to destroy\n\n00:18:51.425 --\u003e 00:18:53.332\nthe Soviet retaliatory force.\n\n00:18:53.332 --\u003e 00:18:58.657\nAnd that our targeting\nmust have other purposes.\n\n00:18:58.657 --\u003e 00:19:02.808\nAnd Soviet aggression must\nbe stopped by other means\n\n00:19:02.808 --\u003e 00:19:05.930\nthan an attack on the Soviet homeland.\n\n00:19:07.940 --\u003e 00:19:12.982\nNow, I will come to this\nproblem in a few minutes,\n\n00:19:12.982 --\u003e 00:19:15.750\nbut I would like to say now.\n\n00:19:15.750 --\u003e 00:19:21.201\nThat it seems to me\nextraordinarily unlikely that\n\n00:19:21.201 --\u003e 00:19:29.260\nthe military establishment will ever\nbe able to convince the president.\n\n00:19:29.260 --\u003e 00:19:35.583\nThat it in fact possesses a counterforce\ncapability even if in fact it does.\n\n00:19:38.610 --\u003e 00:19:43.100\nWhat is required to win\na modern strategic war?\n\n00:19:43.100 --\u003e 00:19:47.181\nIt's so complicated, so\n\n00:19:47.181 --\u003e 00:19:51.450\nsubtle, and so untested.\n\n00:19:51.450 --\u003e 00:19:56.981\nThat I do not see how a conclusive\ndemonstration could be made within\n\n00:19:56.981 --\u003e 00:20:02.229\nour governmental machine,\nthat we possess such a capability.\n\n00:20:02.229 --\u003e 00:20:08.834\nAnd then we face the curious fact that we\nmay in fact have a certain capability.\n\n00:20:10.852 --\u003e 00:20:17.520\nBut since our political leadership doesn't\nbelieve it, we cannot use it politically.\n\n00:20:17.520 --\u003e 00:20:21.870\nAnd we will act politically as if\nwe didn't have the capability.\n\n00:20:24.920 --\u003e 00:20:25.740\nThis is one problem.\n\n00:20:26.850 --\u003e 00:20:28.995\nThe second problem is,\n\n00:20:28.995 --\u003e 00:20:34.905\nsince the purpose of our military\nestablishment is to prevent war\n\n00:20:39.197 --\u003e 00:20:42.030\nThere are two other psychological hurdles.\n\n00:20:43.300 --\u003e 00:20:47.630\nOne of these psychological hurdles\nis again our own state of mind.\n\n00:20:49.070 --\u003e 00:20:53.550\nThe effectiveness of our military\nestablishment is tested negatively.\n\n00:20:54.600 --\u003e 00:20:56.905\nIt is tested by things\nwhich do not happen.\n\n00:20:58.580 --\u003e 00:21:04.160\nNow any of you who have studied logic\nwill know that it is impossible to prove\n\n00:21:04.160 --\u003e 00:21:06.385\nthe reason why something does not happen.\n\n00:21:06.385 --\u003e 00:21:10.900\n[COUGH]\nAlso,\n\n00:21:11.960 --\u003e 00:21:18.009\nyou never can prove that another policy\nmight not have been even more successful.\n\n00:21:19.300 --\u003e 00:21:24.097\nEven less can you prove that\nthere is a need for change.\n\n00:21:24.097 --\u003e 00:21:28.233\nThe very fact that something\nhas been successful for\n\n00:21:28.233 --\u003e 00:21:34.535\n15 years is going to be taken as a proof\nthat it must continue to be successful.\n\n00:21:34.535 --\u003e 00:21:36.740\nEven though technology is changing.\n\n00:21:38.670 --\u003e 00:21:43.740\nThe success of the existing\npolicy can therefore be a menace\n\n00:21:43.740 --\u003e 00:21:44.940\nto the future security.\n\n00:21:46.980 --\u003e 00:21:51.965\nAnd then there is\nthe psychological hurdle of\n\n00:21:51.965 --\u003e 00:21:57.091\nthe state of mind of\nthe potential aggressor.\n\n00:21:57.091 --\u003e 00:22:01.995\nA military policy that doesn't\nevoke in the potential\n\n00:22:01.995 --\u003e 00:22:06.375\naggressor the responses\nwe are trying to evoke.\n\n00:22:06.375 --\u003e 00:22:12.683\nMay have disastrous consequences,\nor it may simply fail.\n\n00:22:16.626 --\u003e 00:22:22.932\nIf we cannot succeed in conveying\neither our determination or\n\n00:22:22.932 --\u003e 00:22:27.182\nthe consequences of our determination.\n\n00:22:27.182 --\u003e 00:22:34.539\nEither deterrence will fail or\nwe may lose a war.\n\n00:22:39.240 --\u003e 00:22:42.344\nIndeed from the point\nof view of deterrence,\n\n00:22:44.644 --\u003e 00:22:49.361\nAn action which is intended as a bluff but\n\n00:22:49.361 --\u003e 00:22:52.561\nwhich is taken seriously.