{"@context":"http://iiif.io/api/presentation/3/context.json","id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/iiif/1v5bc3t23f/manifest","type":"Manifest","label":{"en":["\"NATO as a United Nation,\" Conference on World Affairs panel presentation, 1961 April 11"]},"logo":"https://d9jk7wjtjpu5g.cloudfront.net/organizations/logo_images/000/000/013/original/yale-blue.png?1678220072","metadata":[{"label":{"en":["Identifier"]},"value":{"en":["mssa.ms.1981 (EAD ID)","MS 1981  (Call Number)","ms_1981_s07_b0912_0001.mp3 (Digital Object ID)","ms_1981_s07_b0912_0002.mp3 (Digital Object ID)"]}},{"label":{"en":["Format"]},"value":{"en":["audiocassettes"]}},{"label":{"en":["Date"]},"value":{"en":["1961 April 11 (Creation)"]}},{"label":{"en":["Description"]},"value":{"en":["https://preservica.library.yale.edu/explorer/explorer.html#prop:4\u0026amp;35b7743f-73c9-4b82-b1b3-6bb99b6d1632 (Other Finding Aid Note)"]}},{"label":{"en":["Language"]},"value":{"en":[]}},{"label":{"en":["Rights Statement"]},"value":{"en":["The materials are open for research.","Researchers must register and agree to the Yale University Library User Agreement for Special Collections before accessing audiovisual material in this collection."]}},{"label":{"en":["Publisher"]},"value":{"en":["Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library."]}},{"label":{"en":["Source Metadata URI"]},"value":{"en":["https://archives.yale.edu/repositories/12/archival_objects/2076698"]}},{"label":{"en":["Preferred Citation"]},"value":{"en":["\"NATO as a United Nation,\" Conference on World Affairs panel presentation, 1961 April 11. Henry A. Kissinger Papers, Part II (MS 1981). Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library. https://archives.yale.edu/repositories/12/resources/5211."]}}],"summary":{"en":["https://preservica.library.yale.edu/explorer/explorer.html#prop:4\u002635b7743f-73c9-4b82-b1b3-6bb99b6d1632"]},"requiredStatement":{"label":{"en":["Attribution"]},"value":{"en":["The materials are open for research.","Researchers must register and agree to the Yale University Library User Agreement for Special Collections before accessing audiovisual material in this collection."]}},"provider":[{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/aboutus","type":"Agent","label":{"en":["Manuscripts and Archives Yale University Library"]},"homepage":[{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/","type":"Text","label":{"en":["Manuscripts and Archives Yale University Library"]},"format":"text/html"}],"logo":[{"id":"https://d9jk7wjtjpu5g.cloudfront.net/organizations/logo_images/000/000/013/original/yale-blue.png?1678220072","type":"Image"}]}],"thumbnail":[{"id":"https://d9jk7wjtjpu5g.cloudfront.net/public/images/audio-default.png","type":"Image","format":"image/png"}],"items":[{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961","type":"Canvas","label":{"en":["Media File 1 of 2 - open-uri20200302-3371-ju0gh.mpga"]},"duration":3652.70203,"width":640,"height":40,"thumbnail":[{"id":"https://d9jk7wjtjpu5g.cloudfront.net/public/images/audio-default.png","type":"Image","format":"image/png"}],"items":[{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/content/1","type":"AnnotationPage","items":[{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/content/1/annotation/1","type":"Annotation","motivation":"painting","body":{"id":"https://aviary-p-yalemssa.s3.wasabisys.com/collection_resource_files/resource_files/000/072/961/original/open-uri20200302-3371-ju0gh.mpga?1583148575","type":"Audio","format":"audio/mpeg","duration":3652.70203,"width":640,"height":40},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961","metadata":[]}]}],"annotations":[{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799","type":"AnnotationPage","label":{"en":["ms_1981_s07_b0912_0001_transcript.txt [Transcript]"]},"items":[{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/1","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\u003e\u003e April 11, NATO as a nation. The main speaker, Professor Kissinger, and discussion panel, reel number one.\n\u003e\u003e I wish to welcome you to the panel discussion. On NATO as a united nation in the world of coexistence. The main speaker will be Professor Kissinger of Harvard University. And the discussion group, we have five gentleman, well known to their work, to my left, first one, is Mr. Tannum.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=6.0,52.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/2","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nMr. Tannum is a historian assistant to the president of the Rand Corporation, Washington. Then Mr. Neal, political scientists of Claremont Graduate School. On the other side of Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Weir, first secretary of the British Embassy, Washington. The next [INAUDIBLE], sociologist of the University of [INAUDIBLE] and the last one, Mr. Hitchcock of the state department.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=52.0,96.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/3","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd I shall now have Mr. Kissinger talk to us.\n\u003e\u003e Mr. Chairman, now I thought I would make a few general observations about the problems of NATO as I see them and hope that they will lead to a discussion with my colleagues. First of all, [COUGH] I would like to express my own conviction that the absolute cornerstone of American foreign policy has been and must continue to be the western alliance.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=96.0,145.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/4","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nNot only in its military sense but in the sense that here is an association of people with a similar tradition, sharing similar values having to a considerable extent similar institutions. If this community of nations cannot make a success of its collaboration, indeed. If it cannot point a way towards [COUGH]\nhow to deal with the problem of nationalism in our time, then the future of freedom is thin indeed.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=145.0,189.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/5","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nI strongly agree with the sense of the very wise speech that Prime Minister Macmillan made at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology last week. Where he spoke of the need for not only for greater integration, but for unity in the western alliance. In the 19th century, Europe was assumed the leadership of the world because at that time, the nation state was the most viable, the most advanced form of social organization.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=189.0,229.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/6","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIn the 20th century we had a duty to show how we can go beyond the nation state and form larger groupings. And the challenge ahead for the democracies, is how they can form institutions and develop dynamism in a program of real partnership. Now this has many components. I will speak and the first instance about the military component, not again as I said this morning because I think the military component includes [INAUDIBLE]\nall our other problems.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=229.0,278.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/7","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBut simply because if we cannot deal with the military component effectively, we will not be able to deal with any of our other problems. NATO was formed in the first instance as to increase the security of all its members, it has to go beyond that. But if it cannot do that, there's no chance of going beyond it.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=278.0,307.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/8","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nNow the one of the big problems that NATO has faced is produced by the new weapons technology. In the past, an alliance can be said to have had roughly three purposes. One, to leave no doubt about the alignment of forces. It used to be said for example that if Hitler had known what if the Germans in 1914 had known that the United States would get into the war, they would never have attacked.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=307.0,345.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/9","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nNow an alliance symbolizes the fact that the nations will cooperate, therefore theoretically, the aggressor should know what he's confronting. Secondly, it is a device to assemble a greater power than any nation can individually. And thirdly, it is a device by which the last and least important by which the roots of a nation.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=345.0,380.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/10","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nCan be stationed on the territory of another for the protection of these other nations. Now, I would like to suggest to you that the policy which NATO has pursued over the past ten years is inconsistent with all three of these objectives. That the main task now is to make it consistent.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=380.0,411.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/11","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n[COUGH]\nThe reason for the inconsistency is the strategic doctrine on which the free world has based its defense. Essentially, it was the doctrine of massive retaliation, which assumed that in case of an attack on Europe. Well first of all, there would be no attack on Europe if we would threaten to devastate the Soviet homeland.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=411.0,445.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/12","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd secondly, that if there were an attack on Europe, it was feudal to fight in Europe. It would be a signal that the communists were interested in world domination and therefore we should immediately deliver an all out blow on the Soviet homeland. Now this was never rigidly followed because it had one of its corollaries was for the time it leaves the European countries would be overrun by the communists if there were a war.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=445.0,478.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/13","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd no European country was particularly eager to be liberated, they wanted to be protected. And from the very beginning NATO has oscillated between trying to build up local forces for defense, and at the same time depending very largely on its retaliatory strategy. Then there were very many other motives.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=478.0,503.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/14","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nEvery or most NATO countries almost all of them are democratic. Almost all of them wanted to cut military expenditures. Almost all of them therefore told their people that they could get more tanks for the attack if they relied on nuclear weapons and that they could cut the local forces with a high degree of safety.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=503.0,527.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/15","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nNow the result of this is that a military establishment has grown up on the continent which is really a confused mixture of confused motives. There are five American divisions and supporting units. There are two British divisions and supporting units. Then there are number of German divisions. In fact, the strongest force of the free world is concentrated in Europe in the one place where we have announced that a local war was unthinkable.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=527.0,572.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/16","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThen all kinds of rationalizations have been developed for having this force, there is the rationalization for example that this force ought to be big enough to enforce a pause in operations. Now, no one has fully explained to me what happens after the pause and who the Russians would attack.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=572.0,596.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/17","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nWithout having taken this particular problem into consideration, to begin with. Then it's said that they ought to bring home the threat of general war to the Russians. There's something in this. But it still raises the question of what the purpose of the local forces in Europe really is because it isn't clear why five divisions raise the threat of General more than one division or two divisions.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=596.0,626.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/18","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nWell, in fact, in their heart of hearts, most European nations have had one of two motives. They've either believed that they were already protected by the United States nuclear arsenal, in which case they have made a contribution which was the absolute minimum consistent with their treaty obligations. And the absolute minimum men that if you're oblige to have a division and if you call abrogated division, this is fulfilling your obligation.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=626.0,661.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/19","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThe second, this was the road that has been traveled by most of the continental nations. The second was the road which has been taken essentially by Great Britain which is, that if it is true that nuclear weapons are the key to the defense of Europe, then if one wants to make a contribution to the deterrent, one has to have nuclear weapons of one's own.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=661.0,691.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/20","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nNow, the result of both of these approaches has been that the alliance has not been as effective as it should have been. On the part of the continental nations, because it meant that our local forces were inadequate, on the part of the British and our French approach. It meant that our allies were duplicating at great expense the strategic category in which the United States was already strongest and which they could not rely to fight without United States' support and if they had our support they didn't need.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=691.0,731.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/21","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nA retaliatory power of their own. One has to have understanding for this. Again, Prime Minister Macmillan pointed out last Friday that in their heart of hearts, the reason the British wanted their own deterrent, is because throughout their history, the British had felt that in the last resort they had to be able to defend themselves alone.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=731.0,756.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/22","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd the free world owes its freedom to that fact. If Great Britain in 1914 or 1939 had made the defense of freedom depending on American willingness to enter the war, Germany would have overrun the world both times. Now the same reason that has impelled the British to develop a nuclear arsenal of their own has now impelled the French to develop a nuclear arsenal of their own, the French with an eight-year timeline.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=756.0,795.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/23","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThe French feel that they too cannot absolutely rely on the United States. That's inconsistent with their status as a great power, that they have the fear, they are worried either the nuclear weapons will not be used at all in their defense or that they will be used against targets which are not of prime interest to them, or at least that they will not have proper political influence unless they have nuclear weapons of their own.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=795.0,830.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/24","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThis means that we run the risk now of a proliferation of nuclear establishments within NATO, and at the same time taking away from the forces which are essential for the local defense of Europe. Now it's senseless to accuse our European allies of being extremely suspicious. It's senseless to come a bit abstract protestations about goodwill.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=830.0,868.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/25","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnyone who knows the history of the last 20 years knows that allies can be left in the lurch. It has happened before. Anyone who knows the history of the last three years is aware that allied unity has very often been absent, Great Britain and the United States landed in Lebanon without informing the French in advance.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=868.0,892.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/26","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBritain and France landed in Suez and were opposed by the United States. The diplomacy prior to the summit meeting witnessed a competition among the statesman of the west as to who could pretend to best to his own people that he had the peculiar gimmick to bring peace. That he had the perfect method for dealing with Mr. Khrushchev.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=892.0,916.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/27","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThat he was more reasonable than any of his allies. And it has become almost a requirement for the domestic election campaigns in many of the allied countries to pretend that one had a special key for dealing with Mr. Khrushchev. Now I believe that separate approaches to Mr. Khrushchev are sometimes necessary.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=916.0,942.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/28","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd if they're well concerted in advance as they were in Laos, I believe they can be effective. I think also that the kind of diplomacy which preceded the board of summit meeting is disastrous for the alliance. There's no point in separate conversations with Mr. Khrushchev, as far as Khrushchev is concerned, unless it is to create the impression of a separate settlement.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=942.0,973.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/29","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd if one studies, the Soviet notes to all Allies. They constantly raise the possibility that some other Ally is going to settle with them, so wouldn't it be better to settle directly? This is their approach now. This was the theme of their last note to the Germans, to the effect that the Germans could make a much better deal for themselves than they could through us.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=973.0,1001.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/30","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nNow, as long as there is such a degree of political disunity, we must have understandings for the position of countries, of other countries. Not have to have to depend, at the last analysis, on our understanding of the danger, and on our willingness to engage ourselves. And to want to have some degree of control over their fate.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=1001.0,1026.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/31","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nNow, I believe getting one's own nuclear establishment is the most expensive and worst way of doing that. But we have to understand the conditions that produce it. Now, take another situation. Take the fact that, When the French, for example, speak of the necessity of having nuclear weapons to have political influence.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=1026.0,1059.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/32","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThen you ask yourself what political inference are they gonna have. Are they gonna bomb us? Are they gonna start a war which forces us to support them? Both of these contingencies are extremely unlikely. Well, I can think of one contingency in which nuclear weapons gets them political influence.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=1059.0,1081.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/33","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nNuclear weapons enabled them to participate in disarmament negotiations about nuclear weapons. And it is a fact that Great Britain has been participating as an equal partner in the nuclear test ban negotiations, while France has been excluded. And it is also a fact that the disposal of nuclear of weapons, the control of nuclear weapons, the reduction of nuclear weapons is as much a matter of life and death to the French as the creation of nuclear weapons.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=1081.0,1117.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/34","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd again, the lack of political unity or the fact that the French feel they must be physically present to protect their interest at these disarmament negotiations, gets them an incentive to produce nuclear weapons of their own. And there's no sense in telling them that they ought to be more reasonable, and that they ought to be good boys.