\n\n00:22:52.561 --\u003e 00:22:57.505\nIs more useful than\nan action which is intended\n\n00:22:57.505 --\u003e 00:23:01.698\nseriously but interpreted as a bluff.\n\n00:23:01.698 --\u003e 00:23:08.218\nNow all of these are psychological\nproblems which one has to keep in mind.\n\n00:23:08.218 --\u003e 00:23:13.860\nReasonably independent of the nature of\nour forces they would exist in any case.\n\n00:23:15.320 --\u003e 00:23:20.296\nAnd I mention them only to indicate\nthe complexity of the problem\n\n00:23:20.296 --\u003e 00:23:22.610\nthat our policymakers face.\n\n00:23:24.340 --\u003e 00:23:29.284\nNow I would like to say\none very brief word\n\n00:23:29.284 --\u003e 00:23:34.375\nhere about why all of\nthis is necessary and\n\n00:23:34.375 --\u003e 00:23:40.646\nthen I will turn to\nthe strategic question as such.\n\n00:23:40.646 --\u003e 00:23:46.856\nWhen I hear my friends from\nvarious pacifist groups or\n\n00:23:46.856 --\u003e 00:23:55.144\nunilateral disarmament groups speak\nabout the notion of deterrence.\n\n00:23:55.144 --\u003e 00:23:58.260\nI can hardly understand how people can be\n\n00:24:00.458 --\u003e 00:24:06.399\nAs stupid as they described the people who\nhave studied the problem of deterrence.\n\n00:24:07.584 --\u003e 00:24:13.398\nIndeed I would believe,\nif the problem were quite that simple,\n\n00:24:13.398 --\u003e 00:24:18.899\neven we who have studied the problem,\nmight understand it.\n\n00:24:22.836 --\u003e 00:24:30.971\nNo one has ever advocated that\nwe start a war of any kind.\n\n00:24:30.971 --\u003e 00:24:35.544\nThe problem of war and\nof defense arises only,\n\n00:24:35.544 --\u003e 00:24:38.828\nif there is communist pressure,\n\n00:24:38.828 --\u003e 00:24:43.887\ncommunist blackmail, or\ncommunist aggression.\n\n00:24:43.887 --\u003e 00:24:49.088\nAnd I would say that the history\nof the last 15 years makes\n\n00:24:49.088 --\u003e 00:24:53.774\nit at least plausible that\nthose things can happen.\n\n00:24:58.000 --\u003e 00:25:02.929\nI don't maintain,\nthat the communists have a theory, or\n\n00:25:02.929 --\u003e 00:25:09.988\na master plan according to which they want\nto take over the world by military means.\n\n00:25:09.988 --\u003e 00:25:15.608\nCommunist psychology and\ntheory work in a more complicated fashion.\n\n00:25:15.608 --\u003e 00:25:20.513\nCommunists believe that they understand\nobjective factors better than we do\n\n00:25:20.513 --\u003e 00:25:21.350\nourselves.\n\n00:25:22.690 --\u003e 00:25:28.817\nAnd they believe also that any\nchange in objective conditions,\n\n00:25:28.817 --\u003e 00:25:36.320\nwhat they call objective conditions,\nmust bring about a political benefit.\n\n00:25:36.320 --\u003e 00:25:42.561\nAs a result, even though very\nshortly after the inauguration\n\n00:25:42.561 --\u003e 00:25:49.171\nwe made clear that we were prepared\nto settle for a neutral hours.\n\n00:25:49.171 --\u003e 00:25:53.516\nThe communists brought in more and\nmore troops, incidentally,\n\n00:25:53.516 --\u003e 00:25:56.597\nquite different from\nthe American approach,\n\n00:25:56.597 --\u003e 00:26:01.664\nsay during the Korean peace negotiations,\nor during the nuclear test ban.\n\n00:26:01.664 --\u003e 00:26:06.663\nOur tendency is that when negotiation\nstart to take off the pressure,\n\n00:26:06.663 --\u003e 00:26:10.643\nbecause we want to show that\nwe are regular fellows, and\n\n00:26:10.643 --\u003e 00:26:13.288\nwe don't want to disturb goodwill.\n\n00:26:13.288 --\u003e 00:26:18.352\nThe communists when negotiation\nare eminent, increase the pressure.\n\n00:26:18.352 --\u003e 00:26:23.987\nBecause they are convinced\nthat a settlement will reflect\n\n00:26:23.987 --\u003e 00:26:28.935\nwhatever balance of forces\nhas been established.\n\n00:26:28.935 --\u003e 00:26:33.759\nAnd the communist build-up in Laos\nincreased, rather than decreased,\n\n00:26:33.759 --\u003e 00:26:36.570\nafter we made our conciliatory gestures.\n\n00:26:38.930 --\u003e 00:26:44.176\nThe pressure on Berlin has been\njustified essentially with one argument,\n\n00:26:44.176 --\u003e 00:26:47.266\nor basically with one argument as follows.\n\n00:26:47.266 --\u003e 00:26:52.002\nIn 1945,\nthe Berlin situation was all right,\n\n00:26:52.002 --\u003e 00:26:56.770\nbecause the balance of\nforces was a certain way.\n\n00:26:56.770 --\u003e 00:27:02.308\nIn 1961 and in 60, the balance of\npower in the world has changed,\n\n00:27:02.308 --\u003e 00:27:07.770\nand therefore we communists must\nget some political benefit from it.\n\n00:27:09.290 --\u003e 00:27:13.718\nAnd if the balance of\npower continues to change,\n\n00:27:13.718 --\u003e 00:27:17.392\nthis is how the communists would use it.\n\n00:27:17.392 --\u003e 00:27:22.645\nNot necessarily to land troops\n\n00:27:22.645 --\u003e 00:27:27.089\nin the United States, but\n\n00:27:27.089 --\u003e 00:27:32.342\nto get a change of the political\n\n00:27:32.342 --\u003e 00:27:38.213\nenvironment for their purposes.\n\n00:27:38.213 --\u003e 00:27:42.452\nIndeed it maybe,\nI believe that the communists do this for\n\n00:27:42.452 --\u003e 00:27:48.371\nreasons they consider\ndefensive Except that these,\n\n00:27:48.371 --\u003e 00:27:52.264\nwe can draw a small\nconsolation from that fact.\n\n00:27:55.193 --\u003e 00:27:59.979\nThe key is not that\nthe communists feel defensive, but\n\n00:27:59.979 --\u003e 00:28:02.788\nthat they cannot be reassured,\n\n00:28:02.788 --\u003e 00:28:07.999\nshort of the neutralization\nof any non-communist power.\n\n00:28:07.999 --\u003e 00:28:15.459\nAnd again, all one has to do is to look at\nhow communist leaders treat each other.\n\n00:28:15.459 --\u003e 00:28:19.494\nIn what communist country has anytime,\nnot so\n\n00:28:19.494 --\u003e 00:28:25.090\nmuch opposition, but\neven divergent opinion been tolerated.\n\n00:28:25.090 --\u003e 00:28:32.240\nWhere have the communist leaders learned\nanything except that opposition,\n\n00:28:32.240 --\u003e 00:28:37.311\nindeed even potential opposition,\nmust be smashed.\n\n00:28:39.508 --\u003e 00:28:45.901\nThis is what forces us\ninto a consideration\n\n00:28:45.901 --\u003e 00:28:50.170\nof the problem of security.\n\n00:28:50.170 --\u003e 00:28:55.688\nNow here we face the fact that matters\n\n00:28:55.688 --\u003e 00:29:03.526\nhave changed at least four\ntimes since World War II.\n\n00:29:03.526 --\u003e 00:29:06.650\nThere was first of all a period\nwhen we had the atomic monopoly.\n\n00:29:08.980 --\u003e 00:29:15.255\nThere was a second period when we\nno longer had a atomic monopoly,\n\n00:29:15.255 --\u003e 00:29:19.142\nbut a decisive strategic superiority.\n\n00:29:19.142 --\u003e 00:29:26.661\nThere was a third period, that second\nperiod ended as late as 1956, 57 perhaps.\n\n00:29:28.478 --\u003e 00:29:35.177\nThere was a third period through\nwhich we may be coming to an end,\n\n00:29:35.177 --\u003e 00:29:41.379\nin which the side which struck\nfirst had a great advantage,\n\n00:29:41.379 --\u003e 00:29:46.611\nand there was a great\npremium on surprise attack.\n\n00:29:46.611 --\u003e 00:29:52.458\nPerhaps both sides,\ncertainly we could win if we struck first,\n\n00:29:52.458 --\u003e 00:29:58.212\nbut this might not be the situation\nif we didn't strike first.\n\n00:29:58.212 --\u003e 00:30:05.207\nAnd finally, there was the period,\nwhich in my judgement is approaching,\n\n00:30:05.207 --\u003e 00:30:09.141\nin which in the equation of strategic war,\n\n00:30:09.141 --\u003e 00:30:15.371\nneither side will be able to\ncalculate with sufficient certainty,\n\n00:30:15.371 --\u003e 00:30:22.180\nthat it can win, by striking first and\nobviously not by striking second.\n\n00:30:22.180 --\u003e 00:30:28.336\nNow, the difficulty we have\nhad in our military policy,\n\n00:30:28.336 --\u003e 00:30:33.081\nis that we have essentially\npursued the same\n\n00:30:33.081 --\u003e 00:30:38.097\nstrategy through all\nthe strategic changes.\n\n00:30:38.097 --\u003e 00:30:45.210\nEssentially our policy has been an\nadaptation of the policy of World War II.\n\n00:30:45.210 --\u003e 00:30:50.226\nThat is if the aggression was clear and\n\n00:30:50.226 --\u003e 00:30:54.460\nunambiguous, we would destroy\n\n00:30:54.460 --\u003e 00:31:00.280\nthe opponent by devastating his homeland.