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=1117.0,1140.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/35","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nWe are in the conference room and they are not. Now, [COUGH] [COUGH] Then we have the problem which is that here an alliance is confronting a unitary state. The fact is that the Soviet Union can threaten all of the European countries and us from its own territory. The other hand, none of the threatened countries is capable of resisting alone.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=1140.0,1178.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/36","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThe Soviet Union can threaten each Ally one by one. The Allies are in a position where they must respond by threatening the Soviet Union. And one of the disadvantages of having your own nuclear arsenal is that when the chips are down, it may be that it removes any incentive to support an ally.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=1178.0,1202.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/37","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nCuz if each country has its own nuclear arsenal, if each Allied country has its own nuclear arsenal, it will believe that when the chips are down, it can protect itself. And until the chips are down, it is foolish to risk its national existence for a foreign country. I once told a French friend of mine, if you have your own nuclear arsenal, why should you fight for anything that goes on across the Rhine?\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=1202.0,1236.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/38","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nHe said, that may be true but at least we can then fight if anybody tries to cross the Rhine. Now secondly, as Great Britain has found out, nuclear weapons in the hands of, Highly concentrated nations or European nations with populations are geographically very concentrated. Really do not confer their security that they are thought to confer.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=1236.0,1274.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/39","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAll the problems about protecting the retaliatory force, which the United States is confronting, become almost insoluble. Even for Great Britain, which has been in the nuclear club for eight years. And France will find out it's insoluble for France, too. So you then have the tendency of either your ten people will say, we'll adopt some version of unilateral disarmament.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=1274.0,1298.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/40","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nOf saying if the only weapon that makes any sense are nuclear weapons. And if nuclear weapons cannot protect us, at least we might get the benefit, whatever benefit there is, in having no weapons at all. And this, it seems to me, if I understand them correctly, is the theme of some of the British unilateralists.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=1298.0,1322.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/41","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIt hasn't happened in France yet because the French are still in the earlier stage of nuclear development of euphoria, where they think that every explosions adds to their capability. Now then, in this process, one neglects to examine an assumption which has become almost taken for granted. Namely, somehow the West cannot resist the so-called hordes of Soviet manpower.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=1322.0,1353.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/42","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd that unless we resort to these nuclear weapons, we cannot resists the hordes of Soviet manpower. Now the fact is the Soviets don't have hordes of manpower. The combined manpower of the West is about twice that of the Soviet Union. The industrial base of the West is about three times that of the Soviet Union.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=1353.0,1376.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/43","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThere's no reason in the world why Europe should not be able to be defended in Europe. Except lack of will, lack of political unity and lack of courage of the political leadership in telling its people the facts of life. And again, I want to come back to what I said this morning.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=1376.0,1395.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/44","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIf we are serious about not wanting to rely on nuclear weapons, then we can do one of two things. The easy things is to march around with placards and say ban the bomb, and let's uninvent what's been invented. The more difficult training is to build up our conventional establishment.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=1395.0,1416.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/45","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd force the Soviets into the choice of whether they are so eager to win that they're willing to risk a nuclear war in order to win. This would be a tremendous change in the psychological situation. And it seems to me that in Europe, of all places, it is the place where we could come very close to achieving it.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=1416.0,1437.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/46","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThe problem of Berlin will be entirely different if there were sufficient forces in Europe to defend Berlin locally rather than with a threat of nuclear devastation. Now [COUGH] This however, raises a number of questions. You can not have a conventional defense of Europe without having a nuclear arsenal to back it up.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=1437.0,1474.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/47","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThere must be nuclear weapons of sufficient discrimination. And in sufficient quantity and sufficiently responsive to control, to prevent the communists from winning by introducing nuclear weapons themselves. There must be both a tactical and a strategical nuclear arsenal. Yet, if every European country, or every major European country developed its own nuclear arsenal, there simply won't be enough resources left to build conventional forces.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=1474.0,1505.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/48","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nSo there has to be a certain division of labor, and there has to be a much greater degree of integration of the nuclear forces. Than has been the case previously. No one will make an effort in the conventional deal until the nuclear problem is solved. And this is why many members of the alliance, particularly the United States and Great Britain have an obligation to take into account the concerns about European allies, about sharing to some degree in the control of the nuclear weapons on a natal basis not on a national basis.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=1505.0,1547.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/49","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIn fact this may be the only way we can prevent the spreading on a national basis. We don't have the choice anymore between no spread or a complete spread. The French are already developing nuclear weapons on their own and will continue to develop them. And as I understand the president's speech yesterday and the president's statements.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=1547.0,1573.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/50","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nVice president Johnson speech last week and Prime Minister speech, there is an increase in understanding for this particular problem, in the west. Secondly, much greater effort has been made to build up the conventional forces of NATO. So that almost any conceivable attack on NATO can be resisted in Europe.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=1573.0,1604.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/51","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nNow, there are many people, this also means that we have to think through again. Many of the on which western policy has been based. For example, one of the phrases that General Nordstaf never tires of repeated is the phrase that all we need is enough forces to get a pause in military operations.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=1604.0,1631.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/52","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nNow he never quite explains what enough means in this contact, what pause means, and what happens after the pause on the theory that probably the Soviets will not bring us to that stage and that what we have to do is produce uncertainty in the Soviet mind. Now I agree that it's not undesirable to have uncertainty in the Soviet mind, but I wish we were certain in our own mind of what we are going to do.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=1631.0,1657.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/53","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThere's enough uncertainty produced when we are certain for us not to compound it by being certain, uncertain. I would say that the goal has to be to conduct a very substantial operation on the continent of Europe. Should the soviets attack, and my own inclination is to say to resist almost any scale of attack on the continent.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=1657.0,1686.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/54","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nSecondly, there to be a much higher degree of political unity within the alliance. If we simply cannot afford any longer to have a repetition of the kind of diplomas he which preceded the aborted summit meeting. We cannot go into, we cannot have, as a prelude to every conference a bickering among the allies with inspired leagues from various capitals, including Washington.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=1686.0,1719.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/55","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAt least in Washington you don't have to inspire Leagues. There it happens automatically. But best in which allies take decades to the public, and criticize other allies putting step in, foolish rigid or whatever the phrase is. This must encourage the Soviets to continue their pressure and this must create an atmosphere in which the alliance is always at its weakest point just before a negotiation.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=1719.0,1762.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/56","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nI think the Western Alliance has an obligation. I hope indeed that it will come on issues which concern the Western Alliance as a whole to adopt the principle of having a single negotiating team with a single Chairman and of course representatives from different countries rather than three different negotiating teams, With various possessions.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=1762.0,1794.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/57","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nI think we can make no progress in the disarmament field until each ally has the confidence that every other ally will take its interest as seriously as it would take its own. We do not have to station nuclear weapons in Maine in order to convey to the Soviets that we will resist an attack on Maine with all the forces at our disposal, even though Maine may be less important.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=1794.0,1827.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/58","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThen France but France does not have that sense of security. The conclusion I draw is that the Western Alliance has to get the sense of cohesion so that it thinks of itself and acts as one political unit. And that it develops appropriate institutions to make this effective.\n\u003e\u003e End of Tape One.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=1827.0,1858.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/59","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBeginning of Tape Two.\n\u003e\u003e We tend to be mesmerized by the Communist initiative\n\u003e\u003e But it seems to me that if the vested alliance in its own relation to each other, can prove that it can create a new international system in which it can transcend the petty nationalism of the last generation or so.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=1858.0,1881.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/60","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThat this would be more of an inspiration to other parts of the world\n\u003e\u003e Then all the abstract preachments, indeed then all the formal economic programs that we can conceive. And one of the risks we face now, and I say this quite frankly, with a highly competent administration it's that it may, or we may not be\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=1881.0,1906.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/61","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e Bold enough and sometimes it seems to me it is easier to a big thing than a succession of little things. Now I must say But I am much encouraged by the talks that have been going on in this direction by the implications of the public statements that have been made.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=1906.0,1931.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/62","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nWhat I'm expressing here does not appear to simply be my idea. But it is, what I take to be the future and the hope of the rest of my life.\n\u003e\u003e [APPLAUSE]\n[INAUDIBLE]\n\u003e\u003e Sounds like you're suggesting that they get prepared to fight World War II again. Have we really thought this out?\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=1931.0,1969.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/63","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e Have I really thought it out? [INAUDIBLE]\n\u003e\u003e And we had 100 division, now we have 20.\n\u003e\u003e Well, first of all I'm not saying we should fight anymore if it can possibly be avoided. Secondly, no war can be fought today that doesn't involve the threat of a nuclear war in the background.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=1969.0,2006.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/64","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nNo military past show we can adapt. Nothing we can say or do can uninvent nuclear weapons. I consider it extremely unlikely that there can be a conventional war lasting four or five years, and having 100 divisions with nothing else happening. So this would seem to me, the most unlikely of eventualities.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2006.0,2035.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/65","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nI must say however, that I would rather fight World War II than World War III. And even a World War II with 100 divisions is going to be much more tolerable than thermonuclear bombs on the major cities of the United States and Europe.\n\u003e\u003e Well, I'm inclined to agree with you, but I think if we are preparing for this eventuality, this means the mobilization based on entirely revamping of our defense structure and of our allies I think.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2035.0,2069.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/66","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e I'm in favor of complete revamping of our defense structure and that of the allies. We can't do it without [INAUDIBLE] military establishment.\n\u003e\u003e No, I was gonna ask you I don't think those 20 divisions will last very long.\n\u003e\u003e It can't be done with present military establishment in Europe.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2069.0,2084.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/67","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBut what we have now is an uneasy compromise which is partly retaliatory in nature, partly conventional. And really has its major deterrent effect In the fact that no one can really predict what will happen when this establishment ever gets used including the military commanders. Now, this may sound facetious, this has a certain element of deterrence in it.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2084.0,2114.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/68","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBecause we simply cannot guarantee to the Russians, no matter what we say that everything won't blow up if fighting on a substantial scale in Europe starts. On the other hand, I think this is a rather irresponsible political posture, which in the long run will demoralize the countries concerned.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2114.0,2132.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/69","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nNow, as we get tighter political control over these weapons, we then get into the position where they may be willing to run greater risks. And then we will automatically be forced into revamping the establishment. But your question, if we want to keep our present defense levels in the absence of disarmament agreement, we cannot do what I've proposed.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2132.0,2156.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/70","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nWhat I proposed requires a substantial increase in the part of allied forces, a substantial increase in ally cohesion. And it is not merely an adaptation of the existing views.\n\u003e\u003e It is not like [INAUDIBLE] money but men their blood they might [INAUDIBLE] to get the charge open again [INAUDIBLE] expending their blood to save our cities.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2156.0,2184.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/71","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e If the Belgians and French in 1914 had said that they would fight only if Britain would be as devastated as they were. They wouldn't have been defended, you're quite right this is one of the that's already been made in Germany. I think it's based on a misunderstanding of nuclear wars loses [INAUDIBLE] many men in big nuclear war.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2184.0,2212.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/72","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThey lose more men in a big nuclear war. Then they would in most conceivable conventional wars.\n\u003e\u003e Well some of the hope have been [INAUDIBLE] in the middle?\n\u003e\u003e Well but the fallout, but the wind goes from West to East.\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e From East to West.\n\u003e\u003e Vaporize the Northern Hemisphere, but they have the ocean between us and the rest of it is blowing over toward Russia.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2212.0,2238.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/73","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e Yes, this is quite true. If the concern of every ally is to adopt that military policy which shifts the devastation into the territory of another ally, then the alliance is gonna split up.\n\u003e\u003e Under pressure, this usually happens. I remember in 1940, when they were closing in Dunkirk and Gordon got orders to withdraw to Dunkirk and to England.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2238.0,2263.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/74","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThe French got orders to try to break through the Southern France and [INAUDIBLE] both decided to quit.\n\u003e\u003e If the pressure in an alliance becomes too great this, this can happen. But if this happens, then what we will see is a multiplication of national nuclear establishments. A gradual weakening of the alliance, because every ally will think it can protect itself on it's own.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2263.0,2293.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/75","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThere will not be any reasonable disarmament negotiations because you have too many national nuclear establishments. That's the other price. I'm not saying that what I'm proposing it doesn't have great complexities.\n\u003e\u003e No, I wasn't disagreeing with you, which has happened too many times on these panels. What I really want to draw the point of this as a major change and it involves men and money.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2293.0,2317.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/76","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e It involves men and money and a major political realignment.\n\u003e\u003e Right.\n\u003e\u003e One way to prevent the kind of breakup that occurred at Dunkirk is really by the method which Churchill proposed too late, namely, a political union between Great Britain and France. Now, if the alliance began to think of itself as a unit, the possibility of secession would still exist, but it would be much minimized.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2317.0,2348.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/77","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e When you get to the point of trust which you mentioned in the association with the Russians, we don't quite trust the British or they trust us enough to have a political union at this time.