\n\n00:31:00.280 --\u003e 00:31:08.671\nWe forgot that in World War II we were\nin essence in an invulnerable position,\n\n00:31:08.671 --\u003e 00:31:13.461\nwe could do so\nwithout fear of retaliation.\n\n00:31:13.461 --\u003e 00:31:17.614\nWe forgot that up to 1956,\n\n00:31:17.614 --\u003e 00:31:22.734\nthis policy worked reasonably well.\n\n00:31:22.734 --\u003e 00:31:27.843\nNot so much because of\nthe destructiveness of our weapons,\n\n00:31:27.843 --\u003e 00:31:32.135\nbut because of our ability\nto destroy the opposing\n\n00:31:32.135 --\u003e 00:31:35.727\nretaliatory force, if we struck first.\n\n00:31:35.727 --\u003e 00:31:43.127\nUnder these conditions,\nthe communists had to be very careful,\n\n00:31:43.127 --\u003e 00:31:47.298\neven in local adventures lest they,\n\n00:31:47.298 --\u003e 00:31:51.615\nin retaliation, they be destroyed.\n\n00:31:51.615 --\u003e 00:31:58.720\nAs to nuclear age develops, this condition\nis going to be increasingly difficult.\n\n00:31:58.720 --\u003e 00:32:01.490\nIndeed, I would say\nimpossible to maintain.\n\n00:32:04.020 --\u003e 00:32:09.201\nWe are moving into a period, First of all,\n\n00:32:09.201 --\u003e 00:32:11.710\nwe are moving into a period\nof the Missile Age.\n\n00:32:13.620 --\u003e 00:32:15.650\nFor some time,\n\n00:32:15.650 --\u003e 00:32:20.370\nthe Soviet Union is likely to possess\nsomewhat more missiles than we are.\n\n00:32:22.170 --\u003e 00:32:27.580\nUnder those conditions, it is going\nto be technically almost impossible\n\n00:32:27.580 --\u003e 00:32:30.430\nto win by striking first.\n\n00:32:30.430 --\u003e 00:32:33.540\nLet me explain what I mean\nby striking first here.\n\n00:32:33.540 --\u003e 00:32:35.581\nI don't mean that we start a war.\n\n00:32:35.581 --\u003e 00:32:40.822\nI mean that if the Communists,\nsay, attack Europe,\n\n00:32:40.822 --\u003e 00:32:45.252\nwe attack the communist retaliatory force.\n\n00:32:45.252 --\u003e 00:32:50.846\nUnder those conditions, an American\nfirst strike is technically impossible,\n\n00:32:50.846 --\u003e 00:32:56.210\nor at least impossible in the sense that\na political leader cannot rely on it.\n\n00:32:57.960 --\u003e 00:33:03.063\nBecause it will take several hours for\nAmerican airplanes to go\n\n00:33:03.063 --\u003e 00:33:08.071\nfrom the Soviet early warning\nlines to Soviet missile sites,\n\n00:33:08.071 --\u003e 00:33:12.712\nor plenty of time for\nthe Soviets to fire their missiles.\n\n00:33:15.573 --\u003e 00:33:20.171\nAfter the period of the missile gap ends,\nand\n\n00:33:20.171 --\u003e 00:33:24.648\nboth sides have large numbers of missiles,\n\n00:33:24.648 --\u003e 00:33:32.282\nit will be technically very hard to\ncalculate with sufficient precision.\n\n00:33:33.761 --\u003e 00:33:37.587\nDespite the theoretical calculations,\n\n00:33:37.587 --\u003e 00:33:43.050\nwhich I know many people make,\nthe sufficient precision,\n\n00:33:43.050 --\u003e 00:33:50.170\na successfully retaliatory strike for\nus to continue to rely on this policy.\n\n00:33:51.760 --\u003e 00:33:55.490\nNow, this has been recognized\nby the president, and\n\n00:33:55.490 --\u003e 00:34:00.007\nit has been embodied\nin his defense budget.\n\n00:34:01.100 --\u003e 00:34:03.448\nIt was repeated again yesterday.\n\n00:34:05.542 --\u003e 00:34:10.359\nIt is, in effect,\na statement that we would not,\n\n00:34:10.359 --\u003e 00:34:15.294\nunder most circumstances,\nrely on a massive first\n\n00:34:15.294 --\u003e 00:34:19.905\nstrike as a response to\ncommunist aggression.\n\n00:34:23.121 --\u003e 00:34:26.480\nOne of the difficulty in this\nconnection is political.\n\n00:34:27.720 --\u003e 00:34:34.260\nNamely, how we can convey,\neven if we wanted to, our desire\n\n00:34:34.260 --\u003e 00:34:38.890\nor our willingness to run\nthis risk to the other side.\n\n00:34:41.930 --\u003e 00:34:46.780\nNow, what we would be forced to\ndo in any crisis, such as Berlin,\n\n00:34:48.110 --\u003e 00:34:52.050\nis to convince the communists\nthat we are prepared\n\n00:34:54.200 --\u003e 00:34:57.449\nto resort to mutual annihilation.\n\n00:34:58.860 --\u003e 00:35:01.730\nRather than aqueous in their game, but\n\n00:35:01.730 --\u003e 00:35:04.090\nthat we are not going\nto attack irrationally.