\n\u003e\u003e Well a British friend of mine said to me.\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e [INAUDIBLE]\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2348.0,2365.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/78","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e Class, I'll let him answer but I want to, one British friend said to me, no annihilation without representation.\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e He just added to provide, in fact he was a Labor party member. He said he was strongly in favor of Britain joining the Union, what he really meant was to reverse the error of the 18th century.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2365.0,2392.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/79","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBut that they would insist on accounting for at least 15 states.\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e Well, I think we'd be willing to give this a try All our not only present prime minister-\n\u003e\u003e Can we take it this is an official statement?\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e You will have to read all this in the light of statements by higher authority.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2392.0,2416.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/80","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBut I think Mr. McMillan has spoken enough about interdependence and unity in the Atlantic community. To make it clear that he is in favor of some closer form of association than we have at present. And he, having been credited approval by Dr. Kissinger. It would be ungracious of me to take issue with him at any point, substantial points.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2416.0,2448.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/81","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nOn the military side it seems to me that whatever the reasons were for our developing a separate nuclear capability. We have it and it is a contribution to the western deterrent. Whether or not, we would hope we would not, ever be faced with the decision of whether or not to use it independently.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2448.0,2479.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/82","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBut it does bring about a desirable dispersal in the deterrent forces. And we like to think, although it is a bit expensive and increasingly expensive. That we are able to get fairly close towards our goals in conventional forces, as well. Which, without wishing to criticize our French allies, is perhaps not the case with France.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2479.0,2509.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/83","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBut the military field is such a complex one, and I don't think the studies. Unless President Kennedy's statement yesterday indicated the combination of these. I don't think they have been fully carried through. I think Mr. Atchison is still working with his group and NATO is still studying the question.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2509.0,2533.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/84","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIn our view, obviously, the deterrent has to be brought up to date. But perhaps the balance between nuclear and conventional forces at the moment is approximately correct. However, there are these other fields, the political one, well undoubtedly that has been less consultation. And you intimated, and it's desirable to consider, but we certainly agree more must be done about that.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2533.0,2564.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/85","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIf one desires to strike a posture which will be agreeable to the uncommitted countries, for instance. In the United Nations on colonial questions, that kind of thing. It would be desirable to have them clear the ground, perhaps within the western alliance beforehand. I'm not saying this doesn't happen.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2564.0,2584.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/86","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBut it is a desirable custom to follow. And there is lastly the economic filed of which Mr. McMillan spoke at MIT the other day. There is a great deal to be done there. As Dr. Kissinger said, the situation is that you have a monolithic and centrally controlled system facing you on the communist side.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2584.0,2612.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/87","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd at this stage of the game they are putting everything into developing their economic potential. We can't afford to dissipate ours and we need to increase the wealth of the nations, of the Western Alliance. When you have economic divisions as you have at the moment between the six and the seven, this is not an ideal state of affairs.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2612.0,2637.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/88","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd we hope fervently that something can be done to have an accommodation there. The OECD is another fruitful field for coordinating economic policies. And not least is the field of trade. Which after all is what creates wealth. And we would hope from the British angle that. Now that the American balance of payments seems to be in slightly healthier shape.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2637.0,2668.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/89","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nMore can be done by way of freeing trade across the Atlantic. I've noticed, I think I'm right in detecting in what Mr. Kissinger has said before. A suggestion that the United States might be able to consider some [INAUDIBLE] from national sovereignty. To bring about greater unity in their lives.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2668.0,2694.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/90","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd I would be very interested to know what sort of concessions he thinks might be feasible. I would hope trade would be a possible field, but are there more spectacular political ones?\n\u003e\u003e Before I give my sketchy ideas on this I'd like to point out that even if you find my particular ideas unsatisfactory.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2694.0,2727.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/91","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThat doesn't mean that, as painful as this is for me to admit it, that better ideas may not exist.\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e Because I think, if President Kennedy put the some 20 odd thousand men working in antiseptic splendor in the State Department. To work on the problem of how to produce greater unity that they might do better than an individual, a Harvard professor.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2727.0,2759.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/92","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAlthough in my heart of hearts, I don't really believe that.\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e [COUGH] Now, I have indicated a few directions. To pick up the point of Mr. [INAUDIBLE]. [COUGH] I think that this so called split between the six and the seven. That we could contribute to healing this by ourselves, taking steps towards free trade.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2759.0,2790.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/93","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd I would think, my guess would be. That Great Britain would always be willing to take any step towards Europe that we are prepared to take. And probably be prepared to go beyond where we are prepared to go if we had in the direct. Secondly, I think on negotiations that affect the alliance as a whole.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2790.0,2818.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/94","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThe alliance ought to negotiate as a unit rather than as separate national sovereignties. I think when the Berlin issue comes up again, the issue of Germany comes up again. It would be much better for there to be one negotiating team, I think, on regional disarmament. I would prefer to see one negotiating team rather than groups of it.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2818.0,2845.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/95","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nSecondly, I think that the alliance might well ask itself, where it would like to be. Not so much as a military alliance but as a community over a five to ten year period. And on a number of issues, give up a degree of sovereignty either to a steering committee of the alliance.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2845.0,2869.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/96","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nOne can invent almost unlimited numbers of schemes in this direction and it might be wise to begin in restricted fields. On the model of how European unity was promoted from the 1950's on. Where it seems to me that this is the direction in which we might go. If for example on this military question, we established a system, by which some kind of qualified majority of the alliance could make some of the fundamental decisions.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2869.0,2914.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/97","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd then no individual nations would agree not to withdraw their forces. Except with the approval of this majority, this would already be a step towards a kind of confederation, removing one of the great fears that some of our European allies have that in times of crisis we might not be there to support them.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2914.0,2938.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/98","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nGreat Britain, in fact, has done this with respect to his force, say on the continent, and I think this could be extended. My limited experience in government has indicated this to me. That if you ask the bureaucracy to come up with a proposal they will find 500 reasons why things wont work.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2938.0,2963.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/99","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBecause they'll only get into difficulties and they don't foresee a risk. For a major departure, the political leadership has to take the responsibility, and if they indicate this is the way we want the go, the bureaucracy would be very ingenious in coming up with schemes. To defend it and the marching orders that I think should be given to the bureaucracies of the western countries is to move towards an Atlantic confederation and then let's see what they might come up with.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2963.0,2995.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/100","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e One aspect of the question which we haven't yet addressed ourselves to is the effectiveness of NATO outside the NATO area. You always felt that NATO has certain built in limitations in operating effectively outside this area, and particularly in other countries where NATO is, A) looked upon as a military alliance.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=2995.0,3019.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/101","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd B) looked upon as a kind of confederation of the white man. You may recall a publication of the mid-century series Rockefeller Foundation in which they, looking at the long, long range of foreign policy developments see as one of the most menacing long-range conflicts. A world divided on color lines.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=3019.0,3044.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/102","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nNow, I think these questions can be asked without in any way deprecating the importance of the NATO and the Atlantic Community alliance. But I do think that in judging the usefulness of NATO, we ought to realize that it probably has some parameters And I wondered what your views might be on some of these limitations.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=3044.0,3069.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/103","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e Let first say I worry about this mid-century series because I wrote a considerable portion of these reports myself, so that I can't really disagree with what you've just said. It is a real problem that the world may be split along color lines. I think, however, that greater union in the West, is not inconsistent with greater dynamism with relation to the underdeveloped nations and with relations to some of the colored nations of the world.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=3069.0,3115.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/104","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nI don't believe that it is that we gain long-term credit with the underdeveloped nations by consistently supporting them against our closest friends. By this, I don't necessarily mean Portugal but I do mean countries like Great Britain and France, and I would do my utmost to use our influence for moderate policy within the alliance, in the direction of independence.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=3115.0,3151.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/105","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nRather than the kind of grandstand plays which we pursued on several occasions. While I didn't like the British action in Suez, I was sick about the self-righteousness with which we behaved, with which we behaved afterwards. But this is a different question now. If we move in the direction of greater confederation with Europe, we should at the same time use this confederation through other instruments than NATO like the OECD to spur the development of the new nations, perhaps at a scale, certainly at a scale considerably beyond what we have been doing.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=3151.0,3198.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/106","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd it's partly up to the other nations also. We cannot be the only ones that have the duty to prevent the split of the world along color lines. We are not making this arrangement against anyone else. We should show sympathy and compassion and support for the other nations.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=3198.0,3219.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/107","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBut I think the new nations have a certain responsibility themselves. Not to permit a split of the world strictly along color lines. I would agree, however, that there are parameters here and that not all the problems of the world can be solved simply by creating an Atlantic community.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=3219.0,3240.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/108","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e I was going to raise a question or two, which perhaps in the immediate sense I would consider somewhat more fundamental. Personally I don't think NATO is very important, you know I'm not against it, it's all right maybe, but it seems to me it raises some real problems.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=3240.0,3260.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/109","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH].\n\u003e\u003e Now the purpose NATO is of course to, as I understand it, to defend Western Europe. The question then arises is Western Europe threatened? And if so, by whom? Obviously if it's threatened, it's threatened by the Soviet Union. I have seen no indication of Soviet Union threatens Western Europe and I don't think it does assuming, however, that it did threaten Western Europe.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=3260.0,3290.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/110","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThen the question arises is to what role NATO would play. There's been some talk about some kind of ground forces being involved. If NATO has any strength now, it seems to me it's because of the American participation in it. Although the Germans are quite coming up fast on the outside as they say.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=3290.0,3313.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/111","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAside from that I don't think it has any support. If one speaks about the continental countries, for example France, or countries on the periphery of the continent, for example Great Britain. The contribution of the ground forces in NATO is not very great. They've been occupied elsewhere, they've been on the process of decreasing rather than increasing.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=3313.0,3336.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/112","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd furthermore, I'm not at all sure if one looks at France for example, with its long age-old, enmity for the Germans. And one looks at the amount of resistance which the French put up in the face of the German invasion in 1940. I'm not at all sure that the French would participate in a In a war involving the Soviet Union in effective extend.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=3336.0,3366.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/113","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBut I don't think that is very significant anyway, because I can't conceive possibly the Soviet Union assuming it wanted the threat, assuming it did threaten the Western Europe and it intended to invade it. That it would invade it with its armed forces unless it was very serious now, about an all out war.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=3366.0,3386.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/114","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd if it were very serious about an all out war, I can't imagine that the Soviet Union would simply send its ground forces let us say from Eastern Germany and from Czechoslovakia and other places rolling into Western Europe. While if missile people went on vacation to the Black Sea, for example, not at all, I think they will be employed simultaneously.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=3386.0,3410.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/115","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nBut let's suppose that were not the case, let's suppose the Russian thought well for first place, we can take Western Europe but without getting involved in some nuclear war. Then what would happen? Presumably, NATO forces, American expeditionary forces, all other kinds would involve them. Let us say, NATO is build up and if we're gonna have it, I would agree with Mr Kissinger, it should build up its conventional forces.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=3410.0,3433.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/116","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nSo it would engage the Russians and then it would give them pause, or whatever it is that General Norstad said. And then what? Presumably, then the Russians send in some more forces. The Kremlin says, don't pause, move on. So NATO steps its force then and the Russians step up theirs, now at some point, I would assume no longer are we going to be involved and ground forces are.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=3433.0,3457.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/117","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nObviously, this is involved with this escalated thing which everybody knows about. But I don't see how really that this has very much to do with NATO as a defensive force against Western Europe, against the Soviet Union as far as Western Europe goes. And if there were to be, if there were to be some kind of a defense which in the event of a war being started by the Soviet Union, I think the concept of defense of Western Europe would be meaningless, in that case.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=3457.0,3489.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/118","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIt seemed to me it would come because of American deterrent capacity. Now, while we had deterrent capacity, we said this was the reason the Russians didn't attack Western Europe because we had deterrent capacity. And then pretty soon it seemed that we no longer had the deterrent capacity at least we didn't out deter the Russians.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=3489.0,3510.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/119","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd then still the attack didn't come. I recall at various at NATO meetings. There had both been a series of target dates. NATO must have a force in being capable of resisting a Soviet invasion by such and such a date or catastrophe will result. The date I think has been 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56 and so on.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=3510.0,3534.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/120","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIt seems to me that in terms of a military defense of Western Europe, NATO wasn't any good. And furthermore, I can conceive that it might have a lot of dangers. I'm not thinking of, especially if we get a thermonuclear weapon which the Lord forbid. I'm not thinking so much of any field being and aggressive force by itself but the question arises as to, how long, for example, the United States is going to have its own forces in Western Europe?\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=3534.0,3565.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/121","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAre we going to have them in Western Europe 10 years, 50 years, 100 years? At some point if the war lasts, do we succeed, do we consider ourselves withdrawing them? And whether we do or not, I think the question arises as to who dominates, or who will dominate an APO?\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=3565.0,3579.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/122","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd I should say very clearly, it was going to be the Germans. And I was on a panel with a distinguished German representative from the council in Boston this morning. And we were talking about the Oder–Neisse line. And he made it very clear that it was placed where the Germans were not going to recognize the present German-Polish boundary because of the enormous political pressure of the immigrants in German and Polish in West Germany, not to recognize that line, and although he didn't say it in these words, to therefore take back those former German territories.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=3579.0,3613.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/123","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nI don't know. I'm not one of these people who foresees the development of militarism and Nazism in West Germany. But I don't know that German history has given us any reason to be entirely sanguine about the future of German foreign policy. And I can well imagine an NATO in which was dominated by the Germans.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=3613.0,3634.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7799/annotation/124","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nOr an NATO which the Germans thought they could involve, might involve us all in some very serious business which we really didn't wanna be involved in.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=3634.0,3652.70203"}]},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7800","type":"AnnotationPage","label":{"en":["ms_1981_s07_b0912_0001_caption.vtt [Transcript]"]},"items":[{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7800/annotation/125","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"WEBVTT\nLanguage: en\n\n00:00:06.845 --\u003e 00:00:10.540\nApril 11, NATO as a nation.\n\n00:00:10.540 --\u003e 00:00:16.030\nThe main speaker, Professor Kissinger,\nand discussion panel, reel number one.\n\n00:00:17.990 --\u003e 00:00:21.870\n\u003e\u003e I wish to welcome you\nto the panel discussion.\n\n00:00:23.080 --\u003e 00:00:29.730\nOn NATO as a united nation\nin the world of coexistence.\n\n00:00:31.110 --\u003e 00:00:37.782\nThe main speaker will be\nProfessor Kissinger of Harvard University.\n\n00:00:37.782 --\u003e 00:00:42.600\nAnd the discussion group, we have five\n\n00:00:42.600 --\u003e 00:00:47.418\ngentleman, well known to their work,\n\n00:00:47.418 --\u003e 00:00:52.403\nto my left, first one, is Mr. Tannum.\n\n00:00:52.403 --\u003e 00:00:58.896\nMr. Tannum is a historian\nassistant to the president\n\n00:00:58.896 --\u003e 00:01:03.814\nof the Rand Corporation, Washington.\n\n00:01:03.814 --\u003e 00:01:08.640\nThen Mr. Neal, political scientists\n\n00:01:08.640 --\u003e 00:01:12.600\nof Claremont Graduate School.\n\n00:01:12.600 --\u003e 00:01:16.730\nOn the other side of Mr.\nKissinger, Mr. Weir,\n\n00:01:16.730 --\u003e 00:01:21.486\nfirst secretary of the British Embassy,\nWashington.\n\n00:01:21.486 --\u003e 00:01:28.928\nThe next [INAUDIBLE], sociologist of\nthe University of [INAUDIBLE] and\n\n00:01:28.928 --\u003e 00:01:34.970\nthe last one, Mr.\nHitchcock of the state department.\n\n00:01:36.570 --\u003e 00:01:40.686\nAnd I shall now have Mr.\nKissinger talk to us.\n\n00:01:40.686 --\u003e 00:01:45.680\n\u003e\u003e Mr. Chairman,\nnow I thought I would make\n\n00:01:47.920 --\u003e 00:01:52.780\na few general observations\n\n00:01:52.780 --\u003e 00:01:57.900\nabout the problems of\nNATO as I see them and\n\n00:02:00.380 --\u003e 00:02:04.620\nhope that they will lead to\na discussion with my colleagues.\n\n00:02:06.150 --\u003e 00:02:12.560\nFirst of all, [COUGH] I would\nlike to express my own conviction\n\n00:02:12.560 --\u003e 00:02:17.010\nthat the absolute cornerstone\nof American foreign policy\n\n00:02:18.320 --\u003e 00:02:23.910\nhas been and\nmust continue to be the western alliance.\n\n00:02:25.000 --\u003e 00:02:30.260\nNot only in its military sense but\nin the sense that here\n\n00:02:30.260 --\u003e 00:02:36.580\nis an association of people with\na similar tradition, sharing similar\n\n00:02:39.340 --\u003e 00:02:42.700\nvalues having to a considerable\nextent similar institutions.\n\n00:02:43.990 --\u003e 00:02:49.800\nIf this community of nations cannot make\na success of its collaboration, indeed.\n\n00:02:49.800 --\u003e 00:02:54.085\nIf it cannot point a way towards\n\n00:02:54.085 --\u003e 00:02:59.260\n[COUGH]\nhow\n\n00:02:59.260 --\u003e 00:03:02.660\nto deal with the problem\nof nationalism in our time,\n\n00:03:03.700 --\u003e 00:03:08.030\nthen the future of freedom is thin indeed.\n\n00:03:09.730 --\u003e 00:03:14.390\nI strongly agree with the sense of\n\n00:03:14.390 --\u003e 00:03:19.650\nthe very wise speech that\nPrime Minister Macmillan made at\n\n00:03:19.650 --\u003e 00:03:25.030\nthe Massachusetts Institute\nof Technology last week.\n\n00:03:26.660 --\u003e 00:03:30.254\nWhere he spoke of the need for\nnot only for\n\n00:03:30.254 --\u003e 00:03:35.867\ngreater integration, but for\nunity in the western alliance.\n\n00:03:35.867 --\u003e 00:03:40.389\nIn the 19th century,\nEurope was assumed the leadership of\n\n00:03:40.389 --\u003e 00:03:45.617\nthe world because at that time,\nthe nation state was the most viable,\n\n00:03:45.617 --\u003e 00:03:49.291\nthe most advanced form\nof social organization.\n\n00:03:49.291 --\u003e 00:03:52.370\nIn the 20th century we had a duty\n\n00:03:52.370 --\u003e 00:03:57.180\nto show how we can go beyond the nation\nstate and form larger groupings.\n\n00:03:58.990 --\u003e 00:04:02.430\nAnd the challenge ahead for\nthe democracies,\n\n00:04:03.640 --\u003e 00:04:09.044\nis how they can form institutions and\n\n00:04:09.044 --\u003e 00:04:14.670\ndevelop dynamism in a program\nof real partnership.\n\n00:04:16.740 --\u003e 00:04:18.130\nNow this has many components.\n\n00:04:19.210 --\u003e 00:04:22.210\nI will speak and\n\n00:04:22.210 --\u003e 00:04:27.070\nthe first instance about\nthe military component,\n\n00:04:28.440 --\u003e 00:04:33.675\nnot again as I said this morning because\nI think the military component includes\n\n00:04:33.675 --\u003e 00:04:38.080\n[INAUDIBLE]\nall our other problems.\n\n00:04:38.080 --\u003e 00:04:45.090\nBut simply because if we cannot deal\nwith the military component effectively,\n\n00:04:45.090 --\u003e 00:04:50.680\nwe will not be able to deal\nwith any of our other problems.\n\n00:04:50.680 --\u003e 00:04:56.270\nNATO was formed in the first\ninstance as to increase the security\n\n00:04:56.270 --\u003e 00:05:01.500\nof all its members,\nit has to go beyond that.\n\n00:05:02.660 --\u003e 00:05:07.717\nBut if it cannot do that,\nthere's no chance of going beyond it.\n\n00:05:07.717 --\u003e 00:05:15.460\nNow the one of the big\nproblems that NATO has faced\n\n00:05:16.920 --\u003e 00:05:22.370\nis produced by the new weapons technology.\n\n00:05:23.560 --\u003e 00:05:28.570\nIn the past, an alliance can be said\nto have had roughly three purposes.\n\n00:05:29.610 --\u003e 00:05:34.270\nOne, to leave no doubt about\nthe alignment of forces.\n\n00:05:34.270 --\u003e 00:05:35.330\nIt used to be said for\n\n00:05:35.330 --\u003e 00:05:40.280\nexample that if Hitler had known what\nif the Germans in 1914 had known that\n\n00:05:40.280 --\u003e 00:05:44.770\nthe United States would get into the war,\nthey would never have attacked.\n\n00:05:45.888 --\u003e 00:05:51.300\nNow an alliance symbolizes the fact\nthat the nations will cooperate,\n\n00:05:51.300 --\u003e 00:05:58.950\ntherefore theoretically, the aggressor\nshould know what he's confronting.\n\n00:06:00.450 --\u003e 00:06:04.240\nSecondly, it is a device to assemble\n\n00:06:04.240 --\u003e 00:06:08.450\na greater power than any\nnation can individually.\n\n00:06:08.450 --\u003e 00:06:13.480\nAnd thirdly,\nit is a device by which the last and\n\n00:06:13.480 --\u003e 00:06:20.620\nleast important by which\nthe roots of a nation.\n\n00:06:20.620 --\u003e 00:06:23.490\nCan be stationed on\nthe territory of another for\n\n00:06:23.490 --\u003e 00:06:25.420\nthe protection of these other nations.\n\n00:06:26.920 --\u003e 00:06:30.000\nNow, I would like to suggest to you\n\n00:06:31.190 --\u003e 00:06:35.960\nthat the policy which NATO has\npursued over the past ten years\n\n00:06:37.150 --\u003e 00:06:41.180\nis inconsistent with all\nthree of these objectives.\n\n00:06:42.310 --\u003e 00:06:48.740\nThat the main task now is\nto make it consistent.\n\n00:06:51.316 --\u003e 00:06:58.070\n[COUGH]\nThe reason for the inconsistency\n\n00:07:00.440 --\u003e 00:07:06.690\nis the strategic doctrine on which\nthe free world has based its defense.\n\n00:07:07.950 --\u003e 00:07:12.550\nEssentially, it was the doctrine\nof massive retaliation,\n\n00:07:12.550 --\u003e 00:07:17.079\nwhich assumed that in case\nof an attack on Europe.\n\n00:07:18.490 --\u003e 00:07:21.480\nWell first of all,\nthere would be no attack on Europe if we\n\n00:07:21.480 --\u003e 00:07:25.220\nwould threaten to devastate\nthe Soviet homeland.\n\n00:07:25.220 --\u003e 00:07:28.950\nAnd secondly,\nthat if there were an attack on Europe,\n\n00:07:28.950 --\u003e 00:07:31.990\nit was feudal to fight in Europe.\n\n00:07:31.990 --\u003e 00:07:37.000\nIt would be a signal that the communists\nwere interested in world domination and\n\n00:07:37.000 --\u003e 00:07:40.410\ntherefore we should immediately\n\n00:07:41.640 --\u003e 00:07:46.660\ndeliver an all out blow\non the Soviet homeland.\n\n00:07:46.660 --\u003e 00:07:51.530\nNow this was never rigidly\nfollowed because it had one of its\n\n00:07:51.530 --\u003e 00:07:56.490\ncorollaries was for the time it leaves\nthe European countries would be overrun by\n\n00:07:56.490 --\u003e 00:07:58.990\nthe communists if there were a war.\n\n00:07:58.990 --\u003e 00:08:02.000\nAnd no European country was\nparticularly eager to be liberated,\n\n00:08:02.000 --\u003e 00:08:04.130\nthey wanted to be protected.\n\n00:08:04.130 --\u003e 00:08:09.124\nAnd from the very beginning NATO\nhas oscillated between trying to\n\n00:08:09.124 --\u003e 00:08:12.119\nbuild up local forces for defense, and\n\n00:08:12.119 --\u003e 00:08:17.499\nat the same time depending very\nlargely on its retaliatory strategy.\n\n00:08:20.251 --\u003e 00:08:23.110\nThen there were very many other motives.\n\n00:08:23.110 --\u003e 00:08:29.470\nEvery or most NATO countries\nalmost all of them are democratic.\n\n00:08:29.470 --\u003e 00:08:34.480\nAlmost all of them wanted to\ncut military expenditures.\n\n00:08:34.480 --\u003e 00:08:38.160\nAlmost all of them therefore told their\npeople that they could get more tanks for\n\n00:08:38.160 --\u003e 00:08:42.340\nthe attack if they relied\non nuclear weapons and\n\n00:08:42.340 --\u003e 00:08:46.380\nthat they could cut the local forces\nwith a high degree of safety.\n\n00:08:47.960 --\u003e 00:08:53.498\nNow the result of this is that\na military establishment has\n\n00:08:53.498 --\u003e 00:09:01.305\ngrown up on the continent which is really\na confused mixture of confused motives.\n\n00:09:05.839 --\u003e 00:09:09.280\nThere are five American divisions and\nsupporting units.\n\n00:09:10.290 --\u003e 00:09:13.209\nThere are two British divisions and\nsupporting units.\n\n00:09:14.610 --\u003e 00:09:16.373\nThen there are number of German divisions.\n\n00:09:18.539 --\u003e 00:09:24.127\nIn fact, the strongest force of the free\nworld is concentrated in Europe\n\n00:09:24.127 --\u003e 00:09:29.820\nin the one place where we have announced\nthat a local war was unthinkable.\n\n00:09:32.140 --\u003e 00:09:36.360\nThen all kinds of rationalizations\nhave been developed for\n\n00:09:36.360 --\u003e 00:09:40.140\nhaving this force,\nthere is the rationalization for\n\n00:09:40.140 --\u003e 00:09:45.180\nexample that this force ought to be big\nenough to enforce a pause in operations.\n\n00:09:46.420 --\u003e 00:09:50.070\nNow, no one has fully explained to\nme what happens after the pause\n\n00:09:51.080 --\u003e 00:09:56.780\nand who the Russians would attack.\n\n00:09:56.780 --\u003e 00:10:02.530\nWithout having taken this particular\nproblem into consideration, to begin with.\n\n00:10:04.300 --\u003e 00:10:07.510\nThen it's said that they ought to\nbring home the threat of general war\n\n00:10:07.510 --\u003e 00:10:08.100\nto the Russians.\n\n00:10:09.910 --\u003e 00:10:11.660\nThere's something in this.\n\n00:10:11.660 --\u003e 00:10:14.610\nBut it still raises the question of what\n\n00:10:14.610 --\u003e 00:10:18.720\nthe purpose of the local forces in Europe\nreally is because it isn't clear why\n\n00:10:18.720 --\u003e 00:10:23.240\nfive divisions raise the threat of General\nmore than one division or two divisions.\n\n00:10:26.070 --\u003e 00:10:28.150\nWell, in fact, in their heart of hearts,\n\n00:10:28.150 --\u003e 00:10:32.490\nmost European nations have\nhad one of two motives.\n\n00:10:32.490 --\u003e 00:10:39.900\nThey've either believed that they were\nalready protected by the United States\n\n00:10:39.900 --\u003e 00:10:45.111\nnuclear arsenal, in which case\nthey have made a contribution\n\n00:10:45.111 --\u003e 00:10:50.460\nwhich was the absolute minimum consistent\nwith their treaty obligations.\n\n00:10:52.080 --\u003e 00:10:57.410\nAnd the absolute minimum men that if\nyou're oblige to have a division and\n\n00:10:57.410 --\u003e 00:11:01.942\nif you call abrogated division,\nthis is fulfilling your obligation.\n\n00:11:01.942 --\u003e 00:11:06.190\nThe second,\n\n00:11:06.190 --\u003e 00:11:10.640\nthis was the road that has been traveled\nby most of the continental nations.\n\n00:11:10.640 --\u003e 00:11:14.770\nThe second was the road which has been\ntaken essentially by Great Britain which\n\n00:11:14.770 --\u003e 00:11:19.860\nis, that if it is true that nuclear\nweapons are the key to the defense of\n\n00:11:19.860 --\u003e 00:11:25.000\nEurope, then if one wants to make\na contribution to the deterrent,\n\n00:11:25.000 --\u003e 00:11:27.190\none has to have nuclear\nweapons of one's own.\n\n00:11:31.080 --\u003e 00:11:34.780\nNow, the result of both of\nthese approaches has been\n\n00:11:34.780 --\u003e 00:11:39.670\nthat the alliance has not been as\neffective as it should have been.\n\n00:11:39.670 --\u003e 00:11:45.930\nOn the part of the continental nations,\nbecause it meant that our\n\n00:11:45.930 --\u003e 00:11:51.830\nlocal forces were inadequate, on the part\nof the British and our French approach.\n\n00:11:51.830 --\u003e 00:11:57.200\nIt meant that our allies were duplicating\nat great expense the strategic\n\n00:11:57.200 --\u003e 00:12:01.550\ncategory in which the United States\nwas already strongest and\n\n00:12:01.550 --\u003e 00:12:06.560\nwhich they could not rely to fight\n\n00:12:06.560 --\u003e 00:12:11.720\nwithout United States' support and\nif they had our support they didn't need.\n\n00:12:11.720 --\u003e 00:12:15.770\nA retaliatory power of their own.\n\n00:12:15.770 --\u003e 00:12:18.620\nOne has to have understanding for this.\n\n00:12:18.620 --\u003e 00:12:23.320\nAgain, Prime Minister Macmillan\npointed out last Friday that in their\n\n00:12:23.320 --\u003e 00:12:27.941\nheart of hearts, the reason the British\nwanted their own deterrent,\n\n00:12:27.941 --\u003e 00:12:32.172\nis because throughout their history,\nthe British had felt that\n\n00:12:32.172 --\u003e 00:12:36.505\nin the last resort they had to be\nable to defend themselves alone.\n\n00:12:36.505 --\u003e 00:12:41.448\nAnd the free world owes\nits freedom to that fact.\n\n00:12:41.448 --\u003e 00:12:47.368\nIf Great Britain in 1914 or\n1939 had made the defense\n\n00:12:47.368 --\u003e 00:12:53.636\nof freedom depending on American\nwillingness to enter the war,\n\n00:12:53.636 --\u003e 00:12:58.523\nGermany would have overrun\nthe world both times.\n\n00:12:58.523 --\u003e 00:13:03.555\nNow the same reason that has\nimpelled the British to develop\n\n00:13:03.555 --\u003e 00:13:08.587\na nuclear arsenal of their own\nhas now impelled the French to\n\n00:13:08.587 --\u003e 00:13:15.660\ndevelop a nuclear arsenal of their own,\nthe French with an eight-year timeline.\n\n00:13:15.660 --\u003e 00:13:21.510\nThe French feel that they too cannot\nabsolutely rely on the United States.\n\n00:13:22.940 --\u003e 00:13:26.680\nThat's inconsistent with their\nstatus as a great power,\n\n00:13:26.680 --\u003e 00:13:31.340\nthat they have the fear,\nthey are worried either the nuclear\n\n00:13:31.340 --\u003e 00:13:35.560\nweapons will not be used\nat all in their defense or\n\n00:13:35.560 --\u003e 00:13:41.040\nthat they will be used against targets\nwhich are not of prime interest to them,\n\n00:13:41.040 --\u003e 00:13:45.510\nor at least that they will not have proper\npolitical influence unless they have\n\n00:13:45.510 --\u003e 00:13:50.810\nnuclear weapons of their own.\n\n00:13:50.810 --\u003e 00:13:56.070\nThis means that we run the risk\nnow of a proliferation of\n\n00:13:56.070 --\u003e 00:14:01.590\nnuclear establishments within NATO,\nand at the same time\n\n00:14:03.640 --\u003e 00:14:08.683\ntaking away from the forces which are\nessential for the local defense of Europe.\n\n00:14:12.810 --\u003e 00:14:17.949\nNow it's senseless to accuse\nour European allies of\n\n00:14:17.949 --\u003e 00:14:22.860\nbeing extremely suspicious.\n\n00:14:22.860 --\u003e 00:14:26.990\nIt's senseless to come a bit abstract\nprotestations about goodwill.\n\n00:14:28.450 --\u003e 00:14:32.150\nAnyone who knows the history\nof the last 20 years knows\n\n00:14:32.150 --\u003e 00:14:34.100\nthat allies can be left in the lurch.\n\n00:14:34.100 --\u003e 00:14:35.230\nIt has happened before.\n\n00:14:36.820 --\u003e 00:14:41.280\nAnyone who knows the history of\nthe last three years is aware that\n\n00:14:41.280 --\u003e 00:14:46.160\nallied unity has very often been absent,\nGreat Britain and\n\n00:14:46.160 --\u003e 00:14:50.640\nthe United States landed in Lebanon\nwithout informing the French in advance.\n\n00:14:52.240 --\u003e 00:14:58.770\nBritain and France landed in Suez and\nwere opposed by the United States.\n\n00:14:58.770 --\u003e 00:15:01.130\nThe diplomacy prior to the summit meeting\n\n00:15:02.850 --\u003e 00:15:06.900\nwitnessed a competition among\nthe statesman of the west as to who could\n\n00:15:06.900 --\u003e 00:15:12.120\npretend to best to his own people that he\nhad the peculiar gimmick to bring peace.\n\n00:15:12.120 --\u003e 00:15:16.700\nThat he had the perfect method for\ndealing with Mr. Khrushchev.\n\n00:15:16.700 --\u003e 00:15:19.340\nThat he was more reasonable\nthan any of his allies.\n\n00:15:20.990 --\u003e 00:15:23.970\nAnd it has become almost a requirement for\n\n00:15:23.970 --\u003e 00:15:29.630\nthe domestic election campaigns\nin many of the allied countries\n\n00:15:29.630 --\u003e 00:15:34.770\nto pretend that one had a special key for\ndealing with Mr. Khrushchev.\n\n00:15:35.820 --\u003e 00:15:41.220\nNow I believe that separate approaches to\nMr. Khrushchev are sometimes necessary.\n\n00:15:42.480 --\u003e 00:15:46.430\nAnd if they're well concerted\nin advance as they were in Laos,\n\n00:15:46.430 --\u003e 00:15:47.940\nI believe they can be effective.\n\n00:15:49.060 --\u003e 00:15:52.830\nI think also that the kind\nof diplomacy which\n\n00:15:52.830 --\u003e 00:15:57.770\npreceded the board of summit meeting\nis disastrous for the alliance.\n\n00:15:59.120 --\u003e 00:16:03.885\nThere's no point in separate\nconversations with Mr.\n\n00:16:03.885 --\u003e 00:16:08.234\nKhrushchev, as far as\nKhrushchev is concerned,\n\n00:16:08.234 --\u003e 00:16:13.838\nunless it is to create the impression\nof a separate settlement.\n\n00:16:13.838 --\u003e 00:16:17.819\nAnd if one studies,\nthe Soviet notes to all Allies.\n\n00:16:17.819 --\u003e 00:16:21.536\nThey constantly raise the possibility\nthat some other Ally is going to\n\n00:16:21.536 --\u003e 00:16:25.010\nsettle with them, so\nwouldn't it be better to settle directly?\n\n00:16:26.330 --\u003e 00:16:28.220\nThis is their approach now.\n\n00:16:30.060 --\u003e 00:16:34.049\nThis was the theme of their\nlast note to the Germans,\n\n00:16:34.049 --\u003e 00:16:38.764\nto the effect that the Germans\ncould make a much better deal for\n\n00:16:38.764 --\u003e 00:16:41.861\nthemselves than they could through us.\n\n00:16:41.861 --\u003e 00:16:46.752\nNow, as long as there is such\na degree of political disunity,\n\n00:16:46.752 --\u003e 00:16:53.259\nwe must have understandings for the\nposition of countries, of other countries.\n\n00:16:53.259 --\u003e 00:16:56.209\nNot have to have to depend,\nat the last analysis,\n\n00:16:56.209 --\u003e 00:17:01.072\non our understanding of the danger, and\non our willingness to engage ourselves.\n\n00:17:01.072 --\u003e 00:17:05.670\nAnd to want to have some degree\nof control over their fate.\n\n00:17:06.730 --\u003e 00:17:11.510\nNow, I believe getting one's own\nnuclear establishment is the most\n\n00:17:11.510 --\u003e 00:17:16.551\nexpensive and worst way of doing that.\n\n00:17:16.551 --\u003e 00:17:20.630\nBut we have to understand\nthe conditions that produce it.\n\n00:17:20.630 --\u003e 00:17:22.290\nNow, take another situation.