\n\n00:35:06.240 --\u003e 00:35:08.430\nThese may be two inconsistent measures.\n\n00:35:09.810 --\u003e 00:35:14.810\nWe would have to convince them that\nto defend Berlin, for example, or\n\n00:35:14.810 --\u003e 00:35:21.120\nSaigon, we are willing to suffer\ntens of millions of casualties.\n\n00:35:23.900 --\u003e 00:35:28.410\nThe only way we could convince\nthem of this is to prove to them\n\n00:35:28.410 --\u003e 00:35:31.930\nthat we have a high capacity for\nirrationality.\n\n00:35:33.970 --\u003e 00:35:38.070\nIn other words, we would have to behave\nin such a fashion, at the beginning of\n\n00:35:38.070 --\u003e 00:35:44.260\na crisis, so nervously that the communist\nleaders would draw the conclusion that,\n\n00:35:45.530 --\u003e 00:35:49.395\nsensible or not, on this issue,\nthe Americans are likely to go crazy.\n\n00:35:49.395 --\u003e 00:35:55.580\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e I'm quite serious,\n\n00:35:55.580 --\u003e 00:35:56.869\nthis is what would have to be done.\n\n00:35:57.900 --\u003e 00:36:02.690\nThe other hand, this is exactly\nthe kind of policy which we cannot\n\n00:36:02.690 --\u003e 00:36:07.300\npursue vis-a-vis our own people,\nor vis-a-vis our own ally.\n\n00:36:08.610 --\u003e 00:36:14.603\nIndeed, at the beginning of any crisis,\nit is the normal reaction of most\n\n00:36:14.603 --\u003e 00:36:21.620\nAmerican presidents to say we are going\nto be calm, we are gonna be collected.\n\n00:36:21.620 --\u003e 00:36:24.460\nIn President Kennedy's words or\nlaws, we're not gonna be trapped.\n\n00:36:26.370 --\u003e 00:36:28.700\nWe are gonna be under good control.\n\n00:36:28.700 --\u003e 00:36:33.160\nIn other words, to behave in precisely\nthe fashion, which must convince\n\n00:36:33.160 --\u003e 00:36:38.767\nthe communists that we are not\nlikely to resort to the threat\n\n00:36:38.767 --\u003e 00:36:43.800\nof a counter-force or\na massive first strike policy.\n\n00:36:47.430 --\u003e 00:36:49.440\nAnd this gets, however,\nto the second problem.\n\n00:36:51.000 --\u003e 00:36:57.540\nAs the danger, to the communist,\nof a massive strike is reduced,\n\n00:36:59.460 --\u003e 00:37:03.040\nthe risks to them of local\npressures are also reduced.\n\n00:37:04.480 --\u003e 00:37:07.870\nAnd we can therefore expect,\nover the next few years,\n\n00:37:09.160 --\u003e 00:37:12.290\nan increase in local communist pressures.\n\n00:37:13.770 --\u003e 00:37:19.916\nMany of the actions that are now being\ntaken, which I strongly support,\n\n00:37:19.916 --\u003e 00:37:26.289\nsuch as bringing the retaliatory\nforces under closer political control.\n\n00:37:29.037 --\u003e 00:37:32.557\nThose measures are essential, but\n\n00:37:32.557 --\u003e 00:37:37.365\nthey have the penalty that\nthe rest of the Soviets\n\n00:37:37.365 --\u003e 00:37:42.069\nare being reduced,\nthe risk of local actions.\n\n00:37:42.069 --\u003e 00:37:47.905\nAnd that we therefore must be\nprepared to build up local forces and\n\n00:37:47.905 --\u003e 00:37:51.430\nalso to build up non-nuclear forces.\n\n00:37:51.430 --\u003e 00:37:57.800\nAnd again, many of my pacifist friends\nare having a marvelous time proving\n\n00:37:57.800 --\u003e 00:38:03.850\nthat people who talk about arms control,\nand at the same time say,\n\n00:38:03.850 --\u003e 00:38:08.320\nwe must build up conventional forces,\nare either fools or knaves.\n\n00:38:09.510 --\u003e 00:38:10.530\nIt isn't so ridiculous.\n\n00:38:11.620 --\u003e 00:38:17.049\nIf we are serious in reducing\nreliance on our retaliatory strategy,\n\n00:38:18.400 --\u003e 00:38:23.030\nif we really mean it that\nwe do not want to stake\n\n00:38:24.620 --\u003e 00:38:29.090\nan exchange of cities on every crisis.\n\n00:38:29.090 --\u003e 00:38:30.580\nIf we are serious about that,\n\n00:38:31.750 --\u003e 00:38:37.130\nthen we have to be also serious\nabout building up our local forces.\n\n00:38:38.240 --\u003e 00:38:43.370\nOtherwise, we will have a continuation\nof losses all over the world.\n\n00:38:44.570 --\u003e 00:38:49.340\nWe'll have a repetition of\nthe Berlin-type crisis.\n\n00:38:49.340 --\u003e 00:38:52.913\nWe cannot have something for nothing.\n\n00:38:55.007 --\u003e 00:38:58.623\nIn NATO, for example, about which,\n\n00:38:58.623 --\u003e 00:39:03.150\nI understand there's\na panel this afternoon.\n\n00:39:05.140 --\u003e 00:39:12.783\nOne difficulty is that our allies\nare torn by two contradictory concerns.\n\n00:39:12.783 --\u003e 00:39:20.936\nOne is that the United States would\nuse nuclear weapons in their defense.\n\n00:39:20.936 --\u003e 00:39:25.016\nAnd the second is that the United States\nwould not use nuclear weapons\n\n00:39:25.016 --\u003e 00:39:26.150\nin their defense.\n\n00:39:27.260 --\u003e 00:39:29.327\nOne is that we are too trigger happy,\n\n00:39:29.327 --\u003e 00:39:32.138\nthe other is that we are not\ntrigger happy enough.\n\n00:39:35.508 --\u003e 00:39:38.834\nOur allies, even more than weak,\n\n00:39:38.834 --\u003e 00:39:44.453\nwould like to have the advantage\nof low military budgets,\n\n00:39:44.453 --\u003e 00:39:47.910\nminimum risk, maximum security.\n\n00:39:47.910 --\u003e 00:39:48.870\nWe cannot have that.\n\n00:39:50.460 --\u003e 00:39:54.550\nWe cannot combine the advantage\nof every course of action.\n\n00:39:55.810 --\u003e 00:40:01.150\nMany of our allies Have\nhad as a primary purpose,\n\n00:40:01.150 --\u003e 00:40:04.110\na commitment of American forces in Europe.\n\n00:40:04.110 --\u003e 00:40:09.722\nNot because they felt these forces would\ndo any good but because they wanted to be\n\n00:40:09.722 --\u003e 00:40:15.363\nvery sure that if the communists attack,\nthe United States would be in the war.\n\n00:40:15.363 --\u003e 00:40:20.294\nThey have about the same significance as\nwhen the Chief of Staff of the French army\n\n00:40:20.294 --\u003e 00:40:25.060\nwas asked in 1914 by the British,\nhow many British soldiers do you want?\n\n00:40:25.060 --\u003e 00:40:27.167\nHe said, we want one soldier and\n\n00:40:27.167 --\u003e 00:40:31.002\nwe'll make sure he gets killed\nin the first day of the war.\n\n00:40:31.002 --\u003e 00:40:36.170\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e Now, this kind of evasion.\n\n00:40:38.190 --\u003e 00:40:41.056\nOf this kind of evasion of responsibility.\n\n00:40:41.056 --\u003e 00:40:45.713\nThis kind of unwillingness to tell\nthe truth to their own people of all\n\n00:40:45.713 --\u003e 00:40:50.050\nmembers of the alliance,\nincluding ourselves.\n\n00:40:50.050 --\u003e 00:40:55.280\nHas had the result, that when we\nput nuclear weapons into Europe,\n\n00:40:55.280 --\u003e 00:40:56.100\nthere is an outcry.\n\n00:40:57.340 --\u003e 00:41:02.170\nAnd when we control the nuclear weapons\nwe put into Europe, there is another cry.\n\n00:41:03.540 --\u003e 00:41:08.442\nWhen we ask them to build up\nconventional forces, it is interpreted\n\n00:41:08.442 --\u003e 00:41:13.259\nas an attempt by the United States\nto shirk its responsibilities.\n\n00:41:13.259 --\u003e 00:41:18.830\nWe ask them to build up their own forces,\nit is taken as a proof.\n\n00:41:21.309 --\u003e 00:41:27.177\nNow, NATO can not possibly survive unless\n\n00:41:27.177 --\u003e 00:41:32.400\nwe straighten out these confusions.\n\n00:41:33.760 --\u003e 00:41:38.744\nAnd unless we admit to\nourselves that security\n\n00:41:38.744 --\u003e 00:41:42.716\ncannot no longer be had on the cheap.\n\n00:41:42.716 --\u003e 00:41:47.941\nAnd that all our people's will have\n\n00:41:47.941 --\u003e 00:41:53.166\nto choose between whether they want\n\n00:41:53.166 --\u003e 00:41:58.930\npresent comfort or ultimate freedom.\n\n00:41:58.930 --\u003e 00:42:05.720\nNow let me say a few words here\nabout the reverse side of this.\n\n00:42:05.720 --\u003e 00:42:11.978\nMany people, after they hear\na strategic discussion of strategy,\n\n00:42:11.978 --\u003e 00:42:16.166\nleave with somewhat of\na feeling of despair.\n\n00:42:16.166 --\u003e 00:42:19.470\nThey ask themselves,\nhow can this ever end?\n\n00:42:21.480 --\u003e 00:42:25.904\nIs there going to be an endless\nmultiplication of arms.\n\n00:42:25.904 --\u003e 00:42:27.970\nCan we do something about it?