\n\n00:17:23.300 --\u003e 00:17:32.536\nTake the fact that,\nWhen the French, for example,\n\n00:17:32.536 --\u003e 00:17:39.200\nspeak of the necessity of having nuclear\nweapons to have political influence.\n\n00:17:39.200 --\u003e 00:17:42.930\nThen you ask yourself what political\ninference are they gonna have.\n\n00:17:42.930 --\u003e 00:17:44.911\nAre they gonna bomb us?\n\n00:17:44.911 --\u003e 00:17:48.763\nAre they gonna start a war which\nforces us to support them?\n\n00:17:48.763 --\u003e 00:17:52.465\nBoth of these contingencies\nare extremely unlikely.\n\n00:17:55.346 --\u003e 00:18:00.029\nWell, I can think of one contingency\nin which nuclear weapons gets them\n\n00:18:00.029 --\u003e 00:18:01.610\npolitical influence.\n\n00:18:01.610 --\u003e 00:18:06.475\nNuclear weapons enabled them\nto participate in disarmament\n\n00:18:06.475 --\u003e 00:18:09.630\nnegotiations about nuclear weapons.\n\n00:18:09.630 --\u003e 00:18:16.047\nAnd it is a fact that Great Britain has\nbeen participating as an equal partner in\n\n00:18:16.047 --\u003e 00:18:21.800\nthe nuclear test ban negotiations,\nwhile France has been excluded.\n\n00:18:21.800 --\u003e 00:18:26.087\nAnd it is also a fact that\nthe disposal of nuclear of weapons,\n\n00:18:26.087 --\u003e 00:18:31.133\nthe control of nuclear weapons,\nthe reduction of nuclear weapons is as\n\n00:18:31.133 --\u003e 00:18:37.640\nmuch a matter of life and death to the\nFrench as the creation of nuclear weapons.\n\n00:18:37.640 --\u003e 00:18:42.480\nAnd again, the lack of political unity\n\n00:18:44.830 --\u003e 00:18:47.970\nor the fact that the French feel\nthey must be physically present to\n\n00:18:47.970 --\u003e 00:18:52.260\nprotect their interest at these\ndisarmament negotiations,\n\n00:18:52.260 --\u003e 00:18:57.020\ngets them an incentive to produce\nnuclear weapons of their own.\n\n00:18:57.020 --\u003e 00:18:59.798\nAnd there's no sense in telling them that\nthey ought to be more reasonable, and\n\n00:18:59.798 --\u003e 00:19:00.922\nthat they ought to be good boys.\n\n00:19:00.922 --\u003e 00:19:04.352\nWe are in the conference room and\nthey are not.\n\n00:19:07.297 --\u003e 00:19:12.987\nNow, [COUGH] [COUGH]\n\n00:19:12.987 --\u003e 00:19:18.151\nThen we have the problem\nwhich is that here\n\n00:19:18.151 --\u003e 00:19:23.767\nan alliance is confronting\na unitary state.\n\n00:19:23.767 --\u003e 00:19:28.572\nThe fact is that the Soviet Union\ncan threaten all of\n\n00:19:28.572 --\u003e 00:19:33.732\nthe European countries and\nus from its own territory.\n\n00:19:33.732 --\u003e 00:19:38.467\nThe other hand, none of the threatened\ncountries is capable of resisting alone.\n\n00:19:38.467 --\u003e 00:19:43.400\nThe Soviet Union can threaten\neach Ally one by one.\n\n00:19:45.380 --\u003e 00:19:48.780\nThe Allies are in a position where\nthey must respond by threatening\n\n00:19:50.230 --\u003e 00:19:51.960\nthe Soviet Union.\n\n00:19:51.960 --\u003e 00:19:57.400\nAnd one of the disadvantages of having\nyour own nuclear arsenal is that\n\n00:19:57.400 --\u003e 00:20:01.610\nwhen the chips are down, it may be that it\nremoves any incentive to support an ally.\n\n00:20:02.790 --\u003e 00:20:05.440\nCuz if each country has\nits own nuclear arsenal,\n\n00:20:05.440 --\u003e 00:20:09.360\nif each Allied country has its own\nnuclear arsenal, it will believe\n\n00:20:11.580 --\u003e 00:20:15.360\nthat when the chips are down,\nit can protect itself.\n\n00:20:15.360 --\u003e 00:20:16.840\nAnd until the chips are down,\n\n00:20:16.840 --\u003e 00:20:21.290\nit is foolish to risk its national\nexistence for a foreign country.\n\n00:20:23.440 --\u003e 00:20:30.207\nI once told a French friend of mine,\nif you have your own nuclear arsenal,\n\n00:20:30.207 --\u003e 00:20:36.117\nwhy should you fight for\nanything that goes on across the Rhine?\n\n00:20:36.117 --\u003e 00:20:38.205\nHe said, that may be true but\n\n00:20:38.205 --\u003e 00:20:42.732\nat least we can then fight if\nanybody tries to cross the Rhine.\n\n00:20:45.631 --\u003e 00:20:51.072\nNow secondly,\nas Great Britain has found out,\n\n00:20:51.072 --\u003e 00:20:59.772\nnuclear weapons in the hands of,\nHighly concentrated nations or\n\n00:20:59.772 --\u003e 00:21:05.810\nEuropean nations with populations\nare geographically very concentrated.\n\n00:21:07.080 --\u003e 00:21:14.080\nReally do not confer their security\nthat they are thought to confer.\n\n00:21:14.080 --\u003e 00:21:17.937\nAll the problems about protecting\nthe retaliatory force,\n\n00:21:17.937 --\u003e 00:21:22.419\nwhich the United States is confronting,\nbecome almost insoluble.\n\n00:21:22.419 --\u003e 00:21:26.880\nEven for Great Britain, which has been\nin the nuclear club for eight years.\n\n00:21:26.880 --\u003e 00:21:29.810\nAnd France will find out it's\ninsoluble for France, too.\n\n00:21:30.880 --\u003e 00:21:35.620\nSo you then have the tendency of\neither your ten people will say,\n\n00:21:35.620 --\u003e 00:21:38.700\nwe'll adopt some version\nof unilateral disarmament.\n\n00:21:38.700 --\u003e 00:21:43.410\nOf saying if the only weapon that\nmakes any sense are nuclear weapons.\n\n00:21:44.900 --\u003e 00:21:49.560\nAnd if nuclear weapons cannot protect us,\nat least we might get the benefit,\n\n00:21:50.580 --\u003e 00:21:53.770\nwhatever benefit there is,\nin having no weapons at all.\n\n00:21:53.770 --\u003e 00:21:56.660\nAnd this, it seems to me,\nif I understand them correctly,\n\n00:21:56.660 --\u003e 00:22:02.390\nis the theme of some of\nthe British unilateralists.\n\n00:22:02.390 --\u003e 00:22:07.301\nIt hasn't happened in France yet\nbecause the French are still\n\n00:22:07.301 --\u003e 00:22:11.929\nin the earlier stage of nuclear\ndevelopment of euphoria,\n\n00:22:11.929 --\u003e 00:22:17.231\nwhere they think that every\nexplosions adds to their capability.\n\n00:22:17.231 --\u003e 00:22:21.852\nNow then, in this process,\none neglects to examine\n\n00:22:21.852 --\u003e 00:22:27.009\nan assumption which has become\nalmost taken for granted.\n\n00:22:27.009 --\u003e 00:22:32.100\nNamely, somehow the West cannot resist\nthe so-called hordes of Soviet manpower.\n\n00:22:33.260 --\u003e 00:22:36.668\nAnd that unless we resort\nto these nuclear weapons,\n\n00:22:36.668 --\u003e 00:22:39.929\nwe cannot resists the hordes\nof Soviet manpower.\n\n00:22:39.929 --\u003e 00:22:43.668\nNow the fact is the Soviets\ndon't have hordes of manpower.\n\n00:22:43.668 --\u003e 00:22:51.748\nThe combined manpower of the West is\nabout twice that of the Soviet Union.\n\n00:22:51.748 --\u003e 00:22:56.344\nThe industrial base of the West is about\nthree times that of the Soviet Union.\n\n00:22:56.344 --\u003e 00:23:01.220\nThere's no reason in the world why\nEurope should not be able to be defended\n\n00:23:01.220 --\u003e 00:23:02.540\nin Europe.\n\n00:23:02.540 --\u003e 00:23:06.590\nExcept lack of will,\nlack of political unity and lack of\n\n00:23:06.590 --\u003e 00:23:10.249\ncourage of the political leadership in\ntelling its people the facts of life.\n\n00:23:12.450 --\u003e 00:23:15.190\nAnd again, I want to come back\nto what I said this morning.\n\n00:23:15.190 --\u003e 00:23:17.650\nIf we are serious about\n\n00:23:18.870 --\u003e 00:23:22.938\nnot wanting to rely on nuclear weapons,\nthen we can do one of two things.\n\n00:23:22.938 --\u003e 00:23:26.640\nThe easy things is to march\naround with placards and\n\n00:23:26.640 --\u003e 00:23:31.380\nsay ban the bomb, and\nlet's uninvent what's been invented.\n\n00:23:31.380 --\u003e 00:23:36.900\nThe more difficult training is to build\nup our conventional establishment.\n\n00:23:36.900 --\u003e 00:23:40.800\nAnd force the Soviets into\nthe choice of whether they are so\n\n00:23:40.800 --\u003e 00:23:44.480\neager to win that they're willing to\nrisk a nuclear war in order to win.\n\n00:23:45.600 --\u003e 00:23:49.230\nThis would be a tremendous change\nin the psychological situation.\n\n00:23:49.230 --\u003e 00:23:52.650\nAnd it seems to me that in Europe,\nof all places,\n\n00:23:52.650 --\u003e 00:23:57.120\nit is the place where we could\ncome very close to achieving it.\n\n00:23:57.120 --\u003e 00:24:01.520\nThe problem of Berlin will be entirely\n\n00:24:01.520 --\u003e 00:24:06.472\ndifferent if there were sufficient forces\n\n00:24:06.472 --\u003e 00:24:11.285\nin Europe to defend Berlin locally rather\n\n00:24:11.285 --\u003e 00:24:16.397\nthan with a threat of nuclear devastation.\n\n00:24:16.397 --\u003e 00:24:24.210\nNow [COUGH] This however,\nraises a number of questions.\n\n00:24:25.510 --\u003e 00:24:29.530\nYou can not have a conventional\ndefense of Europe\n\n00:24:29.530 --\u003e 00:24:33.040\nwithout having a nuclear\narsenal to back it up.\n\n00:24:34.090 --\u003e 00:24:37.860\nThere must be nuclear weapons\nof sufficient discrimination.\n\n00:24:38.920 --\u003e 00:24:44.570\nAnd in sufficient quantity and\nsufficiently responsive to control,\n\n00:24:44.570 --\u003e 00:24:49.940\nto prevent the communists from winning by\nintroducing nuclear weapons themselves.\n\n00:24:49.940 --\u003e 00:24:53.409\nThere must be both a tactical and\na strategical nuclear arsenal.\n\n00:24:56.250 --\u003e 00:24:58.600\nYet, if every European country,\n\n00:24:58.600 --\u003e 00:25:01.990\nor every major European country\ndeveloped its own nuclear arsenal,\n\n00:25:01.990 --\u003e 00:25:05.920\nthere simply won't be enough resources\nleft to build conventional forces.\n\n00:25:05.920 --\u003e 00:25:09.630\nSo there has to be a certain\ndivision of labor, and\n\n00:25:09.630 --\u003e 00:25:15.110\nthere has to be a much greater degree\nof integration of the nuclear forces.\n\n00:25:15.110 --\u003e 00:25:17.670\nThan has been the case previously.\n\n00:25:17.670 --\u003e 00:25:20.790\nNo one will make an effort\nin the conventional deal\n\n00:25:20.790 --\u003e 00:25:22.650\nuntil the nuclear problem is solved.\n\n00:25:23.800 --\u003e 00:25:28.040\nAnd this is why many\nmembers of the alliance,\n\n00:25:28.040 --\u003e 00:25:33.220\nparticularly the United States and\nGreat Britain have an obligation to\n\n00:25:33.220 --\u003e 00:25:37.060\ntake into account the concerns\nabout European allies,\n\n00:25:37.060 --\u003e 00:25:41.710\nabout sharing to some degree\n\n00:25:41.710 --\u003e 00:25:46.520\nin the control of the nuclear weapons on\na natal basis not on a national basis.\n\n00:25:47.840 --\u003e 00:25:52.730\nIn fact this may be the only way we can\nprevent the spreading on a national basis.\n\n00:25:53.830 --\u003e 00:25:59.630\nWe don't have the choice anymore\nbetween no spread or a complete spread.\n\n00:25:59.630 --\u003e 00:26:02.850\nThe French are already developing\nnuclear weapons on their own and\n\n00:26:02.850 --\u003e 00:26:06.090\nwill continue to develop them.\n\n00:26:06.090 --\u003e 00:26:12.080\nAnd as I understand the president's speech\nyesterday and the president's statements.\n\n00:26:13.700 --\u003e 00:26:17.760\nVice president Johnson speech last\nweek and Prime Minister speech,\n\n00:26:17.760 --\u003e 00:26:24.350\nthere is an increase in understanding for\nthis particular problem, in the west.\n\n00:26:26.630 --\u003e 00:26:31.970\nSecondly, much greater effort has been\nmade to build up the conventional forces\n\n00:26:31.970 --\u003e 00:26:32.515\nof NATO.\n\n00:26:35.660 --\u003e 00:26:43.010\nSo that almost any conceivable attack\non NATO can be resisted in Europe.\n\n00:26:44.540 --\u003e 00:26:47.460\nNow, there are many people,\n\n00:26:49.860 --\u003e 00:26:54.370\nthis also means that we have\nto think through again.\n\n00:26:54.370 --\u003e 00:26:58.570\nMany of the on which western\npolicy has been based.\n\n00:26:58.570 --\u003e 00:27:00.330\nFor example,\n\n00:27:00.330 --\u003e 00:27:05.730\none of the phrases that General Nordstaf\nnever tires of repeated is the phrase\n\n00:27:05.730 --\u003e 00:27:10.489\nthat all we need is enough forces to\nget a pause in military operations.\n\n00:27:11.490 --\u003e 00:27:15.820\nNow he never quite explains what enough\nmeans in this contact, what pause means,\n\n00:27:15.820 --\u003e 00:27:20.350\nand what happens after\nthe pause on the theory\n\n00:27:20.350 --\u003e 00:27:25.435\nthat probably the Soviets will\nnot bring us to that stage and\n\n00:27:25.435 --\u003e 00:27:29.095\nthat what we have to do is produce\nuncertainty in the Soviet mind.\n\n00:27:29.095 --\u003e 00:27:33.755\nNow I agree that it's not undesirable to\nhave uncertainty in the Soviet mind, but\n\n00:27:33.755 --\u003e 00:27:37.895\nI wish we were certain in our own\nmind of what we are going to do.\n\n00:27:37.895 --\u003e 00:27:40.775\nThere's enough uncertainty\nproduced when we are certain for\n\n00:27:40.775 --\u003e 00:27:43.425\nus not to compound it by being certain,\nuncertain.\n\n00:27:45.850 --\u003e 00:27:50.930\nI would say that the goal\nhas to be to conduct a very\n\n00:27:50.930 --\u003e 00:27:56.280\nsubstantial operation on\nthe continent of Europe.\n\n00:27:56.280 --\u003e 00:28:01.520\nShould the soviets attack, and\nmy own inclination is to say to resist\n\n00:28:01.520 --\u003e 00:28:04.009\nalmost any scale of\nattack on the continent.\n\n00:28:06.640 --\u003e 00:28:12.520\nSecondly, there to be a much higher degree\nof political unity within the alliance.\n\n00:28:13.930 --\u003e 00:28:17.890\nIf we simply cannot\nafford any longer to have\n\n00:28:17.890 --\u003e 00:28:22.120\na repetition of the kind of diplomas he\nwhich preceded the aborted summit meeting.\n\n00:28:23.196 --\u003e 00:28:27.460\nWe cannot go into, we cannot have,\n\n00:28:28.510 --\u003e 00:28:34.520\nas a prelude to every conference\na bickering among the allies with\n\n00:28:34.520 --\u003e 00:28:39.430\ninspired leagues from various capitals,\nincluding Washington.\n\n00:28:39.430 --\u003e 00:28:45.400\nAt least in Washington you\ndon't have to inspire Leagues.\n\n00:28:47.510 --\u003e 00:28:49.361\nThere it happens automatically.\n\n00:28:49.361 --\u003e 00:28:54.807\nBut best in which\n\n00:28:54.807 --\u003e 00:29:01.530\nallies take decades to the public,\nand criticize other allies putting\n\n00:29:02.950 --\u003e 00:29:08.750\nstep in, foolish rigid or\nwhatever the phrase is.\n\n00:29:08.750 --\u003e 00:29:12.550\nThis must encourage the Soviets\nto continue their pressure and\n\n00:29:12.550 --\u003e 00:29:15.950\nthis must create an atmosphere in which\n\n00:29:17.050 --\u003e 00:29:21.750\nthe alliance is always at its weakest\npoint just before a negotiation.\n\n00:29:22.810 --\u003e 00:29:25.759\nI think the Western Alliance\nhas an obligation.\n\n00:29:27.550 --\u003e 00:29:33.521\nI hope indeed that it will come on issues\nwhich concern the Western Alliance\n\n00:29:33.521 --\u003e 00:29:38.543\nas a whole to adopt the principle\nof having a single negotiating\n\n00:29:38.543 --\u003e 00:29:43.567\nteam with a single Chairman and\nof course representatives from\n\n00:29:43.567 --\u003e 00:29:49.281\ndifferent countries rather than\nthree different negotiating teams,\n\n00:29:52.197 --\u003e 00:29:54.680\nWith various possessions.\n\n00:29:54.680 --\u003e 00:29:59.643\nI think we can make no progress\nin the disarmament field until\n\n00:29:59.643 --\u003e 00:30:04.509\neach ally has the confidence\nthat every other ally will take\n\n00:30:04.509 --\u003e 00:30:09.610\nits interest as seriously\nas it would take its own.\n\n00:30:09.610 --\u003e 00:30:15.640\nWe do not have to station nuclear weapons\nin Maine in order to convey to the Soviets\n\n00:30:15.640 --\u003e 00:30:21.840\nthat we will resist an attack\non Maine with all the forces\n\n00:30:21.840 --\u003e 00:30:27.428\nat our disposal,\neven though Maine may be less important.\n\n00:30:27.428 --\u003e 00:30:32.790\nThen France but France does not\nhave that sense of security.\n\n00:30:32.790 --\u003e 00:30:38.068\nThe conclusion I draw is that\nthe Western Alliance has to get the sense\n\n00:30:38.068 --\u003e 00:30:43.405\nof cohesion so\nthat it thinks of itself and\n\n00:30:43.405 --\u003e 00:30:47.972\nacts as one political unit.\n\n00:30:49.060 --\u003e 00:30:54.120\nAnd that it develops appropriate\ninstitutions to make this effective.\n\n00:30:56.530 --\u003e 00:30:58.080\n\u003e\u003e End of Tape One.\n\n00:30:58.080 --\u003e 00:30:59.440\nBeginning of Tape Two.\n\n00:31:00.910 --\u003e 00:31:03.620\n\u003e\u003e We tend to be mesmerized by\n\n00:31:03.620 --\u003e 00:31:06.370\nthe Communist initiative\n\u003e\u003e But\n\n00:31:06.370 --\u003e 00:31:11.630\nit seems to me that if the vested alliance\nin its own relation to each other,\n\n00:31:11.630 --\u003e 00:31:15.880\ncan prove that it can create\na new international system\n\n00:31:15.880 --\u003e 00:31:21.220\nin which it can transcend the petty\nnationalism of the last generation or so.\n\n00:31:21.220 --\u003e 00:31:25.960\nThat this would be more of an inspiration\nto other parts of the world\n\n00:31:25.960 --\u003e 00:31:28.410\n\u003e\u003e Then all the abstract preachments,\n\n00:31:28.410 --\u003e 00:31:36.760\nindeed then all the formal economic\nprograms that we can conceive.\n\n00:31:36.760 --\u003e 00:31:40.650\nAnd one of the risks we face now,\nand I say this quite frankly,\n\n00:31:41.870 --\u003e 00:31:45.480\nwith a highly competent\nadministration it's that it may,\n\n00:31:45.480 --\u003e 00:31:49.600\nor we may not be\n\u003e\u003e Bold enough and sometimes it seems to\n\n00:31:49.600 --\u003e 00:31:54.810\nme it is easier to a big thing than\na succession of little things.\n\n00:31:56.480 --\u003e 00:31:59.810\nNow I must say But\n\n00:31:59.810 --\u003e 00:32:06.020\nI am much encouraged by the talks\nthat have been going on\n\n00:32:06.020 --\u003e 00:32:09.930\nin this direction by the implications of\nthe public statements that have been made.\n\n00:32:11.040 --\u003e 00:32:16.290\nWhat I'm expressing here does\nnot appear to simply be my idea.\n\n00:32:16.290 --\u003e 00:32:23.495\nBut it is, what I take to be the future\nand the hope of the rest of my life.\n\n00:32:26.366 --\u003e 00:32:32.731\n\u003e\u003e [APPLAUSE]\n\n00:32:32.731 --\u003e 00:32:39.906\n[INAUDIBLE]\n\n00:32:39.906 --\u003e 00:32:42.603\n\u003e\u003e Sounds like you're suggesting that\n\n00:32:42.603 --\u003e 00:32:46.000\nthey get prepared to\nfight World War II again.\n\n00:32:46.000 --\u003e 00:32:49.869\nHave we really thought this out?\n\n00:32:49.869 --\u003e 00:32:56.605\n\u003e\u003e Have I really thought it out?\n\n00:32:56.605 --\u003e 00:32:58.910\n[INAUDIBLE]\n\u003e\u003e And\n\n00:32:58.910 --\u003e 00:33:02.020\nwe had 100 division, now we have 20.\n\n00:33:02.020 --\u003e 00:33:05.710\n\u003e\u003e Well, first of all I'm not\n\n00:33:07.990 --\u003e 00:33:15.530\nsaying we should fight anymore\nif it can possibly be avoided.\n\n00:33:16.910 --\u003e 00:33:22.350\nSecondly, no war can be fought\ntoday that doesn't involve\n\n00:33:22.350 --\u003e 00:33:26.030\nthe threat of a nuclear\nwar in the background.\n\n00:33:26.030 --\u003e 00:33:28.820\nNo military past show we can adapt.\n\n00:33:28.820 --\u003e 00:33:32.310\nNothing we can say or\ndo can uninvent nuclear weapons.\n\n00:33:34.210 --\u003e 00:33:36.770\nI consider it extremely unlikely\n\n00:33:40.090 --\u003e 00:33:43.660\nthat there can be a conventional\nwar lasting four or\n\n00:33:43.660 --\u003e 00:33:48.650\nfive years, and having 100 divisions\nwith nothing else happening.\n\n00:33:50.480 --\u003e 00:33:55.710\nSo this would seem to me,\nthe most unlikely of eventualities.\n\n00:33:55.710 --\u003e 00:34:01.566\nI must say however, that I would rather\nfight World War II than World War III.\n\n00:34:01.566 --\u003e 00:34:07.570\nAnd even a World War II with 100 divisions\n\n00:34:09.300 --\u003e 00:34:13.560\nis going to be much more\ntolerable than thermonuclear bombs\n\n00:34:13.560 --\u003e 00:34:17.520\non the major cities of\nthe United States and Europe.\n\n00:34:17.520 --\u003e 00:34:21.763\n\u003e\u003e Well, I'm inclined to agree with you,\nbut I think if we are preparing for\n\n00:34:21.763 --\u003e 00:34:26.213\nthis eventuality, this means the\nmobilization based on entirely revamping\n\n00:34:26.213 --\u003e 00:34:29.168\nof our defense structure and\nof our allies I think.\n\n00:34:29.168 --\u003e 00:34:32.702\n\u003e\u003e I'm in favor of complete revamping\nof our defense structure and\n\n00:34:32.702 --\u003e 00:34:33.970\nthat of the allies.\n\n00:34:33.970 --\u003e 00:34:37.050\nWe can't do it without [INAUDIBLE]\nmilitary establishment.\n\n00:34:37.050 --\u003e 00:34:40.158\n\u003e\u003e No, I was gonna ask you I don't think\nthose 20 divisions will last very long.\n\n00:34:40.158 --\u003e 00:34:44.801\n\u003e\u003e It can't be done with present\nmilitary establishment in Europe.\n\n00:34:44.801 --\u003e 00:34:49.629\nBut what we have now is\nan uneasy compromise which is\n\n00:34:49.629 --\u003e 00:34:54.918\npartly retaliatory in nature,\npartly conventional.\n\n00:34:54.918 --\u003e 00:34:59.794\nAnd really has its major deterrent effect\nIn the fact that no one can really predict\n\n00:34:59.794 --\u003e 00:35:03.118\nwhat will happen when this\nestablishment ever gets used\n\n00:35:03.118 --\u003e 00:35:05.390\nincluding the military commanders.\n\n00:35:07.190 --\u003e 00:35:14.430\nNow, this may sound facetious, this has\na certain element of deterrence in it.\n\n00:35:14.430 --\u003e 00:35:18.600\nBecause we simply cannot guarantee to\nthe Russians, no matter what we say\n\n00:35:18.600 --\u003e 00:35:23.650\nthat everything won't blow up if fighting\non a substantial scale in Europe starts.\n\n00:35:24.670 --\u003e 00:35:29.040\nOn the other hand, I think this is\na rather irresponsible political posture,\n\n00:35:29.040 --\u003e 00:35:32.790\nwhich in the long run will\ndemoralize the countries concerned.\n\n00:35:32.790 --\u003e 00:35:36.380\nNow, as we get tighter political\ncontrol over these weapons,\n\n00:35:36.380 --\u003e 00:35:40.410\nwe then get into the position where they\nmay be willing to run greater risks.\n\n00:35:41.560 --\u003e 00:35:45.180\nAnd then we will automatically be forced\ninto revamping the establishment.\n\n00:35:45.180 --\u003e 00:35:50.459\nBut your question, if we want to\nkeep our present defense levels\n\n00:35:50.459 --\u003e 00:35:56.837\nin the absence of disarmament agreement,\nwe cannot do what I've proposed.\n\n00:35:56.837 --\u003e 00:36:02.840\nWhat I proposed requires\na substantial increase\n\n00:36:02.840 --\u003e 00:36:07.350\nin the part of allied forces,\na substantial increase in ally cohesion.\n\n00:36:09.560 --\u003e 00:36:13.932\nAnd it is not merely an adaptation\nof the existing views.\n\n00:36:13.932 --\u003e 00:36:18.932\n\u003e\u003e It is not like [INAUDIBLE] money but\nmen their blood they might [INAUDIBLE]\n\n00:36:18.932 --\u003e 00:36:24.708\nto get the charge open again [INAUDIBLE]\nexpending their blood to save our cities.\n\n00:36:24.708 --\u003e 00:36:29.972\n\u003e\u003e If the Belgians and\nFrench in 1914 had said that they\n\n00:36:29.972 --\u003e 00:36:36.030\nwould fight only if Britain would\nbe as devastated as they were.\n\n00:36:37.820 --\u003e 00:36:42.890\nThey wouldn't have been defended,\nyou're quite right this\n\n00:36:42.890 --\u003e 00:36:47.780\nis one of the that's already\nbeen made in Germany.\n\n00:36:47.780 --\u003e 00:36:50.509\nI think it's based on\na misunderstanding of nuclear wars\n\n00:36:50.509 --\u003e 00:36:52.920\nloses [INAUDIBLE] many\nmen in big nuclear war.\n\n00:36:52.920 --\u003e 00:36:54.799\nThey lose more men in a big nuclear war.\n\n00:36:55.880 --\u003e 00:36:58.850\nThen they would in most\nconceivable conventional wars.\n\n00:36:58.850 --\u003e 00:37:04.030\n\u003e\u003e Well some of the hope have\nbeen [INAUDIBLE] in the middle?\n\n00:37:04.030 --\u003e 00:37:09.768\n\u003e\u003e Well but the fallout, but\nthe wind goes from West to East.\n\n00:37:09.768 --\u003e 00:37:11.842\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e From East to West.\n\n00:37:11.842 --\u003e 00:37:14.259\n\u003e\u003e Vaporize the Northern Hemisphere, but\n\n00:37:14.259 --\u003e 00:37:18.960\nthey have the ocean between us and the\nrest of it is blowing over toward Russia.\n\n00:37:18.960 --\u003e 00:37:20.744\n\u003e\u003e Yes, this is quite true.\n\n00:37:20.744 --\u003e 00:37:25.759\nIf the concern of every ally is\nto adopt that military policy\n\n00:37:25.759 --\u003e 00:37:31.379\nwhich shifts the devastation into\nthe territory of another ally,\n\n00:37:31.379 --\u003e 00:37:35.250\nthen the alliance is gonna split up.\n\n00:37:35.250 --\u003e 00:37:37.780\n\u003e\u003e Under pressure, this usually happens.\n\n00:37:37.780 --\u003e 00:37:41.055\nI remember in 1940,\nwhen they were closing in Dunkirk and\n\n00:37:41.055 --\u003e 00:37:43.729\nGordon got orders to withdraw\nto Dunkirk and to England.\n\n00:37:43.729 --\u003e 00:37:48.401\nThe French got orders to try to break\nthrough the Southern France and\n\n00:37:48.401 --\u003e 00:37:50.447\n[INAUDIBLE] both decided to quit.\n\n00:37:50.447 --\u003e 00:37:57.820\n\u003e\u003e If the pressure in an alliance\nbecomes too great this, this can happen.\n\n00:37:57.820 --\u003e 00:37:59.224\nBut if this happens,\n\n00:37:59.224 --\u003e 00:38:05.300\nthen what we will see is a multiplication\nof national nuclear establishments.\n\n00:38:05.300 --\u003e 00:38:08.319\nA gradual weakening of the alliance,\n\n00:38:08.319 --\u003e 00:38:13.517\nbecause every ally will think it\ncan protect itself on it's own.\n\n00:38:13.517 --\u003e 00:38:18.213\nThere will not be any reasonable\ndisarmament negotiations because you have\n\n00:38:18.213 --\u003e 00:38:21.280\ntoo many national nuclear establishments.\n\n00:38:21.280 --\u003e 00:38:23.030\nThat's the other price.\n\n00:38:23.030 --\u003e 00:38:27.070\nI'm not saying that what I'm proposing\nit doesn't have great complexities.\n\n00:38:27.070 --\u003e 00:38:28.520\n\u003e\u003e No, I wasn't disagreeing with you,\n\n00:38:28.520 --\u003e 00:38:30.715\nwhich has happened too many\ntimes on these panels.\n\n00:38:30.715 --\u003e 00:38:35.276\nWhat I really want to draw the point\nof this as a major change and\n\n00:38:35.276 --\u003e 00:38:37.310\nit involves men and money.\n\n00:38:37.310 --\u003e 00:38:41.622\n\u003e\u003e It involves men and money and\na major political realignment.\n\n00:38:41.622 --\u003e 00:38:42.193\n\u003e\u003e Right.\n\n00:38:42.193 --\u003e 00:38:46.868\n\u003e\u003e One way to prevent the kind of\nbreakup that occurred at Dunkirk is\n\n00:38:46.868 --\u003e 00:38:51.719\nreally by the method which Churchill\nproposed too late, namely,\n\n00:38:51.719 --\u003e 00:38:55.630\na political union between\nGreat Britain and France.\n\n00:38:57.780 --\u003e 00:39:01.530\nNow, if the alliance began to\nthink of itself as a unit,\n\n00:39:02.790 --\u003e 00:39:08.810\nthe possibility of secession would still\nexist, but it would be much minimized.\n\n00:39:08.810 --\u003e 00:39:11.900\n\u003e\u003e When you get to the point of trust\nwhich you mentioned in the association\n\n00:39:11.900 --\u003e 00:39:13.880\nwith the Russians,\nwe don't quite trust the British or\n\n00:39:13.880 --\u003e 00:39:16.800\nthey trust us enough to have\na political union at this time.\n\n00:39:18.220 --\u003e 00:39:21.267\n\u003e\u003e Well a British friend\nof mine said to me.\n\n00:39:21.267 --\u003e 00:39:25.628\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e [INAUDIBLE]\n\n00:39:25.628 --\u003e 00:39:28.625\n\u003e\u003e Class, I'll let him answer but\n\n00:39:28.625 --\u003e 00:39:32.510\nI want to, one British friend said to me,\n\n00:39:32.510 --\u003e 00:39:36.628\nno annihilation without representation.\n\n00:39:36.628 --\u003e 00:39:42.134\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e He just added to provide,\n\n00:39:42.134 --\u003e 00:39:44.659\nin fact he was a Labor party member.\n\n00:39:44.659 --\u003e 00:39:48.374\nHe said he was strongly in favor\nof Britain joining the Union,\n\n00:39:48.374 --\u003e 00:39:52.910\nwhat he really meant was to reverse\nthe error of the 18th century.\n\n00:39:52.910 --\u003e 00:39:55.975\nBut that they would insist on\naccounting for at least 15 states.\n\n00:39:55.975 --\u003e 00:39:59.090\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e Well,\n\n00:39:59.090 --\u003e 00:40:01.880\nI think we'd be willing to give this a try\n\n00:40:03.170 --\u003e 00:40:07.639\nAll our not only present prime minister-\n\u003e\u003e Can we take it this is an official\n\n00:40:07.639 --\u003e 00:40:08.178\nstatement?\n\n00:40:08.178 --\u003e 00:40:12.915\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e You will have to read all\n\n00:40:12.915 --\u003e 00:40:16.605\nthis in the light of statements\nby higher authority.\n\n00:40:16.605 --\u003e 00:40:21.423\nBut I think Mr.\nMcMillan has spoken enough about\n\n00:40:21.423 --\u003e 00:40:26.958\ninterdependence and\nunity in the Atlantic community.\n\n00:40:26.958 --\u003e 00:40:31.917\nTo make it clear that he is in favor\nof some closer form of association\n\n00:40:31.917 --\u003e 00:40:33.750\nthan we have at present.\n\n00:40:33.750 --\u003e 00:40:38.380\nAnd he, having been credited\napproval by Dr. Kissinger.\n\n00:40:38.380 --\u003e 00:40:43.766\nIt would be ungracious\nof me to take issue with\n\n00:40:43.766 --\u003e 00:40:48.602\nhim at any point, substantial points.\n\n00:40:48.602 --\u003e 00:40:57.041\nOn the military side it seems to me\nthat whatever the reasons were for\n\n00:40:57.041 --\u003e 00:41:03.120\nour developing a separate\nnuclear capability.\n\n00:41:03.120 --\u003e 00:41:10.722\nWe have it and it is a contribution\nto the western deterrent.\n\n00:41:10.722 --\u003e 00:41:13.856\nWhether or not,\nwe would hope we would not,\n\n00:41:13.856 --\u003e 00:41:19.128\never be faced with the decision of\nwhether or not to use it independently.\n\n00:41:19.128 --\u003e 00:41:25.717\nBut it does bring about a desirable\ndispersal in the deterrent forces.\n\n00:41:25.717 --\u003e 00:41:31.173\nAnd we like to think, although it is a bit\nexpensive and increasingly expensive.\n\n00:41:31.173 --\u003e 00:41:36.619\nThat we are able to get fairly close\ntowards our goals in conventional forces,\n\n00:41:36.619 --\u003e 00:41:38.260\nas well.\n\n00:41:38.260 --\u003e 00:41:44.941\nWhich, without wishing to\ncriticize our French allies,\n\n00:41:44.941 --\u003e 00:41:49.178\nis perhaps not the case with France.\n\n00:41:49.178 --\u003e 00:41:54.808\nBut the military field\nis such a complex one,\n\n00:41:54.808 --\u003e 00:41:58.817\nand I don't think the studies.\n\n00:41:58.817 --\u003e 00:42:02.703\nUnless President Kennedy's statement\nyesterday indicated the combination\n\n00:42:02.703 --\u003e 00:42:03.240\nof these.\n\n00:42:03.240 --\u003e 00:42:06.276\nI don't think they have\nbeen fully carried through.\n\n00:42:06.276 --\u003e 00:42:10.690\nI think Mr. Atchison is still\nworking with his group and\n\n00:42:10.690 --\u003e 00:42:13.170\nNATO is still studying the question.\n\n00:42:13.170 --\u003e 00:42:18.710\nIn our view, obviously, the deterrent\nhas to be brought up to date.\n\n00:42:18.710 --\u003e 00:42:22.225\nBut perhaps the balance\nbetween nuclear and\n\n00:42:22.225 --\u003e 00:42:27.280\nconventional forces at the moment\nis approximately correct.\n\n00:42:27.280 --\u003e 00:42:29.220\nHowever, there are these other fields,\n\n00:42:29.220 --\u003e 00:42:33.650\nthe political one, well undoubtedly\nthat has been less consultation.\n\n00:42:34.730 --\u003e 00:42:39.859\nAnd you intimated, and\nit's desirable to consider,\n\n00:42:39.859 --\u003e 00:42:44.776\nbut we certainly agree more\nmust be done about that.\n\n00:42:44.776 --\u003e 00:42:49.314\nIf one desires to strike a posture\nwhich will be agreeable to\n\n00:42:49.314 --\u003e 00:42:52.781\nthe uncommitted countries, for instance.\n\n00:42:52.781 --\u003e 00:42:56.450\nIn the United Nations on colonial\nquestions, that kind of thing.\n\n00:42:56.450 --\u003e 00:42:59.892\nIt would be desirable to\nhave them clear the ground,\n\n00:42:59.892 --\u003e 00:43:03.268\nperhaps within the western\nalliance beforehand.\n\n00:43:03.268 --\u003e 00:43:04.401\nI'm not saying this doesn't happen.\n\n00:43:04.401 --\u003e 00:43:10.549\nBut it is a desirable custom to follow.\n\n00:43:10.549 --\u003e 00:43:16.097\nAnd there is lastly\nthe economic filed of which Mr.\n\n00:43:16.097 --\u003e 00:43:20.106\nMcMillan spoke at MIT the other day.\n\n00:43:20.106 --\u003e 00:43:22.161\nThere is a great deal to be done there.\n\n00:43:22.161 --\u003e 00:43:27.771\nAs Dr. Kissinger said, the situation\nis that you have a monolithic and\n\n00:43:27.771 --\u003e 00:43:32.835\ncentrally controlled system\nfacing you on the communist side.\n\n00:43:32.835 --\u003e 00:43:37.822\nAnd at this stage of the game they\nare putting everything into developing\n\n00:43:37.822 --\u003e 00:43:39.793\ntheir economic potential.\n\n00:43:39.793 --\u003e 00:43:42.790\nWe can't afford to dissipate ours and\n\n00:43:42.790 --\u003e 00:43:48.512\nwe need to increase the wealth of\nthe nations, of the Western Alliance.\n\n00:43:48.512 --\u003e 00:43:53.891\nWhen you have economic divisions as you\nhave at the moment between the six and\n\n00:43:53.891 --\u003e 00:43:57.432\nthe seven,\nthis is not an ideal state of affairs.\n\n00:43:57.432 --\u003e 00:44:03.240\nAnd we hope fervently that something can\nbe done to have an accommodation there.\n\n00:44:04.450 --\u003e 00:44:08.761\nThe OECD is another fruitful field for\n\n00:44:08.761 --\u003e 00:44:12.816\ncoordinating economic policies.\n\n00:44:12.816 --\u003e 00:44:17.301\nAnd not least is the field of trade.\n\n00:44:17.301 --\u003e 00:44:19.566\nWhich after all is what creates wealth.\n\n00:44:19.566 --\u003e 00:44:22.890\nAnd we would hope from\nthe British angle that.\n\n00:44:22.890 --\u003e 00:44:28.440\nNow that the American balance of payments\nseems to be in slightly healthier shape.\n\n00:44:28.440 --\u003e 00:44:35.096\nMore can be done by way of freeing\ntrade across the Atlantic.\n\n00:44:35.096 --\u003e 00:44:39.532\nI've noticed,\nI think I'm right in detecting in what Mr.\n\n00:44:39.532 --\u003e 00:44:41.670\nKissinger has said before.\n\n00:44:41.670 --\u003e 00:44:46.241\nA suggestion that\nthe United States might be able to\n\n00:44:46.241 --\u003e 00:44:51.146\nconsider some [INAUDIBLE]\nfrom national sovereignty.\n\n00:44:51.146 --\u003e 00:44:54.317\nTo bring about greater\nunity in their lives.\n\n00:44:54.317 --\u003e 00:44:58.033\nAnd I would be very interested\nto know what sort of concessions\n\n00:44:58.033 --\u003e 00:44:59.825\nhe thinks might be feasible.\n\n00:44:59.825 --\u003e 00:45:03.167\nI would hope trade would\nbe a possible field, but\n\n00:45:03.167 --\u003e 00:45:06.272\nare there more spectacular political ones?\n\n00:45:16.103 --\u003e 00:45:21.439\n\u003e\u003e Before I give my sketchy\nideas on this I'd like to point\n\n00:45:21.439 --\u003e 00:45:27.590\nout that even if you find my\nparticular ideas unsatisfactory.\n\n00:45:27.590 --\u003e 00:45:31.971\nThat doesn't mean that,\nas painful as this is for me to admit it,\n\n00:45:31.971 --\u003e 00:45:34.212\nthat better ideas may not exist.\n\n00:45:34.212 --\u003e 00:45:36.605\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e Because I think,\n\n00:45:36.605 --\u003e 00:45:41.483\nif President Kennedy put\nthe some 20 odd thousand men\n\n00:45:41.483 --\u003e 00:45:46.689\nworking in antiseptic splendor\nin the State Department.\n\n00:45:46.689 --\u003e 00:45:52.321\nTo work on the problem of\nhow to produce greater unity\n\n00:45:52.321 --\u003e 00:45:59.750\nthat they might do better than\nan individual, a Harvard professor.\n\n00:45:59.750 --\u003e 00:46:03.186\nAlthough in my heart of hearts,\nI don't really believe that.\n\n00:46:03.186 --\u003e 00:46:06.450\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH]\n\u003e\u003e [COUGH] Now,\n\n00:46:06.450 --\u003e 00:46:12.879\nI have indicated a few directions.\n\n00:46:12.879 --\u003e 00:46:16.767\nTo pick up the point of Mr. [INAUDIBLE].\n\n00:46:16.767 --\u003e 00:46:22.245\n[COUGH] I think that this so called\nsplit between the six and the seven.\n\n00:46:22.245 --\u003e 00:46:27.452\nThat we could contribute to\nhealing this by ourselves,\n\n00:46:27.452 --\u003e 00:46:30.674\ntaking steps towards free trade.\n\n00:46:30.674 --\u003e 00:46:33.688\nAnd I would think, my guess would be.\n\n00:46:33.688 --\u003e 00:46:38.521\nThat Great Britain would always be willing\nto take any step towards Europe that we\n\n00:46:38.521 --\u003e 00:46:39.880\nare prepared to take.\n\n00:46:39.880 --\u003e 00:46:44.890\nAnd probably be prepared\nto go beyond where\n\n00:46:44.890 --\u003e 00:46:50.046\nwe are prepared to go if\nwe had in the direct.\n\n00:46:50.046 --\u003e 00:46:58.568\nSecondly, I think on negotiations\nthat affect the alliance as a whole.\n\n00:46:58.568 --\u003e 00:47:02.848\nThe alliance ought to negotiate\nas a unit rather than as\n\n00:47:02.848 --\u003e 00:47:05.740\nseparate national sovereignties.\n\n00:47:05.740 --\u003e 00:47:08.427\nI think when the Berlin\nissue comes up again,\n\n00:47:08.427 --\u003e 00:47:10.626\nthe issue of Germany comes up again.\n\n00:47:10.626 --\u003e 00:47:15.576\nIt would be much better for\nthere to be one negotiating team,\n\n00:47:15.576 --\u003e 00:47:18.595\nI think, on regional disarmament.\n\n00:47:18.595 --\u003e 00:47:25.397\nI would prefer to see one negotiating\nteam rather than groups of it.\n\n00:47:25.397 --\u003e 00:47:28.800\nSecondly, I think that the alliance\nmight well ask itself,\n\n00:47:28.800 --\u003e 00:47:30.276\nwhere it would like to be.\n\n00:47:30.276 --\u003e 00:47:33.500\nNot so much as a military alliance but\n\n00:47:33.500 --\u003e 00:47:37.460\nas a community over a five\nto ten year period.\n\n00:47:37.460 --\u003e 00:47:42.492\nAnd on a number of issues,\ngive up a degree of\n\n00:47:42.492 --\u003e 00:47:49.569\nsovereignty either to a steering\ncommittee of the alliance.\n\n00:47:49.569 --\u003e 00:47:55.181\nOne can invent almost unlimited numbers\nof schemes in this direction and\n\n00:47:55.181 --\u003e 00:47:58.864\nit might be wise to begin\nin restricted fields.\n\n00:48:04.100 --\u003e 00:48:08.583\nOn the model of how European unity was\n\n00:48:08.583 --\u003e 00:48:12.926\npromoted from the 1950's on.\n\n00:48:12.926 --\u003e 00:48:19.160\nWhere it seems to me that this is\nthe direction in which we might go.\n\n00:48:19.160 --\u003e 00:48:25.600\nIf for example on this military question,\n\n00:48:25.600 --\u003e 00:48:30.980\nwe established a system, by which\nsome kind of qualified majority of\n\n00:48:30.980 --\u003e 00:48:34.890\nthe alliance could make some\nof the fundamental decisions.\n\n00:48:34.890 --\u003e 00:48:41.170\nAnd then no individual nations would\nagree not to withdraw their forces.\n\n00:48:41.170 --\u003e 00:48:44.481\nExcept with the approval of this majority,\n\n00:48:44.481 --\u003e 00:48:49.132\nthis would already be a step\ntowards a kind of confederation,\n\n00:48:49.132 --\u003e 00:48:53.873\nremoving one of the great fears\nthat some of our European allies\n\n00:48:53.873 --\u003e 00:48:58.809\nhave that in times of crisis we\nmight not be there to support them.\n\n00:48:58.809 --\u003e 00:49:05.315\nGreat Britain, in fact,\nhas done this with respect to his force,\n\n00:49:05.315 --\u003e 00:49:11.030\nsay on the continent, and\nI think this could be extended.\n\n00:49:11.030 --\u003e 00:49:15.090\nMy limited experience in government\nhas indicated this to me.\n\n00:49:15.090 --\u003e 00:49:19.020\nThat if you ask the bureaucracy\nto come up with a proposal\n\n00:49:19.020 --\u003e 00:49:21.820\nthey will find 500 reasons\nwhy things wont work.\n\n00:49:23.280 --\u003e 00:49:28.585\nBecause they'll only get into difficulties\nand they don't foresee a risk.\n\n00:49:28.585 --\u003e 00:49:33.810\nFor a major departure, the political\nleadership has to take the responsibility,\n\n00:49:33.810 --\u003e 00:49:37.260\nand if they indicate this\nis the way we want the go,\n\n00:49:37.260 --\u003e 00:49:42.430\nthe bureaucracy would be very\ningenious in coming up with schemes.\n\n00:49:42.430 --\u003e 00:49:46.516\nTo defend it and the marching orders\nthat I think should be given to\n\n00:49:46.516 --\u003e 00:49:51.126\nthe bureaucracies of the western\ncountries is to move towards an Atlantic\n\n00:49:51.126 --\u003e 00:49:55.167\nconfederation and then let's see\nwhat they might come up with.\n\n00:49:55.167 --\u003e 00:50:00.220\n\u003e\u003e One aspect of the question\nwhich we haven't yet addressed\n\n00:50:00.220 --\u003e 00:50:05.904\nourselves to is the effectiveness\nof NATO outside the NATO area.\n\n00:50:05.904 --\u003e 00:50:10.562\nYou always felt that NATO has certain\nbuilt in limitations in operating\n\n00:50:10.562 --\u003e 00:50:12.969\neffectively outside this area, and\n\n00:50:12.969 --\u003e 00:50:19.720\nparticularly in other countries where NATO\nis, A) looked upon as a military alliance.\n\n00:50:19.720 --\u003e 00:50:25.410\nAnd B) looked upon as a kind of\nconfederation of the white man.\n\n00:50:25.410 --\u003e 00:50:30.820\nYou may recall a publication of the\nmid-century series Rockefeller Foundation\n\n00:50:30.820 --\u003e 00:50:35.515\nin which they, looking at the long,\nlong range of foreign policy\n\n00:50:35.515 --\u003e 00:50:41.540\ndevelopments see as one of the most\nmenacing long-range conflicts.\n\n00:50:41.540 --\u003e 00:50:43.510\nA world divided on color lines.\n\n00:50:44.820 --\u003e 00:50:49.570\nNow, I think these questions\ncan be asked without in any way\n\n00:50:49.570 --\u003e 00:50:55.210\ndeprecating the importance of the NATO and\nthe Atlantic Community alliance.\n\n00:50:55.210 --\u003e 00:50:59.354\nBut I do think that in judging\nthe usefulness of NATO,\n\n00:50:59.354 --\u003e 00:51:03.959\nwe ought to realize that it\nprobably has some parameters And\n\n00:51:03.959 --\u003e 00:51:09.044\nI wondered what your views might\nbe on some of these limitations.\n\n00:51:09.044 --\u003e 00:51:13.837\n\u003e\u003e Let first say I worry about\nthis mid-century series because I\n\n00:51:13.837 --\u003e 00:51:18.353\nwrote a considerable portion\nof these reports myself, so\n\n00:51:18.353 --\u003e 00:51:22.976\nthat I can't really disagree\nwith what you've just said.\n\n00:51:27.260 --\u003e 00:51:36.200\nIt is a real problem that the world\nmay be split along color lines.\n\n00:51:36.200 --\u003e 00:51:41.680\nI think, however,\nthat greater union in the West,\n\n00:51:41.680 --\u003e 00:51:44.400\nis not inconsistent with\n\n00:51:46.760 --\u003e 00:51:50.750\ngreater dynamism with relation to\nthe underdeveloped nations and\n\n00:51:50.750 --\u003e 00:51:55.299\nwith relations to some of\nthe colored nations of the world.\n\n00:51:55.299 --\u003e 00:52:00.464\nI don't believe that it is that we\n\n00:52:00.464 --\u003e 00:52:06.190\ngain long-term credit with\nthe underdeveloped nations\n\n00:52:06.190 --\u003e 00:52:11.420\nby consistently supporting them\nagainst our closest friends.\n\n00:52:11.420 --\u003e 00:52:16.350\nBy this,\nI don't necessarily mean Portugal but\n\n00:52:16.350 --\u003e 00:52:20.890\nI do mean countries like Great Britain and\nFrance, and\n\n00:52:20.890 --\u003e 00:52:27.050\nI would do my utmost to\nuse our influence for\n\n00:52:27.050 --\u003e 00:52:31.730\nmoderate policy within the alliance,\nin the direction of independence.\n\n00:52:31.730 --\u003e 00:52:40.330\nRather than the kind of grandstand plays\nwhich we pursued on several occasions.\n\n00:52:40.330 --\u003e 00:52:44.350\nWhile I didn't like the British\naction in Suez, I was sick about\n\n00:52:44.350 --\u003e 00:52:50.090\nthe self-righteousness with which we\nbehaved, with which we behaved afterwards.\n\n00:52:50.090 --\u003e 00:52:52.770\nBut this is a different question now.\n\n00:52:52.770 --\u003e 00:52:57.900\nIf we move in the direction of\ngreater confederation with Europe,\n\n00:52:57.900 --\u003e 00:53:03.763\nwe should at the same time use this\nconfederation through other instruments\n\n00:53:03.763 --\u003e 00:53:08.891\nthan NATO like the OECD to spur\nthe development of the new nations,\n\n00:53:08.891 --\u003e 00:53:10.447\nperhaps at a scale,\n\n00:53:10.447 --\u003e 00:53:15.602\ncertainly at a scale considerably\nbeyond what we have been doing.\n\n00:53:18.460 --\u003e 00:53:21.090\nAnd it's partly up to\nthe other nations also.\n\n00:53:21.090 --\u003e 00:53:23.870\nWe cannot be the only ones\n\n00:53:23.870 --\u003e 00:53:28.000\nthat have the duty to prevent the split\nof the world along color lines.\n\n00:53:28.000 --\u003e 00:53:34.400\nWe are not making this\narrangement against anyone else.