\n\n00:42:29.386 --\u003e 00:42:35.435\nNow, it is of course I think, one of\nthe most attractive to American traits.\n\n00:42:36.530 --\u003e 00:42:41.950\nTo believe that you can do\nsomething about every problem.\n\n00:42:43.400 --\u003e 00:42:47.140\nAnd that the right answer\nhasn't been given yet\n\n00:42:47.140 --\u003e 00:42:51.827\nbecause somebody has forgotten\nto ask the right question.\n\n00:42:51.827 --\u003e 00:42:55.310\nNow it may well be, indeed it is certain.\n\n00:42:56.650 --\u003e 00:43:00.190\nThat no matter what we will do,\nwe will live\n\n00:43:00.190 --\u003e 00:43:04.984\nthrough our lifetimes\nin the midst of crisis.\n\n00:43:04.984 --\u003e 00:43:10.327\nNo one should pretend and anyone who\n\n00:43:10.327 --\u003e 00:43:15.857\npretends cannot be understanding.\n\n00:43:15.857 --\u003e 00:43:20.064\nThat we are working towards\nsome kind of a terminal\n\n00:43:20.064 --\u003e 00:43:24.780\ndate called peace in which only for\neffort disappears.\n\n00:43:26.050 --\u003e 00:43:30.842\nAnd in which all tension has evaporated.\n\n00:43:30.842 --\u003e 00:43:37.340\nNo one should promise this to the American\npeople because it isn't true.\n\n00:43:39.050 --\u003e 00:43:42.957\nWhat we can do, what we should try to do,\n\n00:43:45.609 --\u003e 00:43:50.678\nIs to affect the environment in which we\n\n00:43:50.678 --\u003e 00:43:56.667\nlive in such a way that\nthe incentives produced\n\n00:43:56.667 --\u003e 00:44:01.912\nby the weapons to go to war, is reduced.\n\n00:44:01.912 --\u003e 00:44:05.530\nPerhaps eliminated.\n\n00:44:05.530 --\u003e 00:44:08.713\nIt isn't any good to say,\nas many people do,\n\n00:44:11.150 --\u003e 00:44:14.396\nWe simply have to trust the Russians.\n\n00:44:14.396 --\u003e 00:44:18.360\nAnd if we trusted the Russians we could\nhave all kinds of disarmament agreements.\n\n00:44:19.970 --\u003e 00:44:23.315\nIf we trusted the Russians we\nwouldn't need disarmament agreements.\n\n00:44:23.315 --\u003e 00:44:27.350\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e No one has\n\n00:44:27.350 --\u003e 00:44:32.180\never proposed that we make a disarmament\nagreement with Great Britain.\n\n00:44:33.550 --\u003e 00:44:37.509\nNo one has ever proposed that we\ninspect the British nuclear force.\n\n00:44:37.509 --\u003e 00:44:42.180\nEven though they could also\nkill millions of Americans.\n\n00:44:44.890 --\u003e 00:44:49.100\nThe problem of these disarmament\nnegotiations is precisely\n\n00:44:50.130 --\u003e 00:44:52.499\nthe fact that we do not\ntrust the Russians.\n\n00:44:54.820 --\u003e 00:45:01.778\nAnd we cannot simply explain that problem\naway or that the Russians trust us.\n\n00:45:01.778 --\u003e 00:45:06.180\nNor can disarmament remove\nall causes of tension.\n\n00:45:07.980 --\u003e 00:45:13.500\nWhat we can ask of these negotiations\nis that they address themselves\n\n00:45:13.500 --\u003e 00:45:18.363\nto those tensions that are produced\nby weapons themselves.\n\n00:45:21.430 --\u003e 00:45:26.107\nAnd of those tensions, there is the great\n\n00:45:26.107 --\u003e 00:45:30.795\nadvantage that is inherent in surprise.\n\n00:45:30.795 --\u003e 00:45:39.260\nThere is the great problem of the spread\nof nuclear weapons to ever more nations.\n\n00:45:41.065 --\u003e 00:45:46.521\nThere's the problem, which was discussed\nin one of the panels this morning,\n\n00:45:46.521 --\u003e 00:45:48.679\nof the control of outer space.\n\n00:45:48.679 --\u003e 00:45:54.209\nThere is the problem of accidental war.\n\n00:45:56.610 --\u003e 00:46:02.349\nAnd again I would stress, that in these\n\n00:46:02.349 --\u003e 00:46:09.580\nnegotiations every thing depends\non the ability to be concrete\n\n00:46:12.100 --\u003e 00:46:16.530\nand on the ability to\nmake precise proposals.\n\n00:46:18.580 --\u003e 00:46:23.230\nI sometimes have the impression that\nthere are some groups who believe,\n\n00:46:23.230 --\u003e 00:46:26.130\nthat unless you tell horror\nstories to the American people,\n\n00:46:27.160 --\u003e 00:46:29.240\nyou will never get them to do anything.