\n\n00:53:34.400 --\u003e 00:53:38.200\nWe should show sympathy and compassion and\nsupport for the other nations.\n\n00:53:39.330 --\u003e 00:53:43.859\nBut I think the new nations have\na certain responsibility themselves.\n\n00:53:45.160 --\u003e 00:53:50.590\nNot to permit a split of the world\nstrictly along color lines.\n\n00:53:50.590 --\u003e 00:53:54.980\nI would agree, however, that there\nare parameters here and that not all\n\n00:53:54.980 --\u003e 00:54:00.090\nthe problems of the world can be solved\nsimply by creating an Atlantic community.\n\n00:54:00.090 --\u003e 00:54:03.220\n\u003e\u003e I was going to raise a question or two,\n\n00:54:03.220 --\u003e 00:54:07.519\nwhich perhaps in the immediate sense I\nwould consider somewhat more fundamental.\n\n00:54:08.970 --\u003e 00:54:14.850\nPersonally I don't think NATO is very\nimportant, you know I'm not against it,\n\n00:54:14.850 --\u003e 00:54:20.050\nit's all right maybe, but it seems\nto me it raises some real problems.\n\n00:54:20.050 --\u003e 00:54:23.579\n\u003e\u003e [LAUGH].\n\u003e\u003e Now the purpose NATO is of course to,\n\n00:54:23.579 --\u003e 00:54:28.080\nas I understand it,\nto defend Western Europe.\n\n00:54:29.360 --\u003e 00:54:32.823\nThe question then arises is\nWestern Europe threatened?\n\n00:54:32.823 --\u003e 00:54:34.106\nAnd if so, by whom?\n\n00:54:34.106 --\u003e 00:54:37.230\nObviously if it's threatened,\nit's threatened by the Soviet Union.\n\n00:54:37.230 --\u003e 00:54:43.091\nI have seen no indication of Soviet Union\nthreatens Western Europe and\n\n00:54:43.091 --\u003e 00:54:50.620\nI don't think it does assuming, however,\nthat it did threaten Western Europe.\n\n00:54:50.620 --\u003e 00:54:53.990\nThen the question arises is\nto what role NATO would play.\n\n00:54:56.570 --\u003e 00:55:01.300\nThere's been some talk about some\nkind of ground forces being involved.\n\n00:55:01.300 --\u003e 00:55:04.150\nIf NATO has any strength now,\n\n00:55:04.150 --\u003e 00:55:07.410\nit seems to me it's because of\nthe American participation in it.\n\n00:55:07.410 --\u003e 00:55:13.840\nAlthough the Germans are quite coming\nup fast on the outside as they say.\n\n00:55:13.840 --\u003e 00:55:17.500\nAside from that I don't\nthink it has any support.\n\n00:55:17.500 --\u003e 00:55:22.940\nIf one speaks about the continental\ncountries, for example France, or\n\n00:55:22.940 --\u003e 00:55:26.580\ncountries on the periphery of\nthe continent, for example Great Britain.\n\n00:55:26.580 --\u003e 00:55:31.060\nThe contribution of the ground\nforces in NATO is not very great.\n\n00:55:31.060 --\u003e 00:55:32.580\nThey've been occupied elsewhere,\n\n00:55:32.580 --\u003e 00:55:35.610\nthey've been on the process of\ndecreasing rather than increasing.\n\n00:55:36.950 --\u003e 00:55:41.610\nAnd furthermore, I'm not at all\nsure if one looks at France for\n\n00:55:41.610 --\u003e 00:55:46.520\nexample, with its long age-old,\nenmity for the Germans.\n\n00:55:48.120 --\u003e 00:55:52.752\nAnd one looks at the amount of\nresistance which the French\n\n00:55:52.752 --\u003e 00:55:57.105\nput up in the face of\nthe German invasion in 1940.\n\n00:55:57.105 --\u003e 00:56:01.800\nI'm not at all sure that the French\nwould participate in a In\n\n00:56:01.800 --\u003e 00:56:06.480\na war involving the Soviet Union\nin effective extend.\n\n00:56:06.480 --\u003e 00:56:10.820\nBut I don't think that is very\nsignificant anyway, because I can't\n\n00:56:10.820 --\u003e 00:56:14.850\nconceive possibly the Soviet Union\nassuming it wanted the threat,\n\n00:56:14.850 --\u003e 00:56:18.790\nassuming it did threaten the Western\nEurope and it intended to invade it.\n\n00:56:18.790 --\u003e 00:56:23.434\nThat it would invade it with\nits armed forces unless it was\n\n00:56:23.434 --\u003e 00:56:26.734\nvery serious now, about an all out war.\n\n00:56:26.734 --\u003e 00:56:29.583\nAnd if it were very serious\nabout an all out war,\n\n00:56:29.583 --\u003e 00:56:34.359\nI can't imagine that the Soviet Union\nwould simply send its ground forces let us\n\n00:56:34.359 --\u003e 00:56:37.567\nsay from Eastern Germany and\nfrom Czechoslovakia and\n\n00:56:37.567 --\u003e 00:56:40.219\nother places rolling into Western Europe.\n\n00:56:40.219 --\u003e 00:56:44.956\nWhile if missile people went on\nvacation to the Black Sea, for\n\n00:56:44.956 --\u003e 00:56:50.345\nexample, not at all, I think they\nwill be employed simultaneously.\n\n00:56:50.345 --\u003e 00:56:54.987\nBut let's suppose that were not the case,\nlet's suppose the Russian thought well for\n\n00:56:54.987 --\u003e 00:56:57.340\nfirst place,\nwe can take Western Europe but\n\n00:56:57.340 --\u003e 00:56:59.895\nwithout getting involved\nin some nuclear war.\n\n00:56:59.895 --\u003e 00:57:01.140\nThen what would happen?\n\n00:57:01.140 --\u003e 00:57:05.390\nPresumably, NATO forces,\nAmerican expeditionary forces,\n\n00:57:05.390 --\u003e 00:57:06.940\nall other kinds would involve them.\n\n00:57:06.940 --\u003e 00:57:09.651\nLet us say, NATO is build up and\nif we're gonna have it,\n\n00:57:09.651 --\u003e 00:57:13.488\nI would agree with Mr Kissinger, it\nshould build up its conventional forces.\n\n00:57:13.488 --\u003e 00:57:17.250\nSo it would engage the Russians and\nthen it would give them pause, or\n\n00:57:17.250 --\u003e 00:57:19.633\nwhatever it is that General Norstad said.\n\n00:57:19.633 --\u003e 00:57:22.030\nAnd then what?\n\n00:57:22.030 --\u003e 00:57:25.229\nPresumably, then the Russians\nsend in some more forces.\n\n00:57:25.229 --\u003e 00:57:27.480\nThe Kremlin says, don't pause, move on.\n\n00:57:27.480 --\u003e 00:57:31.930\nSo NATO steps its force then and\nthe Russians step up theirs,\n\n00:57:31.930 --\u003e 00:57:36.430\nnow at some point, I would assume no\nlonger are we going to be involved and\n\n00:57:36.430 --\u003e 00:57:37.360\nground forces are.\n\n00:57:37.360 --\u003e 00:57:40.630\nObviously, this is involved with\nthis escalated thing which everybody\n\n00:57:40.630 --\u003e 00:57:41.249\nknows about.\n\n00:57:42.270 --\u003e 00:57:47.107\nBut I don't see how really that\nthis has very much to do with NATO\n\n00:57:47.107 --\u003e 00:57:50.666\nas a defensive force\nagainst Western Europe,\n\n00:57:50.666 --\u003e 00:57:54.974\nagainst the Soviet Union as\nfar as Western Europe goes.\n\n00:57:54.974 --\u003e 00:57:59.834\nAnd if there were to be, if there were\nto be some kind of a defense which in\n\n00:57:59.834 --\u003e 00:58:03.398\nthe event of a war being\nstarted by the Soviet Union,\n\n00:58:03.398 --\u003e 00:58:09.770\nI think the concept of defense of Western\nEurope would be meaningless, in that case.\n\n00:58:09.770 --\u003e 00:58:13.730\nIt seemed to me it would come because\nof American deterrent capacity.\n\n00:58:13.730 --\u003e 00:58:17.690\nNow, while we had deterrent capacity,\nwe said this was the reason the Russians\n\n00:58:17.690 --\u003e 00:58:22.575\ndidn't attack Western Europe\nbecause we had deterrent capacity.\n\n00:58:22.575 --\u003e 00:58:25.150\nAnd then pretty soon it\nseemed that we no longer\n\n00:58:25.150 --\u003e 00:58:28.920\nhad the deterrent capacity at least\nwe didn't out deter the Russians.\n\n00:58:30.010 --\u003e 00:58:33.030\nAnd then still the attack didn't come.\n\n00:58:33.030 --\u003e 00:58:36.060\nI recall at various at NATO meetings.\n\n00:58:36.060 --\u003e 00:58:38.700\nThere had both been\na series of target dates.\n\n00:58:38.700 --\u003e 00:58:44.305\nNATO must have a force in being capable of\nresisting a Soviet invasion by such and\n\n00:58:44.305 --\u003e 00:58:47.161\nsuch a date or catastrophe will result.\n\n00:58:47.161 --\u003e 00:58:54.246\nThe date I think has been 51,\n52, 53, 54, 55, 56 and so on.\n\n00:58:54.246 --\u003e 00:58:59.329\nIt seems to me that in terms of\na military defense of Western Europe,\n\n00:58:59.329 --\u003e 00:59:01.130\nNATO wasn't any good.\n\n00:59:01.130 --\u003e 00:59:06.260\nAnd furthermore, I can conceive that\nit might have a lot of dangers.\n\n00:59:06.260 --\u003e 00:59:07.350\nI'm not thinking of,\n\n00:59:08.500 --\u003e 00:59:11.360\nespecially if we get a thermonuclear\nweapon which the Lord forbid.\n\n00:59:13.020 --\u003e 00:59:15.650\nI'm not thinking so\nmuch of any field being and\n\n00:59:15.650 --\u003e 00:59:20.030\naggressive force by itself but\nthe question arises as to, how long,\n\n00:59:20.030 --\u003e 00:59:25.340\nfor example, the United States is going\nto have its own forces in Western Europe?\n\n00:59:25.340 --\u003e 00:59:29.820\nAre we going to have them in Western\nEurope 10 years, 50 years, 100 years?\n\n00:59:29.820 --\u003e 00:59:32.340\nAt some point if the war lasts,\ndo we succeed,\n\n00:59:32.340 --\u003e 00:59:34.690\ndo we consider ourselves withdrawing them?\n\n00:59:34.690 --\u003e 00:59:37.950\nAnd whether we do or not, I think the\nquestion arises as to who dominates, or\n\n00:59:37.950 --\u003e 00:59:39.580\nwho will dominate an APO?\n\n00:59:39.580 --\u003e 00:59:42.230\nAnd I should say very clearly,\nit was going to be the Germans.\n\n00:59:42.230 --\u003e 00:59:45.720\nAnd I was on a panel with a distinguished\nGerman representative from the council\n\n00:59:45.720 --\u003e 00:59:47.050\nin Boston this morning.\n\n00:59:47.050 --\u003e 00:59:49.286\nAnd we were talking about\nthe Oder–Neisse line.\n\n00:59:49.286 --\u003e 00:59:54.308\nAnd he made it very clear that it was\nplaced where the Germans were not going\n\n00:59:54.308 --\u003e 00:59:59.412\nto recognize the present German-Polish\nboundary because of the enormous\n\n00:59:59.412 --\u003e 01:00:04.597\npolitical pressure of the immigrants\nin German and Polish in West Germany,\n\n01:00:04.597 --\u003e 01:00:09.700\nnot to recognize that line, and\nalthough he didn't say it in these words,\n\n01:00:09.700 --\u003e 01:00:13.700\nto therefore take back those\nformer German territories.\n\n01:00:13.700 --\u003e 01:00:15.245\nI don't know.\n\n01:00:15.245 --\u003e 01:00:19.792\nI'm not one of these people who foresees\nthe development of militarism and\n\n01:00:19.792 --\u003e 01:00:21.320\nNazism in West Germany.\n\n01:00:21.320 --\u003e 01:00:25.598\nBut I don't know that German history\nhas given us any reason to be entirely\n\n01:00:25.598 --\u003e 01:00:28.710\nsanguine about the future\nof German foreign policy.\n\n01:00:29.730 --\u003e 01:00:34.198\nAnd I can well imagine an NATO in\nwhich was dominated by the Germans.\n\n01:00:34.198 --\u003e 01:00:38.620\nOr an NATO which the Germans thought they\ncould involve, might involve us all in\n\n01:00:38.620 --\u003e 01:00:42.727\nsome very serious business which we\nreally didn't wanna be involved in.","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961#t=0.0,3652.70203"}]},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7800","type":"AnnotationPage","label":{"en":["English [Transcript]"]},"items":[{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72961/transcript/7800/annotation/126","type":"Annotation","motivation":"subtitling","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"https://d9jk7wjtjpu5g.cloudfront.net/file_transcripts/associated_files/000/007/800/original/transcript_index_158316657820200302-3371-gmlf4x?1583148579","format":"text/vtt","language":"en"},"target":"https://d9jk7wjtjpu5g.cloudfront.net/file_transcripts/associated_files/000/007/800/original/transcript_index_158316657820200302-3371-gmlf4x?1583148579"}]}]},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962","type":"Canvas","label":{"en":["Media File 2 of 2 - open-uri20200302-3371-14unbsg.mpga"]},"duration":732.13388,"width":640,"height":40,"thumbnail":[{"id":"https://d9jk7wjtjpu5g.cloudfront.net/public/images/audio-default.png","type":"Image","format":"image/png"}],"items":[{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962/content/1","type":"AnnotationPage","items":[{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962/content/2/annotation/1","type":"Annotation","motivation":"painting","body":{"id":"https://aviary-p-yalemssa.s3.wasabisys.com/collection_resource_files/resource_files/000/072/962/original/open-uri20200302-3371-14unbsg.mpga?1583148585","type":"Audio","format":"audio/mpeg","duration":732.13388,"width":640,"height":40},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962","metadata":[]}]}],"annotations":[{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962/transcript/7801","type":"AnnotationPage","label":{"en":["ms_1981_s07_b0912_0002_transcript.txt [Transcript]"]},"items":[{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962/transcript/7801/annotation/1","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\u003e\u003e And I can well imagine that an NATO which was dominated by the Germans, or an NATO which the Germans thought they could involve, might involve us all in some very serious business which we really didn't want to be involved in. And then I would like to say, I would like to say one thing more.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962#t=2.0,20.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962/transcript/7801/annotation/2","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIt seems to me that the central question of any discussion on foreign policy these days should be pointed toward what can be done to achieve conditions, if anything, which would lead us in the direction of arms control in this army. And it seems to me that one of the things that, an absolute prerequisite, has got to be that some reduction of tensions between us and the Soviet Union, things which can be negotiated.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962#t=20.0,49.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962/transcript/7801/annotation/3","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nOne of these things seemed to me to be, and I would again probably say a prerequisite, some kind of an disengagement of military forces in Western Europe. And I would say that the more NATO is built up, the less possibility there is of disengagement. The less possibility of disengagement, the less possibility there is of reducing tensions.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962#t=49.0,67.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962/transcript/7801/annotation/4","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThe less possibility of reducing tensions, the less possibility of arms control. And without arms control, I foresee a very unhappy future, if indeed there would be any talk.\n\u003e\u003e I wasn't sure whether Mr. Neil was attacking NATO because it is too effective, because it is too ineffective, or because no ally will fight for NATO, or because some allies are going to be too eager to fight for NATO.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962#t=67.0,96.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962/transcript/7801/annotation/5","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nSo I'm not absolutely sure. In this very compact statement which covered a great many subjects, but I'm going to be completely responsive to every point. Now, as for the military portions of it, if Mr. Neil forgives me, he reflected orthodox 1957 doctrine. Namely, if the communists attack, it's gonna be an all-out war.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962#t=96.0,127.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962/transcript/7801/annotation/6","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAs long as it's gonna be an all-out war, why should they attack Europe? If they attack Europe, we are going to clobber them anyway. So [INAUDIBLE] forces in Europe. This is essentially the doctrine of 1957. And this is what I say and what many people feel is no longer psychologically, politically, militarily sensible.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962#t=127.0,156.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962/transcript/7801/annotation/7","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nSecondly, it is of course true that if the Soviets are so determined to win, that they're going to use every weapon at their disposal. It's very easy to demonstrate that if one side puts in forces, the other side puts in more forces, sooner or later you're going to have a general war.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962#t=156.0,175.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962/transcript/7801/annotation/8","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThen I would say the only option we have is to surrender, if we are afraid of this. No one can guarantee that the strategy which I was talking about unfailingly prevents thermonuclear war. All it does is create more stages before we have to take the decision, and it gives us an opportunity to reassess the situation.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962#t=175.0,201.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962/transcript/7801/annotation/9","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThirdly, on the question of Germany. Now, I, again don't quite follow the argument that the Germans are going to dominate NATO and they're too dangerous, but if left alone they're going to be less dangerous outside of NATO. And I think it is correct to say on the point of the Oder–Neisse line that while the Germans have said that they will not accept it politically, they have also renounced the use of force in settling this, by a solemn declaration of both their government and their parliament.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962#t=201.0,242.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962/transcript/7801/annotation/10","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nNow, on the question of arms control in Europe, I would argue very strongly that the line of reasoning which I have put before you makes it easier to have arms control. Because it makes it possible to think of inspected zones of some zones that are denuclearized than when each nation insists on having its own nuclear arsenal, its own nuclear protection.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962#t=242.0,270.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962/transcript/7801/annotation/11","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nAnd one final point, which I think we have to keep in mind, Mr. Neil said that the only hope for any arms control is disengagement. Now, why is this so? Because the Russians have said the only hope for arms control is disengagement. What this means is, that those things are negotiable which the Russians have said are negotiable.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962#t=270.0,295.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962/transcript/7801/annotation/12","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e No, [INAUDIBLE] I didn't quite say that. What I said was I didn't see any hope for arms control unless there were a reduction of tensions. And I thought it [CROSSTALK]\n\u003e\u003e And among the reduction of tensions, you said disengagement is the only hopeful method in Europe. Was one of the most hopeful methods in Europe.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962#t=295.0,313.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962/transcript/7801/annotation/13","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e Right.\n\u003e\u003e Now. This is so not necessarily because of analysis has shown this engagement to be helpful. But because the communists have kept saying this engagement is helpful. I don't know a single war in the history of warfare that has started because military units were facing each other.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962#t=313.0,336.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962/transcript/7801/annotation/14","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nYou couldn't, I don't think you could cite a war that was caused by that reason and not by a political decision to have these military units shoot at each other. Now, there may be some measures of disengagement that are helpful, but the shibboleth which has been made of disengagement, disengagement as a key to European security, will not in my judgment stand analysis.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962#t=336.0,371.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962/transcript/7801/annotation/15","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nNow, Mr. Neil said there is no military threat in Europe. Well, this is like saying let's abolish a very efficient police department because there hasn't been any crime. Obviously there can't be any criminals, so therefore let's abolish the police.\n\u003e\u003e No, I don't think [INAUDIBLE]\n\u003e\u003e Well, the fact that there has been no military aggression doesn't mean that there's no intention to bring pressure.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962#t=371.0,395.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962/transcript/7801/annotation/16","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e Not necessarily.\n\u003e\u003e And if you look at the question, for example of Berlin, I have been suffering from the perhaps misapprehension that the Soviets have reinforced their pressure very considerable with the threat of military force and have based their plan on a military superiority. And if you look at a disengaged area, Laos was a reasonably disengaged area-\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962#t=395.0,425.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962/transcript/7801/annotation/17","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e Until the Americans began to intervene in it, I think.\n\u003e\u003e Well.\n\u003e\u003e [CROSSTALK]\n\u003e\u003e Most of the tensions in the world have occurred in the places where there were no units, no American units, engaged. And I'm not sure if the situation in Europe would be happier if we repeated the conditions that led to the Korean War and to the turmoil we now see in Southeast Asia.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962#t=425.0,461.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962/transcript/7801/annotation/18","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e I think the Korean War is not an applicable analogy, and so far as Berlin is concerned, it seems to me that if there's to be anything, kind of a settlement about Berlin, it's got to be a negotiated settlement about Berlin. And it seems to me the more you build up NATO, the less chance we have for negotiating settlement.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962#t=461.0,479.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962/transcript/7801/annotation/19","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n\n\u003e\u003e It concerned me a little bit that we're thinking still in terms of a confederation type of thing where each nation would in a sense be able to veto anything that were done. This thing that is hamstringing NATO as such now, it seems to me. And if by confederation, you mean something where this decision would be made and then no dissenter could keep things from operating, then I would go along.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962#t=479.0,506.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962/transcript/7801/annotation/20","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThe other issue is that it seems to me while this is going to be an improvement, and here I would disagree with Dr. Neil, I think this would be an improvement of our position in the world struggle. It is still true that we are simply realigning the power struggle.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962#t=506.0,525.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962/transcript/7801/annotation/21","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThis is not really, in the last analysis, giving us security. It is possibly postponing the crisis, as you pointed out. But it seems to me, we need always to keep in perspective the realization that unless this agreement to control arms and prevent aggression and so on along the lines you're working in are implemented, that we are not really going to get the security we're after.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962#t=525.0,555.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962/transcript/7801/annotation/22","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nEven with a kind of federation of NATO nations.\n\u003e\u003e It is true that the initial steps of any confederation idea will retain a large measure of national sovereignty. But it seems to be more important to get started in the right direction than to fight the theological debate about great nations of sovereignty at this stage.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962#t=555.0,579.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962/transcript/7801/annotation/23","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThough I admit your basic concern. The fundamental thing that I believe the west has to achieve is what in a curious way it had achieved in the 19th and early 20th century. One speaks a lot now about the evils of colonialism, and there were many evils of colonialism.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962#t=579.0,606.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962/transcript/7801/annotation/24","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nIt is however a curious fact that many of the, particularly in the British colonies, that many of the people who studied in the west from the colonial territories adopted the principles of the west and fought their struggle for independence in the name of the principles that they had learned from the colonial countries.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962#t=606.0,634.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962/transcript/7801/annotation/25","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThey were not fighting against the international order based on the 19th century principles. They were asking for their right to join that international order as equals. Now, the basic reason is that when they looked at the west, they saw progress, dynamism, and certain values. They had a sense of movement.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962#t=634.0,657.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962/transcript/7801/annotation/26","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nWhen they look at the west today, they have a sense of a static condition at a high plateau. But nevertheless, a static condition. And for a revolutionary society, the sense of direction is more important than the state of achievement. Now, what I would like to see happen in the world is that when the younger people in the underdeveloped countries and ultimately even in Russia look outside, they have the same feeling that the 19th century young Russians had for example.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962#t=657.0,689.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962/transcript/7801/annotation/27","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\nThat they were the backward people, and that they have the sense that the west has been created and that there's something they can learn from the west. And for this reason, it is very essential that we engage in new acts of political creativity. Now, I'm sure that Mr. Neil will hit the ball right out of the ballpark while I leave, thank you very much.\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962#t=689.0,717.0"},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962/transcript/7801/annotation/28","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"\n[CROSSTALK]\n\u003e\u003e [APPLAUSE]\n\n","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962#t=717.0,732.13388"}]},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962/transcript/7802","type":"AnnotationPage","label":{"en":["ms_1981_s07_b0912_0002_caption.vtt [Transcript]"]},"items":[{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962/transcript/7802/annotation/29","type":"Annotation","motivation":"transcribing","body":{"type":"TextualBody","value":"WEBVTT\nLanguage: en\n\n00:00:02.841 --\u003e 00:00:07.030\nAnd I can well imagine that an NATO\nwhich was dominated by the Germans, or\n\n00:00:07.030 --\u003e 00:00:11.493\nan NATO which the Germans thought they\ncould involve, might involve us all in\n\n00:00:11.493 --\u003e 00:00:16.720\nsome very serious business which we\nreally didn't want to be involved in.\n\n00:00:16.720 --\u003e 00:00:20.990\nAnd then I would like to say,\nI would like to say one thing more.\n\n00:00:20.990 --\u003e 00:00:25.710\nIt seems to me that the central question\nof any discussion on foreign policy these\n\n00:00:25.710 --\u003e 00:00:33.070\ndays should be pointed toward what can be\ndone to achieve conditions, if anything,\n\n00:00:33.070 --\u003e 00:00:37.950\nwhich would lead us in the direction\nof arms control in this army.\n\n00:00:39.020 --\u003e 00:00:43.810\nAnd it seems to me that one of the things\nthat, an absolute prerequisite,\n\n00:00:43.810 --\u003e 00:00:47.508\nhas got to be that some reduction\nof tensions between us and\n\n00:00:47.508 --\u003e 00:00:49.960\nthe Soviet Union,\nthings which can be negotiated.\n\n00:00:49.960 --\u003e 00:00:52.440\nOne of these things seemed to me to be,\nand\n\n00:00:52.440 --\u003e 00:00:54.430\nI would again probably say a prerequisite,\n\n00:00:54.430 --\u003e 00:00:58.230\nsome kind of an disengagement of\nmilitary forces in Western Europe.\n\n00:00:58.230 --\u003e 00:01:00.670\nAnd I would say that\nthe more NATO is built up,\n\n00:01:00.670 --\u003e 00:01:02.800\nthe less possibility there\nis of disengagement.\n\n00:01:02.800 --\u003e 00:01:05.100\nThe less possibility of disengagement,\n\n00:01:05.100 --\u003e 00:01:07.640\nthe less possibility there\nis of reducing tensions.\n\n00:01:07.640 --\u003e 00:01:11.200\nThe less possibility of reducing tensions,\nthe less possibility of arms control.\n\n00:01:11.200 --\u003e 00:01:15.470\nAnd without arms control,\nI foresee a very unhappy future,\n\n00:01:15.470 --\u003e 00:01:18.170\nif indeed there would be any talk.\n\n00:01:18.170 --\u003e 00:01:20.463\n\u003e\u003e I wasn't sure whether Mr.\n\n00:01:20.463 --\u003e 00:01:24.950\nNeil was attacking NATO\nbecause it is too effective,\n\n00:01:24.950 --\u003e 00:01:30.333\nbecause it is too ineffective, or\nbecause no ally will fight for\n\n00:01:30.333 --\u003e 00:01:36.435\nNATO, or because some allies are going\nto be too eager to fight for NATO.\n\n00:01:36.435 --\u003e 00:01:40.919\nSo I'm not absolutely sure.\n\n00:01:40.919 --\u003e 00:01:45.407\nIn this very compact statement which\ncovered a great many subjects, but\n\n00:01:45.407 --\u003e 00:01:49.770\nI'm going to be completely\nresponsive to every point.\n\n00:01:49.770 --\u003e 00:01:54.330\nNow, as for\nthe military portions of it, if Mr.\n\n00:01:54.330 --\u003e 00:01:59.030\nNeil forgives me,\nhe reflected orthodox 1957 doctrine.\n\n00:02:01.250 --\u003e 00:02:07.184\nNamely, if the communists attack,\nit's gonna be an all-out war.\n\n00:02:07.184 --\u003e 00:02:11.540\nAs long as it's gonna be an all-out war,\nwhy should they attack Europe?\n\n00:02:11.540 --\u003e 00:02:14.930\nIf they attack Europe,\nwe are going to clobber them anyway.\n\n00:02:14.930 --\u003e 00:02:19.003\nSo [INAUDIBLE] forces in Europe.\n\n00:02:19.003 --\u003e 00:02:23.116\nThis is essentially the doctrine of 1957.\n\n00:02:23.116 --\u003e 00:02:27.919\nAnd this is what I say and\nwhat many people\n\n00:02:27.919 --\u003e 00:02:32.298\nfeel is no longer psychologically,\n\n00:02:32.298 --\u003e 00:02:36.976\npolitically, militarily sensible.\n\n00:02:36.976 --\u003e 00:02:43.110\nSecondly, it is of course true\nthat if the Soviets are so\n\n00:02:43.110 --\u003e 00:02:47.400\ndetermined to win, that they're going\nto use every weapon at their disposal.\n\n00:02:47.400 --\u003e 00:02:51.670\nIt's very easy to demonstrate that if\none side puts in forces, the other side\n\n00:02:51.670 --\u003e 00:02:54.390\nputs in more forces, sooner or\nlater you're going to have a general war.\n\n00:02:55.590 --\u003e 00:03:00.090\nThen I would say the only option we have\nis to surrender, if we are afraid of this.\n\n00:03:01.390 --\u003e 00:03:06.574\nNo one can guarantee that\nthe strategy which I was talking\n\n00:03:06.574 --\u003e 00:03:11.116\nabout unfailingly prevents\nthermonuclear war.\n\n00:03:11.116 --\u003e 00:03:15.788\nAll it does is create more stages before\nwe have to take the decision, and\n\n00:03:15.788 --\u003e 00:03:19.320\nit gives us an opportunity\nto reassess the situation.\n\n00:03:21.520 --\u003e 00:03:24.390\nThirdly, on the question of Germany.\n\n00:03:24.390 --\u003e 00:03:29.513\nNow, I, again don't quite follow\nthe argument that the Germans\n\n00:03:29.513 --\u003e 00:03:34.171\nare going to dominate NATO and\nthey're too dangerous, but\n\n00:03:34.171 --\u003e 00:03:39.406\nif left alone they're going to be\nless dangerous outside of NATO.\n\n00:03:39.406 --\u003e 00:03:44.524\nAnd I think it is correct to say\non the point of the Oder–Neisse\n\n00:03:44.524 --\u003e 00:03:51.121\nline that while the Germans have said\nthat they will not accept it politically,\n\n00:03:51.121 --\u003e 00:03:56.044\nthey have also renounced the use\nof force in settling this,\n\n00:03:56.044 --\u003e 00:04:02.080\nby a solemn declaration of both their\ngovernment and their parliament.\n\n00:04:02.080 --\u003e 00:04:04.272\nNow, on the question of\narms control in Europe,\n\n00:04:04.272 --\u003e 00:04:10.020\nI would argue very strongly that\nthe line of reasoning which\n\n00:04:10.020 --\u003e 00:04:15.750\nI have put before you makes it\neasier to have arms control.\n\n00:04:15.750 --\u003e 00:04:20.826\nBecause it makes it possible to\nthink of inspected zones of some\n\n00:04:20.826 --\u003e 00:04:25.808\nzones that are denuclearized\nthan when each nation insists on\n\n00:04:25.808 --\u003e 00:04:30.911\nhaving its own nuclear arsenal,\nits own nuclear protection.\n\n00:04:30.911 --\u003e 00:04:36.393\nAnd one final point,\nwhich I think we have to keep in mind, Mr.\n\n00:04:36.393 --\u003e 00:04:43.010\nNeil said that the only hope for\nany arms control is disengagement.\n\n00:04:43.010 --\u003e 00:04:44.370\nNow, why is this so?\n\n00:04:44.370 --\u003e 00:04:48.880\nBecause the Russians have said the only\nhope for arms control is disengagement.\n\n00:04:48.880 --\u003e 00:04:50.192\nWhat this means is,\n\n00:04:50.192 --\u003e 00:04:55.372\nthat those things are negotiable which\nthe Russians have said are negotiable.\n\n00:04:55.372 --\u003e 00:04:57.120\n\u003e\u003e No,\n[INAUDIBLE] I didn't quite say that.\n\n00:04:57.120 --\u003e 00:04:58.960\nWhat I said was I didn't see any hope for\n\n00:04:58.960 --\u003e 00:05:02.300\narms control unless there\nwere a reduction of tensions.\n\n00:05:02.300 --\u003e 00:05:06.939\nAnd I thought it [CROSSTALK]\n\u003e\u003e And among the reduction of tensions,\n\n00:05:06.939 --\u003e 00:05:11.190\nyou said disengagement is the only\nhopeful method in Europe.\n\n00:05:11.190 --\u003e 00:05:13.170\nWas one of the most\nhopeful methods in Europe.\n\n00:05:13.170 --\u003e 00:05:14.184\n\u003e\u003e Right.\n\u003e\u003e Now.\n\n00:05:17.659 --\u003e 00:05:18.260\nThis is so\n\n00:05:18.260 --\u003e 00:05:23.520\nnot necessarily because of analysis has\nshown this engagement to be helpful.\n\n00:05:23.520 --\u003e 00:05:28.680\nBut because the communists have kept\nsaying this engagement is helpful.\n\n00:05:28.680 --\u003e 00:05:32.420\nI don't know a single war\nin the history of warfare\n\n00:05:32.420 --\u003e 00:05:36.880\nthat has started because military\nunits were facing each other.\n\n00:05:36.880 --\u003e 00:05:42.400\nYou couldn't, I don't think you could cite\na war that was caused by that reason and\n\n00:05:42.400 --\u003e 00:05:46.140\nnot by a political decision to have these\nmilitary units shoot at each other.\n\n00:05:48.340 --\u003e 00:05:55.707\nNow, there may be some measures of\ndisengagement that are helpful,\n\n00:05:55.707 --\u003e 00:06:01.931\nbut the shibboleth which has\nbeen made of disengagement,\n\n00:06:01.931 --\u003e 00:06:06.885\ndisengagement as a key\nto European security,\n\n00:06:06.885 --\u003e 00:06:11.216\nwill not in my judgment stand analysis.\n\n00:06:11.216 --\u003e 00:06:17.120\nNow, Mr. Neil said there is\nno military threat in Europe.\n\n00:06:17.120 --\u003e 00:06:22.290\nWell, this is like saying let's abolish\na very efficient police department\n\n00:06:22.290 --\u003e 00:06:23.710\nbecause there hasn't been any crime.\n\n00:06:23.710 --\u003e 00:06:27.577\nObviously there can't be any criminals,\nso therefore let's abolish the police.\n\n00:06:27.577 --\u003e 00:06:31.528\n\u003e\u003e No, I don't think [INAUDIBLE]\n\u003e\u003e Well, the fact that there has been no\n\n00:06:31.528 --\u003e 00:06:35.900\nmilitary aggression doesn't mean that\nthere's no intention to bring pressure.\n\n00:06:35.900 --\u003e 00:06:38.759\n\u003e\u003e Not necessarily.\n\n00:06:38.759 --\u003e 00:06:43.480\n\u003e\u003e And if you look at the question,\nfor example of Berlin,\n\n00:06:43.480 --\u003e 00:06:48.201\nI have been suffering from\nthe perhaps misapprehension\n\n00:06:48.201 --\u003e 00:06:52.722\nthat the Soviets have\nreinforced their pressure very\n\n00:06:52.722 --\u003e 00:06:57.042\nconsiderable with the threat\nof military force and\n\n00:06:57.042 --\u003e 00:07:01.272\nhave based their plan on\na military superiority.\n\n00:07:01.272 --\u003e 00:07:03.394\nAnd if you look at a disengaged area,\n\n00:07:03.394 --\u003e 00:07:07.830\nLaos was a reasonably disengaged area-\n\u003e\u003e Until the Americans began to intervene\n\n00:07:07.830 --\u003e 00:07:08.727\nin it, I think.\n\n00:07:08.727 --\u003e 00:07:09.716\n\u003e\u003e Well.\n\n00:07:09.716 --\u003e 00:07:15.373\n\u003e\u003e [CROSSTALK]\n\n00:07:15.373 --\u003e 00:07:19.177\n\u003e\u003e Most of the tensions in the world have\n\n00:07:19.177 --\u003e 00:07:24.332\noccurred in the places\nwhere there were no units,\n\n00:07:24.332 --\u003e 00:07:27.536\nno American units, engaged.\n\n00:07:27.536 --\u003e 00:07:32.800\nAnd I'm not sure if the situation\nin Europe would be happier\n\n00:07:32.800 --\u003e 00:07:37.960\nif we repeated the conditions\nthat led to the Korean War and\n\n00:07:37.960 --\u003e 00:07:41.871\nto the turmoil we now\nsee in Southeast Asia.\n\n00:07:41.871 --\u003e 00:07:44.771\n\u003e\u003e I think the Korean War is\nnot an applicable analogy, and\n\n00:07:44.771 --\u003e 00:07:49.150\nso far as Berlin is concerned, it seems to\nme that if there's to be anything, kind of\n\n00:07:49.150 --\u003e 00:07:53.499\na settlement about Berlin, it's got to\nbe a negotiated settlement about Berlin.\n\n00:07:53.499 --\u003e 00:07:57.006\nAnd it seems to me the more you build\nup NATO, the less chance we have for\n\n00:07:57.006 --\u003e 00:07:59.300\nnegotiating settlement.\n\n00:07:59.300 --\u003e 00:08:04.350\n\u003e\u003e It concerned me a little bit that we're\nthinking still in terms of a confederation\n\n00:08:04.350 --\u003e 00:08:07.710\ntype of thing where each\nnation would in a sense\n\n00:08:07.710 --\u003e 00:08:10.140\nbe able to veto anything that were done.\n\n00:08:10.140 --\u003e 00:08:15.320\nThis thing that is hamstringing\nNATO as such now, it seems to me.\n\n00:08:15.320 --\u003e 00:08:17.125\nAnd if by confederation,\n\n00:08:17.125 --\u003e 00:08:20.980\nyou mean something where this\ndecision would be made and\n\n00:08:20.980 --\u003e 00:08:26.241\nthen no dissenter could keep things\nfrom operating, then I would go along.\n\n00:08:26.241 --\u003e 00:08:31.878\nThe other issue is that it seems to me\nwhile this is going to be an improvement,\n\n00:08:31.878 --\u003e 00:08:34.914\nand here I would disagree with Dr. Neil,\n\n00:08:34.914 --\u003e 00:08:40.409\nI think this would be an improvement\nof our position in the world struggle.\n\n00:08:40.409 --\u003e 00:08:45.708\nIt is still true that we are simply\nrealigning the power struggle.\n\n00:08:45.708 --\u003e 00:08:50.470\nThis is not really, in the last analysis,\ngiving us security.\n\n00:08:50.470 --\u003e 00:08:54.391\nIt is possibly postponing the crisis,\nas you pointed out.\n\n00:08:54.391 --\u003e 00:08:59.957\nBut it seems to me, we need always to\nkeep in perspective the realization\n\n00:08:59.957 --\u003e 00:09:05.343\nthat unless this agreement to control\narms and prevent aggression and\n\n00:09:05.343 --\u003e 00:09:09.814\nso on along the lines you're\nworking in are implemented,\n\n00:09:09.814 --\u003e 00:09:15.010\nthat we are not really going to\nget the security we're after.\n\n00:09:15.010 --\u003e 00:09:19.700\nEven with a kind of\nfederation of NATO nations.\n\n00:09:19.700 --\u003e 00:09:23.960\n\u003e\u003e It is true that the initial\nsteps of any confederation\n\n00:09:23.960 --\u003e 00:09:27.620\nidea will retain a large measure\nof national sovereignty.\n\n00:09:27.620 --\u003e 00:09:33.037\nBut it seems to be more important to get\nstarted in the right direction than to\n\n00:09:33.037 --\u003e 00:09:39.170\nfight the theological debate about great\nnations of sovereignty at this stage.\n\n00:09:39.170 --\u003e 00:09:46.714\nThough I admit your basic concern.\n\n00:09:46.714 --\u003e 00:09:52.219\nThe fundamental thing that I\nbelieve the west has to achieve\n\n00:09:52.219 --\u003e 00:09:59.500\nis what in a curious way it had achieved\nin the 19th and early 20th century.\n\n00:10:00.670 --\u003e 00:10:03.991\nOne speaks a lot now about\nthe evils of colonialism,\n\n00:10:03.991 --\u003e 00:10:06.720\nand there were many evils of colonialism.\n\n00:10:06.720 --\u003e 00:10:13.964\nIt is however a curious fact that many of\nthe, particularly in the British colonies,\n\n00:10:13.964 --\u003e 00:10:19.296\nthat many of the people who studied\nin the west from the colonial\n\n00:10:19.296 --\u003e 00:10:23.625\nterritories adopted\nthe principles of the west and\n\n00:10:23.625 --\u003e 00:10:28.153\nfought their struggle for\nindependence in the name of\n\n00:10:28.153 --\u003e 00:10:34.650\nthe principles that they had learned\nfrom the colonial countries.\n\n00:10:34.650 --\u003e 00:10:37.550\nThey were not fighting against\n\n00:10:37.550 --\u003e 00:10:41.540\nthe international order based\non the 19th century principles.\n\n00:10:41.540 --\u003e 00:10:46.580\nThey were asking for their right to\njoin that international order as equals.\n\n00:10:46.580 --\u003e 00:10:51.414\nNow, the basic reason is that\nwhen they looked at the west,\n\n00:10:51.414 --\u003e 00:10:55.778\nthey saw progress, dynamism,\nand certain values.\n\n00:10:55.778 --\u003e 00:10:57.900\nThey had a sense of movement.\n\n00:10:57.900 --\u003e 00:11:00.850\nWhen they look at the west today,\n\n00:11:00.850 --\u003e 00:11:06.340\nthey have a sense of a static\ncondition at a high plateau.\n\n00:11:06.340 --\u003e 00:11:08.780\nBut nevertheless, a static condition.\n\n00:11:08.780 --\u003e 00:11:11.040\nAnd for a revolutionary society,\n\n00:11:11.040 --\u003e 00:11:16.050\nthe sense of direction is more important\nthan the state of achievement.\n\n00:11:16.050 --\u003e 00:11:20.610\nNow, what I would like to see happen in\nthe world is that when the younger people\n\n00:11:20.610 --\u003e 00:11:24.680\nin the underdeveloped countries and\nultimately even in Russia look outside,\n\n00:11:24.680 --\u003e 00:11:29.430\nthey have the same feeling that the 19th\ncentury young Russians had for example.\n\n00:11:29.430 --\u003e 00:11:34.602\nThat they were the backward people, and\nthat they have the sense that the west\n\n00:11:34.602 --\u003e 00:11:40.320\nhas been created and that there's\nsomething they can learn from the west.\n\n00:11:40.320 --\u003e 00:11:45.540\nAnd for this reason,\nit is very essential that we engage in new\n\n00:11:45.540 --\u003e 00:11:49.425\nacts of political creativity.\n\n00:11:49.425 --\u003e 00:11:53.563\nNow, I'm sure that Mr.\nNeil will hit the ball right out of\n\n00:11:53.563 --\u003e 00:11:57.123\nthe ballpark while I leave,\nthank you very much.\n\n00:11:57.123 --\u003e 00:12:02.191\n[CROSSTALK]\n\u003e\u003e [APPLAUSE]","format":"text/plain"},"target":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962#t=0.0,732.13388"}]},{"id":"https://yalemssa.aviaryplatform.com/collections/56/collection_resources/17507/file/72962/transcript/7802","type":"AnnotationPage","label":{"en":["English 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