\n\n00:46:30.350 --\u003e 00:46:32.990\nThere is a problem of accidental war.\n\n00:46:32.990 --\u003e 00:46:36.099\nBut it doesn't happen to be\nthe problem described in On the Beach.\n\n00:46:38.310 --\u003e 00:46:43.190\nThere is a problem about the spread of\nnuclear weapons but I rarely see it\n\n00:46:43.190 --\u003e 00:46:49.682\ndescribed in analytical terms.\n\n00:46:49.682 --\u003e 00:46:56.852\n[COUGH]\nWe have to get used to the fact,\n\n00:46:56.852 --\u003e 00:47:02.871\nand I won't pretend to give the answers\nin this field of disarmament,\n\n00:47:02.871 --\u003e 00:47:07.171\nor arms control, or\nwhatever you want to call it.\n\n00:47:07.171 --\u003e 00:47:11.140\nThat the answers are gonna be\nvery complex if they are serious.\n\n00:47:12.770 --\u003e 00:47:18.477\nWe have even to be kept used to\nthe fact that it may be that our most\n\n00:47:18.477 --\u003e 00:47:24.951\nresponsible proposals will not be\nunderstood by the rest of the world.\n\n00:47:24.951 --\u003e 00:47:30.798\nEveryone says we have to take\ninto world opinion into account.\n\n00:47:30.798 --\u003e 00:47:31.620\nOf course we do.\n\n00:47:32.840 --\u003e 00:47:36.770\nBut we also have to remember that\none of the criticisms that is\n\n00:47:36.770 --\u003e 00:47:39.040\nmade of the United States,\n\n00:47:39.040 --\u003e 00:47:44.170\nis that we've had too few people\nstudying the problem of disarmament.\n\n00:47:44.170 --\u003e 00:47:48.301\nWe've had about close\nto 100 studying it now.\n\n00:47:48.301 --\u003e 00:47:53.405\nThere's no country in the world,\nnone of the new countries,\n\n00:47:53.405 --\u003e 00:47:59.410\nthat has even one full time person\nstudying the problem of disarmament.\n\n00:48:03.179 --\u003e 00:48:07.378\n[COUGH] If we are going to\nengage in a propaganda slogan,\n\n00:48:07.378 --\u003e 00:48:10.130\nthe battle of propaganda slogans.\n\n00:48:11.190 --\u003e 00:48:15.870\nIf we want to get [COUGH]\na public relations appeal.\n\n00:48:17.000 --\u003e 00:48:20.250\nThen we should hire a firm\nfrom Madison Avenue.\n\n00:48:20.250 --\u003e 00:48:23.321\nAnd a lot of people are now\nwasting their time in watching.\n\n00:48:25.418 --\u003e 00:48:28.857\n[COUGH] All I can say, is\n\n00:48:30.393 --\u003e 00:48:36.680\nThat we may have to engage in many\nseemingly contradictory actions.\n\n00:48:38.360 --\u003e 00:48:42.587\nWe may have to build up\nconventional forces even as we\n\n00:48:42.587 --\u003e 00:48:45.765\nare trying to control nuclear forces.\n\n00:48:45.765 --\u003e 00:48:50.601\nWe also have to keep in mind that\nthere are many things that we\n\n00:48:50.601 --\u003e 00:48:52.450\ncan do unilaterally.\n\n00:48:53.600 --\u003e 00:48:56.290\nRegardless of whether we get agreement.\n\n00:48:57.520 --\u003e 00:49:01.840\nWe can make sure that our military\nforces are always responsive\n\n00:49:01.840 --\u003e 00:49:02.870\nto political control.\n\n00:49:04.130 --\u003e 00:49:08.678\nWe can make sure that they are as\ninvulnerable as we can make them,\n\n00:49:08.678 --\u003e 00:49:11.747\nin order to remove an incentive for\nattack.\n\n00:49:11.747 --\u003e 00:49:15.720\nWe can take certain\nother unilateral steps.\n\n00:49:17.680 --\u003e 00:49:23.475\nBut we may have to engaged in seemingly\ncontradictory actions simultaneously.\n\n00:49:24.830 --\u003e 00:49:28.005\nAll of them are going to be complex.\n\n00:49:29.380 --\u003e 00:49:33.500\nAll of them have to keep in\nmind not only the military but\n\n00:49:33.500 --\u003e 00:49:36.860\nthe psychological and\npolitical environment.\n\n00:49:38.550 --\u003e 00:49:43.779\nI would therefore suggest\nthat many of the answers\n\n00:49:43.779 --\u003e 00:49:50.751\nwe give here will test not only our\ntechnical ability to survive but\n\n00:49:50.751 --\u003e 00:49:54.995\nabove all, our worthiness to survive.\n\n00:49:54.995 --\u003e 00:50:04.995\n\u003e\u003e [APPLAUSE]","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959#t=0.0,3023.59509"}]},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17505/file/72959/transcript/7798","type":"AnnotationPage","label":{"en":["English 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